Introduction

The left Vietnamese soldier Minh (contraction of Việt Nam Ðộc Lập Ðồng Minh Hội , in Chữ name 越南独立同盟會), league for the independence of Vietnam , resulting from components nationalist and communist, claimed the Indépendance Vietnam as of 1941.

At the beginning of the occupant Japan board in 1945, with the Révolution of August and the foundation of the Democratic republic of Vietnam, constituted a self government that France recognized initially. A disagreement emerges, however, about the devolution of the Cochinchine to the new state. In 1946, it is the war with old the Métropole which is demolished with the Bataille of Diên Biên Phu in 1954 and grants the Accords of Geneva, ratifying a provisional technical cleavage, for the regrouping of the military forces Vietnameses in North and the French military forces in the South before their complete evacuation of the country in 1955, with height of the 17 {{E}} parallel. A referendum was planned for the reunification in 1956. The sabotage of the Agreements of armistice of Geneva led to the Second War of Indo-China or Guerre of the Vietnam who existed forever, from a legal point of view, in international law.

The word " Minh" Vietnamese soldier; is a contraction of " Vietnam Doc. Lap Dong Minh Hôi" meaning " League (Dong Minh Hoi) for the independence (Doc. Lap) of Vietnam ". The league Viêt Minh was presented in the form of a national union for the independence of Vietnam. Once made independence, it was scuttled to make place with the Party of Work " Lao Dong" , as before the Indochinese Communist party (PCI) scuttled itself to make place with the league Viêt Minh, in the " Revolution of August ".

(Fr) http://etoilerouge.chez-alice.fr/documents/vietnam4.html

The league " Minh" Vietnamese soldier; also ramifies in " hierarchy parallèles" of a public administration in " zone occupée" , " zone libérée" and " zone contestée" , which made much for the major and fundamental victory. It has, according to Bernard B. Fall, led to the Bataille of Diên Biên Phu, which would not have been possible without this organization of a whole nation in fight for its independence.

http://www.claramoniak.com/siteVN/1ere%20guerre%20d'indochine.htm

Vietnamese Nationalism-Communism

The recognition in 1950 of the Democratic republic of Vietnam (RDVN) by the Popular republic of China (RPC) inaugurated the cold war in Southeast Asia and reorientated the networks external of the RDVN towards interior Indo-China and southernmost China. It is thanks to the support of the Chinese Communist party (PCC) and of its leaders that Vietnam directed by the Indochinese Communist party (PCI) could enter officially the communist community under the direction of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (PCUS). Indeed, the Vietnamese Communists had much with their Chinese colleagues being given the dead end in which they were between 1945 and 1950. Of course, all that is well-known. What is known less, however, it is that this driving way with this diplomatic recognition in 1950 had not been easy communist side. In fact, the victory of the Chinese Communists in October 1949 was, in the final analysis, crucial for the diplomatic survival of the RDVN/PCI and the rehabilitation of revolutionary Vietnam in a European communist world which was wary of Vietnamese Communism, perhaps even of Ho Chi Minh himself (work of Christopher E, Goscha).

• the " dissolution" NCV in November 1945 for the league Vietnamese soldier Minh

During all its life, Ho Chi Minh had to show two faces near its people and of the world: one nationalist, the other Communist. One knows at which point to post this double personality was going to irritate its detractors anticommunists. But what one knows less, it is that while showing a double face, Ho Chi Minh was going to cause doubts near the higher levels of the communist movement, even if it were one of the Asian Communists most devoted to Communism.

In the middle of the problem: l'" car-dissolution" NCV by Ho Chi Minh and her partisans in November 1945. At the beginning of the seizure of power of the Vietnamese soldier Minh in August - September 1945, the communist contents of the RDVN were obvious and posed to thorn-bush problems with the Vietnamese nationalists not-Communists, the Chinese occupying the North of the country and, with a least degree, the French. Indeed, the Minh Vietnamese soldier, or national front created in 1941, was with the hands of the NCV or rather of sound " Directeur" committee; (“Tong Bo”). The nationalists not-Communists of the VNQDD (“Vietnam Quoc daN Dang”), close to the Chinese nationalists, opposed the seizure of power NCV by carrying out direct actions and while resting on the Kuomintang (Left nationalist Chinese or KMT) of Tchang Kaï-chek. They very skilfully reflect in place a press campaign démystificatrice, aiming at showing with the populations that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist, that the Minh Vietnamese soldier, Tong Bo and the NCV actually did only one. Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh made her possible to minimize her communist fasteners with the public and to maximize her nationalist attraction near the populations Vietnameses, of the Asian countries not-Communists but savagely anticolonialists and of the Americans opposed to the return of French colonialism in Indo-China.

With the declaration of independence of Vietnam on the Place Ba Dinh in Hanoi, on September 2nd, 1945, Major Archimedes Patti of the Détachement 101 of L OSI was held beside Vo Nguyen Giap. With paravant, it helped Ho Chi Minh to write the declaration of independence of Vietnam, by evoking that of the USA in the order of freedoms in preamble.

• http://www.earthstation1.com/History/Vietnam/Pics/TN_OSSOfficerArchimedesPattiWithVoNguyenGiap1945.jpg

• http://www.richmond.edu/~ebolt/history398/AdvisingTheVietMinh.html

The situation in the North of Vietnam had quickly become very tended. All the Vietnamese parties played large in their race for the power during second half of 1945. So that the nationalists anticommunists intended to act on November 8th, 1945, exactly three days before the dissolution of the NCV. Nguyen Hai Than, chief of the party Dong Minh Hoi, claimed the immediate resignation of the president, the dissolution of his government, the " suppression; dictatorship of only one parti" and the creation of a new government. This ultimatum was to have the approval of the general Lou Han, Chinese chief in Vietnam, before her return to Kunming, come with its army to disarm the Japanese forces in the North of the 17th parallel. Nguyen Hai Than would have declared with the Chinese that it declined any responsibility in the event of incident between the Minh Vietnamese soldier and the not-Communists if the ultimatum were pushed back by Ho Chi Minh. The Gracey General had come to the South from the 17th parallel to disarm the Japanese forces with his Indian division and in his luggage a French detachment of the Général Leclerc which wanted to make the colonial reconquest by the South in 1945.

This action of the opposition, apparently supported by Chinese officers, put Ho Chi Minh in a perilous situation. Since August, the NCV feared that the KMT simply did not reverse the RDVN to install a government pro-Chinese and anticommunist. In spite of the remarkable Ho efforts to gain Lou Han and Siao Wen with its cause, it could never draw aside the possibility that a change in the Chinese line occurred. Propaganda savagely anticommunist and ultra-nationalist of the opposition was effective. Mid-November, the Vietnamese Communists feared even a true takeover by force. The situation was tended so much that Vietnamese Communists in the North, whose Ho Chi Minh, made the extraordinary decision to dissolve the Indochinese Communist party (PCI), on November 11th, 1945, vis-a-vis the threats of Nguyen Hai Than and of the VNQDD and following secret meetings behaviors by the NCV. It was necessary at all costs to hide the communist face of the Minh Vietnamese soldier in order to take again the nationalist initiative with opponents VNQDD and DMH, in other words to keep the capacity thus. The car-dissolution of the NCV was to show the ultimate sacrifice for the fatherland. It was also necessary to reassure the Chinese, the Americans and other countries Asian not-Communists on the properly nationalist contents of the RDVN and the Minh Vietnamese soldier.

This operation seems to have defused the latent conflict. The takeover by force not-Communist did not take place. According to official historiography, the NCV had not been dissolved actually; it was about a tactic to keep the capacity in one difficult moment. In its memories, Hoang Van Hoan claims that it was necessary for all to alleviate Lou Han, which was wary of long time of the Vietnamese Communists and which supported the not-Communists theoretically. According to this testifies Vietnamese, the dissolution of the NCV " the situation less tended " returned;. Our research shows that even if the NCV were reconverted in a " Group Marxist studies " , the " Party " continued to exist clandestinely. But any mention of its name was prohibited, operation aiming at camouflaging the true contents of the Minh Vietnamese soldier and the RDVN. The Vietnamese Communists had to await the Chinese victory before daring to show their truths ideological colors with the Vietnamese people and the world.

Though it was, this dissolution was a surprise for much, and not only the French. Above suspicion in November 1945, it seems to have taken with deprived the Communist parties in France, China and especially in Soviet Union. In the history of Communism, except for the American Communist party and among that of Yugoslavia, no Communist party had never been dissolved. It is not even sure either that all the leaders of the NCV had been consulted in advance, nor which they all had be of agreement. Vo Nguyen Giap, then Minister of Interior Department made a bloody purging near the adverse nationalists.

Metamorphoses

This dissolution of the NCV was a first stage of the metamorphoses, while penetrating behind the League Minh Vietnamese soldier for independence, in the possible widest configuration of all the nationalist tendencies in 1945. The NCV, in a second phase, was transformed into “Party of the Work of Vietnam” (Dang Lao Dong Vietnam) to the Second National congress of the Party held in Tuyen Quang in 1951, in “territory released” in the North of Vietnam, while the First War D” Indo-China for independence turned in favor of the Democratic republic of Vietnam in the plans soldier and diplomatic, with the diplomatic recognition of the RDVN by the communist countries and after the first series of French military defeats of Na San, CAD Bang and Lang Its, in the “Battle of the Colonial Roads”, along the Chinese border from now on with the hands of the Republic Popular of China since 1949.

The Party “Lao Dong” reassures China and the USSR of the good communist color of Vietnam to have their diplomatic and material support. In 1951, the league Viêt Minh took the name of " Face of the patrie" (" Viêt" bond; meaning " unit Vietnamese) to reassure all the patriots not-Communists of any tendency.

Independence obtained, with the Agreement of Geneva and at the price of the temporary technical partition of the armed forces, involved the dissolution of the League Minh Vietnamese soldier which did not take place any more to exist. It now belongs to the Party “Lao Dong” to build socialism on the territory of the RDVN in the North of Vietnam in the fights of influence between the tendencies Chinese and Soviet, between Truong Chinh and LeDuan, under the arbitration of Ho Chi Minh.

The Third National congress held in Hanoi in 1960 had the task to build, reinforce socialism in the North of Vietnam and to release the South of Vietnam for the reunification. The Fourth National congress held in Hanoi in 1976 after the fall of Saigon and the reunification “de facto” by the force of the weapons made fall the masks and the disguises to take again the name of origin of Vietnamese Communist party.

(Fr) http://www.lmvntd.org/avl/dossier/031010revolution.htm

Difficult navigation between China, the USSR and the USA

The recognition in 1950 of the Democratic republic of Vietnam (RDVN) by the Popular republic of China (RPC) inaugurated the cold war in Southeast Asia and reorientated the networks external of the RDVN towards interior Indo-China and southernmost China. It is thanks to the support of the Chinese Communist party (PCC) and of its leaders that Vietnam directed by the Indochinese Communist party (PCI) could enter officially the communist community under the direction of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (PCUS). Indeed, the Vietnamese Communists had much with their Chinese colleagues, being given the dead end in which they were between 1945 and 1950. Of course, all that is well-known. What is known less, however, is that this driving way with this diplomatic recognition in 1950 had not been easy communist side. In fact, the victory of the Chinese Communists in October 1949 was, in the final analysis, crucial for the diplomatic survival of the RDVN/PCI and the rehabilitation of revolutionary Vietnam in a European communist world which was wary of Vietnamese Communism, perhaps even of Ho Chi Minh himself.

The Indochinese Communist party (PCI) had been born in 1930 in HongKong with the crossing from the “networks” from the Office from the East from the Comintern and those from the PCC (Christopher E. Goscha, `Entremêlements sino-Vietnamese: Reflections on the South of China and the revolution Vietnamese between the-two-wars”, Approach-Asia, No 16, (1999), pp. 81-108).

As of the beginning, Ho Chi Minh was mingled with these movements. Member of the French Communist party (PCF), it had begun his career internationalist in Moscow in 1924 and had worked with the Communist leaders of the Chinese Communist party (PCC) with Guangzhou (Canton), such Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi, until his arrest in HongKong in 1931. Thanks to all these connections, Ho governed the creation of the " Vietnamese Communist party " at the beginning of 1930, renamed under the aegis Tran Phu the " Communist party indochinois" to extend with the Kampuchea and the Laos. Following its release of prison in HongKong in 1934, it turned over to Russia. Ho turned over in the South of China at the end of the years 1930 on the instructions of the Komintern, while passing by the general headquarter of the PCC with Yan' year. Thanks to its Chinese and Soviet supports, he hoped to again place the NCV under the direction of the Komintern when he took in hand the direction of the NCV in 1941 (For this period, to see especially: Sophie Quinn-Judge, `Nguyen Have Quoc, the Comintern, and the Vietnamese communist movement, (1919-1941)', thesis, London, The University off London, SOAS, 2001, chapter 6).

However, the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and especially the Second world war made these connections very difficult. It was only following the failure of the communist rising of the trotskists in the Nam South-Vietnamese soldier into 1940 that Ho Chi Minh could again affirm her influence on the NCV starting from southernmost China, in the province of Guangxi which was opposite that of CAD Bang. However, the contacts of Ho Chi Minh with the Soviet Union and the PCC became increasingly difficult to maintain because of the war. A representative of the Comintern was present at Yan' year of 1942 to 1945 (Georges Boudarel, `the idéocratie imported in Vietnam with the Maoism', in “the bureaucracy in Vietnam”, Paris, Harmattan, 1983, p. 54). It is incredible that Ho Chi Minh remained in contact with Moscow via Yan' year), but this revolutionary capital of China of North was far from the border sino-Vietnamese and the Guomindang (GMD) Chinese Nationalist Party often preferred to tackle the Chinese Communists rather than to honor an alliance to fight against the Japanese. Even if the Comintern had not been truly dissolved in 1943, the connections between the NCV and Moscow were from now on very weak (the Comintern truly dissolved in 1943, but were not reconverted in other organizations not to obstruct the Americans during the Second world war. See: Grant Adibekov, `The Comintern following its formal dissolution (1943-1944)', “Voprosy Istorii, Voprosy Istorii”, No 8, (1997).). The other way of connection with the movement internationalist could be done by PCF. But there too, the Second world war and the prohibition of the party in France (since its support of the Pact germano-Soviet between Stalin and Hitler in 1939) had actually broken well contacts with this party in Western Europe.

The Democratic republic of Vietnam RDVN and its Communist leaders remained still crossed Communist parties in Moscow, to Europe and with Yan' year (However, the resumption of the civil war in China moved away the PCC and NCV. Sophie Quinn-Judge, `Nguyen Have Quoc, the Comintern, and the Vietnamese communist movement', chapters 6-7). The shortly after the Japanese capitulation in 1945, Ho Chi Minh sent letters to Stalin, informing him of the existence of her new government and her precariousness in front of the return of the French. In another letter, Ho required of the Soviet Union to subject the Vietnamese question in front of UNO. But its letters remained without continuation. Like Truman, Stalin did not answer. When the request of Ho Chi Minh arrived on the desk of S.P. Kozyrev, European section head of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Moscow, this last wrote simply: " with not répondre" (I.B. Bukharkin, `Kremli goes Ho Chi Minh' the Kremlin and Ho Chi Minh, Xua goes Nay, No 55, (September 1998), pp. 4-5. Ho wrote another letter with Stalin in January 1946. See: `Letter of Ho Chi Minh with Stalin', dated January 17th, 1946, D. 1004, APCUS.).

Between 1945 and 1946, the RDVN had perhaps more support, or at least of sympathy anticolonialist, near the American representatives after the Second world war (According to an American journalist of left and sympathizer of the RDVN, neither PCF, nor the Soviets was ready to help the NCV in 1945 because of the Franco-Soviet relations in Europe). That was communicated to the NCV Harold R. Isaacs, “No Peace for Asia”, Cambridge, the United States, MIT, 1967 edition goes back to 1947, pp. 170-175. See also: Thai Quang Trung, `Stalin and national revolutions', “French Review of Sciences Policy”, (October 1980), pp. 996-1000).

In a maintenance in Moscow with the General Georges Catroux in January 1947, at the time of the battle of Hanoi, Molotov known as " that he hoped that France and Vietnam could reach a satisfactory agreement for the two " parts; , without re-establishing " a mode of domination coloniale" (Interview with Molotov on Indo-China', Moscow, dated January 15th, 1947, signed Catroux, D. 1352, C. 153, New Funds, Indo-China, CAOM.).

But, being given the surrounding of the RDVN, the Communists Vietnamese could not wait until 1950 being miraculeusement saved by the Chinese victory. Their diplomatic situation was completely critical. Behind the diplomacy not-Communist of the RDVN in Asia, there was a second completely communist diplomatic ballet. It is with PCF, the PCC and the PCUS which the Vietnamese Communists wanted to carry out the dance, while waiting for a hypothetical Chinese victory. And here the paradox: the Vietnamese Communists had made of their to better convince the Asian Americans, their neighbors and their own people of their anticolonialism and their nationalism. They were going from now on to have to convince the Soviet delegates and the French Communist party (PCF) that the RDVN was truly communist and worthy to belong to a world internationalist which was to exceed, precisely, nationalism. The failure of the Western way towards the communist world (1945-1948)

Bonds existed between the delegates of the RDVN and the representatives Soviet in station in Bangkok. In an article being pressed on documents of the files of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the ex-USSR, Benoît de Tréglodé shows that Vietnamese representatives in Thailand met rather often the Soviet delegate there. Letters intercepted by the French also confirm that Soviet legation had brought an financial assistance to the delegation of the RDVN to Bangkok. But it remained limited, even unimportant. A letter of a Vietnamese framework in station in the capital thaïe in November 1950 addressed to a colleague in Moscow indicated that " our relationships to Russian Legation are neither convenient nor fructueuses".

France still represented another way to contact the Soviet government. August 28th, 1945, A.E. Bogomolov, the ambassador from the USSR in Paris, expressed the opinion in a letter with its superiors who it would perhaps not be desirable to support the reinstalment of French colonialism in Indo-China. According to him, the Indochinese problem could be regulated by putting Indo-China under a allied supervision, allusion undoubtedly to the ideas of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt. However, for the leaders in charge of the European diplomacy, whose Andrei Gromyko, such an idea was not going to find positive feedbacks. Like their American counterpart, the leaders of the Soviet Union were not going to risk their European interests while being opposed to the French government about Indo-China. Bogomolov accepted instructions active in this direction.

However, in 1946 the French way remained always one in the best ways to contact the “friends outside”. Ho Chi Minh went itself to France in 1946 to try to find a solution negotiated with the conflict free-Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh would have liked to secretly contact a representative of the USSR to explain her policy in Indo-China and undoubtedly her dissolution of the NCV. Jacques Duclos had published itself in April 1945 a very critical article on the dissolution of the Communist party American (Jaques Duclos, `the dissolution of the American Communist party', “Books of the Communism”, (April 1945), quoted by Alain Ruscio, “French Communists and the war of Indo-China, 1944-1954”, Paris, Harmattan, 1985, p. 109), causing thereafter the dismissal of its general secretary, Ernest Browder. At the time of her voyage in France, Ho Chi Minh was to explain the motivations of her choice, her circumstances and why it did not deserve to undergo the same disapproval as that of the American party. According to Alain Ruscio, " the ambiguity had then been levée".

The training of a delegation Vietnamese in Paris with semi-1946 made it possible to have more continuous contacts with PCF and the Soviet embassy. Before leaving France to return to Vietnam in 1946, Ho named Hoang Minh Giam and Tran Ngoc Danh with the direction of its diplomatic office in Paris, officially entitled the " Permanent delegation of the Democratic republic of Vietnam ". Ho Chi Minh would have granted " to him; by credit transfer, a first equipment of 10 million old francs". The metropolitan police force estimated that the delegation monthly generated two franc million thanks to her contributions among the Vietnameses of France. In February 1948, the bank account of the delegation amounted to 15 franc million. Like the delegations with New Delhi, Rangoon and Bangkok, the office of Paris made propaganda and espionage for the new Vietnamese State, mobilized the populations Vietnameses in France with her cause, probed the French ministries and met foreign diplomats and characters.

As in Asia, one can wonder whether the delegation Vietnamese in Paris were used pareillement as relay to facilitate the relations of the NCV with the Communist parties of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. After all, Tran Ngoc Danh was the little brother of Tran Phu, the founder of the Indochinese Communist party at the end of 1930. Tran Ngoc Danh itself had been formed in Moscow before being stopped with the beginning of the year 1930. It passed more than 10 years in prison until its release in 1945, date on which one finds it like a member of the Central committee of the NCV. Being given the close relationships of PCF with the wing `occidentalized' of the NCV since the beginning of the years 1930, it seems impossible to believe that the Vietnameses did not want to contact the communist world via the good care of PCF and/or the Soviet embassy in Paris. A source of American source, reported into 1947 that the Soviet ambassador with Paris, Mr. Bogomolov, accepted on November 22nd, 1946 a representative of the RDVN. Thanks to this contact, the Vietnameses could more regularly meet the director of Soviet information in charge of the Vietnamese question. Meanwhile, " at the end of 1946 " , Nguyen Luong Bang, a leader very high placed NCV, could meet a representative of the Soviet embassy in China, but, unfortunately, the contents of this meeting is not known.

Conclusion

Instrumental for a nationalism fundamental and more pragmatic than ideological, like lont already made noticed Bernard B. Fall, Jean Lacouture and Paul Driven (chapter XIV `Descartes and Confucius' of “Vietnam. Sociology of a war”, Threshold, Paris, 1952), Vietnamese Communism S” is presented under various disguises, in its metamorphoses, and on various ways in difficult navigation between the China, the the USSR and the E. - U., initially with the policy anticolonialist of Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

To the Revolution of August 1945, the constitution of the league Viêt Minh corresponded to the administrative, diplomatic, military fight and policy for the independence of Vietnam and her dissolution corresponded to acquired independence, to make place with the Party " Lao Dong" in the establishment of socialism in the RDVN reduced to the North of Vietnam and in the effort of war for the reunification completed in 1975.

After the reunification and the Third War of Indo-China or War sino-Vietnamese to liquidate the antique Contentious sino-Vietnamese, Vietnamese Communism became folk on the furnace bridge of the ancestors, in a fast economic development of a liberal economy which does not have anything any more to see with the Marxisme-léninisme and the muscular land reforms of the Maoisme of the years 1955-1965.

Bibliographical references

• Georges Boudarel, `the idéocratie imported in Vietnam with the Maoism', in “the bureaucracy in Vietnam”, Harmattan, Paris 1983
• Joseph Buttinger, “The Smaller Dragon: Apolitical History off Vietnam”, Frederick have, Praeger, New York, 1958.
• Philippe Devillers, “History of the Vietnam of 1940 to 1952”, Seuil, Paris, 1952.
• Philippe devillers, “Paris-Saigon-Hanoi: Files of the War, 1944-1947”, Gallimard/Julliard, Paris, 1988.
• Bernard B. Fall
• The Vietminh Mode (1954), Vietminh (1960, French translation, Hake)
• The Two Vietnams (1963), two Vietnam (1962, French translation, Payot)
• Indo-China 1946-1962 (1962, Laffont)
• Vietnam Witness, 1953-66 (1966)
• Jean Lacouture, " Ho Chi Minh" , Threshold, Political coll, Paris, 1967
• Paul Driven, " Vietnam. Sociology of a guerre" , Threshold, Paris 1852
• Thanh H. Vuong, “Theory of the contexts and international relations: departure of the first War of Indochine" , in International studies, vol. XVII, No 3, p, 571-597, September 1986
• Thanh H. Vuong & Jorge Virchez, " Economic community of Pacific Asia. Economic test of anthropolgie and geography politique" , Presses Inter Academics, Cape Red, Quebec, QC, 2004

Related bonds

Revolution of August

External bonds

• (Fr) http://histgeo.free.fr/troisieme/deco/hoch.html
• (in) http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0850866.html
• (Fr) http://perso.orange.fr/felina/doc/colon/indochine.htm
• (Fr) http://chatquipeche.free.fr/Cahiers-n.8.html Requiem of a Vietnamese well-read man deceased at 92 years

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