The war of Korea took place of 1950 with 1953 between the forces of the communist North Korea, supported by the Popular republic of China and the Soviet Union, and those of the South Korea under Western influence, supported by the the United Nations (mainly the the United States).

The partition of the peninsula

With the Conference of Yalta, Stalin had promised with Roosevelt that the USSR would enter in war against the Japan three months after the Capitulation of Germany; at the same time, the Allies had been appropriate that in Korea the Japanese forces stationed in the north of the 38 {{E}} parallel would go to the Soviets, and those which occupied the South with the Americans.

The Soviets intervened in North a few days after the declaration of war in Japan, on August 9th, 1945. For their part, the Americans unloaded on September 8th, 1945, two days later of the proclamation in Seoul of a transitory Democratic republic by the left parties with communist majority which had been active in resistance to the Japanese occupation.

However, neither the United States, neither the Soviets, nor a fortiori the Koreans themselves regarded as final the partition de facto of the Korean peninsula which rose from the double American presence and Soviet: indeed, an American-Soviet Joint Committee set up itself as of January 1946, but its work did not lead because of the increasing tension between the two Large ones.

In September 1947, the Americans carried the Korean question in front of the the United Nations. The General meeting indicated a charged commission to organize and supervise free elections as preliminaries with the formation of a national government. However, the Soviets, who regarded the United Nations as an organization related to the United States (before the decolonization, the majority of its members belonged to the Western block), refused to admit the commission in their zone of occupation.

The left parties of all the country, as well as nationalist organizations antiaméricaines, met in Pyongyang in April 1948 and decided the boycott of the elections. Those were organized only in the zone occupied by the United States, under the monitoring of UNO; they carried to the capacity the old nationalist leader and Anticommuniste Syngman Rhee, which had been the chief of the Korean government in exile made up in 1919. July 19th, 1948, the République of Korea was proclaimed with Seoul.

In reaction, in the Soviet zone of occupation, of the elections not supervised by UNO were organized; they gave the majority to the left parties dominated by the Communists. At the same time, of the clandestine elections were held in the South: the delegates thus elected sat at Pyongyang, where the supreme Popular Assembly proclaimed the democratic Popular republic of Korea. Just like the Republic of Korea, this one claimed to represent the whole of the peninsula. The strong man of the new mode North-Korean was Kim It-sung, general secretary of the Parti the work of Korea and old resistant to the Japanese occupation. Leader of an small group of Korean partisans starting from 1930, Kim had indeed directed several raids against the Japanese outposts to Korea starting from the Mandchourie where, child, it had taken refuge with his parents. In 1941, it left Mandchourie, accepted a military training in Soviet Union and turned over in 1945 in its country as an officer of the Red Army .

Syngman Rhee and Kim It-sung wished both to reunify the peninsula, but each one according to its own political ideology.

With the Conscription restored in 1947 (which causes a certain resistance armed in part of the population, to see UNPIK). Equipped in tanks and heavy weapons of Soviet origin, the army North-Korean called popular Armée with Korea was more able to take the initiative, while the South Korean army, because of an American support more limited after the withdrawal of the troops of occupation (December 1948 and June 1949), was in a state of inferiority, material (no tank and not of fighter) but especially numerical.

The question of the origins of the war

Bernard Droz affirmed in 1992 that the American and South Korean responsibility appeared not very credible and, since the opening of the Soviet files, even a historian “revisionist” like Bruce Cumings, in a debate finally dépassionné, holds from now on for asset that the general offensive of the June 25th 1950 was prepared of long time by the North Korea.

According to Soviet documents of files, Kim It-sung decided to invade South Korea at the latest at the beginning of September 1949, whereas “there no were serious incidents with the parallel 38e since August 15th”. Stalin considered however that for the moment such an initiative was convenient neither militarily, neither politically, nor economically. He worried in particular about the unpreparedness of the army North-Korean as well as possible American intervention and consequently prohibits a company which every success was not assured. Indeed, by a telegram dated from the September 24th 1949, the Politburo charged the Soviet ambassador with Pyongyang, the Shtykov general, to inform Kim It-sung that with the eyes of the Soviet leaders the “Korean popular Army was not ready for an attack”, that this one would involve “political and economic difficulties significant for the North Korea” and that consequently such an attack “was not allowed”.

Thereafter, the North-Koreans reinforced their army and transformed it into a formidable offensive instrument on the model of the armor-plated forces of the Red Army Soviet. Thus, in 1950, the North Korea had from now on an unquestionable advantage in all the categories of armament.

The Popular republic of China was initially reticent, because a war in Korea would destabilize all the area. Mao Zedong estimated in addition that such a conflict would encourage the Americans to intervene in the Far East and would interfere with the conquest envisaged of Taiwan, where the forces had been cut off from the Kuomintang of Tchang Kaï-chek. Nevertheless, China would not accept the presence of enemy troops at its borders, which let predict a Chinese intervention if it estimated that its territory was threatened.

The January 12th 1950, new the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, declared with the national Club of the press that the American perimeter of defense in the Pacifique included/understood the Aleutian Islands, the islands Ryūkyū, the Filipino Japan and the : the explicit omission of Korea could let imply that, in the event of war, the Americans would not intervene. However, if such had been at one time the position of Washington, the US government there renonça as of April 1950. Consequently, the '' containment '' remaining the principle of the American policy, Washington regarded South Korea as a bastion being used to dam up the communist progression in Asia, more particularly after the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949.

Meanwhile, the attitude of Stalin had evolved/moved: at the time of a visit of Kim with Moscow, in April 1950, the Master of the the Kremlin endorsed the annexationists projects of the leader North-Korean, because, after the departure of the American troops, he did not judge any more that one war made run serious risks to the North Korea, while specifying however that he could not guarantee an official support on behalf of the Soviet Union.

In an interview granted in 1992 to the Russian Sergeï Goncharov, Chung Blood-chin, old historian Brigadier general in the army North-Korean, reported that, according to the interpreter of Kim It-sung, this last would have called upon four arguments to collect the adhesion of Stalin: the attack, started with the improvist, would be decisive, so that the victory would be acquired in three days; in South Korea, the offensive of the popular Army would be accompanied by a rising of the two hundred and thousand members of the Party; the communist guerilla would bring his support to the popular Army; and finally, the United States would not have time to intervene. Chung added that Kim was informed of the Acheson speech.

According to a report/ratio of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the intention in particular of Brejnev, report/ratio dated from the August 9th 1966,

the government North-Korean envisaged to achieve his goal in three stages:

1. concentration of troops along the 38e parallel
2. proposal in the South of a peaceful reunification
3. initiative of military operations after the rejection by the South of the proposal for a peaceful reunification.

(…)
At the end of May 1950, the staff of the popular Army, in agreement with the Soviet military advisers, announced that the Korean army was ready to begin its concentration along the parallel 38e. In front of the insistence of Kim It-sung, the beginning of military operations was fixed at the June 25th 1950 (telegram 468,1950). The reliability of the Soviet documents was highly disputed by the authorities North-Korean, as they question the official story of the country. In addition, according to the North-Koreans, who call upon the presence of American advisers, the United States would not have respected the terms of the soviéto-American agreement on the withdrawal of the troops of the peninsula and they would have multiplied the provocations and the attacks, some of scale, in order to destabilize the North Korea. Thus, the Museum of the War with Pyongyang exposes documents of files making state of projects of invasion of the democratic Popular republic of Korea.

For their part, the majority of the South Korean historians, following the example in left France of intellectuals of , raised as of the Années 1950 the multiplication of the border incidents along the parallel 38e and the quarrelsome declarations of Syngman Rhee during the time preceding the war, from where they concluded with a shared responsibility. According to Heo Man-Ho, qualified schoolteacher at the department of political science and diplomacy to the faculty of social sciences of Seoul, specialist in the history of Korea, “the quarrelsome attempts former to the war of Korea had already made more 100  000 dead”. In other words, according to Heo-Man-Ho, these border incidents were in certain cases of “true pitched battles in which approximately 6  000 men were committed” (and whose initiative came as well on the side North-Korean as on the South Korean side), which made increasingly probable the assumption of a conflict opened, under consideration by one and the other camp. “It is thus difficult to slice in a sure way on this question of knowing which is the invader and the initiator of the war. The only criteria which can help to trim this question find in the military preparations set up by the leaders of both Corées like in the forms of the support of the two super powers near these same leaders. ” Consequently, the professor Heo Man-Ho concludes, “by supporting us on these criteria, we could support the thesis of the invasion North-Korean on the South ; indeed, the war of Korea was prepared more seriously by the leaders North-Korean with the supports sino-Soviet”.

Being the South Korean preparations, the special correspondent of Truman in South Korea, Philip C. Jessup, underlines, in a memorandum with his government dated from the January 14th 1950 following a discussion with South Korean president Syngman Rhee, that this last explained why the Koreans of the South “would have a much better strategic line of defense, if their forces moved towards the North Korea, that there no was planning to launch out in any operation of conquest. However, the general impression of its intervention lets believe that he had not been opposed when South Korean forces, in edge of the parallel 38e, had taken initiatives from time to time”. On its side, Mr. Muccio, American ambassador with Seoul, made state that in 1948, at the time of a reception to the South Korean presidential palace, the South Korean Minister for Defense “told him with pleasure that its men had conquered Haeju”, city located on the peninsula of Ongjin, “just beyond the parallel 38e, (…) but did not add that practically everyone had been made there kill”.

Always it is that Kim It-sung had given himself the means of a general offensive by reinforcing her army and, when it finally accepted, after forty-eight telegrams, the permission of Stalin in April 1950, and that of Mao Zedong one month later, it took the initiative on June 25th, 1950, benefitting from a situation which it considered favorable - inferiority material and numerical South Korean army, presence on the ground of a few hundreds only of American advisers, apparent renunciation of the United States of the Truman doctrine with regard to the Korean peninsula -, and that in a context of repression of the communist movements of guerilla which had dominated politically in South Korea with the Japanese capitulation.

Thus, the offensive North-Korean of the June 25th 1950 does not leave any doubt about the initiator of a terribly expensive conflict in human lives. On another side, the war could perhaps have been prevented if, with the eyes of Stalin and Truman, prisoners one and the other of the principles of the Cold war, it had not seemed almost inescapable.

Unfolding of the war

The date of the June 25th 1950, selected “at the end of May 1950 in front of the insistence of Kim It-sung”, mark the crossing of the parallel 38e by divisions North-Korean; she is generally regarded by the Western and Russian historians as the beginning of the war of Korea. For its part, the North Korea appoints a former date of a few days, while pleading which it would have done nothing but counteract an important South Korean incursion on its territory, incursion delivered with the support of American advisers.

The attack North-Korean

In the hours preceding the paddle by the June 25th 1950, under the protection of a formidable stopping of artillery, 135  000 North-Koreans crossed the border between the two Corées. The government North-Korean announced that troops ordered by the “traitor and gangster” Syngman Rhee had crossed the parallel 38e, and that consequently North had been obliged to counteract “a serious provocation of the fantoches of Washington”, according to Humanity of the following day. On its side, Jean-Paul Sartre, fellow traveller of the French Communist party, affirmed that “it was South Korea which had attacked the North Korea at the instigation of the United States”. Advised and equipped by the Soviets, who will never engage however openly, the army North-Korean put on line 7 divisions, 150 T-34, 1  700 parts of Artillery, 200 reserve and fighters important. The northerner attack was devastator. At least two thirds of the small South Korean army (hardly 38  000 men divided out of 4 divisions of infantry) were then in permission, leaving the country largely disarmed. The Northerners attacked in several strategic places, among which Kaesong, Chunchon, Uijongbu, and Ongjin. In a few days, the forces Southerners, outclassed of number and in firepower, were put in rout and had to beat a retreat. While the attack on the ground progressed, the northerner air force bombarded the airport of Kimpo in Seoul or was the 22 planes of connection and drive of the aviation of the south. Seoul was captured in the afternoon of the June 28th. The North-Koreans however had not succeeded in achieving their main aim, namely fast rendering of the government of Rhee and the disintegration of its army.

The invasion of South Korea (Republic of Korea, RdC, ROK in English) seems to have been a complete surprise for the United States and their allies; a few days before the offensive North-Korean, the June 20th, Dean Acheson, the new Secretary of the State Department, had officially declared with the Congrès that a war was improbable. Truman itself was contacted a few hours after the release of the offensive; he believed that it was about the beginning of the Third World war. In any event, part of the American staff would have accommodated with enthusiasm the advertisement, hoping to thus be able “to dam up” (statégie containment ) the progression of the Communists in the Far East. “The Koreans save us”, would have declared the Secretary of State Acheson when it accepted on June 25th the news of the release of the hostilities.

In spite of the demobilization partial of the forces American and allied after the defeat of Japan, which caused serious logistic problems with the American troops in the area - except the Marines, the divisions of infantry sent in Korea counted only 40% their manpower and the major part of their equipment was unusable -, the United States still had 83  000 men with the Japan divided into 3 divisions of infantry plus the 1 {{era}} division of cavalry, under the command of the general Douglas MacArthur. Separately the units of the the Commonwealth in Korea, no other nation could provide important reinforcements. The president Harry S. Truman, with the news of the invasion, ordered in Mac Arthur to transfer from the ammunition to the profit of the South Korean army (in English ROK Army , ROKA) and to provide an air protection in order to allow the evacuation of the American citizens. However, Truman was in disagreement with its advisers, who wanted to launch air raids against the North Korea. It however authorized the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan, putting thus fine at the American policy of disengagement with respect to the nationalist government of the Kuomintang, confined in Taiwan - American counterpart dreaded by Mao before the attack North-Korean. Tchang Kaï-chek proposed to take part in the war, but this request was rejected by the Americans with the reason that would do nothing but encourage one intervention of the Chinese Communists.

The South Korean and U.N. counter-attack

With the Safety advice of the United Nations, the the United States, benefitting from the absence of the Soviet Union (political known as of the “seat empties”, to denounce the American refusal to admit communist China with the Council), made adopt on June 27th, 1950 a resolution condemning the aggression North-Korean; July 7th, a new resolution entrusted the command of an U.N. force to them. Sixteen countries agreed to come to assistance of the South Korea.

In August, the remains of the South Korean army as well as the 8th American army sent in reinforcement were driven back in the south-east of the peninsula, in the pocket of Pusan. Thanks to an important air support, they managed to stabilize the face along the river Nakdong. However, in spite of new reinforcements, the situation remained critical and it seemed well that the Northerners were about to take the control of the very whole peninsula.

September 15th, 1950, the American general MacArthur unloaded with Incheon, behind the enemy lines, fascinating with reverse the troops North-Korean. Those were encircled and disaggregated quickly after this daring tactical operation. Seoul was taken again on September 26th. October 7th, the troops of the United Nations crossed in their turn the parallel 38e and penetrated in North Korea. October 26th, they reached the Yalou which marks the sino-Korean border.

The intervention of the Chinese “volunteers”

China intervened then in a nonofficial way. October 31st, several Chinese divisions crossed Yalou, where they came into contact with American units. It was about popular IVe armed, ordered by the general Lin Piao. After fierce combats against the Chinese forces, the Americans were pushed back. The Chinese withdrew themselves and the Americans could thus take again their offensive until, fine November 1950, more than one half-million of Chinese soldiers of the popular Armée with release supporting the army North-Korean pass by again with the attack with an aerial cover of the Soviet aviation. The forces of the United Nations, scattered and badly equipped against the cold, were rejected beyond the parallel 38e involving in their retirement more than one million civilians North-Korean fleeing the Communist regime; Seoul was taken again by the Chinese North-Koreans and their allies.

Return to the status quo handle bellum

To rectify the situation, MacArthur suggested a nuclear bombardment of the Mandchourie and the intervention of the nationalist Chinese forces of the Guomindang. Passing in addition to orders of Washington - MacArthur had just passed by again with the attack towards the North (against the will of Truman which wished definitively to stabilize the face on the parallel 38ème) -, it was dismissed by its president, because this last feared a confrontation sino-American from which the Soviet Union could have benefitted.

The successor of MacArthur, the general Ridgway, managed to take again Seoul following several keen offensives. The face was stabilized then on the current line of demarcation.

The idea starts to be spread of a status quo handle bellum .

Negotiations, the problem of the prisoners and the armistice

The June 23rd 1951, Jacob Malik, permanent delegate of the USSR to Nation-Plain, inserts in a speech a passage where it suggests a negotiation on this basis: such a scenario had led two years earlier to the lifting of the Blocus of Berlin.

As of on July 10th, 1951, the delegates of the two camps met in Kaesong, near the old line of demarcation.

But it will be necessary to await the July 27th 1953 so that the negotiations lead to Panmunjeom, putting fine at a conflict which will have lasted three years and will have caused at least a million died according to the majority of the Western historians (more than two million according to the North-Koreans). The cease-fire devoted the return to the status quo handle : indeed, the demilitarized Korean Zone between the two Corées (cutting the parallel 38e in diagonal, following a band of 249  km length on 4  km broad) made that the territories of both Corées will be appreciably the same ones as at the beginning of the conflict with a small advantage for the South, the frontline being stabilized a little beyond the old border.

Prisoners of war

The proportion of losses at the prisoner of war South Korean and of the United Nations in the camps North-Korean and Chinese reached according to certain studies in the neighborhoods of 43%. The ideological character of the conflict does not only explain to him this extréme surmortality, more consequence of the bad conditions of hygiene and nutrition that direct actions of the geôliers, at least after the first year of war.

The negotiations on the prisoners of war were very rough and one of the main reasons of the slowness of the peace talks.

The December 18th 1951, the United Nations provided the names of 132  000 prisoners on 176  000 prisoners. The dissension in the figures comes owing to the fact that 38  000 “soldiers North-Koreans” were actually Citoyen S of the South enlisted of force by North. It missed also 6  000 died or escaped.

The communist list included/understood the names of 11  559 prisoners, in contradiction with the fact that the radio of Pyong-Yang, after 9 months of war had been praised to hold 65  000 prisoners. But at December 18th, 1951, the communist forces stated to hold 7  145 South Korean, 3  198 Americans, 919 British, 234 Turks, 40 Filipinos, 10 French, 6 Australian, 4 South-Africans, 3 Japanese, 1 Canadian, 1 Greek and 1 Netherlander.

10  000 Americans missing, a third only had been found. Not only one of the 1  036 prisoners whose names at one time or another had been quoted in the media of the Eastern bloc did not appear on the list. On the 110 names communicated to the the Red Cross, there remained only 44 about it on the list. More serious, 50  000 South Korean missings “had been released on the frontlines” according to the North Korea, embrigadés of force in the army of North according to the United Nations.

They were the methods of repatriation of the prisoners to the hands of the United Nations which slowed down the negotiations, China and the North Korea wanting that all the prisoners are given to them without conditions while the United Nations preached freedom of choice. Finally, the second solution was adopted, following compromises torn off with the communist nations which could try to convince their citizens to give up their choice. On the 75  000 prisoners who had asked to remain in the Western camp, 5  000 gave up their preliminary draft.

The return of the prisoners was done in 2 phases: the operation “Small Exchange”, in April 1953, where the United Nations restored 5  194 soldiers and 416 civilians North-Korean while North returned 471 South-Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australian, 2 Canadians, 1 Greek, 1 African South, 1 Filipino and 1 Netherlander. Then the operation “Great Exchange” consisted of a massive exchange of prisoners after the armistice : 70  159 North-Koreans and 5  640 Chinese were repatriated in their respective countries while 7  848 South-Koreans, 3  597 Americans and 1  312 members of the other quotas of the United Nations were released.

Approximately 15  000 Chinese and 50  000 North-Koreans chose to remain in the South, while 305 South-Koreans, 1 British and 21 Americans remained in North (3 Americans changed opinion afterwards).

The air war

Strategy

A strategy of intensification of the aerial combats to reverse an unfavourable power struggle being terrestrial forces

The radioscopy of this conflict which burst five years after the end of the second world war reveals how much research air superiority became an absolute priority for the command of the United Nations, i.e. Americans. He saw the first engagements between jets whereas the propeller planes veterans of the preceding war were largely used.

Indeed, the quantitative report/ratio of the terrestrial forces appeared, as of the beginning of the operations, favorable to sino-Korean, in a crushing way.

So that this serious imbalance did not involve a disaster for the terrestrial forces of UNO, it was essential to prevent that planes North-Korean cannot support their troops.

In fact the air forces North-Korean were made up, for a big part, Soviet pilots and Polish. The majority of engagements in aerial combat against the American F-86 were it by Mig-15 (which was at the beginning of the conflict one of most powerful with the world) with the Soviet hands of pilots (the Soviet squadrons were raised every six weeks).

The 64 OIAK (64e air body independent of hunting) of the Voénno Vozdouchnyé Sily deployed since February 1950 in Shanghai against the air forces of Taiwan was deployed in the province of Lianing and on November 9th, 1950, a victory and a loss with the combat against the American air forces were recorded.

To this unfavourable military situation a severe political constraint was added. It was, indeed, interdict with the air forces of UNO to intervene on the ground as in flight in Chinese territory, home base of many raids " north-coréens".

Under these conditions, the research of the air superiority was undertaken in what was named the " Mig Alley" :

• by the means of the destruction by the 5th US Air Force of the 75 army grounds North-Korean.

• by engagement in flight of the enemy air forces.

Even if engagements were frequent in this " allée" , the results of the destruction in flight were weak.

In December 1952, which is one month particularly " actif" , 3  997 Mig-15 were seen by American hunting, 1  849 were committed (46%), 27 only were cut down i.e. 1,5% of the engaged planes, most of the time in whirling combat.

On the whole of the war of Korea, the losses of apparatuses " alliés" in flight were established with 44 planes destroyed for 10  000 exits, is less than half of the rate of destruction in flight noted at the time of the Second world war in spite of the pugnacity of the communist pilots.

Not being able to intervene in and above the Chinese territory, USAF adopted the strategy of the quickly containment , i.e. of the damming up, along the Yalu river, since the grounds of septentrional Korea had become inopérationnels because of the severe undergone destruction.

The flexibility of the air weapon authorized the rigorous compliance with the gold rule of the Western aviation of combat: continuation of a single objective. The concentration of the means in time and space, the quasi-permanence of the sweeps of hunting in this quadrilateral, the speed of the interventions constituted the elements most representative of the air strategy.

Strike air very fatal for the Korean civilians

In same time, the choice to intensify the campaigns of strategic Bombardement resulted in the death of a more significant number of civilian North-Korean.

The US Air Force, according to the official statistics, released: 454000 tons of bends S during the 37 months of the conflict is: 12270 tons per month to be compared with: 537000 released on the Japan during the Campaigns of the Pacific, them: 47778 tons monthly during the whole of the Second world war and them: 44014 tons monthly during the War of Vietnam). (source: )

According to the North-Koreans, " more: 10000 bombers ( cumulative figure ) carried out more than 250 air raids on the only town of Pyongyang enters mid-July and mid-August 1951, the “targets” going from the hospitals, at the rural houses bordering the city. The north of Korea, although making only one third of the surface of Japan, 3,7 times were bombarded more than this last at the time of the Second world war, is: 600000 tons of bombs (napalm and others) " (source: ).

The American historian Bruce Cummings adds that the American experts in Korea thus developed the new shape of air war, sophisticating methods already used against the Japan: " The war of Korea passes to be limited, but it resembled extremely the air war against imperial Japan during the second world war, and was often carried out by the same American military officials. If the attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the subject of many analyzes, the bombardments flamers against the Japanese and Korean cities received much less attention" (source: ).

Always according to the same source, Brice Cummings observes that these massive bombardments did not correspond to the “bombardments of precision” called upon by the American army:

" Within the American air force, some délectaient virtues of this relatively new weapon, introduced at the end of the preceding war, being laughed at the communist protests and misleading the press by speaking about “bombardments of precision” ".

Lesson of the air war for the American experts

If the conflict of Korea constitutes a particular case, taking into account the political and geographical data, it is advisable however to stress that the air chiefs, nourished rich person lesson of the Second world war, could adapt in order to reach this requirement of the air superiority quickly, by supplementing the action of neutralization of the enemy grounds in North Korea by the fixing of the Soviet and Chinese air forces in a quadrilateral chosen by them.

This strategy of the focal point for grievances functioned. Indeed:

• the rate of losses in flight was weak, lower by half than the rate observed during the Second world war.

• the support on the ground of the forces numerically crushing North-Koreans, was consequently unimportant.

Involved forces

• the United Nations:

The air forces of the United Nations result primarily from the American forces. Three air armies (5th, 13th and 20th Air Force) are committed under the general command of the Far East Air Force. To that one will add the air and sea Groupe, including/understanding the apparatuses embarked on the 36 aircraft carriers which will take part one moment or another with the conflict; to note that the first ship of this type on the spot was Royal Navy.

Approximately 80% of the missions of support on the ground at the beginning of the war were ensured by Chance Vought F4U Corsair.

At the end of July 1953, with the conclusion of the war thus, the air forces of the United Nations are the following ones:

• 128 B-26 Invader

• 218 F-84 Thunderjet
• 297 F-86F Saber
• also took part in the war of F-51 Mustang and F-80 Shooting Star in great number, without counting some hunters of night and the helicopters and, of course, the B-29 four-engined planes based in Japan or Okinawa

And several hundreds of embarked planes (F4U Corsair and F9F Panther, inter alia). A total of 800 pilots, supported by 59  700 ground personnels, will be useful in Korea on behalf of the United Nations. It acts, once again, mainly of American personnel.

• North Korea:

The North Korea begins the war with a relatively modest air force, made up of 239 apparatuses, all with piston engines. One counts 129 Yaks, 43 IL-10 S (Version improved of famous the Iliouchine It-2 Sturmovik), like some Po-2 and other apparatuses.

In the first weeks of the conflict, the air force North-Korean will be largely outclassed by the forces of the United Nations, so that the July 22nd 1950, it is reduced to only 65 planes.

In fact the air force North-Korean will play in itself only one minor part at the time of the conflict. They are the Chinese and especially the Soviets who will ensure large engagements without that not being clearly clarified. Indeed it is obvious that, in spite of the nuclear threat, the United States could not have differently made than to declare the war in the USSR if it were publicly recognized that Soviet pilots and machines fought in Korea.

At the end of the war, approximately 125 Mig-15 are directly under the control of the North-Koreans.

• Popular republic of China:

As of the last days of the month of June 1950 the Popular republic of China deploys her first air brigade in North Korea, her composition is the following one: 38 Mig-15, 39 La-11, 39 You-2 (bombers), 25 It-10 (attacks on the ground), and 14 Yak-12 (drive).

September 1st, 1951, it is estimated that not less than 525 Mig-15 was useful under the rosettes North-Korean. At the beginning of June 1952, the air forces of popular China are about 1  830 planes of which a thousand of hunters.

July 31st, 1953, popular China has on the Korean theater nine bodies of hunters (nearly 500 Mig-15) and two more bodies of bombers (54 You-2).

In spite of manpower which thus seem considerable, the communist air forces were never able to effectively support their Army and even less to act strategically on the American backs.

Soviet and Chinese implication

The Soviets will provide, with the Chinese, most of the air effort of war. Indeed, the pilots North-Korean were far from being as well formed with the handling of famous Mig-15 as the confrontations implied it. On several occasions, of the Western pilots to see pilots the Migones with the too strong breadth for the Asian ones will pay to have clearly been able, Russians probably.

The October 10th 1950, Stalin promises to send to the North Korea of the military material and to transfer not less than 16 regiments of Soviet aviation in order to guarantee the protection of the Chinese territories and North-Korean. It is close to 72  000 Soviets who will be useful, over three years, in Korea and China.

The higher quality of the Chinese pilots and especially Soviet will make to Air force North-Korean a frightening opponent vis-a-vis the forces of UNO.

That is all the more true as, before the startup of F-86 Saber, the United States and their allies do not have any plane able to compete with the Migone, the best hunter of the world at that time.

In order to be able to fight the Migone more effectively, the United States will try by all the means of obtaining an intact specimen from it. In front of the little of will to the defection in the communist rows, they will go until offering in April 1953 a reward of 100.000 dollars (a large sum for the time, together with promise of a political asylum) for an intact apparatus. No Mig-15 however will be presented before the end of the war and it is only in September 1953 that they will obtain an apparatus of the hands of a deserter who, curiously, will affirm not to know about the promised reward.

Reports/ratios of engagements

At June 25th, 1951, the United Nations assert 391 planes destroyed or damaged during the first year of war. The losses are the following ones: 188 hunters, 33 bombers, 9 transport and 17 various. This day, 89 F-86 " Saber" are deployed in Korea and the full number of Mig-15 available for the Communists is about 445.

July 1st of the same year, the United Nations recognize 246 apparatuses lost (especially due to the DCA according to them), 857 died and disappeared. More than 200 Mig are asserted like having been destroyed.

In April 1952, the United Nations bring back 243 destroyed planes and 290 planes damaged in one month. A total of 771 planes would have been destroyed by the Northern DCA Korean from September 1st, 1951 to April 30th, 1952. The Americans affirm moreover than the MiG report/ratio destroyed for F-86 destroyed is of 11 per 1.

The June 26th 1952, the following statistics are published by the United Nations:

• the United Nations: 1  180 confirmed victories, including 336 Mig, 75 probable victories, 513 damaged planes.

• Communist: 637 confirmed victories (DCA included/understood).

These figures are to be considered with precautions so much the advertisements of victories compared to the losses sudden by the two camps are unmatched. As well as USAF announces to have lost 16 bombers B-29 with the combat, the Soviet pilots assert 66 destruction in aerial combat of this apparatus without counting the Chinese claims and North-Korean.

As from the moment when the communist forces ebb, the main part of the aerial combats between the hunters of the United Nations and the Communists will proceed in the zone known under the name of MiG Alley . Operating since bases located on the Chinese territory, the Migones will come from to be opposed successfully to the Western forces, forcing the B-29 bombers in particular not to operate but a night more. Even when the situation on the ground is largely in their discredit, the communist pilots continue to carry out exits to dispute the air superiority of the United Nations.

The zone of the MiG Alley corresponds to all that this finds in the west of the triangle formed by the towns of Huichon, Changju and Sinanju (in current North Korea). The Western planes had prohibition to cross the Chinese border to tackle the bases of the squadrons the Mig one but, in the fire of the action, several planes crossed indeed this border.

At the end of the war, the democratic Popular republic of Korea publishes a report which considers the damage having been inflicted him by the air weapon:

• More 8  700 destroyed factories.

• More 600  000 destroyed houses.
• 6  000 destroyed schools and hospitals.

In all, 40% of the industrial potential of the country would have been destroyed. One will note the dramatization of this report/ratio which insists on the destruction caused at the schools, hospitals and houses whereas the engagements made damage similar to the south, which is not mentioned.

Epilog

Finally, one can say that the air power played a key function: for the first time in the history, one made use in operational conditions of fighters to reaction (if one excludes the case of the Me 262).

China had become an air and military power major. Half of its 1400 hunters was the Migones built by the Soviets, planes considered rightly as being best world. Operating starting from bases located in Mandchourie and venturing only very seldom above the lines of UNO, the Migones threatened nevertheless air supremacy of the latter, in particular above Mig Alley.

It had to be waited until the United States produces F-86 Saber so that the forces of UNO finally have at disposal a plane able to compete with the Migone.

Sources: http://www.korean-war.com/

A recurring debate: the question of the American biological weapons

In a note dated December 21st, 1951, the American Secretary of State in Defense, Robert Lovett, asked for the chiefs of staff interarmes ('' Joint Chiefs off Staff '') of provide directives “for the use of bacteriological chemical weapons and . ”; confronted with the same problem of the enormous Chinese numerical superiority, the Japanese, before 1945, had already thought of the same means and the Americans had carefully recovered the results of their work. According to the China and the North Korea, these weapons would have been used on large scales at the beginning of the year 1952.

The use of the biological weapon was blamed, wrongly, the February 22nd 1952 when the Foreign Minister North-Korean, Pak Hon-Yong, showed officially the Americans to have spread in North Korea of the “insect-vectors” diffusing the Peste, the Choléra and “other diseases”. Two days later, Zhou Enlai carried the same charge and, on March 8th, he affirmed that between on February 29th and on March 5th of the American planes had spread with sixty-eight resumptions of the insects carrying pathogenic Germe S on the Mandchourie.

March 12th, 1952, the American Secretary of State Dean Acheson requested officially the International committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to carry out a survey in the areas announced by the North-Koreans and the Chinese. The ICRC presented its request the same day to the North Korea and China, then again on March 28th, on March 31st and on April 10th. Its steps never accepted answer on behalf of the Chinese authorities and North-Korean.

The United States then submitted to the Safety advice of the United Nations a draft Resolution under the terms of which the ICRC would be invited to carry out investigations in China and North Korea. In spite of ten votes out of eleven in favor of American motion, the draft Resolution could not be adopted, the USSR putting its Veto at it. After a new American initiative with UNO, in April 1953, she declared herself ready to withdraw her charges, provided that the United States, on their side, gives up requiring an investigation.

Consequently, it appeared clear that the allegations of the North Korea rested on forged evidence of all parts. It was indeed the case. Indeed, of the Soviet documents published into 1998 evoke a setting in macabre scene organized by the Soviet North-Koreans and their advisers.

Thus, on April 18th, 1953, the lieutenant-general V. NR. Razuvaev, Soviet ambassador in North Korea, informed Beria, member of the Politburo and chief of the Safety of State, the future the KGB, that in February/March 1952, “in collaboration with Soviet advisers, an action plan had been imagined by the ministry for Health North-Korean)” and that, thereafter, following measurements were taken: quarantined areas that one claimed infected plague; hiding of corpses in common graves, then revelation of these mass graves to the international press; sending in Beijing of “material” for its exhibition, before the arrival envisaged of the two international commissions authorized to examine it.

May 2nd, 1953, the the Kremlin charged the Soviet ambassador with Beijing, V. NR. Kuznetsov, to transmit the following message to Mao: The Soviet government and the Central committee of the PCUS were induced in error. The diffusion by the press of information concerning the use by the bacteriological Americans of weapons in Korea was based on fallacious information. The charges against the Americans were false. And, for the Soviet person in charge in North Korea: We recommend that the question of a bacteriological war (…) is not approached any more within international organizations and of bodies of UNO. (…) The workmen (sic) Soviet implied in the manufacture of the so-called proof of an use of bacteriological weapons will severely be punished.

The Chinese thesis and North-Korean were taken again in 1988 by two Canadian historians, Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, professors at the university of York (Toronto) and authors of The United States and Biological Warfare. Secrecies from the Early Cold War and Korea (Indiana University Near, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1988), then again in an article published in the collection Manners of seeing Diplomatic World (August-September 2003). In this article, Misters Endicott and Hagerman say to be supported on “parsimoniously” revealed American files (sic) (lower cf the comment of Governed professor Ed) and on documents coming from the governmental and military files of Beijing. They in addition quote an extract of a letter of April 12th, 1977 sent to Mr. Endicott by Mr. John Burton, outgoing chief of the Australian Department of the Foreign affairs in 1952 and member of the International Scientific Commission having examined bacteriological the “material” provided by the Chinese (cf higher the report/ratio of Razuvaev with Beria). I went to China in 1952, wrote John Burton, to evaluate the assertions on the bacteriological war. Without detailing the evidence, I returned convinced that official Chinese believed that those were conclusive. On my return, Alan Watt, my successor as chief of the Australian department of the foreign affairs, informed me that, in the light of my declarations, he had sought answers to Washington and that it had been informed that the Americans had used biological weapons in Korea, but only on an experimental basis.

The American documents of files and the testimonys collected by professors Endicott and Hagerman give a report on a complete program of biological weapons: “bombs with feathers”, carrying spores cereal coal, Aerosol S causing the infection of the respiratory tracts, “insects vectors” being able to diffuse the cholera, the dysentery, the typhoid one and the botulism. These weapons were to be operational for on July 1st, 1954, “with capacities (…) likely to be implemented as of the month of March 1952”.

Did the Americans devote themselves in Korea to experiments intended to test the effectiveness of these weapons? wonder Misters Endicott and Hagerman. The answer is positive, say, “according to documents preserved in the governmental and military files Chinese” and according to the report/ratio of a Canadian expert who concluded that, “in spite of some anomalies ( sic ), the Chinese indices were reliable. ” Misters Endicott and Hagerman admit however that “among the refutations the best known ones” of the Chinese charges and North-Koreans appears “a report/ratio written by three Canadian scientists at the request of the US government. ” In a article published the June 27th 1999 in the NewYork Times , ED Governed, professor in Rutgers University and author of The Biology off Doom: The History off America' S Secret Germ Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1999), stress that, in their work, Endicott and Hagerman recognize implicitly that 20 years of research did not enable them to discover only one American document of files which would prove an unspecified use of the bacteriological weapon in Korea and China. They accept the documents of circumstance provided by the Chinese and the North-Koreans without the least analysis as for their reliability, said professor Regis, whereas it is known pertinently that the Chinese and the North-Koreans récrivaient the history with an aim propagandist, and that they on the means, the reasons and the occasion to forge evidence. Consequently, he concludes, the extremely contestable allegation of Endicott/Hagerman (“ to their extraordinary dubious claim ”) is equivalent in fact to an exculpation of the defendant.

The Historien S highlighted that the American bacteriological war existed forever and that it was assembled of all parts by the Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett, which was an agent of influence working on behalf of the USSR. The French journalist Pierre Daix showed as of 1976 in his work I believed in the morning how the Australian one had built this business.

An established fact: the massive use of napalm

Beyond “the extremely contestable allegation” (ED Governed) of Endicott and Haverman, the Napalm was, according to the American historian Bruce Cummings, used on more large scales that during the Guerre of Vietnam and the damage were more important because of greater concentration of the Korean population.

The question of the responsibilities and the massacres

This fatal and fratricidal war, which did not bring almost any territorial change, left the impression of a national Suicide for which the current historiographic currently dominating in Occident and Russia allots the principal responsibility to the North Korea. (cf).

Before the opening of the files of the the Kremlin, historians had been able to hold for persons in charge of the external powers, the United States de Truman but especially the USSR of Stalin, which would have made deviate a simple local ideological opposition (Communism against capitalism) in an open war. However, the Soviet documents of files, although disputed by the authorities North-Korean, attest on the contrary that the North Korea considered long time the offensive of June 25th, 1950, in dialog with the Soviets, who did not give “a not very enthusiastic downstream following permanent requests. ” Consequently, according to the actual position of documentation, “the assumption (…) according to which the war of Korea would have been an initiative of Stalin is incorrect. ”

Heo Man-Ho underlines however that the initiative North-Korean should not occult the preparations, at this stage much less advanced, of South Korea, just as the many border incidents which would have caused close to 100  000 died before dated June 25th, 1950. Raymond Aron, for its part, speaks about the “Korean accident” of the American diplomacy, to highlight that this one carries a share of “political responsibility ”: the speech of Dean Acheson would have transmitted to the the Kremlin a message lending to an erroneous interpretation and, in addition, the Americans, by withdrawing their troops of South Korea, would have created a vacuum which the North Korea was tempted to fill by an aggression “with the direction more believed of the term”.

During the war, massacres of civilians and prisoners occurred on both sides, any conflict giving place to gravely hurts with the rights of the people, in each camp

Always nowadays, of tens of thousands of South-Koreans and the thousands of Westerners makes captive by North are carried missing. Those being released having been treated hard and having been subjected to a Washing of brain in the goal to change their political opinions, the North Korea and the Popular republic of China not being signatories of the Geneva Convention of 1949. The proportion of losses in the prisoners of war in the camps North-Korean and Chinese, according to certain studies, reached 43%.

Prisoners, like the North-Korean IH In-Mo, remained imprisoned in the South during more thirty-four years after the armistice, where they were subjected to a program of " conversion" comprising the recourse to the Torture with an aim which they disavow their communist convictions: many prisoners died because of the ill treatments to which they were subjected (blows of stick, forced water ingestion by the nostrils, burns, electrocution…).

Thus, the South-Koreans and the Americans give a report on many war crimes committed by the North-Koreans. Testimonys and documents attest that, at the time of their offensive, the services North-Korean “purified” cities occupied by shooting the civils servant and the “enemies of class” remained on the spot, and that several tens (at least) South Korean and American soldiers were carried out after their capture. In addition, at the time of the counter-offensive of the the United Nations in September 1950, they set fire to the Prison of Sachon in which 280 police officers were locked up, Fonctionnaire South Korean S and landowners. With Anui, Mokpo, Kongju, Hamyang and Chongju, one found mass grave S containing several hundreds of body, among which women and children. Close to the airfield of Taejon, 500 South Korean soldiers, the hand tieds behind the back, were killed out of a ball in the head. Between on September 24th and on October 4th, always in the area of Taejon, one discovered the corpses of 5  000 with 7  000 assassinated South Korean civilians, like those of 40 American soldiers.

The North-Koreans on their side showed the forces of the United Nations - and more particularly the Americans - similar crimes. Thus, of the American documents of files quoted by the BBC prove that American soldiers killed a “number not confirmed” of refugees with Nogun-IH, in July 1950.

The stake of the war of Korea - reunification of the peninsula in a context of tensions between superpuissances - and the practical difficulty to undertake a work of historical research which would confront the direct sources, so much in North than in the South, must however lead to a certain prudence in the standpoint, in particular with regard to the question of the responsibilities - without to challenge the documentary obviousness, because “the renouncement of the historian of his trade is likely to lead at worst the ideological use of the history. ”

The French participation

See also: French Forces in the war of Korea

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