Work of Ferté

The work of Ferté , located on the Sector strengthened of Montmédy, is one of the works of the Ligne Maginot. It is known to have been the only work of the line to being fallen in combat during the Second world war. The integrality of its garrison - three officers, fifteen warrant officers and quatre-vingt-neuf troops - was destroyed during the night from May 18th to 19th 1940. Located on the territory of the communes of Villy and Ferté, the work, frame at the top of a hill (coast 215) having for name “the Cross of Villy”, is sometimes called - wrongly - “work of Villy-La-Ferté”. In addition to Villy, the head of bridge of Montmédy counted four works: Chênois (compound of six blocks), Thonnelle (four blocks) and Velosnes (five blocks).

Construction

The head of bridge of Montmédy, part best organized strengthened Sector of Montmédy, represented an extension of the Ligne Maginot towards the west, the remainder of the sector being formed of fortifications of countryside. It belonged to the “New Faces” of the Ligne Maginot built between 1935 and 1938 to face the desistance from Belgium in the defense system - in light: its passage to neutrality.

The construction of the work, which began during the summer 1935, results first of all from the construction of two autonomous casemates of infantry: that of Ferté-North and that of the Ferté-South. A surplus of credit made it possible to connect the two casemates by a two hundred and seventy meters length underground gallery to an average depth of twenty-four meters. Some buildings were added there: a mixed kitchen - coal-fired and with the fuel - with room laundry also being used as deposit of vivres, an infirmary of four beds, a room being used as secondary telephone center and a room for the ammunition of the turret with a hoist not having never received its engine. The casemates were then renamed “Small work of Ferté”.

During the completion of the construction of the work, it was decided to supplement the device by two casemates independent for parts of seventy-five millimetres. But no brought closer defense not having been envisaged against the infantry, these two casemates had the role of withdrawing their last drawn shell once…

Ferté is not a work of the Ligne Maginot with the clean direction of the term. Indeed, it comprises neither barracks nor underground electric factory. Its defense is directed towards the front one, in direction of the valley of the Chiers. Its vision and its possibilities of fire backwards are particularly limited because the bells of the two blocks are directed towards the front one. With hundred meters behind of block 2 the road of is Ferté crossing the hill in a major trench; but the mortars of fifty being able to be fixed on the kneecaps of bells GFM and the crenels FM were never delivered. It moreover had not been envisaged of turret nor of crenels for mortar of eighty one. The defense of the accesses of the work thus depended entirely on the troops of interval. The geography of the ground could let predict the approach of the enemy troops until the network of barbed wires located at seventy meters.

It should be known that in the preliminary draft, a mixed work was to be built with Are worth-the-Mouzon, between Carignan and Mouzon, thus covering the backs of the work of Ferté. For budgetary reasons, this one was given up, leaving the care of the defense of the accesses by Troops of intervals. The “small work of Ferté” became, thus, the last work of the northern end of the Ligne Maginot.

From the winter 1939, the village of Villy became a solid not support for the work and was seen equipped with a dismountable turret for machine-gun. Two light casemates were built along the road leading to the work and twelve cellars of houses were transformed into blockhouse and were connected by an underground grid. The whole supplemented by an iron wire network which surrounded all the village.

Description

The work of Ferté accommodates a hundred and four troops of the 155e Régiment of infantry of fortress) and three officers, his commander being lieutenant Bourguignon.

The block 1, which was used as main entrance, is made up with the upper floor of an entry with footbridge and grid and, inside, of a crenel of shooting FM; this entry was protected by a Fossé diamond itself protected by a crenel from shooting FM and a Goulotte launches grenade.

The room of shooting itself was protected by a ditch diamond itself protected by a crenel from shooting FM and a chute lance-grenade; it contained a crenel JM/AC47 (Jumellage of machine-guns which can leave room to a anti-tank gun of 47 mm) and a crenel JM (Jumellage of machine-guns). In addition to the room of shooting: a water tank, a room of rest of four beds and the telephone center.

Outside: a projector de 350 in shelter with armor-plated door.

On the tops: two bells GFM (Guet-Rifle-Machine gunner) and two bells AM (Weapons anti-tank mixed-gun of 25 and Reibel machine-gun).

On the lower floor: a room of rest of fourteen beds, the powerplant (factory), the Room of the filters or Room of neutralization, the room of lieutenant Bourguignon, a PC information and the staircase serving the two stages and the gallery.

Block 2 as for him consists of: with the upper floor:

a secondary entry provided with the same device as the entry of Block 1 and on the broad frontage, was laid out the antenna radio
3 rooms of rest for a total of 30 beds
the room radio operator
the telephone room
a driving staircase on the lower floor

on the tops:

1 Turret AM (Weapons mixed-gun of 25 anti-tank device and twinning of Reibel machine-guns)
1 Bell GFM (Guet-Rifle-Machine gunner)
1 Bell VDP (seen direct and periscopic), the only one of the TPM
1 Bell AM (Weapons mixed)

on the lower floor:

the factory
the room of the filters

Actual position

Block 1

a crenel is inserted by an explosive load posed on the Cloche GFM western.
a crenel is inserted by loads and shootings on the Cloche GFM is.
a crenel is inserted by a load posed on the bell western AM. The interior of the bell is destroyed and of the traces of explosions are present on the walls and the ripe ones. The ripe contiguous one to the room of shooting is reversed.
the trumelage of the northern bell AM is still places from there, but damaged. The interior of the bell is destroyed.
the room of shooting is intact.
the corridors and the ceilings of the upper floor are blackened. The door-hoppers have summers puffed up by the internal explosions. The tight armor-plated door was torn off by an explosion, undoubtedly when the Germans penetrated in the work.
the engines and the gas purifiers of the lower stage are intact.
On the tops of the block, one thus notes many funnels the aspect is chaotic.

Block 2

Two crenels are inserted on the Cloche GFM. One also notes some impacts of 88 Misters the interior of the bell is destroyed, the platform crumbled. There are traces of explosions on the ripe ones and the ground. The ripe one between the Bell GFM and the room of rest is ploughed up.
In the room of rest, planned for 20 men, the frames of the beds are twisted, particularly towards the access to bell GFM.
the northern crenel of the bell AM is inserted by a load posed. The wall of the bell is exposed by the artillery shootings. The interior of the bell is damaged and the ripe one between the bell AM and the room of rest is ploughed up. The other ripe ones are blackened.
the drains of the air intakes have summers damaged by the explosions with the foot of the Cloche GFM.
the body of the turret AM was torn off and rests across its puit. A crenel is inserted. On the wall of the turret one notes the important traces of the explosive load whose form and matter were printed in metal. In the room shooting to lie the remainder of the trumelage torn off by a load posed.
the tops of block 2 are chaotic and many funnels are noted.

The tragic destiny

To start, an extract of the report/ratio of Pierre Taittinger (rapporteur of the Commission of National defense) with the House of Commons, following the visit paid on the ground at the beginning of March 1940:

" … The defensive organization in the Area of Montmédy appears frightening. There are Works of old construction (1935) doubled by Works of recent clothes industry, true prolongation of the Maginot Line of the " type; Lorraine".

But the satisfactory impression ceases on arrival with Sedan.

In this Area, one counts much more on the forest of the Ardennes and the Meuse to protect Sedan, perhaps giving to these natural obstacles an exaggerated importance.

The defensive organizations are in this sector rudimentary, not to say embryonic. On the road coming from Bubble, of Belgium, in Sedan, as on the other access points, defense consists of " house fortes" whose resistance would be only of short duration. The iron wire networks which were placed, the destruction considered and the resistance of the strong houses, cannot get a downtime higher than one hour. This amount of time would be just sufficient to give alarm in the event of unexpected attack… Our enemies, avoiding the solid point of Montmédy, could leave " couler" in direction of Sedan, not particularly weak of our defensive system…

The troops appointed with the defense of this sector have moral raised, the riders of the G.R.D.I. (group of recognition of division of infantry) are well ordered, but it is felt that these elements are intended to be sacrificed on the spot, and that true resistance will take place in on this side Meuse.

This intention of the Command can be extremely well defended but still would be necessary it that the Works of the line of resistance are finished, provided with their armament and in a position to fulfill the role which is assigned to them.

In some of these Works, only the formwork is finished and the concrete is not even run. In others, it misses the crenels, doors of iron, the anti-gas material, part of the armament.

One trembles retrospectively by considering what in this sector… " would have been a German attack;

These observations (sadly divinatoires) were rejected by the General HUNTZIGER and on their side, German, by the air recognitions knew the situation of weakness of the strengthened sector and decided to attack each side of Sedan, causing, thus the premises of the tragic destiny of the Work of ferté.

The opening of Sedan

May 10th, 1940, in the morning, the Germans attack Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. As envisaged (Plan Dyle) the French troops makes a vast movement of pivot towards the East, to stop the enemy in Belgium and the division of Light cavalry crosses the border to operate its mission of stop. Alas nothing could stop the Panzerdivisionen and, at the evening of May 10th, the zone located between Sedan and Carignan were directly under the enemy threat.

May 11th, the Cavalry was folded up, the line of the strong houses was given up and all the bridges of the zone were destroyed.

May 13rd, the zone of Donchery until Bazeille was the target of terrible bombardments of aviation enemy in particular of the " Stukas" who reached moral our troops and caused a deep disorganization. Elements of the enemy infantry crossed the Meuse; The fortified position had held only a few hours and on May 13rd, at the evening, it was bored graft Wadelincourt and Bellevue. Panic emparat of our bodies of troops, which gave up their pieces of artillery.

May 14th, the troops occupying the sectors of Chiers and the Meuse ressurent the order to evacuate the blockhouses and their intervals, thus giving up a very large quantity of armament and material. This unhooking directly caused the insulation of the work of Ferté by depriving it of troops of intervals and artillery moreover placing it at a peak for the continuation of the events.

It should be noted, considering the short aspect of this summary, that the French troops very courageously fought. In particular in the sector of Inor called " the hell vert" by the Germans.

Anguish of the work of Ferté

May 15th, the Germans wanted to widen the breach of the opening of Sedan by South-east, in direction of the work.

For that, the abandoned zone " on ordre" the day before by the French troops allowed an unhoped-for starting point made up of comfortable shelters for the German troops.

This day was punctuated various German attacks in direction of Villy and Coast 226. The defense offered by: 3 guns of 25 anti-tank device, 12 machine-guns, 16 F.M. and mortar of 60 of Villy; the gun of 75 of the Casemate of Villy-West (shooting of 800 shells) and the machine-guns of the turret of Block 2 appeared effective, but the Germans awaited reinforcements and especially the contribution of heavy artillery to pass to the true attack. The first bombardments took place on the zone.

May 16th, the installation of the German reinforcements took place during the night from May 15th to 16th. Installation of the German plan of attack which envisaged the catch of coast 226, coast 331 and the village of Villy. Of these fulcrums the attack of the work of Ferté became possible since they directly gave access to the sides of the two blocks so badly defended and with the dead angle by which could slip of the elements of the Genius…

From midday battle artillery enters the two camps. In the new afternoon coast 226 attacks and, in spite of a heroic resistance of the French troops, this strategic point fell under the cut from the German troops. These same German troops again underwent a failure in front of Villy, again proving the effectiveness of the defense system, alas insulated. The only achieved objective, for the German troops, was thus coast 226 at the evening of May 16th.

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