The Tractatus logico-philosophicus is a work of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is initially appeared in German in 1921 under the title Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung , then in English one year later under the Latin title current. With philosophical Investigations , this text is one of the major pieces of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.

Work very short (approximately 70 pages) but very complex, the Tractatus gave place to many bad interpretations - even mésinterprétations. Whereas the major significance of this text is for ethical Wittgenstein , the majority of the readings proposed its interest in Logique and Philosophie of the language. It is only recently that the studies which are devoted to him started to regard the mystical aspect of work as exchange.

Regarded as one of the most important books of philosophy of the 20th century, this text had a major influence on the logical Positivisme and the analytical Philosophie. With Bertrand Russell, it does of the young person Wittgenstein one of holding of the logical Atomisme.

Statute and structure

In spite of its title (Treated Logico-philosophical ), the Tractatus does not want to be a “work of teaching”. The book thus does not contain theses themselves according to its author. This nondoctrinal aspect explains partly the character overall nonargumentative work: Wittgenstein states many its aphorisms without presenting neither arguments nor examples. The thoughts which it expresses perhaps being able to be included/understood only by somebody who already thought them itself, to argue is not most essential.

The work is composed of 7 Aphorisme S principal, ordered at least with most important. Each aphorism, the last put aside, is followed remarks relating to it. The classification of these remarks can be disconcerting at first sight: thus aphorism 2 east followed from 2.01 then of 2.1, in the same way aphorism 3 east followed from 3.001,3.01… 3.03,3.031, etc This classification takes again in fact the mathematical logic of the numerical proximity to indicate the degrees of the remark carried out relative to the aphorism or the remark which precedes it itself: thus 3.001 is closer to 3 than 3.01: a possible interpretation is 3.001 indicates a thin relation of conceptual definition type of the terms of the aphorism, whereas 3.01 indicates the immediate implications of the aphorism, 3.1 widens the fields of comprehension of the aphorism…

One can release the structure of the book as follows:

  • the sections 1. and 2. treats questions of “ontology”. They present the metaphysics of the Tractatus .
    • 1. relates to the world.
    • 2. relates to the nature of the facts.
  • the sections 3. with 6. relates to the image of the world.
    • 3. develops the concept of image.
    • 4. exposes the philosophy of the language and the design of the philosophy of Wittgenstein.
    • 5. and 6. presents a “theory” of logic and its nature.
  • the last proposal, 7. , evokes the inexpressible aspect of the contents of the Tractatus .

Against the structure of the real book, one can also conceive another plan of the work while being based on a matter of Wittgenstein:

“My book consists of two parts: that presented here, more what I did not write. And it is precisely this second part which is the important part. My book so to speak traces interior the limits of the sphere of ethics, and I am convinced that it is the ONLY rigorous way to trace these limits. In short, I believe that where so many others today orate, I arranged myself for all to put well at his place while concealing to me on top. ”

One could thus regard the plan of the book as being articulated around the written left distinction/not written part.

Objective of the book

The Tractatus Logico-philosophicus is a work on the direction. It is a question of tracing the limits of the direction, to separate what can be known as and what cannot the being. All cannot indeed be known as in a judicious way, there is for Wittgenstein a limit with the expression of the thoughts. The author does not support that there are thoughts in themselves deprived of direction, but rather than all the thoughts are not exprimables. The work thus aims at establishing the criteria which make that a speech has a direction, determine what one can say and what it is necessary to conceal. The verdict of Wittgenstein is Net: the field of dicible and that of the direction are recut, to try to express the inexpressible one in the language brings only to one foolish speech. The Tractatus is thus a work of delimitation: Wittgenstein exposes the criteria of the direction to it and in which cases these criteria are not filled.

This demarcation is however not a devalorization of the inexpressible one. Wittgenstein recognizes the importance of the unutterable one, but it is by recognizing it as such as one “puts it at his place”. To give its real importance to inexpressible, it is necessary to include/understand it like such and not to try to communicate it in the language. The formula of the foreword thus summarizes perfectly the book: “All that properly can be known as can be known as clearly, and on that which one cannot speak, it is necessary to keep silence”.

The Aphorism S

; 1. the world is all that is the case. : of Die Welt STI ales, was der Fall STI. ; 2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of states of affair. : of Was der Fall STI, die Tatsache, STI das Bestehen von Sachverhalten. ; 3. the logical image of the facts is the thought. : of Das logische Bild der Tatsache STI der Gedanke. ; 4. the thought is the proposal equipped with direction. : of Der Gedanke STI DER sinnvolle Satz. ; 5. the proposal is a function of truth of the elementary proposals. : of Der Satz STI eine Wahrheitsfunktion der Elementarsätze. ; 6. the general form of the function of truth is: ξ, NR (ξ). It is the general form of the proposal. : of Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist: [p, ξ, NR (ξ)]. Dies STI die allgemeine Form of Satzes. ; 7. On that which one cannot speak, silence should be kept. : of Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen.

“Ontology”

The book opens on a series of aphorisms treating of questions of ontology. These proposals not wanting to be to be theses, to speak about a “ontology” wittgensteinienne is not adequate from the point of view of the author, and we thus put ontology between quotation marks. It is however well an ontology which the beginning of the work presents.

Fact

One of the most important notions of the Tractatus Logico-philosophicus is the concept in fact. It intervenes as of the second proposal (1.1).

“1.1. The world is the totality of the facts, not things”

“1.2. The world breaks up into facts. ”

The world is not a whole of things: trees, people, cities, planes, etc; the world is composed of facts, as “Wikipédia is an encyclopedia”, “Jules loves Julie”, “Wikipédia is not a musical genre” for example. One sees here the aspect nuclear physicist of the philosophy of Wittgenstein, the world is a compound of simple elements (the facts), and by analysis one leads to these elements. Contrary to Russell, Wittgenstein considers that it is the fact, and not the object, which is the fundamental logic element of the world.

The fact is defined as “what is the case”, that one can also translate “what arrives” or “what takes place”. He answers a criterion of independence: a thing can be or not the case without that influencing the remainder of what exists (1.21).

Fact and object

Although it is the basic unit for Wittgenstein, the fact itself is composed of objects. But this composition is theoretical : the object exists only in one fact, there is not possible to reach it differently. It is because the object cannot be considered apart from a fact that it is the fact - and not the object - which is the basic element that Wittgenstein chooses. One cannot directly know “Jules” or “Julie” in the example above. These two objects are abstract starting from the facts. The object “Jules” is not profiled that via facts such as “Jules is brown”, “Jules loves Julie”, etc

Wittgenstein distinguishes two types of objects:

  • the private individuals
  • properties and relations

For example “Wikipédia” is a private individual, and “… is an encyclopedia” is a property. The fact “Wikipédia is an encyclopedia” is thus composed of two objects: a private individual and a property. For “Jules Julie” one loves has two private individuals, and the relation to like, that is to say three objects. The ontology of Wittgenstein is thus strongly related to a logical design, the two types of objects which she proposes correspond to two types of logical components: functions and their arguments.

This theory nuclear physicist poses however a problem: if the fact breaks up into object, then certain facts will have the same composition. “Jules loves Julie” has the same components that “Julie loves Jules”. Contrary to Russell, which admits that there is an additional component in the fact which makes it possible to differentiate these two proposals, Wittgenstein supports that there is no difference of contents. It defends the idea that the facts have a structure, and that it is this structure which makes it possible to distinguish them. This structure is however not itself a component of the fact.

That is to say “R”, “has”, and “B” the components of two different facts “Rab” and “Rba”. Russell analyzes as follows:

C1 (R, has, b)
C2 (R, has, b)
It is the element C which differentiates “Rab” from “Rba”. In a case the composition is C1 in other C2, the difference is well contained in the fact like an additional element. It is with precisely with this solution which Wittgenstein is opposed by affirming that the facts are structured.

Fact and state of affairs

According to Wittgenstein the objects are connected between them in a given way. Wittgenstein names a connection of “made” object ( Tatsache ) or “state of affairs” ( Sachverhalt ). The distinction between Tatsache and Sachverhalt is however not easy to establish, and posed many problems with the commentators of the Tractatus .

Two interpretations were proposed:

  1. the fact is what is complex; the state of affair is what is simple.
  2. the fact is what is real; the state of affair is what is possible.

(1) Complex and simple
The first interpretation is that of Russell in the foreword of the Tractatus , it was also endorsed by others critical. It is based on certain proposals like:

“4.2211 Same if the world is infinitely complex, so that each fact consists of an infinity of states of affairs and that each state of affair is composed of an infinity of objects, it would be necessary nevertheless that there are objects and states of affairs”

Or on a letter with Russell in the Notebooks 1914-1916 :

is

““Which the difference between Tatsache and Sachverhalt of things? ”. Sachverhalt is what corresponds atomic Elementarsatz, if it is true. Tatsache is what corresponds to the logical product of elementary proposals when this product is true. The reason for which I introduce Tatsache before Sachverhalt would require a long explanation. ”

It would thus be necessary to include/understand the difference between Tatsache and Sachverhalt like a difference of the complex to simple. This interpretation justifies that one translates Sachverhalt by “atomic fact”. The Sachverhalt is only one fact simpler. There are then three levels: the fact, which breaks up into atomic facts, which break up themselves into object.

(2) Reality and possible
The second interpretation proposes it to consider that the Tatsache is a Sachverhalt which exists, which is the case. It is based on other proposals:

“1.1. The world is the totality of the facts, not things”

“2.04. The totality of the existing states of affairs is the world”

“4.21 the simplest proposal, the elementary proposal, affirms the existence of a state of affairs”

A Sachverhalt would thus become a Tatsache when it would be the case. There would not be difference between the two the existence put aside. It would be the fact of being real (to exist) or not which would slice the statute of the connection of object. A connection of object possible is then a Sachverhalt and a real connection a Tatsache .

The Tractatus thus presents aphorisms going in the direction of two interpretations. Brian Mc Guinness, one of the two translators of the english language version of the Tractatus proposes an interesting version of the second interpretation which would solve the difficulty. According to him the facts are not composed of states of affairs to the directions where the state of affairs would belong to the fact. The states of affairs are presupposed by the facts like possibilities of actualization. The fact is a state of affair which is carried out, possible which becomes real.

“a fact (real by definition) presupposes that one or more possibilities were carried out. This in its turn is conceivable only if it is possible for us to seize these potentialities independently of their realization. In other words, we can affirm an unspecified fact only if we have access to a reserve of possibilities that we seize”
mentally

It is in this way that the Tractatus is interpreted today. The first interpretation, which raises of the beginning of the interest for the book, raises indeed certain difficulties. If the fact is really composed of state of affairs it its character of simplicity loses: it should not thus be the logical atom of the world any more, role consequently reserved for the state of affairs. It is thus the second interpretation which is from now on privileged.

Positive fact and negative fact

Wittgenstein seems to distinguish two types of facts, the positive facts and the negative facts.

“2. What is the case, the fact, is the existence of state of affairs. ”

“2.06 the existence of the states of affairs and their nonexistence is reality. (The existence of the states of affairs and their nonexistence we respectively also let us name them made positive and negative fact.)”

There still the Tractatus has an ambiguity. One could think that Wittgenstein operates a real division between two types of facts:

  • of the positive facts , as “the Tractatus is a book”
  • negative facts , as “the Tractatus is not a banana”

The positive fact would correspond to a standard logical expression " Pa" ; the negative fact with an expression like “¬Qa”.

This position is however not that of the author of the Tractatus . Wittgenstein refuses that the negation (¬) have a corrélat in reality. The sign “¬” does not correspond to nothing in reality. If it were the case, it would have to be admitted that proposals “Pa” and “¬¬Pa” are not equivalent. The first expression contains two signs of less indeed than the first. If these signs have a corrélat in the world, both proposals do not represent the same thing. However for Wittgenstein proposals “Pa” and “¬¬Pa” have the same representative contents well.

It should be understood that for him “Pa”, “¬Pa”, and “¬¬Pa” return to the even state of affairs. There is one state of affairs, whose these proposals affirms or denies the realization. “Pa” and “¬¬Pa” affirm the realization of " Pa" , “¬Pa” affirms to it not realization of “Pa”. The difference between positive and negative fact is thus a question of language, it is only in the language that it takes place. There are thus no strictly speaking negative facts.

Object

With the concept in fact and state of affair, the concept of object is one of the pillars of the ontology of the Tractatus . Contrary to the fact, the object does not make part of the world. He is postulated but can never be really reached.

Object and made

According to Wittgenstein, the fact is the simplest element to which the analysis can lead. However the fact is defined like a connection of objects, i.e. like a complex made up of simpler parts, the objects. There is no there contradiction. The fact is what is simplest really , the object is what is theoretically simplest.

The residue of an analysis of the world is a whole of facts, but the facts suppose the objects which constitute them. Wittgenstein is thus brought to postulate the objects. If there is complex, there must be the simple one. The analysis must have an end, it cannot regress ad infinitum. There one sees still appearing the atomism of the author.

The object is thus simple, but one cannot consider it in his simplicity. The object is always connected to other objects, it can be apprehended only within one such connection. It is in that the fact is well the simplest element really : the object is simple, but one cannot reach it directly, one can only abstract it starting from facts.

Form object

Wittgenstein affirms that the objects have a form. It consists of their possibility of occurrence in states of affairs (2.0141). In other words, an object cannot be of connection with any other. It can appear only in certain connections, with some other objects. This form is inherent in the objects: the possibility of combining the object with such others is already registered in the object.

If an object is known, one knows in which states of affairs it can appear and in which it cannot it. To know what is a pencil, comes down to knowing that one can write with, that it can be cut, that a pencil can have several colors, etc

This knowledge of the states of affairs in which an object can take seat expresses in the use of the names. When one can use the word “pencil”, it is that one knows the proposals in which one can find it - what amounts knowing the states of affairs in which the " object; crayon" can be met.

Object and name

Wittgenstein indeed establishes a parallel between the world and the language. The proposals represent the facts, and the names the objects. From this point of view it can support that the object is the significance of the name. The object is it to what the name returns.

The role of the object is crucial for the determination of the direction: a proposal whose names do not return to objects is regarded by Wittgenstein as a pseudo-proposal, it does not have a direction.

The idea that the name means the object is not however to include/understand like the real position of Wittgenstein: neither the object, nor the name can be apprehended directly. Consequently it is only theoretically which “the name means the object” (3.203). The significance of a name is in fact the use of this name, the proposals in which it can be. “If a sign does not have a use, it does not have significance” reads one with aphorism 3.238.

Object and substance

the “2.021 objects constitute the substance of the world. ”

The substance is defined as what remains independently of what is the case (2.024). Whatever the states of affairs realized, the substance remains the same one. All the possible worlds thus have jointly their objects.

The postulation of the substance is paramount for the Tractatus . Wittgenstein defends a design of the truth there as correspondence which supposes that one can compare the proposal with the fact.

The substance is thus not postulated free: it has a central role in the work. Without the substance, it is the possibility even of the direction which disappears. Without object to which the name refers, the name does not have any more significance, it does not have any more a direction. And it is then the project to even delimit the borders of the direction and nonthe direction which collapses: the Tractatus cannot thus make the saving in this postulate.

Nature of the private individuals

We higher mentioned two types of objects: private individuals and properties/relations. We then gave examples of private individuals: " Wikipédia" , " Jules" , etc These examples are not nevertheless literally private individuals such as Wittgenstein hears them. They were thus given only with a one teaching aim, the private individuals can correspond only to precise elements. If an object is in a state of affairs so that one can draw a conclusion from this state of affairs concerning the remainder of the states of affairs, then it is not a private individual.

For example, a space point cannot be a private individual. If a point is located in space, it is not located elsewhere in space: one can deduce from his situation of the elements concerning of other states of affairs. In the same way for the points located in time. All that is space-time cannot thus be a private individual wittgensteinien.

The Tractatus does not develop with what could correspond a private individual. This question does not have interest from the point of view of the book. Two interpretations exist however: one could think that the private individuals are the massive points of physics, or points of the perceptive field. In both cases there are elements which have properties without one being able to deduce from these properties though it is on the rest of the world.

Theory of the image

For Wittgenstein a image is characterized by what it represents something. This capacity to be represented supposes a common point between the image and what it appears, this common point will be the form. If an image is image of something, it is because there is an identity of form between the two parts. There is isomorphism between the representative and represented.

This isomorphism should not be taken in a “concrete” direction: to have the same form does not mean to resemble. What makes it possible to say that two things have the same form it is that one can establish a correspondence between each element of these two things. It is necessary that there is a bi-univocal correlation between the image and that of which it is image: to each element of the image must correspond only one element in represented.

A proposal “Rab” is the image of a fact " Rab" if all the components of the proposal have a corrélat in the fact. The sign “R” corresponds to " R" , the sign “has” with " a" , and so on.

Let us note that for Wittgenstein the images form part of the world, they are themselves of the facts. A simple illustration of this idea can be given while thinking of a photograph or has a topographic chart. The photographs and the charts are in the world, and they are well images with the direction wittgensteinien: one can establish a point-to-point correspondence with the chart of a city and the real city.

According to the Tractatus , the possibility of representing holds in the identity of form. However this form is not representable. One cannot produce image of what makes it possible an image to represent. If it were the case the form would have itself a form, which Wittgenstein refuses.

Philosophy of the language

The language like image

Compared with the design of the language which Wittgenstein developed later, that of the Tractatus appears poorer. The Langage aims at representing the world, to give an image of it. It is compared with the reality, with which it shares its form.

There is thus a parallel strict between reality and language. What applies to the fact and the object is also worth for their representatives in the language: the proposal and the Name. The proposal is the simplest element of the language, it has a structure and is composed of names. The name cannot be considered independently of a proposal and cannot form part of all the contexts.

The combinative character already present is found: as various combinations of objects make it possible to obtain various facts, the various combinations of names give various proposals.

Primarily image, the language is thus only considered compared to the proposal (4.001). The pragmatic functions of the language are completely occulted, which is not representation is not taken into account. By contrast, posterior Wittgenstein will be interested much more in pragmatic linguistics thus giving up the design “representationalist” of the Tractatus .

Sign and symbol

Even if its lexicon is sometimes vague, Wittgenstein distinguishes the sign from the symbol. The sign is the material element of the symbol. Different symbols can correspond to the same sign, and the same symbol can correspond to several signs.

The fact that in a natural language the same sign can be attached to very different symbols is at the origin of philosophical confusions. The interest of logic is then to dissipate these mistakes. The sign “is” does not correspond to the same symbols in “Socrate is”, “Socrate is the Master of Plato”, and “Socrate is a philosopher”. The first expression expresses the existence of an individual, the second the identity between two signs, and the third the possession of a property by an individual. Each one of these proposals thus has a different logical form which is masked by the language.

“the language disguises the thought. And in such a way that one cannot, according to the form external of clothing, to discover the form of the thought which it equips (4.002)”

This idea points out the philosophy of Russell and evokes its theory of the definite descriptions. There would be a certain mistrust towards the language which it would share with Wittgenstein. The position of Wittgenstein is however more complex. Contrary to Russell, his/her friend does not have any will to reform the natural languages with the profit of logic. It is only the philosophical use of the language that he criticizes.

Various types of proposals

The Tractatus seeks to determine the limits of what can say in a judicious way. Wittgenstein thus differentiates the judicious proposal S from the proposals which are not it.

It distinguishes three types of stated S:

  • proposals judicious, or equipped with direction ( of sinnvoll )
  • proposals foolish, or deprived of direction ( of unsinnig )
  • proposals out of the direction, or meaningless ( of [[wikt: sinnlos sinnlos]] )

Only the first category includes “proposals” strictly known as. The two other categories include/understand only “pseudo-proposals”. For Wittgenstein an authentic proposal has a direction, if it does not have it of them is not a “proposal”.

Conditions of the direction

Significance and use
The criteria which Wittgenstein poses to say that an expression has a direction are very strict. An expression has a direction if its components have a Signification. Any expression where the terms do not refer thus finds excluded from the judicious one: that relates to metaphysics, but also all the statements of fiction. According to the Tractatus , a sentence as “Ulysses was deposited on the ground of Ithaque in a deep sleep” does not have any direction: the sign “Ulysses” does not indicate anything.

It was however seen that the signs could not be considered out of the proposals: this criterion of nonthe direction thus has another formulation. An expression is foolish when it makes an incorrect use of the signs. If a sign is used in a context where it cannot appear (under the terms of its form), the expression is deprived of direction. “Pierre eats a prime number” is foolish: the term “prime number” cannot combine this way with “eats”.

The theory of Wittgenstein is however subtle. “Water glass drinks Pierre” is not endowed with direction, but “water glass”, “drinks” and “Pierre” can be in relation. “Pierre drinks water glass” is a judicious proposal: what account is the way in which the signs combine. Even if some can never enter of connection, for others it is enough that connection obeys certain constraints so that the statement has direction.

Verifiability
For Wittgenstein of the Tractatus the judicious proposals answer a criterion of Vérifiabilité. There it is not a question of the effective possibility to check a statement or knowledge of a method which would make it possible to check it. Verifiability has a weak direction here. A proposal has a direction if one can conceive that it is checked: there is not even need to have the conditions for a theoretical checking.

Meaningless and nonsense

The statements which are not judicious are pseudo-statements, but to be a pseudo-statement is not equivalent to being foolish. In a way enough surprising, the Tractatus does not make coincide “what is not judicious” with “what is foolish”; when an expression does not have a direction it is not inevitably a nonsense.

Wittgenstein establishes a difference between the pseudo-proposals:

  • of unsinnig , which is in the nonsense, foolish.
  • of sinnlos , which is not even in the field of the direction.

The two categories correspond to very different elements, but the translation can sometimes induce in error. Granger for example translated unsinnig “deprived of meaningless direction” and sinnlos “”. These two expressions can be close in French, whereas the concepts of unsinnig and sinnlos which Wittgenstein defines do not recut at all.

Meaningless
This section utilizes precise logical concepts: for more details you can refer to Calcul of the proposals.

The meaningless direction or proposals, of, are formal proposals. It do not have any contents and do not claim to give information. Wittgenstein thinks of the expressions of the Logique and the Mathématiques.

These “proposals” do not relate to reality, which they express is rather the form of our thought. A \ rightarrow A does not say anything of what exists: in all the possible worlds the expression is true. It is a logical Tautologie: its Truth table gives only the value “truth” (or 1).

The statute that the Tractatus confers on these statements is very original. Actually tautologies are not literally “true”. So that a proposal is true it is necessary that a fact corresponds to him. The true proposal locates the real-world in the whole of the possible worlds: if “Rab” is a fact, the proposal which affirms that " Rab" distinguish the fact (carried out) from the states of affairs which were not carried out. It indicates something as for what is the case and what is not it.

On the contrary tautologies fill the unit of logical space without distinction. They do not say anything on what is the case or not, since she says that something is always the case. What they express is necessary. Wittgenstein thus excludes them from the field of the direction. When I know that “2 + 2 = 4” I do nothing but recognize the form of my thought. There is no information on the world which is transmitted. But what Wittgenstein says implies that it is the same for more complex expressions: “2 + 185462 − 3 = 200.000 − 165461” is not more informative than “has = has”.

Wittgenstein thus solves the question of the knowledge of the logical objects by the Absurde. There is no logical knowledge: there is knowledge only Contingent. What is necessary does not have the same statute, “it is not known” not.

This diagnosis is obviously also worth for the “False” Contradiction S. in all the situations, they are the back of tautologies and are in the same way considered that they.

Nonsense
What Wittgenstein calls nonsense recovers a great number of heteroclite proposals. We saw that the proposals of metaphysics and the fiction are foolish, but those of ethics and esthetics are the same for it. The distinction between dicible and inexpressible takes all its importance here. The meaningless proposals are inexpressible, but they do not pose problems: they do not have any informative claim. It goes from there differently from the proposals of the nonsense. In fact statements believe to say things on reality while at the same time they do not make it, and especially that they it cannot not. The criteria of the directions posed by the Tractatus reject very stated which does not describe facts of the field of the direction.

The nonsense is however not identified with the absurdity. It is not because a proposal is foolish that of which it tries to speak is of no importance. On the contrary, that about which try to speak certain pseudo-proposals is crucial: the error lies only in the attempt to express it in the language. The Tractatus thus lets take shape various categories within the foolish pseudo-proposals.

One will be able to find among them the statements metaphysics, absurd, but also the ethical and esthetic statements, which enjoy a very particular statute. The case of the philosophical statements will be approached separately, but it is clear that philosophy produces it also only pseudo-proposals.

The Tractatus Logico-philosophicus is often mentioned for its aspect anti-metaphysics. Wittgenstein criticizes indeed there metaphysics as being absurd. Metaphysics cannot meet the conditions of the direction. It makes use of the terms without significance (“the first principle”, “absolute” for example). But it uses also current words in uses which are not possible. It re-uses words of the ordinary language without their giving again a significance being appropriate for their new context of use. It thus breaks the fundamental condition of the judicious speech.

Like philosophy, it falls into the traps from the ordinary language and is blind with the real structure of the thought. It sticks to the natural Grammaire and does not see the logical grammar of the words. It confuses Signe and Symbole and leads to nonsenses.

On the other hand, ethical and Esthétique are developed by Wittgenstein. Although these fields are only approached at the end of the work in some proposals, they are not less worthy of interest. The Tractatus brings them closer to logic. Like it, ethical and esthetic are conditions of the world: not more than one cannot design a world without logic, one cannot design a world without ethics and esthetics. In that ethical and esthetic are transcendantales (6.13, 6.421). The fact that one cannot speak about these things thus does not remove them any importance.

Design of philosophy

Mainly exposed in aphorisms 4.003 to 4.116, the design of the philosophy of the Tractatus belongs to the elements which will be most influential. Proposing at the same time a new vision of the discipline and a criticism of former philosophy, Wittgenstein establishes philosophy like an activity directly related on the language and the direction.

Science and philosophy

Philosophy is very strictly differentiated from science. It is neither the method nor the precision which founds this distinction: philosophy and science do not have quite simply the same object. Science aims at producing true descriptions of the world, it has as an aim reality. Philosophy does not have as an aim reality, it does not speak about the world nor does not aim at doing it.

Philosophy thus does not produce any true proposal. Contrary to the science, which produces theories , philosophy is presented in the form of an activity. A theory is a whole of proposals, and it is precisely what philosophy is not. Philosophy produces explanations on proposals, not of new proposals. There there not of “philosophical” proposals as it can be “scientific” proposals. Philosophy has a role second, it reconsiders the proposals for other disciplines. Wittgenstein refusing the idea of a meta-language, the statements of philosophy are not méta-statements, they are only pseudo-proposals. Philosophy is thus condemned to produce only nonsenses.

Philosophy like activity

Philosophy is presented in the form of a logical activity of clarification. Philosophy reveals the logical form of the statements behind their expression in natural language. It thus makes it possible to uncover the pseudo-proposals by showing that their terms are not used in accordance with the form of the words or by clarifying the absence of significance of the names. It is well a “critic of the language” (4.0031).

This activity of criticism does not take place however on all the uses of the language. Wittgenstein does not consider that the ordinary language is faulty. On the contrary “all the proposals for a our usual language in fact, such as they are, are ordered in a logically perfect way” (5.5563). Where the author of the Tractatus will condemn the errors and the nonsenses it is in the philosophical and metaphysical speech. Philosophy highlights what we always had under the eyes and which for this reason one does not see. In this direction, the design of philosophy such as present the Wittgenstein young person is in agreement with that which it will defend in its Philosophical Recherches where it will write that: “Philosophy is satisfied to place any thing in front of us, without anything to explain nor to deduce. - As all, is offered there to the sight, it does not have nothing there to explain” (§126).

Critical of philosophy

The design of the philosophy of Wittgenstein is in particular used to him to denounce philosophy such as it was practiced before him. The philosophers make an inappropriate use of the language, they state only foolish proposals and use terms without referent. Worse, they are mistaken on nature in what they do: they believe speech of reality whereas it is not the case. Philosophy is caught then for a theory, a science.

The statute of the philosophy which Wittgenstein defends is not as for him not explicitly defined. The philosophy of Wittgenstein joined bad philosophy in what she does not speak either about reality. If the Tractatus is not deceived on the statute of only it says, it violates nevertheless the conditions of the direction which it itself posed. The final status of philosophy thus remains ambiguous: Wittgenstein tackles a type of philosophy, but his is not either able to face its own criticisms.

Philosophy some it is, states only pseudo-proposals. But if the philosophy which the Tractatus tackles states of the absurd pseudo-proposals, the philosophy of the Tractatus could support foolish proposals without being the object of attack. These proposals would be then close to that of ethics or esthetics. Wittgenstein does not slice openly on this question, and its silence after the publication of the book does not give any answer.

Direction and philosophy

Philosophy is not limited to clarify the nonsenses, it is especially the activity which delimits direction and nonsense. It is it which determines what, within the thinkable one, can be known as. It thus has a crucial role from the point of view of the Tractatus . It lays down the conditions of the judicious speech and the foolish speech. Its utility after that nevertheless is not fixed. Philosophy could either stop the demarcation carried out, or to continue by having a regulating role. The critic of the language could thus be operated once for all in the delimitation of the criteria of the direction, or be permanently renewed by the effective analysis of the language compared to the criteria posed.

Philosophy of logic

Ethics

Influence Tractatus

In spite of its sometimes enigmatic nature, the Tractatus had a considerable success near certain currents. It in particular held the attention of the members of the Cercle of Vienna, and particularly of Rudolf Carnap and Moritz Schlick. The neopositivists will go until taking for emblem the sentence of Wittgenstein according to which “All that is let say lets say clearly”. They erase nevertheless the second part of the statement: “on that which one cannot speak, it is necessary to keep silence”. Contrary to Wittgenstein, the logical empirists do not consider that there is anything to conceal, it does not have on their premises of a mystical size there.

Although slightly different, the design of philosophy that the members of the Circle assume must much with the Tractatus . Philosophy is not a science, it does not speak about the world but of the language on the world, its vocation is to clarify the speech of science. The method of philosophy will be for them also related to the language: the analysis of the language and the concepts of science will allow the required clarification.

The influence of Wittgenstein is nevertheless to moderate according to the members and does not appear in the same way at all. It is very strong at Carnap, via its design of the statements, and the possibility of comparing the statements with reality; but detectable with more difficulty at Neurath, for which the proposals is compared only with proposals.

At all events of its theoretical heritage, Wittgenstein played a particular part for the Circle of Vienna. A study line with line of the Tractatus will be carried out by the group during the years 1920, and Wittgenstein will take part even in certain meetings of the Circle. He wanted especially to meet some of the members (Schlick, Carnap, Waisman). He often refused to discuss philosophy, and insisted to recite poetry, the chair turned towards the wall. Wittgenstein broke thereafter its relations with the Circle because it had come from there to believe that Carnap had used some of its ideas without its permission.

Rupture and continuity

The Tractatus was definitively to solve the problems of which it treated and to bring to forsake philosophy. Wittgenstein returned however to philosophy in 1929, after seven years of silence.

After its return, Wittgenstein gives up part of the theses presented in its first work. The change is real, but there is however a continuity between Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and posterior Wittgenstein. Of sound Tractatus logico-philosophicus , Wittgenstein rejects four major “theses then”:

  • logical atomism : the elementary statements are independent the ones the others.

  • the extensionality : The value of truth of a proposal depends on the value of truth of the proposals which compose it.

  • the language has as a role to represent the world.

  • logic is the only perfect language.

The rupture with its first book is still incarnated in the new ideas of Wittgenstein. Not having here for goal to expose the late philosophy of Wittgenstein, we will mention these thoughts only what can be put in direct link with the Tractatus .

  • philosophy should not deal with ideal language, it must be interested in the ordinary language .

  • the method of philosophy has nothing to do with science, philosophy does not establish laws. It is a “phenomenology” (with the direction not husserlien) .

  • Change of method: whereas the Tractatus did not give almost any example, the philosophy which succeeds to him will use abundantly of examples.

  • the significance of the name is not the object. The significance lies in the semantic use .

The philosophy which follows the Tractatus thus has an object and a method different from this last: it does not put logic ahead any more and is detached from an exact method of analysis too inherited the logical atomism. It however remains a philosophy of the direction, omnipresent topic at Wittgenstein. If the ruptures are real and outstanding, to exaggerate them with excess would be erroneous: the idea of a total opposition between the two periods is a myth that Wittgenstein itself forged. It is seen above that the method changes, but that the design of philosophy remains, it, near to what aphorism 4.111 described: “Philosophy is not a science of nature”. The concept of use does not appear either ex nihilo: the Tractatus was interested in the syntactic use, the turning on this point resides in the semantic orientation .

Translations

Frenchwomen

The Tractatus logico-philosophicus knew several translations in French.

The first is that of Pierre Klossowski in 1961. She is recognized today defective because dependant on a bad interpretation of the text. Klossowski translated Sachverhalt by “atomic fact”, and thus lets think that the Sachverhalt is simple, in opposition to the Tatsache (made) which would be complex. The defects of such an interpretation were mentioned higher. In addition the term Bild is returned by “table”, translation rather misleading since Wittgenstein speaks about image to the mathematical direction.

The second translation published date of 1993, and is due to Gilles-Gaston Granger. Regarded as much better than the preceding one, it is however sometimes reproached to him for restoring bestehen by “subsistence”, and not by “existence”. This choice is justified by the fact that bestehen does not return in the text to the empirical existence but rather to the existence in a logical space.

In margin of these two translations available in the trade, two other translations were undertaken.

Before even 1961, Pierre Hadot had been harnessed with the task to return the Tractatus available in French. The publication of the Klossowski translation will make him give up the project to finish and publish its translation. One knows however who his translation could have been better than that which was published in 1961: before Granger, Hadot spoke already about “state of affair” to express Sachverhalt .

A new translation is mentioned and quoted in the recently published Introduction to Tractatus of Mathieu Marion. It is due to François Latraverse. Apparently not published, one can read of them extracts in the work of Marion.

English

The two English translations of the Tractatus also deserve they to be mentioned.

That by C.K. Odgen going back to 1922 is historically the first translation of work. It was prepared with the assistance of Frank P. Ramsey, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein itself. She suffers however from defect common to the Klossowski translation since she speaks about “atomic facts” (made atomic) to restore to it problematic Sachverhalt . In the Ogden edition the text of Wittgenstein is preceded by a foreword of Bertrand Russell that Wittgenstein found extremely bad, at the point to be opposed so that it is published in the German version. In a letter with Russell of May 6th, 1920 it is expressed as follows:

“ your Introduction will not be printed, and consequently it is probable that my book will not be it either. Because when I had in front of the eyes the German translation of the Introduction, I could not solve me to let it print with my book. The smoothness of your English style was indeed, as it natural, is lost in the translation, and what remained was only superficiality and incomprehension ”

The foreword of Russell will be found however with the posterior editions of the Tractatus , as well in English as in other languages. Let us note finally that the Ogden edition is bilingual and present the German text opposite the translation.

The second English translation is the fact of David Pears and Brian McGuinness. It is published in 1961. It introduces the term of “state off affairs” (state of affairs) to restore sachverhalt and with the merit to be due to one of the most recognized criticisms of Wittgenstein, Brian Mc Guinness.

Anecdotes

  • the title “Tractatus logico-philosophicus” refers to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus of Baruch Spinoza. He was proposed by G.E.Moore during the first translation. It is however not very probable that Wittgenstein read itself the treaty of Spinoza.

  • Wittgenstein said in connection with its work: “Beside good and original things, my book, the treaty log.phil., also its share of kitsch contains. ” Ms 183 p. 30

  • In a conversation with Frank Ramsey, it acknowledged that it “had forgotten what it kept in mind” by writing certain passages.

  • the musician Finnish Mauri Antero Numminen carried out a musical adaptation of the Tractatus in 1966. This work takes again sentences of the Treaty on varied styles: Jazz, Rock'n'roll, Waltz, atonal Music and walk.

  • There exist fifteen “phantom proposals” which should be present in the text if the sequence main clause/notices on this proposal were perfect. These “missing” proposals are them: 2.0,2.020,2.20,3.00,3.0,3.20,4.00,4.0,5.0,5.10,5.50,5.530,6.00,6.0,6.120.

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