The war of Kippour (in Hebrew: מלחמתיוםהכיפורים), also called war of the Ramadan in the Arab world or war of October (in Arab حربتشرين) or Israeli-Arab war of 1973 opposed, of the October 6th to the October 24th 1973, Israel with a coalition carried out by the Egypt and the Syria.

The day-even of the fast of Yom Kippour/“Great Forgiveness” by the Jews, the Egyptians and the Syrians attacked by simultaneously surprised in the peninsula of the the Sinai and on the plate of the respectively Egyptian Golan, territories and Syrian which were occupied by Israel since the Guerre the Six Day old. After 24 to 48 hours of advanced Arab armies, the tendency was reversed in favor of the Israeli army which ends up pushing back the Syrians out of the plate of Golan at the end of 2 weeks and went beyond the Suez Canal in the Egyptian territory when the Cessez-le-feu required by the the United Nations was applied. This spectacular inversion of situation is in particular due to the American military aids. Washington establishes in fact an airlift of routings of weapons in Israel the October 14th to counter the airlift and maritime Soviet places on October 9th from there.

The Safety advice of the United Nations in co-operation with both Superpuissance S via the the United Kingdom required a cease-fire to leave room to the negotiations. Israel benefitted from it to rearm and take the top. The incapacity of the Israeli secret services to detect the signals of the war and the Israeli recourse to the trick will have as a consequence a political shockwave and in particular the resignation of the Prime Minister Golda Meir.

This episode of the Israeli-Arab Conflit made lie the reputation of invincibility of Israel especially that the psychological impact of the first days of the war to the advantage of the Arab countries brought to the standardization of the relations between Israel and Egypt and to the opening of the peace negotiations which led to the agreements of Camp David in 1978 and to recovery by the Egyptians of the peninsula of the Sinai, occupied by Israel after the Six day old war of 1967. Another consequence of this war was oil crisis of 1973, when OPEC decided the increase of 70% of the price of the barrel of petrol like reducing its production.

Context

Situation of the belligerents before the war

Several wars had already taken place between Israel and the Arab countries of the the Middle East since the Plan of division of Palestine and the Declaration of Independence of the Hebrew State by David Ben Gourion in 1948. At the conclusion of the war of 1967, Israel had conquered important territories with its neighbors and built fortifications on the Golan and in the the Sinai in order to protect itself militarily from the specific attacks which occurred on the new borders. In particular, 500 million dollars had been spent in 1971 in the construction of the line Bar Lev along Eastern bank of the Suez Canal.

However, after the death of the Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in September 1970, its successor Anouar el-Sadate, although more moderated, decided to restore the sovereignty of the Egypt on the whole of its territory. Following the proposal of the U.N. intermediary Gunnar Jarring, Sadate was declared “ready to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel” against a Israeli engagement to apply the resolution 242 (1967) of the the United Nations . But the Israeli leaders, being wary, made prevail the military security that the control of the Sinai ensured them. As, certain analysts explained as after 3 years of being able, the disastrous economic situation of Egypt obliged Sadate to take unpopular measures and that a victorious military operation against Israel, even minor, thus asserted themselves like a good option to return to him a certain popularity near its people mined by the humiliation of 1967. On its side, Hafez el-Assad had reinforced its army firstly in order to return to Syria its row military power within the Arab countries. It prepared to take again Golan by the force then to obtain greater Israeli concessions later by supporting the new Palestinian claims formulated by the young person PLO. In addition, king Hussein of Jordan feared to enter possible a new conflict and especially of new losses for his kingdom (the West Bank had been lost in 1967), the more so as the crisis of the black September of 1970 and the coup attempt of State of PLO of Yasser Arafat in Jordan had created a cold between Hussein and the Syrian and Palestinian positions. The Iraq also refused to fight at the side of the Syria with which the relations were tended. The Lebanese armies as for them were too weak to take share with the engagements.

During month preceding release by the war, Sadate tried a diplomatic offensive to obtain the support of the countries of the Arab Ligue, Mouvement of non-aligned the and Organization of African Unity. It also obtained the assistances British and Frenchwoman with the Safety advice of UNO as well as the supply material by the FRG before the war.

The climbing towards the war

As from 1972, Sadate announces openly that its country is ready to leave in war against Israel, leaves with " to sacrifice a million soldats"! Its army is reinforced by the Soviet contribution of Mig-23, ground-to-air missiles SA-6, rockets anti-tank RPG-7 and of anti-tank guided missiles AT-3 Sagger. On strategic planning, the generals overcome at the time of the rout of 1967 are replaced. The lessons of the preceding war in the field of the armament led Sadate to threaten the USSR to turn to American if Egypt does not receive weapons with the point of technology. The Soviets are thus constrained to equip Egypt to make it able to compete with Israel, itself equipped by American military industry.

The Soviet Union however seeks to avoid a new confrontation arabo-Israeli not to be in open conflict with the United States, whereas the Détente is engaged and that they have little interest to see a destabilization of the Middle East. The two super powers meet in Oslo and agree to seek a status quo. By learning this information, the Egyptians, who prepare to pass Suez Canal, decide to expel the Russians. In July 1972, 20000 Soviet military advisers are returned from Egypt and the Egyptian foreign policy becomes more favorable to the Americans. The Soviets estimate that the chances of an Egyptian victory are weak and that an attack against the fortifications of Suez could be expensive in human losses. On several occasions, president Brejnev tries to avoid the confrontation while recommending to Israel to return at the borders of before-1967.

But Egypt continues to threaten Israel and Sadate is said ready, on October 24th, 1972, to enter in war even without the support of the USSR. Military exercises with large scales including in its Arab neighbors maintain the level of maximum alarm in Israel. The commands of the Arab armies secretly coordinated their plan of attack. The code name of joint operation between Syria and Egypt was baptized Badr operation, which means Full moon in Arabic (in reference to the battle of Badr, one of the first military victories of the Mohammed prophet against the inhabitants of Mecque however higher of number).

Attacks surprised

The Israeli secret services, in their evaluation of the risks of an attack, were based on several starting assumptions:

• Syria could not have entered in war without Egypt.
• an Egyptian, known adviser under the name of “the Source” (of the rumors go on the son-in-law of Nasser, Achraf Marwan), specified that Egypt wished to reconquer the whole of the Sinai but that the Egyptian army awaited the Soviet contribution of fighter-bombers to neutralize the Israeli air forces and of missiles Scud directed towards the Israeli cities to dissuade from possible attacks against the Egyptian infrastructures.
• the fighter-bombers were to arrive at the end of August and to require 4 months of training of the Egyptian soldiers. Moreover, the observers announced that the expulsion of the Soviet advisers by the Egyptians was to weaken the Egyptian army.

These are the assumptions which prevailed against all the alarms announced to the Israeli services. The Egyptians continuously drowned the military observers of false informations on imaginary problems of maintenance or staff shortage trained on the advanced equipment. In May and August 1973, the military exercises carried out by the Egyptian troops at the border had mobilized the Israeli army with a cost of 10 million dollars by twice.

Throughout the week preceding Yom Kippour, the Egyptian exercises multiplied close to the Suez Canal and of the movements were observed at the Syrian border but the Israeli Intelligence did not consider plausible an attack without the Soviet armament.

In spite of the refusal of king Hussein of Jordan to join the Syrian and Egyptian troops, it had most probably (according to Rabinovich) informed summer of the attack to come in terms vague during the preparation between the Arab leaders. In the night of September 25th, king Hussein secretly travelled by the plane to warn Israeli the Prime Minister Golda Meir in Tel Aviv of the imminence of a Syrian attack.

In a way enough surprising, the warning was not taken into account. According to the Israeli reports/ratios, in spite of tens of alerting signs, the Mossad continued to consider improbable the option of a war started by the Arab countries. It was the meeting of the chief of Mossad, Zvi Zamir, with " Source" in Europe which ends up making react the high command of Defense forces of Israel to a few hours of the attack. Reservists were partially mobilized. The mobilization was ironically facilitated by the fact that the troops were generally with the synagog or on their premises for the day of the Yom Kippour .

Contrary to the preceding wars, the factor surprised has this time used against the Israelis

Absence of Israeli preventive attack

The Israeli strategy was to envisage a preventive attack if the war were imminent. It was expected that the secret services give a 48 hours notice.

However, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan and the general David Elazar had met the morning of Yom Kippour, 6 hours before the attack. Dayan always doubted the imminence of the war while Elazar thought of an attack planned in Syria against its air forces, then its missiles and its forces on the ground. But the argument which played was the risk that Israel can need assistance thereafter. However, a European help would be blocked by Arab threats of embargo on oil as that had already occurred concerning ammunition. Israel could thus count only on the American assistance which was conditioned by the first attack . If Israel had attacked in first (even in a preventive way), no help would have come from the United States. That was confirmed by Henry Kissinger later.

Unfolding of the war

In the Sinai

Contrary to 1967, the Egyptian units chose not to advance beyond the cover which their batteries of missiles SAM ensured that they had installed to protect the lines from cease-fire of 1967. The air forces on which Israel had put the essence of its military investments could thus nothing try against them.

The Egyptians start vast air raids against Israeli radars, batteries and three airports. During this bombardment the Egyptians just lost 11 planes including one controlled by the brother of Egyptian president Atif Sadate. During their crossing of Suez Canal, the Egyptians lost 4000 soldiers out of the 8000 who constituted the first wave.

Anticipating a rapid counter-attacks Israeli army, the Egyptians retorted with weapons able to destroy tanks and with the destroying missiles Sagger. An Egyptian soldier on three was armed against the tanks. The Egyptian positions on Suez Canal had been elevated in order to obtain an unquestionable advantage to draw on the Israeli tanks.

The Egyptian army surprised by its ease to create a breach in Israeli defenses and by its capacity to cross the channel in spite of strong the Bar-Lev. With method, the Egyptian forces penetrated on 15 kilometers in the desert of the Sinai thanks to the combined efforts of two brigades. The advantage of the defensive positions of the Israelis, built on sandy projecting ledges, was reduced by clever Egyptian attacks to the water cannon which facilitated strike them against these exposed stations.

Vis-a-vis the number, the forts of the line Bar-Lev yielded all except one (more in north) to the Egyptians who consolidated their initial positions. October 8th, Shmuel Gonen (which had replaced only 3 months before Ariel Sharon as a commander of the southern face) ordered a counter-attack with Hizayon whereas the Israeli tanks were particularly exposed there with the shootings of Saggers. The disaster and the night counter-attack of the Egyptians who followed were stopped only by the division of Ariel Sharon who imposed a relative lull. The two armies were posted then in a defensive position. Rehandlings in the command of the Israeli troops were done then: Gonen, replaced with the head by Elazar and Bar-Lev, of return of its retirement. October 9th Golda Meir launches a call < save Israel > and the United States answered this call by sending weapons to Israel.

After several days of waiting, Sadate again ordered the offensive in order to facilitate the Syrian pressures in the north of Israel. These new attacks were launched on October 14th and were a failure. Indeed, the successive frontal attacks ridged on the folded up Israeli troops, surprisingly armed by American weapons very last thing brought by an airlift established to the beginning with the war. The daily losses rose between 150 and 250 tanks per day, according to an Israeli source.
Starting from October 15th, the Israelis changed tactic and attacked thanks to their infantry which infiltrated with feet to the batteries of ground-to-air missiles and anti-tank.

A division ordered by general major Ariel Sharon attacked the Egyptian line at its weakest point, between the positions defended by the Second Egyptian Army with north and the Third Army in the south. It opened a fault in the Egyptian line and reached Suez Canal. A smaller troop passed the channel and constituted a bridge to rejoin other troops thanks to inflatable dinghies on the channel. Once the anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles neutralized thanks to the American missiles M72, the infantry could again count on the support of these army corps. Thanks to the American supply of the most modern weapons, the division of Avraham " Bren" Adan could set up a floating bridge in the night from October 16th to 17th and cross it towards the south, in order to cut the road to the Third Egyptian Army which tried to be folded up in the west. At the same time, the batteries of SAM missiles in the east were destroyed.

Before the war does not stop, an Israeli division was with 101 kilometers of the Egyptian capital Cairo.

On the plate of Golan

On the Plate of Golan in altitude, the Syrians attacked the Israelis. They sent five divisions and 188 batteries of artillery against the two brigades and the eleven batteries of defense of the Israelis. At the time of the attack, only 180 tanks faced the few 1400 Syrian tanks, equipped for the night combat. Syrian commandos parachuted by helicopter immediately took the most important Israeli bastion of monitoring on the Mont Hermon.

The confrontations on the plate of Golan very quickly become the priority of Defense forces of Israel which as soon as possible sends mobilized reservists to it, because the fall of Golan would have made it possible to the Syrians to infiltrate easily ahead in the Israeli territory. The reservists are sent directly in tanks on the face, without awaiting even the calibration of the guns.

Like the Egyptians in the Sinai, the Syrians use the anti-tank weapons provided by the Soviets and remain under the protection of their batteries of SAM missiles. However, the shootings against the tanks are less effective on this ground than in the desert.

Contrary to the Syrian forecasts which had estimated that the Israeli reservists would arrive on the face only at the end of one day, Israel manages to mobilize its units and to send them to the face after only 15 hours of engagements.

At the conclusion of the first day, the Syrians, however much less armed than theirs opposite Israeli, obtained a victory. They are about to control the important junction of Nafekh (which is also the Israeli general headquarter of the plate). Then during four days, the seventh Israeli brigade ordered by Yanush Ben Gall resists to preserve the northern side of their general headquarter of Nafekh. In the south, the brigade " Barak ", not protected by natural obstacles, essuie of heavy losses. The Commander Colonel Shoham dies in the first days of engagements, whereas the Syrians hopelessly try to advance to reach the Lac of Tibériade.

The wind turns starting from October 8th, on arrival of the new Israeli reservists and of new American weapons which manage to block the Syrian offensive then, on October 10th, to push back it beyond the Purple Line , the border of before the war.

Rabinovich tells that the debate was then intense on the question of continuing the counter-attack inside the Syrian borders. The defeat of Shmuel Gonen in the the Sinai had occurred two days earlier and still marked the spirits. Some considered wise to remain on the defensive on the plate of Golan rather than to engage on the Syrian plains but, four days would have been necessary to send the troops of Golan in the Sinai and the Israeli total assessment was then negative: loss of ground in the Sinai and status quo in north. The decision was thus made to pass the Purple Line as of on October 11th.

From October 11th to 14th, the Israeli push brought them to 40 km of the suburbs of Damas which were with the range of artillery. The king Hussein of Jordan decided whereas the situation required the intervention of its army. Certain sources pay thus that it did what is necessary to send Jordanian troops in support for the Syrians while avoiding being attacked by the Israelis at its own borders. The latter did not wish either to open a third face. In addition, Iraq dispatched some 30  000 men, 500 tanks and 700 APC. The combined efforts of the Arab armies prevented Israel from more advancing.

October 22nd, the Israeli brigades recovered the position of the Mont Hermon in spite of heavy losses due to the gunners Syrian franc-tireurs. The losses of the attacks against this position were heavy but the top of the mount was occupied by a brigade Israeli parachutist following a breach bored by a D9 bulldozer of the infantry.

At sea

The battles naval of Latakia between Syriens and Israelis is held the October 7th, second day of the conflict. It is a resounding Israeli victory which shows in particular the effectiveness of the military ships equipped with the means of self-defense ECM. The Israeli navy was definitively to acquire the naval superiority in the Mediterranean with one second victory, gained the October 9th with Damiette over the Egyptian navy.

In addition, as well Israeli navy as its counterpart Egyptian woman assembled several attacks and operations commando (carried out by naval frogmen) against the unfavourable naval bases.

At the conclusion of the conflict, the assessment of the naval war is very favorable to Israel which is essential very clearly vis-a-vis its adversaries, their sliding ring or seriously damaging 15 buildings for the loss of two light patrol craft (in Red Sea, vis-a-vis the Egyptians).

Contribution of the other Arab countries

The contributions of the other Arab countries are not very precise. The Saudi Arabia and the Kuwait especially provided an financial aid and, in way symbolic system, some soldiers on the face. The Morocco sent three troops on the whole of 5450 men who carried out an opening during the conflict which could stop the Israeli troops beyond Sassa, the Pakistan sent sixteen pilots and of the Palestinian troops also united with the Arab armies. From 1971 to 1973, the Libya sent Mirage S and 1 billion dollar to help the effort of Egyptian armament. The Algérie also sent hunters, bombers and tanks. It was the second military power on the Egyptian face and its force was made up of a squadron of tactical bombers Known-7 escorted by a squadron of Mig-21 hunting. A third squadron equipped with Mig-17 was sent for missions of supports. The Algerian pilots were this time more prepared and more aguerris thanks to the war of attrition. It was the only Arab air force not to have lost apparatuses with the combat, only Mig-17 was touched by Israeli Phantom. In spite of the gravity of the blow the Algerian pilot succeeds in making crush the Mig one close to his base of fastener all while ejecting himself and while avoiding being made capture. The Algerian planes had achieved all their missions which consisted in attacking the Israelis in the Sinai and to protect Cairo from any Israeli counter-offensive. The Tunisia sent a quota of 1000 soldiers near the Egyptian forces in the delta of the Nile. The Sudan sent 3500 soldiers and the radio Ugandan also mentioned Ugandan combatant.

Cease-fire and shortly after war

The Safety advice of the the United Nations adopts the October 22nd 1973 the Résolution 338 (1973), negotiated by the the United States and the Soviet Union, which reaffirms the validity of the resolution 242 (1967), adopted during the Guerre the Six Day old and calls all the parts with the conflict (the Egypt, the Syria, Israel, the Jordan) with an immediate cease-fire and negotiations in sight “to found a peace fair and lasting in the Middle East”. The cease-fire becomes effective twelve hours later at 7 p.m. on the ground, with fallen the night.

Situation of the encircled Egyptian army

At this moment, the Israeli forces are to a few hundred meters of the road of Cairo. Elazar and Dayan agree to take the road which leaves towards the south and thus encircle the Third Egyptian Army in the west of the Suez Canal. In the morning, the Soviet reconnaissance flights observe the projection which the Israeli army carried out during the night and the USSR shows Israel of treachery. Especially, this situation offers to the United States a strategic opportunity: to obtain from Egypt which it definitively left the Soviet influence in exchange of the Third Army, which however is encircled without supply by the Israeli troops much fewer. The exit of this battle was thus dubious.

Soviético-American nuclear threat

Brejnev sends a letter to Nixon in the night from October 23rd to 24th so that Americans and Soviets ensure the respect of the cease-fire on the ground. He threatens even the United States to intervene at the sides of Egypt like had made the United States if they do not act in this direction. Nixon, weakened by the Scandale of Watergate is not consulted by its advisers who take measures of appeasing to put a term at the crisis with the USSR. Nikolai Podgorny entrusted later that it had been surprised by the fear of the Americans. The Soviets would probably not have started the Third World war because of this war in the Middle East. The answer of the United States was to lower the level of alarm of DEFCON and to suggest in Sadate giving up its request for assistance to the Soviets, which it accepts the next morning.

Lull on the northern face

On the northern face, the Syrians had planned a massive counter-attack for on October 23rd. The five Syrian battalions are helped by two Iraqi battalions and some troops of the other Arab countries of which Jordan. The Soviets replaced all the tanks lost by the Syrians in the first weeks of combat. Bombarded Damas, Assad requires Moroccan troops a disengagement going until taking them for target imprisoning of the Moroccan senior officers.

However, the attack day before envisaged, the United Nations impose the cease-fire which had already been accepted by Egypt and Israel on the southern face. Hafez el-Assad decides to give up the offensive and accepts the cease-fire on October 23rd. Iraq points out its troops.

Rabinovich tells that Syria could have continued the combat without Egypt and that certain Syrian generals were favorable there, but that could have meant the destruction of the Third Egyptian Army and Syria could not any more have counted on a possible Egyptian help if Israel had ended up threatening Damas.

Negotiations of post-war period

The organized combat on all fronts ended in the neighborhoods of on October 26th. That did not prevent sporadic shootings nor did not dissipate the military tensions related to the Third Egyptian Army always captive and isolated without supply.

Israel accepted the threat of Kissinger to support a withdrawal at UNO, but a proposal of Sadate at the United States to negotiate directly with Israel the supply of the regiment leads more quickly to the final cease-fire.

The discussions took place on October 28th between general majors Aharon Yariv (Israeli) and Muhammad Al-Ghani Al-Gamasy (Egyptian). They agreed on the exchange of the prisoner of war and the Israeli checkpoints and an peace agreement was found at the top which followed to Geneva. January 18th, Israel signed an agreement of withdrawal of the western part of Suez Canal and withdrew its troops on March 5th.

A diplomatic to and from of Henry Kissinger leads to an agreement of disengagement on May 31st, 1974, based on the prisoner exchange, the Israeli withdrawal until the Purple Line and the establishment of a buffer zone controlled by UNO. A troop of United Nations observers was also established in Golan to guarantee peace.

Assessment of the war

Human account

Israeli side:

• 3.020 dead
• 8.135 wounded

Arab side coalition (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq):

• 8.528 dead

• 19.540 wounded

Source: www.net4war.com/e-revue/dossiers/kippour73/kippour16.htm

Long-term consequences of the war

The discussions of peaces which proceeded at the end of the War of Kippour were the first carried out directly between Arab and Israeli leaders.

For the Arabs (Egyptian in particular), the traumatism of the defeat of the Guerre the Six Day old was cured and that allowed them in a certain way of negotiating with the Israelis on an equal footing. However, if the Arab plan during the war had started exactly as envisaged, it had finally led to show that Israel could not be overcome militarily. The largely shared conviction was whereas peace negotiations could make it possible to obtain what could not have been gained on the ground.

The Israeli population, as for it, had been shocked by the difficult beginning of the war and the lack of vigilance of its too sure soldiers of them. The losses were however as important in three weeks of combat as those undergone by the United States in Vietnam in one decade (40  000 died in Vietnam).

In reaction to the American support for Israel, the Arab countries decided, on October 17th, 1973, of an embargo on oil bound for the Western states. That brought the oil crisis of 1973.

Political crisis in Israel

In Israel, this war constituted a true electric shock. Many myths of the Israeli company crumbled: invincibility of the army, infallibility of the intelligence services. Israeli population forever known hitherto of so serious moral crisis. It will be necessary to await the miasma of the Lebanese conflict, Intifada then the assassination of the Prime Minister Ytzhak Rabin, to witness a questioning of such an importance. The brand image of Israel moreover was degraded throughout the world, reinforcing a little more diplomatic insulation of the Hebrew State. Its privileged relations with the American ally knew real sudden starts

Four months after the end of the war, of the protests of anger started to protest against the Israeli government and Dayan in particular. An investigation into the events of the first days of the war and those having preceded it was required: the commission Shimon Agranat.

The results were published on April 2nd, 1974 and nominated six persons having responsibilities in the errors having weakened Israel.

• the general David Elazar was thorough with the resignation compared to the erroneous assumptions of the situation and the preparation of the war.
• Eli Zeira of the Information and the deputy Aryeh Shalev was also thorough with the resignation.
• the lieutenant-colonels Bandman and Gedelia left the secret services.
• the commander of the southern face, Shmuel Gonen, was dislocated of its functions in the Army to have put troops in a dangerous situation having brought their capture, after the final report of the commission, to have given on January 30th, 1975.

The responsibilities for Dayan and Meir were not recognized, which continued to dissatisfy the Israeli public opinion which claimed their resignation (especially that of Moshe Dayan).

Finally, Golda Meir resigned on April 11th, 1974, involving the end of its government. Meir had before refused the resignation of Dayan by twice. Yitzhak Rabin, which had been the adviser of Elazar, took the head of the new government in June.

Israeli nuclear option?

According to some, the Israelien government would have threatened to use the nuclear weapon when it was in difficulty vis-a-vis the attack égypto-Syrian woman. The decision would have was secretly made on October 8th by the Prime Minister Golda Meir and by the Minister for defense Moshe Dayan: 13 nuclear warheads of 20 kilotons are deployed to be launched on Egypt and Syria by missiles Jericho I (built by Israel on French project) and by fighter-bombers provided by the United States.

A conflict rich in military lesson

The war of Kippour ultimately seems a conflict more balanced and more disputed than the image which was often presented by it. The report/ratio of the involved forces proved less unbalanced than than the authorities Arab and Israeli a long time implied. The real impact of the material aid provided by the two great powers to their respective allies was not as decisive as what the Americans and the Soviets claimed a long time.

This war constitutes the first conflict mechanized of high intensity since the end of the second world war. It showed the importance of the information to counter the effect of surprise. It made it possible to validate, moderate or reject certain operational concepts. It was used as testing ground with many recent weapons, which had not on the occasion to undergo the real test of fire. It showed once again that quality overrode the quantity and that the Human factor always played a crucial role in the control of the battle.

The High technology had a considerable impact on the unfolding of the engagements. The concept of C3I was essential like a fundamental data of the modern combat. The effectiveness of the missiles, although real, was however exaggerated. The tank and the plane showed that they remained the essential vectors of the mechanized combat, with the proviso of being integrated in an environment interarmes ensuring support and protection to them. If the Military aviation played a big role during the conflict, this one was not as decisive as in June 1967. Contrary to the Six Day old war, in fact indeed the tanks have this time open the way to the planes. The power and the effectiveness of the air weapon were thus over-estimated, like little time before at the time of the Guerre of Vietnam, then eighteen years later at the time of the war of the Gulf. Once more, the events showed that the war was lost or gained itself on the ground. In a more total way, the need for an approach interarmées, even interallied, was essential like one of the major stakes for the effective control of a conflict of scale.

Camp David agreements

detailed Article Camp David agreements

From now on on an equal footing of the equitable negotiation could then start. The Rabin government, put in difficulty by scandals, was obliged to cause anticipated elections in 1977. The party of the Likoud gained these elections then and formed a government with for Prime Minister Menahem Begin.

Sadate, which had entered in war to recover the the Sinai, was opposed by the slow rate/rhythm of the peace negotiations. In November 1977, it took an unexpected step by making an official trip in Israel, becoming thus the first Arab leader to recognize the existence of Israel de facto.

This gesture had the effect to accelerate the peace process. Jimmy Carter US president invited then unit Sadate and Begin at a top with Camp David to negotiate a final peace. The discussions proceeded from September 5th to 17th 1978 and led to the peace treaty israélo-Egyptian of 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and its establishments of all the peninsula of the Sinai in exchange of normal relations with Egypt and a durable peace.

Much in the Arab community was scandalized by this peace treaty signed by Egypt with Israel. Egypt was excluded from the Arab Ligue. Two years later, Sadate was assassinated on October 6th, 1981 whereas it attended a procession commemorating the eighth birthday of the beginning of the war. Its assassins were elements of the Army which disapproved the negotiations that he had dared to carry out with Israel.

Sources

• On the naval aspect of the conflict
• magazine Wars and conflict of today , n° 2: Israel-Syria-Egypt, 1984
• Pierre Razoux, navy quartered between projection and dissuasion , magazine Raid , out of the ordinary July 24th, th and th 2007
• Pierre Razoux, Israeli navy of yesterday with today , Marine magazine and Naval forces , number 105, October-November 2006
• Frederic Stahl, the navy Israeli 1948-2006 , magazine Ships and Histoire number 38, October-November 2006

External bond

• File on the war of Kippour with military operations and iniatives diplomatic from day to day, by Dr. Razoux Pierre, Net4War

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