Science

A mythifiée science

It is however such a representation of the science which circulates among the general public, generally accompanied by some other commonplaces, which one finds in particular in secondary education. Robert Nadeau, while being based on a study carried out in 1984, already considered, in 1986, that the school culture is composed of epistemological stereotypes who would form together a kind of mythology of new times who would not be without relationship with a kind of Scientisme.

These current representations of science are studied by researchers in sciences of education. One will be able to quote among them Norman G. Lederman, Yvonne Meichtry or William F. McComas. This last, by examining a series of American scientific handbooks intended for the high-school pupils, identifies ten scientific “Myths”, to start with the idea that the laws, and more generally the scientific knowledge, are truths abolues and last, and that the scientific evidence is not absolute and final. Such a design of science is usually conveyed by the media, in particular television. Harry Hakes written thus that: There TV, science is presented ace is generator off certainty, when it is properly conducted. Uncertainties and ambiguities are the result off incompetence off the scientists, but inadequacy off the apparatus, but off the limited tests conducted so far. Future Residual uncertainties will Be eliminated by tests . One must however raise, as notes it S. Holly Stocking, professor of journalism at the university of Indiana and old journalist of Los Angeles Times, that this type of speech has its during, and that one reproaches to the journalists as well their excess of confidence as their excessive mistrust. The myth of science which incarnates the truth thus goes hand in hand with the idea not less mythical of an always provisional and unstable scientific knowledge. But none of these designs is divided by the specialists in science, except for some scientistic or relativistic radical finally very minority

McComas also locates the myth of science like application of a general and universal “scientific method”. It quotes work of several historians, sociologists or teachers whose work shows the weakness of this generally accepted idea, but it is also possible to be based on the remarks of the large physicist Murray Freezing-Man, who recalls that in practical, the scientific company does not conform exactly to any models precise dictating the rules of its control . Another commonplace (always according to McComas), this scientific method would consist of the application of procedures codifée, in a kind of step algorithmic leaving only little place to the creativity, imagination or the intuition, even at all. Work of Gerald Holton, inter alia, shows that it of it is nothing. Always in the methodological register, McCormas announces current confusion between science and experimentation, which Robert Nadeau names the “narrow experimentalism”: there would be science only experimental. There still, each one of these generally accepted ideas is the object of very critical sharp by the majority of the specialists.

Other commonplaces are also announced, as the idea that the advance in knowledge rests on on the genius of some solitary heroes, the confusion maintained between science and technology, or the idealization of the process of deliberation within the scientific community, from where any passion and any interest would be excluded. With the enumeration of McComas can also be added the myth of the mathematisation (or formalization) like criterion of scientificity, that of a science summarizing itself with the research of that, natural laws of the pure objectivity of the scientists, that of a science very whole round towards the benefit of mankind, or that of “pure science”.

The scientific community is not saved by the generally accepted ideas. Louis Althusser, which produced a course on this question, explains why any scientist is affected of an ideology or a scientific philosophy that it calls " Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists " (and that it shortens in " P.S.S"). This PS, which according to Althusser function in silence , one would present contradictory contents composed of association of convictions materialists and objectivists and idealistic beliefs . Following Althusser, the idea of a spontaneous philosophy of the scientists was taken up by other authors, without the direction being always preserved which granted to him the Marxist philosopher. Dominique Pestre thus opposes it to the idea that the essence of what relates to science passes in the closed universe of the laboratories . It can also be a question of the idea of a certain “purity” effective or desirable of the science, which would be or should be detached from the contingencies of this world. More generally, this concept of spontaneous philosophy of the scientists announces less the belief in a whole of myths stripped of base than adhesion not questioned to certain intuitions metaphysics or philosophies, then held for obvious, however that they are in the middle of after discussions among the philosophers. But like writes it Harry Collins, itself physicist of formation, the Réflexivité, the philosophical return on is-even and on its practices, is not more useful for the researcher than the Generative grammar was not it with Shakespeare.

What is what science?

To exceed these spontaneous generally accepted ideas and these philosophies, and to start to include/understand what is science, it is necessary asresser the authors - philosophers, methodologists, epistemologists, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, economists… - which sought to think science since Plato and Aristote. In nearly 2500 years of reflections on science, the direction of this word evolved/moved, the practices which it also recovers, as well as the method aiming at science itself evolved/moved, as well as the methods aiming at seizing the direction of them. We stop already a few moment on the changes of direction here evolution étymo.

The 20th century marked a radical turning. Very schematically, to the first reflections purely philosophical and often normative came to be added more sociological and psychological reflections, then sociological approaches and anthropological more daring in the years 1980, then finally of the basically heterogeneous approaches as from the years 1990 with Science Studies, which mix various disciplines to include/understand science, of philosophy to the economy while passing by anthropology and psychology. In same time, the glance of the analysts of science is gradually diverted great accounts to go to be interested in the details of science in action. It is about a kind of immanentisation of the design of science: she is not regarded any more today as a éthérée entity. Science is taken today in all its complexity, and its intrication with the cognitive one, the social one, the institutional one. It is also about an acceptance of its complexity. This movement was not done without great controversies, in particular around the questions of the relativism. It would seem today that the spirits calm down, and certain authors endeavor to make converge the various approaches, of philosophy to sociology while passing by the economy.

A corpus of knowledge and methods?

For a long time, science was conceived like a corpus of knowledge and methods, object of study of the Philosophie of sciences. Science then is ordered and désincarnée.

Without going up until Aristote, one can start with the philosophers like Roger and Francis Bacon, Descartes, the empirists, then a little later Mach, Poincaré, Duhem, Bachelard, the circle of Vienna, then Popper, Quine, Lakatos. Successive works of these scientists and philosophers (sometimes both), gradually will disturb the image of science. The majority however remained about it with a design of science like corpus of knowledge, far away from the company. Science is the object of philosophy.

The analyzes of science (one speaks sometimes about métasciences) first of all related to science like corpus of knowledge, and raised a long time of philosophy and epistemology, (analysis of each particular discipline concerned with regional epistemologies ). They were the first steps of the philosophy of sciences, at the 19th century.

Regarded as a corpus of knowledge, the study of science concerns the epistemology and the Philosophie of sciences.

Context of justification and context of discovered the philosophy of sciences and epistemology are worried traditionally only context of justification. It is there that the specificity of the scientific speech would be placed.

The philosophical approaches are often normative: it is a question of defining the criteria making it possible to distinguish good science from bad, the science of nonsciences and pseudo-sciences. A big part of these reflections concern the Methodologie indeed, and emanate in addition often from important actors of the scientific scene. It is a question of including/understanding of what the scientific Méthode consists

The first philosophical speculations aiming at elucidating the problem of knowledge go back to Greek Antiquity, and were developed in particular by Aristote. The great diagrams of thought which were developed there of lost anything their topicality, and we find thought oppositions today there is more than two millenia.

Science as épistémé is opposed to the Doxa, the opinion, the common direction. Such a design is found in particular at Bachelard. It is however not divided by all. Duhem makes a place with the common Sens, and does not see fundamental rupture with science. Today, the idea of a rupture between science and the opinion are the object of criticism, which in particular watch limits of this idea by historicisant it (see work of Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent).

Science would be as the application of the Raison to the exploration of the world which surrounds us.

Science does not function by pure method deductive . A series of experiments would indeed validate results only carried out on a date and in a place private individuals, without logical possibility to generalize them. Bertrand Russell in his work Science and religion (chapter is science mentions superstitious? ) what it names the scandal of the induction , and which it sees like an necessary evil.

to introduce the concept of reproducibility starting from the role of induction in science?

Science advances by theorization, but also by modeling. The concept of model is very important. If the concept of theory is for a long time central in philosophy of sciences, it was necessary to await the medium of 20th so that it seizes concept of model.

The philosophers, like the methodologists, aim in particular distinguishing science and not-science, at defining criteria (one will be able to evoke temptation positivist and science like language).

It is a question of finding the means of distinguishing clearly science and Pseudo-science.

The proposals for criteria are innumerable (Nadeau)

An ignored example: operationnality proposed by Jean Ladrière (Universalis)

One must also announce the current conventionnalist.

The failure of the project fondationnalist: this project aimed at establishing clear criteria making it possible to make sure of the Vérité of a proposal, and in particular of a causal or statistical law: “ one can say that with regard to empirical sciences at least, the fondationnalist project failed: he did not succeed in showing how the relation could be founded, initially between immediate experiment and stated observation, then between observational term and theoretical term, finally between singular statement and universal or probabilistic statement. ”. This failure, which is in particular that of the attempts aiming at solving the problem of induction, ruin the hope to make hold the concept of “science” in the definition of its method.

Falsificationnism: Chalmers exposes the limits of the solution brought by Popper to the Problème of the demarcation between science and not science, which is well far from having the universality which is generally granted to him. Chalmers takes care to specify that it is not true that “ any point of view is as good as another ”, thus denouncing the Relativisme. But it does not make of it less this report: there does not exist universally valid criteria of scientificity.

It is also necessary to evoke the debate between realism and anti-realism.

Where one can speak again of the reflections of certain scientists who, like Weinberg, adheres without reserve to metaphysical realism.

It is of course about this form of metaphysical Réalisme naive pointed by Althusser.

Work of Kuhn will mark a fundamental rupture in philosophy, history and sociology of sciences. It goes historiciser science, and to reject a design momifiée science, as more generally the framework of thought than divided, despite everything their differences, the heirs to Popper and Carnap.

The difficulties of determining science can lead to certain forms of Relativisme, of which the famous epistemological Anarchisme: In front of the difficulties raised by the problem of the demarcation, the relativism seems a radical solution: if the distinction between the scientist and nonthe scientist is so difficult to seize, it is that it does not have any existence in oneself. It is always permissible to trace borders between science and not science, but they remain always contingent, relative to one time and a particular place. There is not really a “corpus” (from where the question mark of the title of this paragraph).

A concrete, human and social entity

During, the sociology started to seize science under the institutional angle. In the years 1960 and 1970, a great part of these studies fitted in the structuralist current, from which it was detached during the years 1980 and 1990.

Since the beginning of the years 1980, social sciences seek to exceed the study of the institution science to approach the analysis of the scientific contents.

The Sociologie of sciences approaches science like social phenomenon, like a social institution.

A long time abandoned with the epistemologists and the philosophers, science started to be the object of the attention of the sociologists in the middle of the 20th century, with work founders of Robert K. Merton, which describes science as a normalized system (standards which can be registered, for example, in the system of evaluation by the pars). With him, sociology thus starts to be interested in science, not as corpus of knowledge, but as a social community.

can introduce here the question of the values of science on the standard basis these

Science is also in interaction with the company. These relations between Science and company are also the object of the attention of the sociologists.

If the attempts at strict definition of science by philosophy showed a failure largely recognized, the sociological approaches did not make it possible either to release a quite clear design of this object.

Merton respects the distinction between context of discovered and context of justification. Leaving the second to epistemology, it does not carry its glance to the first, to analyze the standards guiding the practices of the scientists.

He seeks to analyze the social structures of sciences

Then came time from the opening of the block box.

Following work of Kuhn, the sociologists denounced this distinction, and made carry their investigation on the production process of knowledge itself.

In years 1980 developed current sociology of sciences criticizing the idea that the fact scientists had an existence in oneself. One will evoke in particular the social constructivism.

One finds also the relativism.

Science then seems an ideology, which justifies its dominant position by calls rhetoric to the categories of the Truth or Reality.

Various attempts at elucidation of the nature of science were made. But if none led to universally valid definition of criteria, but all enriched our comprehension by science.

A unit complexes heterogeneous practices

During years 1990, the approach still evolved/moved to underline diversity, the plurality of sciences.

The sciences studies are current recent gathering interdisciplinary studies of sciences, with the crossing of sociology, anthropology, philosophy or economy.

One attends the beginning of the 21e with a certain convergence of the traditions. The positions of the sociologists and philosophers were opposite a long time. This opposition however starts to grow blurred.

One directs oneself towards a social epistemology. But Léna Soler (In the Wagner, the philosophers and science pp. 976-977 and), writes that on the contrary one attends the return of an epistemology have-history, in particular the current cognitivist.

At the end of the day, there are several manners of including/understanding science - history, philosophical, sociological, economic, anthropological, psychological - which maintains between them various kinds of report/ratio and was often unaware of, and which start today to converge.

Today, when well even of many authors continue to defend the idea of a subjacent unit of science, nobody any more denies this plurality and his importance.

In the order: Mach, Poincaré, Duhem, Bachelard, Merton, Popper, Quine, Lakatos, Kuhn, Hakes & Bloor, Latour & Callon. And then there is also the debate internalisme/externalism in history of sciences. Three stage: 1) A science ordered, 2) to open the hard core, 3) Plurality and heterogeneity.

A plural science

Science can appear in thousand ways. And this plurality itself is plural: there exist several manners of differentiating sciences . Science, like recalled it the preceding paragraphs, perhaps conceived like a corpus of knowledge and methods, but also like an institution, or an ideology. It is thus through the prism of this plurality that can be approached these questions, in particular that of the method. For as much, this impossible to circumvent plurality is not necessarily irreducible, and many authors continue to affirm the unit soujacente science. There would be still a direction to speak about the science.

Various categories of science

Léna Soler, in its handbook of introduction to epistemology, distinguishes on the one hand formal sciences from empirical sciences, on the other hand sciences of natures of the social sciences. Robert Nadeau explains on his side that it is generally recognized that one can classify sciences according to their object, their method, and their goal . According to their goal, one can distinguish sciences applied and fundamental sciences. The differences in methods return to the distinction between nomothetic sciences and idiographic sciences, but also between applied sciences, observational sciences and sciences speculative. Lastly, the distinction between empirical sciences (which gathers natural science, social sciences and social sciences) and sciences logico-formal rest on the classification according to the object.

One should not be let misuse by these great categorizations, which pain to give an account of more complex realities. The same science can thus be to some extent experimental, to some extent observational. Guard also should be taken not to fall into the opposite excess which would consist, vis-a-vis complexity from reality, to deny that there can be deep differences between the various forms in scientific research.

According to their goals

The sciences applied (which one should not confuse with the Technique as an application of empirical knowledge) produce knowledge in kind to act on the world, i.e. from the point of view of a practical objective, while the fundamental sciences aim the acquisition of new knowledge firstly. One cannot however classify a priori a particular discipline in a field or another. The Mathematical , the Physical or the Biologie can thus as well be fundamental as applied, according to the context. Certain disciplines remain more anchored however in a field than in another. The Cosmologie is for example an exclusively fundamental science. The Astronomie is also a discipline which concerns in a great measurement fundamental science. The Medicine, the Pedagogy or the Ingénierie are contrary to sciences primarily applied (but not exclusively).

Sciences applied and fundamental sciences are not partitioned. The discoveries resulting from fundamental science find ends useful (ex: the Laser and its application to the numerical sound on CD). In the same way, certain engineering problems lead sometimes to new discoveries in fundamental science. Thus, the research laboratories and the Enquiring S can in parallel make Applied research and Basic research. In addition, the research in fundamental sciences uses the Technologie S exits of science applied, for example the Microscopie, the possibilities of calculation of the Ordinateur S…

Fundamental science should not be identified with a pure activity mental and speculative, it requires sometimes considerable means.

From this point of view, Stokes distinguishes four types of scientific practices. In connection with the quadrant empties of Stokes, the author of " Pasteur' S quadrant" explain that it could have been called the quadrant of Peterson, but that this example is " too much limité" (p. 75 of " Pasteur' S quadrant, to see at this address)

can introduce here the question of the plurality of the values of science starting from the plurality of the normative systems (CUDOS, PLACE,…)

It is heard often today that fundamental science and science applied could not be distinguished any more. In addition to such an idea is already old, it is very debatable

According to their methods

A first distinction of this kind can be made between nomothetic sciences and idiographic sciences. The first seek to establish general laws for phenomena likely to reproduce. One finds there obviously the Physique or the Biologie, but also of the social sciences or social like the economy, the Psychologie or even the Sociologie. The seconds are occupied contrary to the singular, of single, nonrecurring. This class of sciences poses obviously problem. However, the example of the History watch which it is not absurd to consider that the singular can be justiciable to a scientific approach.

One second distinction can relate to the recourse, or not, with the experimental step. The applied sciences , like the Physical or the Biology, rest on an active step of the scientist, who builds and controls an experimental device reproducing certain aspects of the Phénomène S Naturel S studied. These sciences employ the Experimental method. The results of the Expérience S are not always quantifiable (example: the experiment of Konrad Lorenz with gray geese, in ethology). When it is not possible to control an experimental environment, the scientists can have recourse to the Observation. When a discipline is formed around this step, one speaks then about observational sciences . The Astronomy or the economy is traditional examples. But the border is never clear: there exists a experimental economy , and the high-energy physics allows in a certain way of testing certain astronomical theories in experiments. To this diptych experimentation/observation, the data-processing Simulation today is added.

here qqch on reproducibility

According to their object

One can finally distinguish the empirical sciences and the logico-formal sciences .

The first relate to the world empirically accessible, and start from our significant experiment of this world. They gather:

the Sciences of nature, which have as an aim of study the natural phenomena;
the Social sciences, which have as an aim of study the Man and his behaviors individual and collective, passed and present. not to forget to present the discussion on their scientific character

On their side, logico-formal sciences (or formal Sciences) explore deductively, according to rules of formation and demonstration, axiomatic systems. It is for example of the Mathématiques or the Logique (idem that for social sciences, but for other reasons: the question of the statute of science of mathematics is discussed, it should be said).

This typology is not single, to see the epistemological article Typologie.

Different disciplines

The disciplines are not characterized only by their methods or their objects, but also by their institutions: reviews, learned societies, pulpits of teaching, diplomas,…

It should not however be believed that the disciplines are precisely defined, and that they are distinguished perfectly from/to each other. Their perimeter is often fuzzy, and can vary according to the times and the places.

In addition, the disciplines themselves are structured under-disciplines, which in their turn can also be structured. And all these disciplinary structures can overlap.

Values of science

August 1st

Regional sciences?

For a long time, science was regarded as a primarily Western tradition, whose vocation was universal. Science did not have a border. For a few years however, other historical traditions have been reconsidered. In addition, Some authors call in question the universality of science, and underline regional specificities of the scientific practices.

Scientific styles

Without pouring in the cultural relativism, other authors tackles the question of the plurality of the " styles" scientists.

Thesis of the unit of science

The idea of certain an idea of science is recent, it goes up with the débtu our modernity, with the appearance of the academies. This of a major unity of the various forms of science was particularly prégnante with XIXe, and today is very disputed.

At the end of the day

Beyond this diversity…

qqch in connection with the values of science

If the analysis presented in the section the preceding ones do not offer any universally satisfactory answer to the question of the scientificity, the majority of the authors, including some among relativistic, agree to recognize certain specificities with the various scientific practices:

some " refusal of the dogmes" ;
some " report/ratio with the monde" ;
a certain use of the " raison" ;
some " resistance to criticisms rationnelles".

A intellectual practice which would move away too much from these ideal requirements could not claim any more with the statute of science.

Refusal of the dogmas

Science is not not made up historically against the religious dogmas. The relations between science and religion however were very conflict in Europe until the 19th century.

To rub in the world

There is in the scientific step the idea that it is necessary to go to the meeting " réalité" , to rub with something which resists. here the question of reproducibility, to moderate it.

This " report/ratio with the monde" also return to a certain report/ratio to the truth.

A methodical step

Ziman, p. 145

But if nobody defends any more the idea of a single and algorithmic scientific method, no author admits the idea of a complete methodological relaxation of sciences.

This method does not exclude imagination, the direction of the esthetism, the recourse to the analogy,…

Exposure to criticisms rational

August 1st

A plural history

André Pichot distinguishes between the history from the scientific knowledge and that from the scientific thought. Others are also possible, in particular that of the scientific institutions, that of the designs of science, or that of the disciplines. To recall the history of sciences requires to hold each one of these wire together.

New approaches of science and its history also underlines the plurality of the origins of science, so much modern qu old. It S then acts either to reconsider the truly scientific character of the pre-hélénistiques traditions (for the birth of science), or to revise our knowledge of the scientific revolution which saw appearing modern science (see for example " rethinking the scientific revolution").

Old knowledge

Whereas science had not been born yet, certain of knowledge which constitutes it today were already well formed. In astronomy or mathematics, the men very early developed a knowledge proto-scientist.

The scientific thought

It is necessary to await Greece of Ve front century J.C to see appearing the embryo of a scientific thought. This opinion is in particular defended by an author like Geoffrey E. Lloyd, which sees in Greece the true cradle of science. It is still usually allowed today. Thus, Plato is it introduces like the inventor of science into the work of synthesis of Pierre Wagner, while one owes in Aristote the conclusive dimension of science as well as a first form of method. It is also found, and in an explicit way, at Dominique Lecourt, or at André Pichot.

A " thought scientifique" finalist at the time of Aristote, then first rupture with finalism with Galileo, second with Darwin.

To the XVII the " comes; scientific Revolution " , as well as the Mathématisation of science.

A scientific thought turned towards the texts crowned at the time of Thomas d' Acquin, then came Galileo.

Institutions of science

It is yet only much later that science really institutionalizes, during XVIIe initially, this institutionalization accelerating with XIXe and XXe.

It is at this time there that the word " science" takes its current direction. " Scientifique" appears shortly after.

Structuring of science

Science was structured in disciplines, which each one have their history. Joseph Ben David is one of the great authors having made carry his reflection on the mechanism of formation of the disciplines.

Contemporary science

Science would become or be today a “technoscience”.

Large transformation since the years 1970, in particular with regard to pi (Pestre).

History of sciences

this discipline evolved/moved considerably since the end of the year 1970.

The history of sciences is not reducible with the construction of a chronology of the scientific discoveries. The historians aim at elucidating the mechanisms of production of the scientific knowledge.

The dynamics of science

As recalled to the beginning of this article, the dynamics of science is not linear.

These logics which control the mechanisms of production of knowledge are of two orders: collectives and individual.

Rupture and continuity

Bachelard and concept of obstacle epistemological --> psychoanalytical approach of science; continuism; concept of revolution scientific (Kuhn); …

The role of the controversies

The controversies are at the same time an engine and a window on the dynamics of science.

Dynamic collective

Science is basically a collective entity

The essential tension

Polanyi, then Kuhn, show that science advances between tradition and heterodoxy.

Construction of networks

Latour and Callon develop a renewed design of the dynamics of science, by underlining the Co-construction of science and the company

Mode 1 with mode 2?

August 1st

Engines of engagement

With this collective dynamics of science is added the engines of the individual scientific practices. It is a subject which was a long time ignored epistemologists and philosophers of sciences, in the name of the distinction between context of discovered and context of justification. The scientific discovery was justiciable only to one psychological analysis. This distinction grows blurred today, and the philosophers start to carry their glance on the concrete practices of the scientists.

The libido sciendi

August 1st

Systems of incentive

prices, the peer-review,…

Logics of the discovery

Imagination and esthetics

August 1st

The role of the analogy

August 1st

Serendipidity

Art to make happy discoveries by chance.

An incarnated science

Science is not a éthérée step. It falls under a concrete reality, with its trades, its instruments, its places, its institutions. It is itself an institution.

The idea of a “pure science”, simple search of the knowledge released of any economic or political influence , honor of the human spirit, is very modern.

Instruments of science

Science could not develop without the technique and the technology which accompanies it. That goes from the techniques of glass-blower to the ultra-technological devices of the detectors of particles.

Places of science

Science takes place its, the laboratory to start.

Trades of science

That is not summarized with the figure of the researcher

The institution science

Science is not a pure abstraction. It is also an institution.

Science like institution: the Scientific research. It is classically the sociology which is concerned with EC face of science.

This institution has a history; to see the article History of sciences.

The whole of the actions undertaken in order to improve and to increase the state of the Connaissance S in a scientific discipline constitutes the Scientific research. The organization and the assumption of responsibility of the research activities constitute an important issue of competitiveness and prestige for all the nations.

The scientific research has become for a few decades a major stake for economic development. It is from this point of view that were developed statistical tools aiming at measuring the scientific production of a nation, an area, an institution or an individual.

This institution science also carries ideological elements.

To measure science

The Scientométrie is a bibliometric whole of techniques applied to the measurement of the characteristics of the scientific systems.

Policies of science

If the organization of science is on the whole the fact of the scientists themselves, it can also be directed or structured by political decisions. It is about in instrumentaliser the power.

Power of science

This power of science can be included/understood in two manners: on the one hand in its capacity to explain the world and to change our representations, on the other hand to transform it.

Explanatory capacity

The question of knowing if science can all describe is discussed

Applications of science

August 1st

Science and technology

August 1st

End of the linear model

August 1st

Technology

August 1st

For what is used science?

Does this power, towards what can or have be directed? Science can be conceived like a free activity, only directed towards the intellectual satisfaction of the scientists. It can be seen like the independent source of progress, as well material as moral. It can finally be conceived like a means of improving comfort by the development of novel methods, or finally like one of the main motors of the economic growth.

Honor of the human spirit

In a letter of July 2nd, 1830 addressed to Legendre, C.G.J. Written Jacobi: Mr. Fourier had the opinion that the principal goal of mathematics was the public utility and the explanation of the natural phenomena; but a philosopher as should to him have known that the single goal of science, it is the honor of the human spirit, and that under this title, a question of numbers is worth as much as a question of the system of the world. It is the thesis of pure science. The debate is always of topicality.

Science with the service of humanity

Science would be before all means of making the happiness of humanity, while being the engine of material and moral progress. This thesis is distinct from that of pure science, and poses the problem of the autonomy of science, in particular in his report/ratio with the political power.

Science with the service of the company

Pecress: “science is with the service of the company”

It can then be a question of answering the requests as regards health, but also for safety. Science can thus serve as the military objectives, which is more completely the same thing only the service of humanity.

Science in the economy of knowledge

Today, science is usually associated with collective enrichment.

Economy of science

Science is registered in two manners in the economic debates: like object of study, it draws the attention of the economists who try to seize dynamics of it and to include/understand nature of it by mobilizing their own conceptual instruments. Like stake, it is in the middle of the debates on the economy of knowledge.

Science like economic object

For a long time, science was regarded by the economists as a stock of knowledge nourishing the economic growth.

Science like economic issue

Science is for a long time, since Roger Bacon at least, an economic issue. For a few decades, the place of science in the economic system has increased considerably with the development of its industrial applications, and more generally of the technoscience.

Teaching of science

The universities are in the middle of the teaching of the scientific knowledge.

Science and company

The general public and science

The comprehension of science by the general public is the object of studies to whole share, of the reviews are devoted to this subject (in particular Public Understanding off Science ). This concept of Public Understanding off Science (expression devoted in the United Kingdom, " science literacy" with the United States, " culture scientifique" in France).

The term “scientific literacy” was coined in the late 1950s, and most probably appeared in print for the first time when Paul Hurd (Hurd, 1958) used it in has publication entitled Science Literacy: Its Meaning for American Schools (DeBoer, 1991; Roberts, 1983).

Popularization

August 1st

Science and expertise

August 1st

Various forms of dialog

Model of the state education to the Co-construction of the knowledge (Callon and Lascoumes in particular).

Ethical stakes

double dimension: ethics of the researchers, but also stakes ethics suitable for the development scientists (bioethics in particular).

A neutral science?

August 1st

Science and religion

Philosophically, the modern notion of science is related with the Immanentisme, which is an agnostic form of rationalism developed by Kant and Spinoza. This philosophical origin of science mainly explains the epistemological and ethical difficulties contemporary.

Science and democracy

August 1st

Autonomy of science

This question of the autonomy of science differs from one country to another. In France, this autonomy is generally confused with the idea that science must be detached from the mercantile interests. In the Anglo-Saxon countries, the stake is rather its independence at the place of the political power.

One of the main arguments in favor of the autonomy of science is its serendipity, and one often finds the famous example of electricity was not invented while seeking to improve the candles .

It is advisable to oppose utilitarianism another design of science, traditional design on our premises, but which it should be given in value before it is too late. For us, science is the methodical effort made by the man to know the world. It does not have of another object, of another goal to know. The man is surrounded by mysteries: science offers the means to him of boring them more the every day. It is there its fundamental role and, by that only, beneficial. In other words, according to the major word of Jacobi, science is made for the honor of the human spirit.

Science and culture

The scientific worlds and cultural can maintain the difficult relations today. That always was however not the case, and one can still observe close relationships between these two worlds. Science can of course be mobilized to develop or improve the artistic techniques. But its role is not limited to that. It can also cause inspiration, and even be consitutive of an artistic field.

Scientism

examples of contemporary forms of scientism: Weinberg, Dawkins, Hawking,…

Criticisms of science

Science is the object of criticism which aim not only its consequences, but also its principles same. We will start by presenting these last.

Science, appears of human pride

August 1st

Science, instrument of the disenchantment

It is sometimes claimed (Appleyard, 1992), that science erode belief in has transcendential God.

A science plugs with the spiritual one

This form of criticism of science aims before any sound Matérialisme.

An alienating science

August 1st

Science with the service of the war

August 1st

Science against the democracy

August 1st

A science of dominant

These criticisms emanate in particular from farming the studies, which aim at revealing the ideological bases of science. It would be only the instrument of domination of the Western males.

The instrument of the capacity

August 1st

Méta-sciences: studies on science

August 1st

Random links: