Schlieffen plan

The plane Schlieffen is a meticulous organization for the German armed forces successively put into practice at the time of the Première and Seconde World wars.

It owes its name to the marshal-count Alfred von Schlieffen (1833 - 1913) who was military attach3e to Paris of 1867 with 1869 and ordering German army until in 1906.

He recommends a overflow, exploiting the speed of execution of the plan, through the left side of the French army by the Luxembourg and the Belgium in the the Ardennes with swivelling in the east of Paris and repression of the troops on the the Jura and the Suisse. This plan implies obtaining a right-of-way by the Belgium or, failing this, the forced passage with violation of Belgian neutrality.

Assumptions on which rests the Schlieffen plan

Impossibility of gaining a fast victory over the Russian Empire:

Manque of vital objectives on the border, which constrained to be inserted in Russia to achieve the goals of importance
the territory offers to the defenders an unlimited distance for the retirement
Russia cannot mobilize its army in less than six weeks

Impossibilité of attacking France directly:

an advance on the Franco-German border would be too slow because of the French fortifications

Strategy

The final plan is to have a defensive face in Eastern Prussia against the Russians with 10% of manpower and an attack with 90% of manpower on France by violating Belgian neutrality. The fast victory over France in six weeks is essential to be able, after this time, to concentrate the effort of war on Russia.

The count von Schlieffen summarizes in his memories: “It is by the Wall-Dunkirk sector that we must penetrate in the France fortress. We must unceasingly attack the French in their left side and seek without respite to drive back them towards the Jura and Switzerland. ”

Logistics

Logistiquement, this plan notes the great geographical proximity between the great vital organs of Germany (low valley of the the Rhine) and the great industrial centers of the north of France. That makes these centers unbearably vulnerable and excessively trying. That also makes it possible as well as possible to use them at the time of an action by Belgium, whereas conversely, the logistics of the military provisioning of Germany towards France (or conversely) while passing by Alsace and Lorraine, by the the Ardennes, the the Vosges and the the Jura, are not favorable to a fast offensive.

In addition, as much it is difficult to continue the offensive (towards Paris) on the basis of Lorraine, as much on the contrary it is easy to invest the French capital by the plains of Picardy: in the first case, the German army must progress with multiple threats flanking and vis-a-vis the enemy, in the second on the contrary it attacks side.

Lastly, the experiment proves that the fortified towns of the Franco-German border are solid: the attacker has big logistic problems, the defender on the contrary is helped by multiple natural obstacles (geographical or climatic).

Modifications of the plan in 1911

After the retirement of Schlieffen in 1906, Helmuth von Moltke became general-in-chief of the German army. It hardly approved the Plan of Schlieffen, which it considered too risky. But as it had been adopted in 1905, it formed too part of the German military thought so that it completely was given up. All that it could do was to modify it.

In truth, this plan was not one. The initial thought of Schlieffen was directed more towards one vision; he proposed an operational turning, and emitted prospects according to an precise objective: to beat France before turning over all its forces towards Russia. Its way of thinking was articulated around the famous battle of Canae, into 216 before JC. It is on this occasion that Hannibal had invented the perfect encircling movement, leading to the quasi total destruction of the legions of Tarentius Varro. The German military thought was impregnated of this Carthaginian culture thanks to the splendid operation of surrounding of the French forces with Sedan by Molkte the Old man, during the war of 1870. Schlieffen proposed, in a rather logical way, to apply this operation in proportions much higher, and incredibly daring for the time. This operation included all North-East of France. Schlieffen produced on this occasion a memorandum, and not a plan, which drew up an ideal report/ratio from 7 to 1 between the going troops coming from North, and the troops stationed in the east. This proportion appeared in impracticable Moltke, for questions of space and logistics. Also, decided it to decrease in an important way the number of troops intended to enter to France by North, to reinforce the cover on Alsace-Lorraine and the Russian border. In this occurrence, the spirit of the Shlieffen concept was not obéré by it for all that. Admittedly, the going wing coming from North is decreased considerably, whereas it must post a maximum power; the static troops of the East are reinforced whereas their role is to attract and to move back. But this attribution of the forces of each one of these two groups still allows a successful application of the encircling movement, provided that one sticks to the basic principles of the plan.

The other material change was that one would not enter to the Netherlands and that one would limit oneself to Belgium. These changes were the object many debates. In 1970 L.C.F Turner saw in the changes brought by Moltke “a substantial modification of the plan von Schlieffen so that the German countryside in the West was dedicated to the failure before to have even started. ” Turner supports that by weakening the German principal offensive, one lost any real chance to crush the French Army rather quickly, and thus one led to “the war on two faces”. He adds that the fact of not only passing by the Netherlands created a bottleneck at the German-Belgian border, but also that not to have the railroads Dutch made emerge a serious problem of provisioning, a problem which erased the benefit obtained by the fact that one always had access to the Dutch ports. A. Micrometer caliper, on the other hand, does not share this point of view. According to him, the meticulous study of the document concerning in the German plan of war reveals that the changes brought by Moltke were not so large and that the plan was vitiated from the beginning. According to him the reputation of this plan is overrated in what it underestimated each adversary: Russians, French, British and Belgians.

In fact, each one of these two authors chooses a radical judgment. A plan can appear vitiated upon the departure, but appear excellent with the operation; conversely, a good plan can be irremediably trowel by a bad use of its basic principles on the ground. It is on this last assumption that it is necessary to see the failure of the German operation in August and September 14, made abstraction of the enemy involved forces. What said Schlieffen, unceasingly, still and still? Let the French be inserted in the Alsace-Moselle and completely regain as footing in their old provinces; let pass them the Rhine; let be inserted until in Black Forest, if it is needed. The more they will be inserted towards the East, the more their destruction will be guaranteed. It is not at all what occurred. Instead of making plug by attracting the French towards the East and awaiting the arrival of the going wing to strike them with reverse, the Bavaroises troops which kept the borders of the Alsace-Moselle benefitted from their power for, not only to vigorously stop their enemies as of the crossed border, but to counter-attack even more furiously to drive back them with their starting point. The operation imagined by Schlieffen had died, not because of a design defect or initial planning, but of the misuse of his principles.

Situation

Conceptually, and in both cases (1914 and 1940), Germany and France were in situations which created dissymmetry:

Politically, France was in good terms with Belgium, but not enough so that is concretized by an alliance. In addition, supported on a great external empire providing him all which it needed, France could " to play the montre" , while the the United Kingdom, the impossible enemy, prohibited any activity of expansion (and in particular not of too large bringing together between France and Belgium, a fortiori by an invasion). Consequently, the invasion of Belgium by France was a political impossibility, even if the soldiers could cherish the idea of it.
Conversely, Germany, encircled and incompetent to support a too long war, could not have the same scruples.
In 1914 and 1940, France and Belgium counted on the resistance of the Belgian army, in particular of four fortified towns: Antwerp, Brussels, Namur and Charleroi. And, in both cases, Germany believed to have the means of reducing them in one nothing time, thanks to heavy artillery at the time of the First World War, thanks to aviation and the airborne troops at the time of the Second world war; the experiment gave him reason partially. Indeed, at the time of the first attack on the Belt strengthened of Liege, the six German brigades (that is to say 39.000 men), engaged meet a keen resistance and are pushed back sometimes beyond their starting positions (whereas one of the basic elements of success of the plan was speed), from August 4th to 6th. The supreme command of the German Army sends then to the rescue of the six brigades (which lost 3.458 killed infantrymen, wounded or missing), an army of seat of 60.000 men. This one will manage to destroy the last the strong only on August 16th, whereas the crossing of the Walloon provinces of Belgium was to take only a few days and that on this date only Liege is crossed.

. Where Schlieffen had envisaged a division, the Germans had to align eight and waste an invaluable time of them.

Evolution

Consequently, the military behavior of France was foreseeable, and besides by was twice correctly anticipated by Germany. The military behavior of Germany, not less foreseeable, as for him, was constantly ignored by France.

In 1914 the offensive is stopped by the attack of side on the Marne. In 1940, envelopment will take place towards north.

(One will compare with the German article correspondent which seems more critical. We read there: “ In der Praxis schlug DER Plan fehl ”, i.e.: “ In practice the plan failed ”.)

See too

the Plan yellow is the name of the Schlieffen plan in the German Historiographie.

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