The war of Winter ( talvisota in Finnish, vinterkriget in Swedish, Russian Зимняявойна in ), also known under the name of soviéto-Finnish War or Russo-Finnish War , burst with the invasion of the Finland by the Soviet Union, on November 30th, 1939, three months after the beginning of the Second world war. This attack being considered to be completely illegal, the USSR was then excluded from the Société of the Nations the December 14th. The Soviet chief Joseph Stalin hoped to take the control of the totality of the country before the end of the year, but the keen resistance of the Finns made impotent the forces of the Red Army which however fought to 4 against 1. Finland held until the treated of Moscow of March 12th, 1940 which, after heavy human losses, saw it dispossessed of 10  % of its territory and 20  % of its industrial potential.

The results of the war were mitigated. Although the Red Army finally managed to bore the Finnish lines of defense, neither the USSR nor Finland left there unscathed. The Soviet losses with the face were important, and the international repute of the country suffered from it. Worse still, combative qualities of the Red Army were questioned, makes that some hold like having contributed to the decision of Hitler of launching the Opération Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviets did not achieve their initial goal to conquer all Finland, but obtained territories around the lake Ladoga. The Finns preserved as for them them sovereignty and gained in recognition with the international scales.

The treaty which intervened the March 12th crossed short to the Franco-English preparations aiming to the sending of a force of support for Finland via the north of the Scandinavian Péninsule (at the time of the allied countryside in Norway the purpose of which was to cut the Germans of the road of Swedish iron. The invasion by Germany of the Denmark and the Norway on April 9th, 1940 (Operation Weserübung) diverted thereafter the world attention towards the battle for the possession of Norway.

The War of Winter is regarded by certain as a military disaster for the Soviet Union, like like a tangible proof of the weakness inherent in the communist system . Nevertheless, Stalin realized after this fiasco that a political control thorough on the army was unrealizable. After the war of Winter, the the Kremlin initiated a movement aiming reinstalling with the orders of the Red Army with the officers aguerris and at modernizing its forces, decision judicious which makes it possible to the Soviets to resist the German attack. One can however notice on this subject that the Wehrmacht was not, it either, ready for an offensive under winter conditions as in 1941.

Elements of context

Finland for a long time formed part of the Royaume of Sweden when it was conquered by the imperial Russia in 1809. It became then a autonomous Buffer state protecting the Russian capital Saint-Pétersbourg. After the Revolution of October which brought the Communists to the capacity of Russia, the Grand-duché of Finland declared independent on December 6th, 1917. Strong bonds were woven between Finland and the German Empire when this one supported the Finnish clandestine separatist movement during the First World War. During the Finnish Civil war which followed, the Finnish hunters trained by the Germans and the German regular troops played a crucial role. Only the defeat of Germany at the end of the First World War prevented the establishment of a vassal monarchy of Germany in Finland, with Frederic Charles de Hesse as king de Finlande. After the war, the links finno-German remained close, without the Nazi regime inspiring a great sympathy in Finland.

The relations between the Soviet Union and Finland were tended - the two periods of Russianization forced to the turning of the century, and the relents of the socialist rising missed at the time of the civil war contributing to a strong mutual mistrust. Stalin feared that the Nazi Germany does not attack it and, the border finno-Soviet being located at 32 kilometers only Leningrad, Finland could constitute a perfect home base for an attack by the Germans. In 1932, the Soviet Union signs a non-aggression pact with Finland. The agreement was confirmed in 1934 for ten years. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union violated the treaty of Tartu at the time of the Blocus of the Finnish trading vessels between the Lac Ladoga and the Golfe of Finland in 1937.

In April 1938 or perhaps even earlier, the Soviet Union initiated diplomatic negotiations with Finland to try to improve their mutual defense against Germany. The Soviets asserted mainly their fear of a German attack against Leningrad using Finland like head of bridge, and asked for that the transfer of broad territories. More than one year passed without the situation developing, whereas Europe went unrelentingly towards the war.

The Third Reich and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, the Pacte Molotov-Ribbentrop, on August 23rd, 1939. The pact also included/understood a secret clause aiming at distributing the countries of Eastern Europe between the two powers. Finland failed in the Soviet “area of influence”. It followed the attacks of Poland by the Nazi Germany the next on September 1st, which was followed by the invasion by the Soviet Union of the east of the country. In a few weeks, the division of Poland between the two powers was consumed.

Of the autumn 1939, the operations finished in Poland, the USSR required that Finland grant that the border was moved back of 25 kilometers additional in order to move away from it a little more Leningrad. There she also asked that Finland rented to him the peninsula of Hanko during 30 years, in order to be able to establish a Soviet naval base. In exchange, the Soviet Russia conceded to him most of the Karelia (“two mud books against a visitors' book”). The Finnish president Urho Kekkonen stated on this subject in September 1963 that Now, more than 20 years after, if we put ourselves in the position of the Soviet Union, then by considering the German attack in 1941, then the considerations which had, and that the Soviets as for their safety at the end of the years 1930 were to have, become comprehensible .

The Finnish government refused the Soviet request. The November 26th, the Soviets reflect in scene the Bombardement of Mainila, incident during which the Soviet artillery bombarded the surroundings of the Russian village of Mainila, near of the border. The authorities showed Finnish artillery to have attacked and have killed a Soviet garrison. The USSR then required official excuses of the Finns and approached its troops with some 20 kilometers of the border. The Finns denied any responsibility in the business and refused to yield with the Russian requirements. The business of Mainila is not without pointing out the tackles radio station of Gleiwitz that Germany used to attack Poland.

Unfolding

The Soviet Union seizes itself of this pretext to circumvent the non-aggression pact and the November 30th, the Soviets attacked with 23 divisions, adding up: 450000 men. They quickly reached the principal Finnish line of defense, the Ligne Mannerheim, by crossing the isthmus of Karelia, while a flotilla bombarded Helsinki.

A Puppet government was installed in the Finnish frontier city of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) on December 1st, 1939, called “government of the Democratic republic Finnish”, and directed by Otto Wille Kuusinen so much for the diplomatic aspects (the “country” was immediately recognized by the Soviet Union) that military aspects (thus hoping to encourage the Socialists of the Finnish army to desert). This republic was not a great success, but lasted until the March 12th 1940, and was then integrated into the Soviet socialist République of Karelia-Finland).

At the beginning of the conflict, Finland had an army whose mobilizable manpower only reached: 180000 men, but these troops were transformed into a wild adversary, employing the technique of surrounding known as “Motti”, achieved by small groups of very fast skiers in behavior of Camouflage white and making use of their knowledge of the ground. A certain type of bomb flamer, inspired by those used at the time of the Spanish Civil war was used with much success, and became famous under the name of Kingpin.

The conditions of winter 1939-1940 were terrible: temperatures lower than -40°C were current, and the Finns were able to use the Hiver with their advantage. Often, they preferred to attack their enemies under unusual conditions of combat, in particular by aiming at the travelling kitchens and choosing the gatherings of tight Russian soldiers around a campfire the forest, the cold and the long nights of winter served the cause of the Finnish soldiers, for the majority peasants or loggers.

Moreover, with the great surprise so much of the Soviets than of the Finns, the majority of the Communists in the Finnish army did not desert, fighting on the contrary at the sides of their compatriots against a common enemy of which they disapproved the initiative. Indeed, of many Finnish Communists had emigrated in the USSR after the revolution missed to take part in the construction of the “socialist ideal”, but much perished at the time of the Grandes purgings orchestrated by Stalin. That led to great disillusions in the rows of the socialist Finnish which came from there to hate the Stalinist mode.

Another factor, the large projections achieved by the Finnish company after the civil war allowed that the laws of the Republic of Finland evolve/move in order to reduce the ditch which separated different the classes from the Finnish company. This cure partial of the wounds of the civil war of 1918, as well as Finnish linguistic particularism, are always indicated like the “spirit of the War of Winter”, although it also should be noted that many Finnish Communists were not authorized to fight in the army of conscript Finnish because of their political affiliation.

The arrogance and the incompetence of the Soviets also had their importance. The attackers did not expect such a resistance and had even launched the invasion to the sound of the military orchestras in anticipation of the rapid victory. Testimonys brought back above the table of Soviet soldiers advancing arm, arm below, towards the Finnish lines, uniting their voices with the Soviet anthems of the orchestras. But because of the Stalinist purgings, the Soviet command lost 80  % of its manpower in times of peace. The substitutes were generally less qualified but more “honest” towards the mode and their superiors, especially since Stalin had made to chapeauter the high commanders by political police chiefs. Certain tactics employed were already obsolete at the time of the first world war, and applied directly “starting from the books” by the officers, since any personal initiative which would have led to a failure made incur the risk to see itself carried out. Many Soviet losses are thus ascribable with their commanders refusing to beat a retreat or being seen refusing the authorization to do it.

The Soviet army was also badly prepared for a war under conditions of intense cold, like in the forest zones. The vehicles used were decayed and unable to resist cold. Their engines froze quickly, and it was necessary to make turn the engine of the vehicles 24 hours a day to be able to hope to use them at the convenient period. That did not go without breakdowns of gasolines or break-ins driving. One of the greatest defeat in the history of the Red Army took place at the time of the combat of the road of during. The 44e Soviet division of infantry (either approximately: 25000 men) was almost completely destroyed after being itself committed on a forest road where it fell right into an ambush set-up by the Finnish unit “Osasto Kontula” (300 men). This small unit blocked the projection of Soviet division, when Finnish colonel Siilasvuo and his 9th division (that is to say 6000 men) cut the retirement to the Soviets, dividing the enemy force into small groups which were destroyed one by one. The Soviet losses rose with: 23000 men, against 800 among Finns. Moreover, those captured 43 tanks, 71 guns of infantry or anti-aircraft, 29 anti-tank guns, of the armor-plated vehicles of patrol, of the tractors, 260 trucks, 1170 horses, of the weapons of infantry, the ammunition, the medical device and transmission.

The Soviets did not manage to benefit from their numerical superiority at the beginning of the war. Finland massed indeed: 130000 men and 500 guns in the isthmus of Karelia, principal theater of operation of the conflict; in same time, the Soviets attacked with only: 200000 men, 900 guns and 1000 tanks which were wasted and underwent colossal losses.

The shortage of material on the Finnish side is worth the sorrow to be considered. At the beginning of the conflict, only the soldiers having received a basic drive had weapons and uniforms. The others were to manage with their own clothing to which a pretense of badge was added. These odd “uniforms” were called “uniform Cajander” according to the name of the Prime Minister Aimo Cajander. The Finns reduced these problems of shortage by making an intense use of the equipment, weapons and ammunition taken with the enemy. By chance, the Army had not changed standard gauge of its weapons since independence, and the Soviet ammunition could be immediately re-used. By sending soldiers badly trained and badly directed, the Soviets provided the occasion to the Finns to constitute an important arsenal of catches at the beginning of the conflict, which facilitated the later catches.

Two other points deserve to be mentioned. Because of the ethnic prejudices of Stalin, the majority of the troops of the Red Army came, at the time of the War of Winter, of the South of the Soviet Union, Stalin fearing that troops raised in the areas bordering with Finland refused to fight against the Finns. These soldiers coming from remote regions did not have any experience of the Arctic winter and were unable to survive in forest, without speaking even about aptitudes for the combat in this environment. In addition, the Finns carried only their own behavior of winter, and had passed their life in this environment, a large majority of Finland being rural. Moreover, the winter was this year one of worst than Finland ever knew.

The air war during the War of Winter saw Finland inventing the flight in formation “finger furnace” (four planes, two in top, two bellow, two pairs separating in situation from combat, a pair going mutual assistance without dealing with the two other apparatuses). This method was not only quite higher than the Soviet tactic of the patrol of three flying equipments in delta, but was adopted by the majority of the belligerents of the second world war and is useful still today. This technique of hunting and the will of in découdre of the Finnish pilots, whatever were the chances of success, contributed to prevent the Soviet bombers from inflicting the damage hoped with the Finnish positions, the cities and the populations.

Foreign interventions

The Finnish cause was embraced mainly in the world public opinion. The Second War did not have its “world” dimension yet: since the invasion of Poland by Germany and the USSR, only Finland still held head with the Hitler-Stalin pact signed at the summer 1939, the United States being neutral, Great Britain and France inactive (period known as of the “Drôle of war”); at this period, the War of Winter was the only true battle field, and attracted in fact the world glance. The Soviet aggression was mainly judged like unjustified, like had been it, one month earlier, the destruction of Poland, and Finland was clearly perceived like a allied country. Various international organizations sent of the assistance, like medical device. The Finns emigrated in Canada or the United States turned over in their country of origin, and of many volunteers (of which the future actor Christopher Lee) joined the Finnish forces: 1010 Danes, 895 Norwegians, 372 Ingrie NS, 346 Finns expatriates, 210 volunteers of other nationalities rejoined Finland before the end of the hostilities. The war correspondents in Helsinki reported, by strongly exaggerating them, the victories of the Finnish soldiers and celebrated their supposed ingeniousness.

The Sweden, which had been declared not-belligerent in this conflict (rather than neutral as in the war opposing the Nazi Germany and the western powers), provides military material, funds and money loans, of the humanitarian aid and 8700 Swedish volunteers in Finland. Its most significant action was undoubtedly the sending of the Corps of the Volunteers of the Swedish air force, credit starting from January 7th, with 12 hunters, 5 bombers and 8 reconnaissance aircraft or transport, is approximately a third of the Swedish air forces of the time. The pilots and crawling voluntary came from the same rows of the Air force. The ace Carl Gustav von Rosen, (brother-in-law of Hermann Göring), went voluntary in an independent way. Finland could also count on approximately 900 voluntary workmen and engineers in its factories.

The Body of the Swedish Volunteers, with 8402 men in Finland - only important training of volunteers having completed their front transmission the end of the conflict - started to raise five mid-February Bataillon S Finnish in Märkäjärvi. Side by side with the three remaining Finnish battalions, the task force fought against two Soviet divisions, and prepared to attack mid-March, when the peace treaty stopped the preparations of them. 33 men were killed with the combat, among which the commander of the first battalion, the Lieutenant-colonel Magnus Dyrssen.

The Swedish volunteers remain still today a subject of controversy between Sweden and Finland. The internal talks which immediately took place in the years before the war let hope for a support much more important for Finland on behalf of Sweden, in particular in terms of regular troops. That would have perhaps made it possible Finland to push back the Soviet attack and not to even be attacked whole.

Nevertheless, the assistance brought by the volunteers, in particular Scandinavian, was appreciated by the Finns. That can be in particular illustrated by the presence during the countryside of Norway of a medical unit of Finnish volunteers helping the defenders against the German invasion of April 1940. But these turned over soon to Finland, because of rapid victory of the Germans.

Franco-British plans for Scandinavia

In one month, the Soviet command already starts to consider the operation, and the Finnish government receives (via the Swedish government) on January 29th the first emissary to arrange a peace treaty. Hitherto, Finland was already committed in the fight for its existence and its independence as democratic country. When the rumors of talks between the two belligerents arrived at the governments of Paris and London, the initiatives concerning a possible military support changed form radically. Now, Finland thus fought “only” to preserve a maximum of territories around Leningrad. However, not to reach moral troops and the confidence of the public opinion, none of this information was published, whether it is in Finland or elsewhere. It was necessary that the conflict remained a combat with dead of Finland in the public opinion.

In February 1940, the Allies offered their assistance: the plan approved on February 5th by the Allied High command envisaged the sending of: 100000 English and of: 35000 French who were to unload in the Norwegian port of Narvik, and to go to support Finland via Sweden while making safe corridors of provisioning throughout their course. It was agreed that the plan would be launched on March 20th, provided that the Finns called for the aid. March 2nd, the allied forces required officially right-of-way of the Norwegian and Swedish governments. France and England hoped by this operation to make rock in their camp the two still neutral countries Scandinavian, and commit them to reinforce their positions against Germany - Although Hitler has, in December, declared with the Swedish government that the presence on its ground of allied troops would immediately involve its invasion by Germany, which meant in practice that the Nazi Germany would settle in the part populated in the South of Sweden, while the Allies would fight in the Far North.

However, only a small portion of these troops was intended for Finland. One for example had neglected the possibilities that the port of Petsamo offered, free of any ice and allowing to enter directly in Finnish territory. One suspected whereas the real objective of this operation was to capture and occupy the port of Narvik as well as the mountainous region containing the metalliferous fields of the north of Sweden, from which came the majority from the iron ore used by Third Reich for his effort of war. If the Franco-British troops tried this operation, the zone could become a battle field for the allied armies and those of Third Reich. Consequently, Norway and Sweden refused the right-of-way. One learned only after the war that indeed, the allied troops had as an instruction to avoid any combat with the Soviet troops.

The Franco-British plan initially envisaged to capture Scandinavia in the north of a line Stockholm - Gothenburg or Stockholm - Oslo, according to the British concept of the line of the Lakes, according to the line formed by the lakes of Mälaren, Hjälmaren and Vänern, which would have constituted a good long natural line of defense of 1700-1900 kilometers in the south of Narvik. This line of the Lakes thus defined passes by both plus Swedish big cities, which would have had as a consequence the presence in the zone of the possible combat of most of the Swedish population, or their pure and simple occupation by the troops of the Axis. Later, the ambitions of the operation were restricted in the northern half of Sweden and the adjacent coastal area belonging to Norway.

The Swedish government, directed by the Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson, thus refused to allow the transit of troops armed through the Swedish territory. Although Sweden had not declared itself neutral in the War of Winter, it was neutral in the conflict opposing France and England to Germany. At the time, to allow the passage of troops allied on its territory would have been regarded as a too large distorsion the laws on neutrality.

The Swedish cabinet also decided to refuse the applications repeated of Finland to provide him regular troops, and ends even up rendering comprehensible that its support out of weapons and ammunition would not be eternal. In diplomatic terms, Finland was thus wedged between the desires of the Allies to see the conflict being prolonged and fears of its Scandinavian neighbors to see the war extending to their countries (or the surge of consecutive refugees to a Finnish defeat). Thus, Wilhelmstrasse proposed its interested councils for a peace treaty and concessions - the Germans suggesting that concessions “can always be repaired later.”

While Berlin and Stockholm made pressure on Helsinki so that it accepts the terms of the peace treaty, Paris and London had objectives opposite. Successively, several plans were proposed to the Finns. First of all, France and Great Britain promised the sending of: 20000 men before the end of February, in the implicit condition that on their road towards Finland they can have facilities to occupy the north of the Scandinavian Péninsule.

At the end of February, the commander-in-chief of the Finnish forces, the marshal Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, was pessimistic in comparison with the military situation. This is why, on February 29th, the government decided to start peace negotiations. The same day, the Soviets began their attack against Viipuri ( Vyborg in Swedish).

When the allied powers realized that Finland thought seriously of a peace treaty, they made him a new proposal for an assistance: : 50000 men would be sent if Finland launched a call to the assistance before March 12th. As mentioned above, only 6000 of them were really intended to him. The remainder was to go to the security of the mining fields of Sweden.

In spite of the weakness of the quota which was to reach Finland, espionage forwarded the news to Moscow, which strongly contributed to its decision to sign the peace treaty. One claims thus that without the threat of an intervention of the Allies, nothing would not have prevented that the Russians conquered Finland completely, by means of their apparently infinite reserve of troops.

The armistice

At the end of the winter, it became clear that the Russian forces were exhausted, and the German intermediaries suggested in Finland that time had just negotiated with the USSR. The Soviet losses were heavy and the military situation compromised the Soviet mode. With the thaw of the spring which approached, the forces of the Red Army were likely to be embourbées in the Finnish forests, and a first version of the peace treaty was subjected to Finland on February 12th. Not only the Germans, but also the Swedes were relieved to finally foresee an end with the War of Winter, fearing a whole a collapse of their Finnish neighbor. In front of the hesitations of the Finnish government vis-a-vis the very hard conditions of the Soviets, the king Gustave V of Sweden, at the time of a public short speech, specified that it would not give following the Finnish requests for sending of regular troops.

At the end of February, the Finns had exhausted their reserves of ammunition. So the Soviets had finally managed to bore the Mannerheim line hitherto, insuperable. Finally, the February 29th, the Finnish government agreed to sit down with the table of the negotiations. With the March 5th, the Soviet troops had advanced from 10 to 15 kilometers beyond the line of defense, approaching the suburbs of Viipuri. The government proposed an armistice this same day, but the Soviets, wishing to maintain the pressure, rejected it the next day. In fact, the engagements continued to the signature of the peace treaty.

The situation of the Finnish army in the isthmus of Karelia at the time of the suspension of the hostilities raised a long time question, even after war. Orders had indeed already been given in order to prepare the retirement towards the second line of defense, in the sector of Taipale. In March 1940, the opening of the valves of channel of Saimaa, the increase in the water level made it possible the Finnish army to insulate the Soviet troops. The estimates relating to how long of such operations of gradual retirement could have delayed the advance of the Soviets vary between a few days and two months, with a median value of a few weeks, in any case not enough time to allow a capable foreign intervention to turn over the situation.

It is also supposed that, as Stalin had practically destroyed all the structures of Renseignement during his purgings, that had compromised the possible contacts with its spies in Finland and elsewhere, and than its agents, frightened, tended to write the type of reports/ratios which they supposed to want to be read in Moscow. Thus, it may be that Stalin was not with the current of the real situation to the face and in the countries combined during the conflict.

The Soviet information however managed to inform their command of the plans of intervention in the conflict which the Allies prepared, but not their details nor lack of preparation of those. So the Soviets felt constrained to seek a premature means to leave the war before the Allies intervened and declared the war in the Soviet Union.

In four months of engagements, the Red Army knew enormous losses. The losses vary enormously estimate with another - since: 48000 killed, died of the continuations of their wounds and missings, as indicated by official Soviet immediately after the war, until: 391800 according to recent research. The current estimate most reliable figure Soviet losses with: 126875 men. The Finnish losses are limited as for them to approximately: 22830 men.

The treaty of Moscow

See also: Treaty of Moscow (1940)

According to the peace treaty established with Moscow on March 12th, 1940, Finland was to yield to the USSR the Finnish part of Karelia, of which the town of Viipuri, second of the country. The requirements of the treaty represented approximately 10  % of the industrialized zones of Finland, of which certain territories always held by the Finnish army. Some: 422000 Caréliens, is 12  % of the Finnish population before war, were thus day at the following day without housing. According to the terms of the treaty, the civilians and the soldiers who stationed in the yielded zones were to leave as fast as possible, they fled in columns to join the Finnish territory amputee. Only a low number of villagers remained on their grounds from now on under the crook of the Soviets.

Finland was to also give part of the area of Salla, the peninsula of Kalastajansaarento on the Mer of Barents and four islands of the Golfe of Finland. The peninsula of Hanko as for it was rented in the Soviet Union for 30 years, in order to establish a naval base there. Lastly, although they captured it during the war, the Soviets had to restore the town of Petsamo in Finland.

With final, the terms of the treaty were very désavantageux for Finland. The USSR could obtain the totality of its prewar claims, with downtown more of Vyborg (Viipuri). At the time of this conflict, one could thus notice that the sympathy of the SDN, Allies and of Sweden were not used for large thing. And a year later, the engagements began again at the time of the Guerre of Continuation.

The question carélienne post-war period

After the war, the provincial local authorities caréliennes, parishes and organizations founded association Karjalan Liitto to defend the rights and the interests of Caréliens evacuated and to find a means of making them return to Karelia. During the Cold war, the president Urho Kekkonen on several occasions tried to negotiate with the Soviet authorities the return of Karelia in the Finnish bosom, but without success. Then, nobody made of it any more the official request.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the controversy reconsidered the front of the scene. Certain Finnish minority groups for a long time required the peaceful retrocession of the territories lost of Finland. The most active group in this field is undoubtedly ProKarelia. At the time of the last elections, its claims gathered between 26  % and 36  % of the votes in Finland. And although the peaceful return of the territories yielded by Finland belongs to its ideas, Karjalan Liitto for the moment remained in withdrawal on this question.

Principal battles

  • Battle of Suomussalmi, (December 8th, 1939 - January 7th, 1940)
  • Battle of Tolvajärvi, (December 12th, 1939)
  • Battle of Honkaniemi, (February 26th, 1940)
  • Battle of Kollaa, (December 7th, 1939 - March 13rd, 1940)

The war of Winter in the culture

In 1989 Finnish film Talvisota left. The film tells the history of a group Finnish reservists originating in Kauhava. The group depends on the regiment of infatery “Jr23”, which is formed quasi exclusively men originating in the area of Pohjanmaa.

The group of Black metal Finnish Impaled Nazarene recorded the title “Total War - Winter War” in reference to the combat of this conflict.

Consequences

For the two camps, the result of the war was mitigated. Although the Soviet forces managed to cross Finnish defense, neither the Soviet Union nor Finland did not leave the conflict unscathed. The Soviet losses on the face were enormous, and the international prestige of the country suffered from it. Worse still, the capacities of combat of the Red Army were called in question, that strongly contributed to decision making by Hitler to start the Opération Barbarossa. In conclusion, the Soviet forces did not reach their primary goal which was the conquest of Finland, but gained a transfer of territory along the Lac Ladoga. The Finns, as for them, maintained their sovereignty and gained a considerable international interest, in spite of the strong losses of territories.

The preparations free - British dedicated to come to assistance of Finland by North of the Scandinavia (Countryside of Norway), by consequently occupying occasion the area and its mines of iron, precipitated the invasion of the Denmark and the Norway (Opération Weserübung) by the Nazi Germany less than one month after the war.

The War of winter is regarded by certain as a military disaster for the Soviet Union and was interpreted like an index of weakness inherent in the Soviet system. It should be held account that none the Western large armies, not even powerful the Wehrmacht as one were going to be able to note it in 1941, was not prepared with the offensive winter combat. Stalin learned from this fiasco and realized that the political control of the Red Army was not feasible any more. After the War of winter, the Kremlin launched a process of recruitment of qualified officers and modernization of its forces; an important decision which made it possible to the Soviets to resist the German threat.

The desire to recover its territories led Finland to be combined in Germany in its attempt at invasion of the USSR.

Catalog of films

  • Pekka Parikka, Talvisota , Finland, 1989.

See too

Random links:Ligneron | Council of Direction | Marcia Haydée | Rene saint of Angers | Nicolas Kiesa

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