War of Continuation

The war of Continuation (In Finnois Jatkosota, in Swedish Fortsättningskriget, Russian Война́-продолже́ние), is a conflict which opposed the Finland and the Soviet Union of June 25th, 1941 until September 19th, 1944, during the Second world war. The the United Kingdom declared the war in Finland actively on December 6th, 1941, but taken not share with the conflict. The Nazi Germany on the other hand, already committed in the war against the USSR, provides an important material support and its military cooperation in Finland. This conflict was formally closed with the treated of Paris of 1947.

The war of Continuation is named thus to clearly distinguish it all while connecting it with the Guerre from Winter which also opposed Finland and the USSR between the November 30th 1939 and the March 12th 1940. From the Soviet point of view, it is more or less about one of the faces of the patriotic Great War carried out against the Nazi Germany and its allies. In addition, this war was regarded as independent of the Second world war by the Finns - what was not taste of the German mode, main ally of Finland in the conflict.

Introduction

Although the war of Continuation constitutes only one conflict in margin of the Second world war, and in spite of relatively restricted manpower of the troops which took share there, its history intrigues at the same time because it calls in question the comfortable certainty of the morality of the furnished efforts by the Allies and because it calls into question the academic theories as well as the popular beliefs on the fact that democratic nations are not made the war between them. The United Kingdom and its dominions declared the war in Finland the day of its national festival of independence of 1941, however the United States did not make in the same way. Actually, the British Swordfish did nothing but bombard the German boats in the Finnish port of Petsamo, beyond the Polar circle. It is thought that for their part, the Finnish information took part in an active way in the attacks of the Germans against the English convoys towards Mourmansk.

During the conflict, Finland fought at the sides of the Germany against the common enemy Soviet, which as for him was combined with the the United Kingdom and, thereafter, with the the United States. The memory of the War of Winter of 1939, and the incapacity of Combined at the time of this conflict to give an effective support for the Finns pushed Finland then to be combined with Germany.

The assessment of the war was not really prone to controversy in Finland, and retrospectively, the consensus is rather broad there on the fact that the Finns as people would undoubtedly not have survived the war if they had not cooperated with the Nazi Germany. Finnish collective conscience, during the years 1960 - 1970, then regarded the war of Continuation as an error. Nowadays, some tend to ensure that nothing could be made to at least avoid that Finland did not rock in the war of Winter then the war of Continuation, all nothing during the last years before the war.

The principal events of the Second world war, and in general the various phases of the war had a fundamental impact on the turning of the conflict:

the invasion by Germany of the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) corresponds to few things close with the beginning of the war of Continuation.
the allied offensive in France (Battle of Normandy) was coordinated with the major offensive carried out by the Soviets against Finland (of the June 9th to the July 15th 1944), which ends in a five weeks alliance between democratic Finland and Germany (of the June 26th to the August 4th 1944).
the race towards Berlin carried out between the Americans and the Soviets involved the end of the war of Continuation, the Northern Europe not being more one relevant theater of operation.

Objectives of the war

The principal goal of Finland during the Second world war was to survive as a State democratic independent, able to maintain its sovereignty in a hostile political environment. In a specific way, at the time of the war of Continuation, Finland sought to recover the territories which it had lost after the treated of Moscow of March 1940, and to extend its territory more to the East, in order to have more not-Finnish ground to defend before the USSR does not enter in Finnish territory. In addition, some small groups of extreme right-hand side supported the ideology of the Grande Finland. The Finnish effort during the war was, from a formal point of view, a success, even if the price in terms of human losses, payments of war damagees, territorial losses, loss of reputation on a worldwide scale was heavy, and that consequently the policy of Finland had thereafter to adapt to the sights of the Soviet Union. Alliance finno-allemande was very different from the majority of the other relations between nations of the Axe. An striking example which illustrates that is the fact that the Finnish Jews took part in the engagements against the Soviets. In spite of repeated requests of the Nazis, the Finns did not estimate to have Jewish Question to solve.

Finland and Germany were thus not allied " of swears " , they were allied only " de facto ". The Finns and the Germans were only brothers in arms, fighting both against the USSR, but for different reasons. However, Finland lacked weapons in its combat against the Soviet Union, it accepted whereas the Germans attack the USSR starting from Finland in exchange of weapons. The two countries were only companions of fight, although Hitler affirmed that they were allied.

Elements of context

Before the Second world war

Although the Eastern Karelia never belonged to the Finland, a good part of its inhabitants were of Caréliens orthodoxe Finnish speaking. After the declaration of independence of Finland, voices rose claiming the annexation of Eastern Karelia in order to release it from sound " oppression". These claims led to some incursions into the zone (Expédition of Viena and Expédition of Aunus), which remained unfruitful. Finland also on several occasions raised the question of Eastern Karelia in front of the Société of the Nations, without more success.

In the circles of right-hand side, one celebrated the role which the imperial Germany had in the victory of the " Blancs" on the socialist rebels during the Finnish Civil war, although one acknowledged that one had preferred the support of the Scandinavian nations or Great Britain rather than that of Germany. The defense policy of Finland moved first of all towards the constitution of a medical cord, in which the lately independent nations like the Poland, the republics Baltic and Finland would form an alliance of mutual defense against the USSR, but when the negotiations failed, Finland turned to the SDN for its safety. The talks with the other Scandinavian States also had little success. In 1932, Finland and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact, but even the observers of the time already regarded it as without value. The peace agreement of 1920 was broken deliberately in 1937 by the Soviet Union when it prohibits the navigation of the Finnish ships between the lake Laatokka (Ladoga) and the gulf of Finland via the river Neva. One of the articles of this agreement indeed stipulated the possibility of borrowing free this route for the trading vessels.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the war of Winter

The Truce

Walk with the war

The negotiations relating to the allotment of nickel with Petsamo had lasted already for six months when the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs announced in January 1941 that the discussions were from now on to find an early conclusion. The same day, the Soviet Union stopped its cereal deliveries in Finland. The Zotov ambassador was recalled to Moscow the January 18th, and the radio of Moscow gave an account of the preparations for an offensive against Finland. The Germans stationed in the North of Norway reported that the Soviets had gathered 500 fishing vessels with Mourmansk, able to transport a division. Hitler ordered with its troops to immediately occupy (Opération Shareholder) if the Soviet Union launched its offensive on Finland.

After the failure of the talks on the mines of Nickel, the diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken during a few months. This amount of time saw, obviously, increasing the interest which Germany carried to Finland.

The German Minister for the foreign affairs sent Ludwig Weissauer in Finland the May 5th, this time to explain clearly that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union would not be started before spring 1942. Finland there brought credit, all at least in an official way, and transmitted information to Sweden and the United Kingdom. As the war was declared only two months afterwards, it is easy to understand that the Swedes and the English had the impression which the Finns had lied to them.

In spring 1941, Finland and Germany started discussions concerning a military cooperation activates, of joint operations, the pooling of the means of communication and the security of the maritime routes. Finland required an important material aid to take share with the combat against the Soviet Union at the sides of Germany, as well as guarantees concerning its independence. She also wished to find her borders of before the treaty of Moscow (and even more), the continuation of the cereal deliveries, and that the Finnish troops do not cross the border before the Soviets do not make an incursion there. The arrival of the German troops which were to take share with the Barbarossa operation began the June 7th in Petsamo.

The Finnish Parliament was informed of these negociations for the first time the June 9th, when the first orders of mobilization were emitted bound for the troops necessary to the good progress of the later phases of the general mobilization. The June 20th, the government ordered the evacuation of: 45000 people close to the Soviet border. The 21, the chief of the staff, Erik Heinrichs, was finally prevented by its German counterpart that the attack was from now on imminent.

The Finnish offensive of 1941

The Opération Barbarossa had already begun in the sectors close to the Baltic in these last hours to the June 21st, when boats German minelayers, remained with the shelter in the Finnish archipelago, reflect in place two large minefields in the gulf of Finland. These minefields proved sufficient to confine the Soviet ships of the fleet of the Baltic to the extreme is gulf of Finland. Later, the same night, of the German bombers flew along the coast to rejoin Leningrad where they mined the port and the river Neva. On their way of return, they were supplied at the aerodrome of Utti. Finland feared that the Soviet Union tried to occupy Åland, therefore the Opération Kilpapurjehdus (race of veil) was launched in the first hours of the June 22nd to occupy Åland. Soviet bombers directed their attacks against the Finnish ships during the operation, without inflicting damage. The Finnish submarines also deposited six small minefields between 8:00 and 10:00 between Suursaari and the Estonian coast in accordance with the agreements of defense having had course before war between Finland and Estonia.

The morning of June 22nd, the Gebirgskorps Norwegen German (troop of infantry of mountain " Norvège") started the Operation Shareholder and began his movement since North from Norway towards Petsamo. Finland not having allowed German attacks against the Soviet Union directly since its ground, the German forces had to cease fire with Petsamo and with Salla. There were some exchanges of shots between individuals or with more between small groups of Russian and Finnish frontier guards, but besides that the face was calm this surface.

Three days later, early the morning of the June 25th, the USSR started a major air offensive against 18 Finnish cities with 460 planes, aiming mainly their aerodromes but also the civil targets. The Soviet Union justified its attack while saying to aim at German targets in Finland, but even the English ambassador in Finland had to admit that it of it was nothing actually. Small groups of Soviet infantry attacked the Finnish side of the border towards Parikkala. During the meeting envisaged at the Finnish Parliament this June 25th, the Prime Minister Rangell, who was supposed to announce the neutrality of Finland in the conflict germano-Soviet, was constrained by the Soviet bombardments to note that again Finland was in war against the USSR. Later, Finland will sign the Pacte anti-Comintern, the November 25th 1941. The war of Continuation had just started.

The mobilized units started to make movement in direction of the border the June 21st, and were organized in defensive positions as soon as they reached their station on the border. Finland was then able to mobilize 16 divisions of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, two brigades of " Jäger" (hunters), which resembled brigades of infantry to that close that the 1st brigade of hunters (1.JPr), equipped of armoured vehicles taken to the Soviets. One also counted a handle of battalions independent, made mainly of units of frontier guards and used mainly for reconnaissance missions. The plans of the Soviet military authorities estimated that the Finns would be able to mobilize only 10 divisions of infantry, as it was the case at the time of the war of Winter, but it correctly did not take into account the purchases of materials which Finland had carried out during the inter-war period and the drive lavished on the totality of the men able to fight. In the north of Finland, one also counted two divisions of infantry of mountain allemandes, as two German divisions of infantry stationed in Salla. Another division of German infantry was on the way from Sweden towards the Karelia-Ladoga, although a regiment of reserve was redirected thereafter from there Salla worms.

When the war began, the Soviet battle order was the following:

the Soviet Union laid out in the isthmus of Karelia of its 23 {{E}} armed, composed of the 19 {{E}} and 50 {{E}} body, of the 10 {{E}} body mechanized, like 5 divisions of infantry, a division of mechanized infantry and 2 divisions armor-plated.
In Karelia-Ladoga was the 7 {{E}} armed, composed of 4 divisions of infantry.
In the area of Mourmansk - Salla stationed the 14 {{E}} armed with its 42 {{E}} army corps, composed of 5 divisions of infantry (of which one in reserve with Arkhangelsk) and an armor-plated division.
the Soviets also had of approximately 40 battalions, regiments independent and units of fortress which did not form part of the divisional structure in place.
With Leningrad, one counted finally 3 divisions of infantry and 1 army corps mechanized.

The first attack of the Germans against the air units of the USSR did not touch the units stationed on the ground in Finland, in fact the Soviets could count at this place on nearly 750 planes of the Air force and part of the 700 apparatuses of the Soviet fleet, against the few 300 aircraft which Finland could align.

The war against the Germans was not held exactly for the Soviets as envisaged at the time of the war games organized before the beginning of the conflict, and soon the High command Soviet had to take units where it found some. So although the Soviet Union had first of all the initiative in Finland, the initial air attack could not be followed effectively by an offensive on the ground of scale. The Soviets also had to order the retirement of the 10 {{E}} body mechanized like two divisions armor-plated and the 237 {{E}} division of infantry from Karelia-Ladoga, leaving the units of reserve stripped of any defense.

The reconquest of Karelia-Ladoga

At the beginning, the Finnish Army had been spread in defensive position, but the June 29th Mannerheim organized the Armée with Karelia, ordered by the Heinrichs lieutenant-general, and ordered to him to prepare the attack on Karelia-Ladoga. The Army of Karelia was made up of the VI {{E}} army corps (5 {{E}} and 11 {{E}} divisions of infantry), of the VII {{E}} army corps (7 {{E}} and 9 {{E}} divisions of infantry), as well as Groupe O (brigade of cavalry, 1 {{Re}} brigade of " Jäger" and 2 {{E}} brigade of " Jäger"). Thereafter, when the first division of infantry as two regiments of the 163e division of German infantry arrived in the area, those were assigned to the Army of Karelia.

On the other side of the face, the Soviets opposed to the Finns them 7 {{E}} armed, with the 168 {{E}} division of infantry close to Sortavala and the 71 {{E}} division of infantry in the north of Jänisjärvi (the " lake of the lièvre"). The Soviets had taken the care to prepare fortifications of countryside throughout the border until Sortavala and with the important road crossroads of Värtsilä and Korpiselkä.

The July 9th, the Finnish command ordered to pass to the attack. The Life body, ordered by the hero of the Battle of Tolvajärvi, the general major Paavo Talvela, was charged to bore Soviet defenses. The commander for that had as much as possible borrowed pieces of artillery from the other units of the Army of Karelia and even taken the 1 {{Re}} brigade of " Jäger" (colonel Ruben Lagus) of the group O. Under an intense artillery bombardment, it launched the 5 {{E}} division of infantry of colonel Koskimies in direction of Korpiselkä, the July 10th, whose defenders were completely submerged as of the next morning. Talvela was not satisfied with the lack with corrosive of Koskimies, it thus raised it of its command to the profit of colonel Lagus.

Lagus engaged the continuation against the 52e Soviet regiment of infantry in direction of the East by means of its light units, and thus reached Tolvajärvi the July 12th. It forked towards the South, using the small roads, some in so bad condition which the men were to carry there their bicycle. The July 14th, its forces cut the railway line Sortavala - Petrozavodsk, And the following day they could reach banks of the Lac Ladoga, cutting the Soviet transportation routes around the lake. The Soviets had to transfer two regiments and some battalions since the isthmus from Karelia in order to fill the open breach left in the East of the lake.

The 11th division of colonel Heiskanen had already noted (as of on July 4th) that the Soviet forces had temporarily given up their trenches on other side of the border, and had benefitted from aubaine to capture them. When the general offensive began, it had already since July 9th started to push in direction of the East starting from the captured positions, progressing on a ground without roads, and had cut the road between Korpiselkä, Värtsilä and Suistamo, on bank is of Jänisjärvi. From there, they threatened to encircle the Soviet troops stationed in the south of Korpiselkä, which pushed the latter to be cut off in Värtsilä. In order to avoid being encircled, the Soviets had to give up their position and to reprocess towards the East. The 367e Soviet regiment of infantry succeeds in until July 12th holding her positions in the north of Jänisjärvi, when the defenders of Värtsilä had had time to fold up themselves. Heiskanen continued to badger the 367e regiment with infantry by the east of Jänistärvi, and reached Jänisjoki, rejoining with the step of Jänisjärvi race to the lake Ladoga on July 16th, where Division was put in defense.

Lagus immediately continued its offensive along the north-eastern coast of the lake. The 452e regiment of motorized infantry Soviet arrived of the area of the isthmus and its first elements established defensive positions with Salmi, at the place where the Tulemajoki is thrown in the lake Ladoga. The Finns arrived at their contact on July 18th, and early the next morning they engaged the battle by crossing the river with 5 kilometers in the north of Salmi. They succeeded in cutting the roads leading to Salmi before the afternoon, then the following day they emerged in the village, from where only a few small units managed to escape surrounding. Salmi was finally taken in the first hours of July 21st.

The 5th reinforced division continued as quickly its projection as possible and crosses the old border with Rajakontu on July 22nd. During this time, a detachment carried out by colonel Järvinen had made safe the left side of the principal attack by crossing the old border with Känsäselkä and by capturing on July 19th the villages of Kolatselkä and Palalahti towards Tulemajärvi, where they also made safe the roads towards the East and North, while continuing their projection towards the South. Thus, on July 23rd, the attack on the village of Vitele was conducted by the 5th division to the West and the Järvinen detachment to North, village which was captured the next morning. Lagus tried without success to encircle the Soviet forces which were folded up and reached Tuuloksenjoki in the evening, but the tanks and the artillery Soviet managed to stop the advanced elements of Division there.

The 1st division of colonel Paalu had been able to reinforce the Life body as of on July 16th, but she did not manage to reach the frontline towards Vitele before the 20, so much this one moved quickly. From there, it compensated for the Järvinen detachment to continue its attack towards North in direction of Hyrsylä and towards the East in direction of Vieljärvi which it captured a few days later. 2nd, 24e, 28e Soviet regiments of infantry, as well as elements of 9th and 10th regiments launched a counter-offensive on July 23rd, and after 5 days of engagements the frontline is established with approximately 10 kilometers in the east of Vieljärvi.

The Soviet forces were reorganized on the face of North on July 21st, by transferring the 168e Division as well as a regiment from the 71e Division under the command of the 23e Armée, which was to defend the isthmus of Karelia. The same day, the 7th Army was reorganized in two operational groups of combat, the " Group Petrozavodsk of the Antonjuk lieutenant-general made up of a regiment of infantry, two motorized regiments, a regiment armor-plated as well as various units; and the " Southern Group " of the Tsvetajev lieutenant-general made up of a brigade of marines, two regiments motorized like one flopée of units of more reduced size.

Mannerheim knew about this rehandling, and had already ordered on July 19th that the attack is stopped on the Vitele-Vieljärvi line, whereas strong enemy formations always operated in the south-west of Jänisjärvi and that the fast projection of the troops practically offered the right side of the 5th division without protection on the coast of the lake Ladoga, where defense deserved to be reorganized.

Fears of Mannerheim were founded, when on July 19th general major Pavlov, ordering coastal defense of the lake Ladoga ordered with the 4th brigade of marines of launching operations behind the Finnish lines. During the first hours of July 24th, they unloaded with Lunkulansaari and Mantsi, two islands close to Salmi. 1st, 5th and the 11th Divisions being all elsewhere occupied, Talvela had to gather all the forces available (including a company of pontonniers) to reject the attackers with the lake. Thanks to their heavy artillery, which ran four of the fifteen boats used by the Russians, the Finns were able to isolate the Marines into three Motti S isolated, and the attempt aiming at reinforcing these groups was pushed back the morning of July 25th. One by one, the mottis remaining were reduced to silence. July 26th, the Soviets unloaded again in Mantsi and this time, they almost managed to capture all the island before Talvela does not manage to send reinforcements to it. The engagements continued until late in the night of the 27, until Soviet resistance ceased.

VIIe Finnish body (general major Hägglund) accepted the order to attack along the right side of the Life body in direction of Sortavala. However, the isthmus between the lake Ladoga and the Finnish border were relatively narrow, and the important rail junction of Matkaselkä was only with 10 kilometers of the border. It is thus not surprising that the Soviets had already started to strengthen in-depth border region, it as of after the signature of the treaty of Moscow. These fortifications were weakest of all the face of North, on this Hägglund fact decided to make there carry its principal push. The 7th division, reinforced by units of pioneers and supported by all artillery of the army corps, as well as the 19th Division and its only divisional artillery were to cut through a path in the Soviet lines.

The offensive began the evening of July 10th. As a violent one wind of storm blew on the area, it was decided that the infantry would attack without artillery support, in order to benefit as much as possible from the effect of surprise. The plan succeeds and the majority of the Soviet forces remained encircled in their holes of combat were destroyed thereafter by artillery. The next day, the 7th Division of infantry was started, encircling the enemy centers of resistance. In the morning of July 12th, the Finns managed to make irruption in the area where the Soviets had prepared minefields and fortifications.

These obstacles offered only one short respite to the Russians, while the 168e Soviet Division of infantry of colonel Bondarev was raised being a wild adversary. Inlassablement, it had new minefields, created new strengthened points and news Tranchée S, and systematically managed to break the surrounding of the Finns. The combat carried out by the 168e Division of infantry were studied thereafter in the Soviet military academies.

The 7th Finnish Division reached the Western coast of the Jänisjärvi on July 13rd, and moved then towards the South. At July 15th, its soldiers had succeeded in reaching the railway line Sortavala - Petrozavodsk with Pirttipohja and encircling its defenders there.

The 19th Finnish Division of colonel Hannuksela had the not very enviable task to attack in the sector best defended of the zone held by the 168e Soviet Division. Hannuksela decided to create a breach at the same time very narrow and very deep in the sector of the village of Niinisyrjä, broad only of 200 or 300 meters and deep of approximately 4 kilometers, in order to make yield the strengthened border region. The 58e regiment of infantry of the Juva lieutenant-colonel was to be the spearhead of the attack which began late the evening of July 10th. 58e IH fought all the night and the day according to, advancing of one kilometer and half. It became obvious that the artillery available was insufficient, one then decided to borrow that of IIe body. 58e IH continued its attack and reached the last casemates of the frontier fortifications on July 12th. Soviet 168e DI counter-attacked in order to clog the breach and to encircle 58e IH, but the Finns managed to hold the corridor, although the Soviet artillery prohibited the use of it. The 16th Finnish IH of colonel M. Laurila, who followed 58e IH, managed to open the passage the morning of July 15th.

July 15th, the 7th Division continued its attack towards the East along the railway line. July 17th, she managed to bore Soviet defenses between Jänisjärvi and Vahvajärvi. In same time, the 30e and 51e IH, depend on the 7th DI, advanced in direction of Jänisjoki, where they made junction with the 11th Finnish Division the same day. These two regiments cleaned western bank of Jänisjoki and reached the lake Ladoga on July 20th, then undertook to make safe the islands opposite Sortavala.

The 37e regiment of the 7th division accepted the order to advance towards the west, along southern bank of Vahvajärvi in order to make the junction with the 19th DI, which thus made it possible to encircle the enemy between two Divisions. Bondarev smelled the situation and ordered the retirement of Soviet 402e IH. The 19th Finnish DI continued its advance towards South-east, and between the 18 and on July 25th and of wild operations of surrounding and against-surrounding made rage before the Finns do not manage to capture the main roads and to cut the railroad between Sortavala and Matkaselkä, which was captured in its turn on July 18th. The Soviets held with 37e IH the village of Särkisyrjä July 18th and 19th, then the following village, Ilola, from July 20th to 22nd, protecting the retirement from 402e IH. Thus, on July 25th, Soviet 168e DI had succeeded in being strengthened on a frontline with the ground more favorable to defense, on a line going from the river Kiteenjoki with the river Tohmajoki, while passing by the hills of Tirimäki, Okanmäki and Voinmäki.

The valley of Jänisjoki conquered, the remainder of the 7th Division swivelled towards South-west. July 25th, it crosses Tohmajoki. The projection was slow, because the Soviets managed to hold their points strengthened on the hills, forcing the Finns to encircle them. July 28th, the 7th DI discovered a hole in the organization of Soviet defenses and 30e IH quickly slipped there and taken the hill of Voinmäki. The Finnish advanced elements managed to take in a ambush a car, which transported the Chief of Staff of Soviet 198e DI, the Sinyk lieutenant-colonel. The captured documents contained the Soviet order of counter-attack which was to begin the following day. All the units thus accepted the order to stop their projection and to prepare with defense.

The 23e Soviet Armée transferred the 198e Division since the isthmus from Karelia until Sortavala with the order to join the counter-offensive carried out by 168e DI. The objective of the attack was to take again the strip of land between Jänisjärvi and the lake Ladoga, which would generate a perilous situation for the Finnish army in the north of the lake. When the offensive began on July 29th, it failed in all points, because of the weak manpower engaged by the Soviets in the attack, and recovered information had made it possible to the Finns to prepare with the shock. The Finns took again their offensive on August 3rd against the strengthened points remaining on Tirimäki and Okanmäki, which constituted the elements advanced on the road of Sortavala, and which were finally captured on August 5th.

During this time, IIe Corps Finnish had begun its own offensive on July 31st at the narrowest point between the lake Ladoga and the Finnish border and had quickly managed to bore Soviet defenses and to advance in direction of bank of the lake, threatening the Soviet forces of surrounding. The 23e Soviet Armée cancelled its offensive and directed the 198e Division towards the South for a counter-offensive against the projection of IIe Corps Finnish. 168e DI accepted the order to be folded up in direction of the lake on August 5th. Soviet 367e IH accepted the task to defend Sortavala.

Although Sortavala did not cover any strategic interest, and that it had been neutralized de facto when the Finns had captured the islands controlling its accesses to the lake Ladoga on July 27th, the city politically remained important speaking. So rather than to continue to badger 168e DI during its retirement, the Finns concentrated their forces in order to take the city. August 12th, Sortavala was reached by the 7th Finnish DI and it was released from its Soviet occupants the 15. Only of small groups of soldiers managed to extirpate itself some.

IIe Corps Finnish cut the railway line between Viipuri and Sortavala on August 6th, and the Mannerheim on August 8th formed new Ier Corps from 2nd, 7th and 19th DI, while giving him for task to carry out the cleaning of Western bank of the lake Ladoga. IIe Corps had reached the lake on August 8th with Lahdenpohja, thus capturing the port from where Soviet 168e DI was supposed to evacuate the zone, in accordance with the received orders on July 23rd.

The 168e Soviet Division, like many disparate units, continued their retirement along the lake, while the 2nd Finnish DI tightened them of close in South-west, the 19th DI Finnish in North, and that the 7th Finnish DI continued its offensive on Sortavala. August 17th, the Soviets controlled nothing any more but one thin head of 12 kilometers broad bridge on 10 kilometers of depth, but during the days which followed, the Soviets concentrated all that they had of available in terms of naval and air units to protect the evacuation from these units. This operation was a success, and the Finns could capture only one relatively thin spoils of the reduction of this motti, not recovering " que" 40 pieces of artillery, 8 tanks, 310 vehicles, 35 tractors and 1.500 horses starveling.

On the northern side of the main axis of the Finnish offensive, Oinonen, with the Brigade of cavalry and the 2nd Brigade of hunters, accepted the order to advance to the old border. Vis-a-vis him were elements of the 52e regiment of infantry, depend on the Soviet 71e DI, the 80e detachment of guards borders and 126e IH of 71e DI, this last ordered by the major Valli (a Finnish Communist having emigrated in the USSR during the Finnish civil war). Many Caréliens, Ingriens and Communists Finnish were useful in the rows of this unit, just like of the veterans of the popular Army of Kuusinen which before fought at the time of the war of Winter.

The attacks tests began on July 7th, then the principal attack began, and the 2nd Battalion of Jaeger in the south of the group reached Tolvajärvi on July 14th. From there, it initiated a movement of surrounding towards North in direction of Ägläjärvi. The attack of the brigade of cavalry did not have a success also marked, and the Finns were constrained to encircle hill-forts prepared well by the Soviets who the attackers were unable to remove from the first blow because of their lack of support of artillery and their weak aerial cover.

During this time, the 163e German Division of general lieutenant Engelbrecht (private of a brigade and part of its artillery, diverted towards Salted during its transport) had reached the frontline with Tolvajärvi and tried to make there yield the Soviet positions on July 21st by engaging only one brigade, but without success, the enemy being raised more solid than than one waited.

A new offensive began on July 25th when two battalions of German 310e IH and one of Finnish 56e IH launched their attack along the railway close to the station of Näätäoja. In Tolvajärvi, Engelbrecht decided to use the way taken by the 2nd Battalion of hunters and ordered to them, like with a battalion German 307e IH, to capture the village of Ägläjärvi, in order to cut the way of provisioning of the Soviets in front of Tolvajärvi. The attack failed and the Soviets managed to keep open the road passing by Ägläjärvi, although they lost a deposit of material in the battle.

Engelbrecht exchanged the brigade of cavalry against two battalions of infantry which were put in defense, and ordered with the brigade cavalry to cut the road between Tolvajärvi and Ägläjärvi, while passing by the forest zones. The attack began on August 2nd and the 4, it reached the aforementioned road, to continue in direction of Tolvajärvi and Ägläjärvi. August 3rd, the 2nd Battalion of Jaeger and Ier Bataillon of German 307e IH launched their forces against Ägläjärvi, which they managed to capture the 5. The 6, they made junction with the brigade of cavalry in the south of the village. The Soviets continued their retirement in direction of Aittojoki, where they blew up the bridges and were cut off. So the troops more in north could fear to be encircled, and gave up their fortified positions on August 8th, being folded up in the east of Kuolismaa.

July 20th, the 11th Finnish DI had been raised in the sector of Jänisjoki, initially placed in reserve, then in the sector between German 163e DI and the 1st Finnish DI, opposite Hyrsylä, on August 11th. The Soviets accepted reinforcements in this sector, with on August 10th 272e DI lately made up and launched at once an attack in direction of Vieljärvi against the 1st Finnish DI, but they did not manage to advance of more than 2 kilometers in some rare places after 5 days of combat, and the attack ceased.

August 19th, the 11th Finnish DI launched an attack since Hyrsylä in direction of North, and reached the railway line of Petrozavodsk like its main roads the following day. From there, it carried on its road towards the North-East until Suvilahti, which was captured on August 21st, like worms North in direction of Tsalkki, where the last way of supply usable by the Soviets was. August 19th, the 2nd Battalion of hunters, the brigade of cavalry and German 307e IH were ruèrent on Aittojoki. The cavalry tried to encircle the Russian defenders, but the precariousness of their situation pushed the Soviets to be folded up quickly, succeeding in gathering the majority of their forces in the East before the 11th DI cut the way of the retirement to them towards Tsalkki on August 23rd. With the catch of Suojärvi, the last town of Karelia-Ladoga had been reconquered by the Finns.

Reconquest of the isthmus of Karelia

Between the Army of Karelia and the gulf of Finland three Finnish bodies were: IIe Body (2nd, 15th and 18th DI) in the north of the river Vuoksi, Ve Corps (10th DI) and IVe Body (4th, 12th and 8th DI) defending the coast. Soviet side were the XIXe Body (142e and 115e DI), the Body (43e and 123e DI), Xe mechanized Body (21e and 24e dB, 198e mechanized Division) reserves some and the 22e area of fortress, having the force of approximately a Division. Soviet Xe mechanized Body had been transferred at the end of June since the isthmus from Karelia towards the south-western area from Leningrad in order to ensure of it defense against the German projection in the area, leaving only 198e DI like reserves available for this part of the face. Ve Corps Finnish was relaxed and the 10th DI was initially reallocated in IVe Corps of the lieutenant-general Karl Lennart Oesch, then at the end of July in IIe Corps of the general major Taavetti Laatikainen as a unit of reserve. The two sides had been initially installed on the defensive, and only some attack-tests, on the scale of the company or the battalion, were undertaken by the two adversaries in order to improve their own defensive positions. The loss of their units of reserves was the signal for the Soviets of a fold in direction of a line more easily justifiable in the part more in north of this face, which they continued to strengthen in-depth, creating of the fulcrums out of wooden and concrete, trenching and having the minefields, although the Finns always advanced in order to keep the contact with the enemy. This part of the face thus remained rather calm until July 31st, 1941, when the Finnish offensive was started.

The Soviet works of fortifications had been concentrated along Vuoksi as well as roads, blow the Finns concentrated their efforts on the narrow ones and deep breaches practiced in zones deprived of roads, where the genius contributed its share in the shape of roads and temporary bridges making it possible the reinforcements to cross wood and the marshes. The 18th DI of colonel Pajari attacked, while passing by the forest, more in north of the zone defended by Soviet 115e DI, and rather than to follow the roads, it started by making safe a first section of way met, then continued to progress through the forest to the following road where it made in the same way. The portions of roads thus made safe were then occupied by more powerful units, which had to be defended against Soviet counter-attacks supported by tanks. During one of these counter-attacks, the soldier Vilho Rättö captured a Soviet anti-tank gun, and while aiming only with the gun, managed to destroy 4 Soviet tanks, gained here the first Croix of Mannerheim decreed with a private. August 4th, the Finns had finally succeeded in encircling and taking the road of Ilmee, thus forcing the Soviets to give up their fortified positions between Ilmee and the border. The principal push of the 15th DI of colonel Hersalo related against the 588e regiment of Soviet 142e DI, to a broad face only of 2 kilometers, sector where the majority of artillery available carried. After having bored beyond the frontier fortifications, the troops advanced of 5 kilometers through the wooded areas before reaching the road thus working around Soviet defenses, which were encircled and captured with one by troops coming following the elements from head. After six days of progression, the 15th DI was not any more but with three kilometers of the Viipuri-Sortavala railway and 15 kilometers of the Western angle of the lake Ladoga, almost encircling the Soviet forces on their left side. The 2nd DI of colonel Blick decided to encircle two battalions of the 461e DI which defended Tyrjä by encircling the village since the East then by pushing back the defenders on banks of the lake Tyrjänjärvi with the 7th IH while 28e IH would exceed the village and would advance towards the South. But the Soviets, supported by their artillery, held good during 4 days before they are encircled. Certain men were able to flee by the forest, but the majority of them as all heavy equipment remained wedged in the village. However, the Finns knew heavy losses in these engagements, and the 7th IH accepted then the designation of Tyrjän rykmentti (the regiment of Tyrjä). The catch of Tyrjä opened the road of the rail junction of Elisenvaara and on August 5th the first Finnish units reached the Viipuri-Sortavala line.

The commander of the 23e Soviet Armée, general lieutenant M. Gerasimov, ordered on August 4th that 198e DI ceased its counter-attack close to Sortavala and moved towards the South in order to attack in company of 142e DI the 2nd Finnish DI which progressed. During this time, the 43e and 115e DI were to occupy the Finnish reserves. Unfortunately, it was not sufficient and 115e DI was folded up on the river Helisevänjoki, where the surrounding river and hills constituted a good ground of defense against the 18th Finnish DI. The latter advanced to the river and reached the Viipuri-Sortavala line with the level crossing of Inkilä on August 8th. The 10th Finnish DI of colonel Sihvo had also received the order to advance between 15th and the 18th DI and it reached on August 6th the same railway line. The 10th DI continued its offensive in direction of the line Käkisalmi - Hiitola, but the Soviets maintained until August 8th the way opened, date on which the Finns took the village of Hiitola. When the first elements of the 10th DI arrived on banks of the lake Ladoga the following day, the last terrestrial way of communication with the Soviet troops defending the north-western coast of the lake Ladoga had ceased existing. The Soviets tried to reopen a passage August 10th and 11th at the time of furious counter-attacks, but without success.

During this time, the rail junction of Elisenvaara came to be captured by the 28e regiment of the 2nd DI, then making possible the routing of reinforcement per railway from Finland. After the battle of Tyrjä, the 7th regiment of the 2nd DI was entitled to two days of rest - as a unit of reserve - before taking again the attack along the railway line in direction of the borough of Lahdenpohja, which it captured on August 8th, thus crossing into two the head of Soviet bridge in the area. The same day, the 2nd DI was transferred under the orders from Ier Corps lately made up, with the order to clean the northern part of the Soviet head of bridge, while the operations in its southern part fell to 15th and 10th DI where the Soviet 142e and 198e DI had received the order to be folded up, in order to re-embark in the island of Kilpolansaari. This retirement occurred under good conditions and the Finns could not encircle important Soviet formations. August 11th, the 15th DI took possession of the rail junction of Hiitola and on August 13rd, all the forces of the Red Army had been forced to fold up itself in the peninsula of Huiskonniemi and the island of Kilpolansaari. Having a total control of the airspace, the Soviets succeeded in re-embarking the near total of the men and of the material taken in the bow net of the head of bridge and on August 23rd, the 15th DI, then left only exert its pressure on the Soviets, had finished some with the last elements of the rear-guard in the sector.

The Red Army intended to launch a counter-offensive of great scale on August 10th and to this end, the 23e Armée had received the reinforcement of 265e DI in the sector of Räisälä. The offensive was to be directed against 10th and 18th Finnish DI, with for objective opening a passage making it possible to encircle the forces stationed along the north-western coast of the lake Ladoga. At the same time, the 18th DI had been put at rest, and received the order to take again its projection the same day. In fact, when the Soviets started their attack with Inkilä, Finnish launched theirs only 5 kilometers more to the west. While the Soviet attack did not manage to gain ground, the Finns succeeded in cutting the principal way of provisioning of the Soviets and the Finnish counter-attack which followed forced the Russians to be folded up towards the South by undertaking combat of delayed-action, which did not prevent the first Finnish elements from reaching the Vuoksi river with Antrea as of on August 14th, from where they undertook to make safe left bank of the river. The Soviets made movement since the south-west of Viipuri in order to defend Enso and of contrattaquer towards Antrea the 16, but once again their attack was pushed back, and this time they were constrained to evacuate northern bank of Vuoksi on August 21st. More in the East, the Finns advanced in direction of South-east, and reached Vuosalmi on August 17th and the mouth of Vuoksi the 18. Immediately, the Finns crossed it without resistance of the enemy a few kilometers to the west of Vuosalmi the 17, and on August 20th the coast was protected.

The Russian counter-attack against the 10th DI began on August 14th and managed to push back the Finns of 2 kilometers towards North before their reinforcements succeed in stopping the dash of it. The 10th DI then left the guard of the coastal area to the 36e regiment of the 15th DI and concentrated all its forces in order to face Soviet 265e DI in Räisälä. August 15th, the 10th DI launched its own attack during which it encircled the defenders in Räisälä the 17, before taking the city the following day. From there, it continued to clean the left side of the mouth of Vuoksi. August 19th, the 43e regiment of the 10th DI pushed in direction of the South and reached the lake Suvanto two days later. It made then movement towards the East in company of the 1st IH. This change of course threatened of surrounding all the Soviet forces located at the north of Vuoksi, and those then started to withdraw Käkisalmi which was taken on August 21st by the Finns. The attack continued towards the South and, as only of small units of frontier guards were able to delay the attackers, those reached the river Taipaleenjoki and the lake Ladoga on August 23rd, without the Finns being able to cross the river of the same dash.

The Stavka became aware of the gravity of the situation, and ordered on August 20th a general fold towards a new line of defense, still free from any fortification, energy of the south-east of Viipuri to the lake Ladoga, going up towards the north of Viipuri to Vuoksi, along the lake Suvanto, and crossing the Taipaleenjoki. This decision shortened the frontline considerably, but also meant the abandonment of the prepared works of fortification the previous months along the border. The Finns were held ready to launch their attack along the strip of land more to the south of this border, and so when they realized that the Soviets gave up their positions, on August 21st, they accepted the order to launch out immediately to their continuation. Although 43e DI of general major V. Kirpitsnikov had succeeded in equipping with new cuttings off in north and the east with Viipuri, the Soviets were in the incapacity to prevent the 12th DI of colonel Vihma advancing along Right Bank of Vuoksi and from carrying out a junction with the 18th DI, which attempted to increase its head of bridge with Vuosalmi, and the evening of August 22nd the totality on this side of the river was with the hands of the Finns. Soviet 123e DI of general major F. Aljabusev held as for it the face in the south-east of Viipuri. The majority of the troops of the 123e and 115e DI of general major Konjkov, which had been just folded up from the zone of the high course of Vuoksi, remained badly organized because of precipitation in which the fold had been done. The 4th Finnish DI of colonel Viljanen advanced along the Canal of Saimaa, making pressure on Soviet 43e DI by North. August 23rd, the 8th Finnish DI of colonel Winell, more in the South of the attack force, had completed the security of the Western coast of the Baie of Viipuri to the mouth of the Ykspäänjoki and prepared to cross it.

During the day of August 23rd, the Finns had managed to approach with only 8 kilometers Viipuri by the East, but in the morning of the 24, the Soviet 123e and 115e DI counter-attacked in this sector, thus trying to take the initiative and to push back the Finns in the north of the Vuoksi. While concentrating a powerful artillery shooting, the Soviets managed to push back the attackers of 5 kilometers by places, but without managing to create breaches in the frontline and, when the reserves of the 12th Finnish DI, the 26e IH which was already going up on line to raise the other units, arrived in first line, the Soviets were pushed back the following day until their starting positions. Besides the Soviet counter-attack affected by no means the attack envisaged of the 12th DI, which succeeds in cutting the principal railway between Viipuri and Leningrad on August 25th.

August 24th in the morning, the 8th Finnish DI started by crossing bay of Viipuri with IIIe company of the 45e IH which unloaded on the peninsula of Lihaniemi that she endeavoured to make safe during the day. The following day, the attack continued and made it possible to cut the last railway line driving in Viipuri the afternoon, as to extend the head of bridge of a few kilometers in all the directions at the time of the two days which followed. The 12th DI continued its offensive towards South-west, and cut the road Viipuri-Leningrad the 27.Le 28, the STAVKA authorized the 23e Armée to be withdrawn from Viipuri and to constitute a new line of defense on a layout roughly taking again that of old the Ligne Mannerheim. The Soviet forces undertook their fold immediately and forced the passage through the Finnish troops. To Ylä-Nap, they managed to open a road at the evening of August 28th, and during the night they succeeded in making pass several convoys of trucks although the road was always under Finnish fire. The artillery shootings caused damage, and gradually the road became increasingly encumbered, so that at the end only a man with foot could pass. During the two days which followed, the Soviets tried with insistence to borrow the railway along bay of Viipuri, but the evening of August 30th the 3rd regiment of the 12th DI had joined the positions of the 8th DI. It was finished by it Motti of Porlampi.

As the Soviet attempts to break surrounding had made failure and that the pressure of the Finns had intensified, the Soviet troops carried out a last test aiming at saving the men, but giving up all the material, the soldiers thus having to progress to foot through the forest. But the node was tightened already too much and only of small groups managed to extirpate bow net during this last night. In the morning, the troops, demoralized, started to go. Soviet armed 23e, 9 000 men left in captivity, 7 000 others had their burial on the spot, but almost 12 000 men had succeeded in escaping before surrounding. The spoils were important for the Finns: 306 pieces of artillery, 55 tanks, 673 trucks, almost 300 tractors and approximately 4 500 horses.

Along the Viipuri-Leningrad railway, the order of retirement arrived too late at the Soviets, and the 12th Finnish DI took Leipäsuo and continued its projection towards South-west in direction of the lake of Kuolemanjärvi, like worm South-east along the railway. The Soviet defenders held on the main roads with the level of Summa, but the Finns encircled them while making yield the face to Munasuo. The remainders of 123e DI managed to retain the Finns in some rare places, and continued to be folded up towards Leningrad. In the morning of August 30th, the 12th DI cut the line Koivisto - Leningrad in Kuolemanjärvi and reached the Golfe of Finland the same day. In the same way, to Vammelsuu, the 12th DI cut the railway the same evening, without however managing to make in the same way with the main roads. The gulf was reached here also the next morning, and attacks it begun again towards the East in direction of Terijoki, captured on August 31st, to lead on banks of the Rajajoki on September 1st, on the site of the old border. The encircled Russian forces with Koivisto were folded up in the islands and the Soviet fleet was transferred to Leningrad. The last defenders of Koivisto will be evacuated only on November 1st.

On the left side of the 12th DI, starting from August 23rd, the 18th DI launched its attack towards South-east between the lake Muolaanjärvi and Vuoksi. The 26, the first isthmus of the lake was crossed. In same time, the first units of the 2nd DI raised certain units of the 18th DI of their sector of the isthmus between the lakes Kirkkojärvi and Punnusjärvi, and of the elements of the 10th DI made in the same way for the troops of 18th located between the lake Punnusjärvi and Vuoksi. Once the Motti S of north-western banks of the lake Ladoga had been destroyed, Ier Corps was transferred on the Vuoksi river where it took 10th and the 15th DI under its command. 18th as for it the second isthmus crossed described by the lake on August 27th. It rested during one day, before taking again its advance the 29 in direction of the road crossroads of Kivennapa which it captured this same day. The attack was pushed to the old border, reached on August 31st. In the same way, the 2nd DI reached it the same day. The 10th DI had more evil to make in the same way because of contrattaque impetus by Soviet 198e DI on August 29th in its sector. The Finnish attack had been launched earlier so that it reaches its cruising speed around on August 30th, day at the time which the 15th DI was to join the attack, on the other side of Vuoksi. The railway terminus of Valkjärvi was taken on August 31st, and because of the threat of surrounding, the Soviet forces in the south of Vuoksi accepted the order to be folded up beyond the old border. The 15th DI engaged the continuation, stuck to the train Soviets, and on September 2nd, the old border was reached in any point.

August 20th, the general W. Erfurth announced in Mannerheim that the Feld-maréchal Wilhelm Keitel would send a letter to him describing the plans of attacks of Leningrad and where the Finns were supposed to intervene. Mannerheim exposed to him in answer the practical difficulties that comprised the proposal as well as the differences in design which opposed the two allied ones from a political and military point of view. The government had first of all decided that Finland would not attack Leningrad, then it gave its agreement only for one advanced measured beyond the old border, under the pressure of the military command, in order to capture positions easier to defend. The socio-democrats were particularly opposed to a crossing of the old limit. When the letter of Keitel arrived, Ryti and Mannerheim prepared a negative answer jointly. August 31st, Erfurth recontacted Mannerheim to suggest to him not launching the attack envisaged on Eastern Karelia, but rather making carry the attack on Leningrad. Ryti and Mannerheim refused again. This same August 31st, transmitted Mannerheim the order according to which the attack was to stop on the line going of the mouth of Rajajoki with Ohta, the exact definition of the line going of Ohta to the lake Ladoga having been thereafter defined, once the Finns had reached the old border in this sector. That shortened the frontline, without requiring the attack of the fortified positions established by the Soviets in the north of Leningrad. During this last phase, the Soviets had six divisions of infantry as well as many battalions and regiments disorganized in defense in the north of Leningrad. All these units were however reduced to half of their initial force, because of the hard combat carried out against the Finns throughout this offensive.

The 12th DI had already achieved its goal on September 1st, but in other points of the face, the attack began really only on September 2nd. The 18th DI captured Mainila the same day and Valkeasaari the next day. September 7th, as well 18th as the 2nd DI had achieved their goals between Rajajoki and Ohta. The commander of Ier Body, colonel Mäkinen, gave the order to his troops to advance to the line Ohta-Lake Lempaalanjärvi-old border on the lake Ladoga with for instruction, in the event of strong resistance, to cease the projection at once. September 4th the attack began, and on September 6th the 10th DI had managed to encircle and with destroyed Soviet 941e IH in Kirjasalo. Finally, on September 9th, the prescribed line was reached in any point and the Finnish forces are reflected in defensive position.

The Soviet high command took note quickly fall of activity of the Finns and transferred as of on September 5th two divisions since the isthmus from Karelia towards the south from the city, to fight against the Germans. Although the Finnish troops stationed in the isthmus of Karelia did not take an active part in the Siège of Leningrad, their simple presence contributed to it by preventing the supply of the city by the lake Ladoga or by circumventing it.

Occupation of Eastern Karelia

August 1st

Attacks against the railway of Mourmansk

Operations in septentrional Finland

August 1st

Political aspects

July 10th, 1941, the Finnish army launched a major offensive in the sectors of the isthmus of Karelia and the north of the lake Ladoga. The day order of Mannerheim, the speech of the sleeve of the sword , makes state clearly that the implication of Finland in the conflict had an offensive goal. At the end of August 1941, the Finnish troops had reached the border of pre-war period. The question of its crossing caused tensions among the members of the staff, the government, the Parliament, and in the public opinion. The military expansionism had perhaps gained in popularity, but was far from being celebrated unanimously.

In the same way, the international relations remained tended, in particular with the United Kingdom and Sweden, whose governments had received - respectively in May and in June - the insurance on behalf of the Foreign Minister Rolf Witting that Finland absolutely did not have any plan for a joint military campaign with the Germans. The Finnish preparations had a purely defensive goal, ensured it.

The principal members of the Swedish government had hoped to improve their relations with the Nazi Germany while giving to him an indirect support at the time of the operation Barbarossa, mainly brought through Finland. The Prime Minister Hansson and the Foreign Minister Günther could note nevertheless that the political support conveyed by the Gouvernement of national union and social democrat associations appeared insufficient, in particular after the speech of the sleeve of sword of Mannerheim, and more still after Finland started after less than two months of offensive true a war of conquest. A tangible effect of this catch of distance consists of the always increased dependence of Finland with respect to only Germany.

The the Commonwealth declared the Blocus of Finland and the British ambassador was recalled to London. July 31st, 1941, RAF organized an air raid on the Finnish port of Petsamo. The damage which it inflicted was tiny, the port being at this practically empty time of ships.

The September 11th, the ambassador states-unien Arthur Schoenfeld was informed of the stop of the offensive on the isthmus of Karelia on the layout of the old border (with some overflows on the level of the municipalities of Valkeasaari and Kirjasalo), and that " under any condition" Finland would not take part in an offensive for Leningrad, but that on the contrary it would remain in a static way on its positions, in waiting of a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Witting insisted at Schoenfeld on the fact that Germany did not hear it this ear.

September 22nd, a note of the British government was presented (via the Norwegian ambassador Michelet) to the Finnish government, requiring the departure of the German troops of its territory, as well as the fold of its troops in Eastern Karelia beyond the prewar border. Finland was then under the threat of a declaration of war of the United Kingdom if it did not meet its requirements. The declaration of war was published the feastday of Finnish independence, the December 6th.

In December 1941, the Finnish projection had reached the river Svir (which connects the southern ends of the Lac Ladoga and the Lac Onega, and defines the southern border of Eastern Karelia). At the end of 1941, the face was stabilized, and the Finns did not carry out any more a major offensive during the two years and half which followed. The moral one of the troops dropped gradually as they realized that the war would not finish as soon as.

In parallel, certain theses ensure that the execution of the influential pacifist leader Arndt Pekurinen in November 1941 would be related to the fear which demoralization is not exacerbated in the army by such activists.

Foreign volunteers and international assistances

As during the War of Winter, one recruited Swedish volunteers. Those were employed until December, in order to assemble the guard in the perimeter of the Soviet naval base of Hanko which had been emptied by its occupants by sea in the first days of the conflict, then the unit of Swedish volunteers was officially relaxed. During the war of Continuation, the volunteers signed for 3 to 6 months of service. On the whole, more 1 600 men fought on the Finnish side, although one counted of them nothing any more but 60 during the summer 1944. Nearly a third to engaged of the war of Continuation had already been used during the war as Winter. Another group having contributed a considerable share, approximately a quarter of the men were Swedish officers with the retirement.

One can also note the presence of a battalion of volunteers S on the face of septentrional Finland between 1942 and 1944. Its soldiers had been enlisted in Norway like with the Denmark, then both pennies German occupation.

In the same way, approximately 3 400 Estonian volunteers took part in this conflict, on the German side.

Some volunteers from Belgium, from France and Switzerland which had took share with the war of Winter, as for them, were delivered to Gestapo.

Diplomatic operations

The Barbarossa operation was planned like concerning a Blitzkrieg having to last only a few weeks. The English observers and states-uniens thought whereas the invasion would be finished in August. With the autumn 1941, these certainty proved to be false, and the leaders of the Finnish army started to doubt the capacity of Germany to never reach that point. The German troops in septentrional Finland met weather conditions and of ground for which they were not prepared, and failed largely in their companies, in particular in the area of Mourmansk. The Finnish strategy changed consequently. She proposed a peace separated in the Soviet Union, but the German pressure was too large. The idea according to which Finland was to remain implied in the conflict, while preserving to the maximum its troops made its way and accepted a credit growing, perhaps in the hope that Wehrmacht and the Red Army become exhausted mutually, involving necessary negotiations, or all at least to involve them out of the purely Finnish questions. Some were still to also think of a final victory of Germany.

The participation of Finland in the conflict bringing nevertheless important advantages for Germany. The Soviet navy remained confined in the gulf of Finland, which made it possible Kriegsmarine to quasi freely circulate in the Baltic, which could thus be used as training ground to the crews of the U-Boot, like with the transport of the iron ores from Sweden, vital for the German effort of war, just as rare metals like nickel necessary to the manufacture of steel coming from the area of Petsamo. The face of Finland in addition made safe the northern side of the German Groupe of armies Northern stationed in the Baltic States. Sixteen Finnish divisions retained many Soviet units, put the pressure on Leningrad - although Mannerheim refused to take part in its attack - and threatened the railway towards Mourmansk. Moreover, Sweden remained thus very isolated and was forced to yield more with the German and Finnish requirements, although these pressures had limited successes.

In spite of the contribution of Finland to the warlike intentions Nazis, the Western Allies kept ambivalent feelings in its connection, shared between remainders of finer feelingss towards Finland and the need to be in good terms with its essential ally, the Soviet Union. Consequently, Great Britain declared the war in Finland, but not the United States. It there have not combat between these countries and Finland, with some rare exceptions, but the Finnish sailors were imprisoned abroad. In the United States, Finland was denounced to have attacked cargoes sent by the United States to the title of the law lease-lend, but accepted the agreement of the Parliament to continue its payments in order to refund its debts of the First World War during the Truce.

As Finland was signatory of the Pacte anti-Comintern, and that it had signed other agreements with Germany, Italy and Japan, the Allies regarded Finland as a force of the Axis, although the Finns used the term of " then; Co-belligerency with Allemagne".

Jews in Finland

Finland gained thereafter credit among the Allies because of force of its democratic doctrines and its constant refusal to extend to the country the practices anti-semites Nazis. The Finnish Jews were useful in the national army, and they were not only tolerated in Finland, but the majority of Jewish request asylums were accommodated in the country (only 8 on more than 500 were delivered to the Nazis). The synagog of countryside in Western Karelia was probably only and single one like the side of the Axis during the war. In the rare cases which occurred, the Jewish officers of the defense forces Finnish which accepted the German Croix of iron refused it.

The policy of Finnish occupation

Approximately 2 600 with 2 800 Soviet prisoners of war were delivered to the Germans. Majority of them (approximately 2 000) joined the Armée Vlassov. Most of the others was officers of the Red Army or political police chiefs, like 74 Jews (selection made starting from the consonance of their family name by the German military authorities); the majority of the members of these groups perish in the concentration camps Nazis, whereas others were entrusted to the Gestapo to undergo interrogations. Sometimes, these traffics were made in exchange of weapons or food.

This kind of exchange was particularly rare in 1942 in Finland because of a bad harvest, and mainly for this reason the number of deaths in the Finnish camps was particularly important this year. The sorrows incurred for the escape bids or the failures severe with the rules from the camp went from the Isolement to the Exécution. Among the 64.188 Soviet prisoners of war, 18.318 died in the prison camps Finnish.

After the war, 1 381 Finns having had a role in the administration of the prison camps were continued for their crimes according to testimonys of former prisoners of war, among which 723 were condemned to variable sorrows and 658 were slackened without judgment. These defendants had to answer of 42 executions and 242 murders. Among these deaths, there were 7 cases of assassination of former prisoners, 10 cases of death of the continuations of torture, 8 infringements with the property right, 280 infringements with the other rights and 86 other crimes.

Good number of the Soviet immigrants who had settled in Eastern Karelia after 1917 were interned in concentration camps. Among the prisoners were mainly women, children and old men, owing to the fact that it quasi totality of the men as of the women in age to work had been enlisted in the army or had been requisitioned to work in the arms factories: only a third of the 47 000 prewar inhabitants remained in Eastern Karelia when the Finns occupied it, and only half of them was of Caréliens. Approximately 30% of the remaining Russian population (either 24 000 people) were thus parked in camps, of which 6 000 refugees captured on the roads of the exodus whereas they awaited their Russian ground repatriation after a hypothetical crossing of the lake Onega, and 3 000 people having lived beyond the Svir, with an aim of making safe the back-country beyond the frontline in order to avoid to the maximum the attacks of partisans. The first of these camps was open on October 24th, 1941 to Petrozavodsk. During spring and the summer 1941,3 500 prisoners perished of malnutrition. During second half of 1942, the number of prisoners fell quickly with 15 000, and as the sanitary arrangements had improved in the camps, " seules" 500 other people lost there the life until the end of the war.

On other occasions, the Finns accepted the guard of approximately 2.100 Soviet prisoners of war in exchange of the prisoners whom they had given to the Germans. These prisoners were mainly Estonians and of Caréliens eager to enlist in the Finnish army. Those, joined by volunteers originating in occupied Eastern Karelia, formed the battalion known as " clan" (in Finnish, the " Heimopataljoona" ). At the end of the conflict, the USSR required that the members of this battalion " be delivered to him; tribu". Some succeeded in escaping before or during transport, but the majority of them was sent to the Gulag or is carried out.

In 1941, before even the beginning of the war of Continuation, a battalion of Finnish volunteers had already joined the Waffen-SS German with the tacit agreement of the Finnish government. It had been concluded from it that the battalion would represent a mark of Finnish engagement in the co-operation with the Nazi Germany. It had been concluded that the Finnish volunteers would not be engaged in combat the opponent with British or Greeks (only European nations in war with Germany at the time of the agreement). This battalion, names the Finnisches Freiwilligen Bataillon was useful like a unit of the Division S '' Wiking '' in Ukraine and in the the Caucasus. The battalion was withdrawn from the face in May 1943 and was transferred to Tallinn where it was relaxed the July 11th. Its soldiers were then affected in various units of the Finnish army.

End of the war

Finland really started to actively seek an exit with the war after the disastrous German defeat with Stalingrad in January - February 1943. When Edwin Linkomies formed its new cabinet, the peace process was then its vital objective. Between 1943 and 1944, the negotiations were led in an intermittent way between Finland and its representative Juho Kusti Paasikivi on the one hand, and the Allies Western and the Soviet Union on the other hand, but no agreement was concluded. Stalin decided to force Finland with rendering, first of all with a bombardment campaign aiming at terrorizing the civilians. The " battle of Helsinki" in February 1944 included/understood three major air attacks on the capital, not adding up less 6 000 exits of bombers. Nevertheless, the Finnish anti-aircraft defense managed rather well to push back these raids, one estimates that only 5% of the bombs reached the initially indicated targets. Other major air raids took for target Oulu and Kotka, and other multiple raids took place on many targets. Nevertheless, thanks to the alarms transmitted by the information and with successes of the anti-aircraft defense, the victims were relatively very few in comparison with those caused by the bombardments of the towns of Central Europe or Tallinn. The combative spirit of the population remained of this intact fact.

June 9th, 1944, the Soviet Union launched a great offensive against the Finnish positions in the isthmus of Karelia and the sector of the lake Ladoga. This major operation had been planned to coincide with the D-day. At the second day of the offensive, the Soviets made yield the Finnish lines, and in the weeks which followed the rate/rhythm of their projection seemed able to quickly threaten the integrity of Finland as an independent state. On the 21,7 kilometers broad opening, the Soviets had massed 2.851 parts of 45mm and 130 parts of 50mm. In the sectors best kept face of the isthmus of Karelia, the USSR had had more 200 guns per kilometer of face (either every 5 meters). June 9th, for example, the Soviet artillery drew more than 80.000 blows on the isthmus of Karelia. The first week of engagements at the time of the offensive on the isthmus of Karelia constitutes one of the greatest offensives of the Second world war in Europe. The Soviet troops released Petrozadovsk on June 28th. Before folding up itself, the Finns had taken the care to provide to the population the two weeks equivalent of supply. It is about a rare fact, and perhaps even single, in the history of the war.

At this time conflict, Finland particularly missed modern anti-tank armament, which only could stop the advance of the Soviet tanks, which the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop proposed in exchange of the insurance that Finland would not try any more to conclude a separate peace. June 26th, the president Risto Ryti gave his agreement like a personal mark of his engagement, which it told to hold until the end of his mandate. In addition to the deliveries of material, Hitler then sent some brigades of guns of attack as well as a unit of fighter-bombers of the Luftwaffe to temporarily help Finland in the sectors most threatened of its face.

With these new deliveries coming from Germany, Finland was now able to control the situation, and managed to stop the Soviets at the beginning of July. At this time, the Finns had moved back of almost 100 kilometers, bringing back them about to the positions which they held at the end of the war of Winter. This line was known under the name of " VKT" line; (for " Viipuri-Kuparsaari-Taipale" , energy of Vyborg until the Vuoksi, then according to the course of the river to the lake Ladoga with Taipale) where the Soviet projection had been stopped at the time of the Bataille of Tali-Ihantala, it in spite of their material and numerical superiority. But Finland had already become a secondary theater of operation in the head of the Soviet strategists, who directed now their weapons in direction of Poland and Europe of south-east. The success of Alliés in Normandy was confirmed, and the Anglo-American ones pushed already in direction of Germany, and the Soviets did not hope to leave them free field in Central Europe. Although the face was once again stabilized in Finland, the Finns were from now on with end of forces, and wished at all costs to leave the war.

Mannerheim had frequently reminded the Germans that if their troops were withdrawn from Estonia, Finland would be then in the obligation to conclude a separated peace, even if the terms of the agreement proved very unfavourable. Estonia occupied by the Soviets would have indeed given to the enemy an home base very favorable to an amphibious attack or for its bombers, and would prohibit any access to the sea for the Finns. When the Germans were constrained to fold up themselves, the desire of the Finns to see a term with the war still developed. Perhaps carrying out the reality of Finnish fears, the German initial reaction was limited only to verbal injunctions against the Finnish advertisement of its will to find a peace separate. Nevertheless, the Nazis reflect with the stops of the hundreds of Finnish sailors to damping with their ships in Germany, in Denmark and in Norway.

President Ryti resigned, and the military chief and national hero Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, was exceptionally named president by the government, accepting this responsibility until the end for the conflict.

The September 4th, a cease-fire put a term at military operations on the Finnish side. The Soviet Union ceased the hostilities exactly 24 hours after the Finns. A Armistice was signed in Moscow the September 19th between the Soviet Union and Finland. Finland had to yield with many compensatory concessions: the Soviet Union found its borders of 1940, with in more the zone of Petsamo; the peninsula of Porkkala (near to the Finnish capital Helsinki) was rented with the Soviet navy for 50 years (it was finally restored in 1956); and the USSR obtained transit duties on the Finnish territory; the Finnish army was to be demobilized in all haste, and Finland was as fast as possible to expel all the German troops still stationed in the country. As the Germans refused to meet this requirement, the Finns did not have an other choice to only fight consequently against their old allies, during the Guerre of Lapland. The Finns also had to dismantle the minefields laid out in Karelia (like in Eastern Karelia) and in the gulf of Finland (like in Lapland thereafter). The cleaning of the mines was a long-term operation, particularly in the maritime sectors, lasting until 1952, killing more than 100 bomb disposal experts and by wounding 200, the majority of them in Lapland. Until in the Seventies, it happened that one finds old mines floating in the gulf of Finland.

Conclusion

Retrospectively, the war of Continuation can be regarded as rising from a series of political errors of appreciation on behalf of the Finnish authorities lasting which military qualities of Finland exceeded its diplomatic aptitudes clearly. Nevertheless, of many analysts hold Finland like victim of a lack of chance in addition to its many errors, forced to make a choice which would have inevitably led it to be attacked by a side or another. One tends to believe thus that if Finland had not joined the German camp in its fight against the USSR, of the attempts at occupation would have taken place of share or other, involving in all the cases Finland in the war.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, it became clearly that Finland, while choosing after the war of Winter to engage a bringing together with the German interests - perhaps more by " chance" there that by a real strategic thought in the long run - had made the good choice for its destiny. This idea rests on the idea that it would still have in the contrary case inevitably undergone a Soviet occupation as well as a certainly worse destiny than that reserved for the others frontier States.

The field-marshal Mannerheim, old, could be well at the origin of some errors of appreciation, in particular with the speech of the sleeve of the sword to the day order of July 10th, 1941, but at the end of the war it had gained a considerable reputation as well among its former enemies as its old allies, in Finland like abroad, which mainly made it possible Finland to be left the war without too much evil.

In all the cases, Finland does not draw more badly from the world war than any other country implied in the conflict - quite to the contrary. Only 2 000 Finnish civilians were killed during the war, and only a narrow border region had been the theater of intense combat. During almost three years, until June 20th, 1944, day of the fall of Vyborg, any the Finnish main cities was not besieged or was occupied. During the war, there were only three European capitals which were not occupied by foreign forces, according to various levels: London, Moscow and Helsinki. Lastly, Finland succeeds in keeping its Indépendance, its parliamentary Démocratie and its market economy.

After the war, Finland preserved its independence by adapting its foreign politics in order to avoid being sharp with the USSR, Superpuissance of the time, concession compensated by the abandonment by the Soviet government on the one hand of its profits according to war, and by the limitation of situation of too obvious interference in the Finnish interior matters. Finland also signed a mutual assistance and cooperation agreement with the USSR which ensured that in the event of conflict between the western powers and the Eastern bloc, Finland would defend its territory and its airspace of the Western intrusions. For Moscow, independent Finland which was bound to him by a treaty of co-operation was a less evil to keep neutral Sweden in the Cold war, misunderstanding guaranteeing during the 40 years to come the Soviet strategic interests in an area much larger.

Important battles and operations

Operation Silberfuchs (1941)
Battle of Tali-Ihantala (1944)

See too

References

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