Aristote is a complete scientist who is interested in all the fields of the Connaissance. In the field of the Physical , it often adopts a point of view of biologist, from where a predilection for the Finalité. Physics is one of the principal works of Aristote. It treats definition and explanation of some fundamental concepts. Most important are the space, the Temps, the Mouvement and the Cause.

Physics: Deliver II

Need for treating Cause S

For Aristote, we do not believe to know anything before to have seized it why (i.e. seized the first Cause). It is the case for the generation and corruption and all the physical change. Answers to this question “why? ” “causes are called”. The specificity of Aristote lies in its design of a multiplicity of Cause S. Moreover, if he admits the Hasard, he does not allot to him a causal role in the Absolu.

Four causes

Causes material, driving, formal and final

There are four directions of the word “causes”, (which can answer the question “why? ”).

• That whose thing is made and there residence immanent (Matérielle causes, which will become the Substance in the Scholastique). The raw material aristotelician is a pure power, nonrecognizable because it does not have a Forme. A modern equivalent would be for example the Continuum space time. A logical equivalent of the raw material would be the universal unknown factor X without predicate to specify it P (X)
• the form or the model (Quiddité or formal gasoline or causes formal). All that we know is for Aristote a mixture of matter and form. The form is for Aristote an ambiguous concept, which indicates at the same time the geometrical form and the idea, the Concept of a thing.
• the first beginning of the movement and the rest (causes driving or efficient). The efficient cause of modern physics is in Discontinuité with its effect, which is not the case at Aristote.
• end or Teleological principle (final Cause, which for us is rather the Conséquence)

Three corollaries

The same thing can have a plurality of causes but not with the same direction. It can see there “Rétroaction” final Cause on the event. The same thing can be cause of the opposites, according to whether it is present or absent

Methods of the causes

Among the causes of same a Species, there exist various methods:

• By oneself or Simple or combined Accident,
• ,
• Particular or Kind (Individual or Universal).

And each one of them is also divided into causes “in power” or “act”, according to the ontology aristotelician. These causes are for Aristote explanatory principles, from where the explicit call to its Métaphysique. If there were no change, but that to be, it would not need metaphysics there.

These divisions make it possible to give the following rules:

• the Cause S in acts and particular are simultaneous with their effect,
• It is necessary each time to seek the highest cause: anteriority, general information, by oneself,
• the kinds are Cause S of the kinds, the particular things of the particular things.

The Fortune and the Chance

Refutation of the theory of the inexistence of the chance

Aristote leaves the popular wisdom which says that fortune and the chance are Cause S, but the fact that the old wise ones do not speak about it even questions their existence. It stresses that for certain events that one allots to fortune, one can seize some share them Cause, which is not fortune. But it is a fact that many things exist and are generated by fortune and the chance. For him, the exceptional one in the Nature justify the existence of fortune and the chance. It is thus necessary to examine chance and fortune and to see how they fall into our classification.

Of which natures are the chance and fortune like causes?

The effects of fortune are neither constant nor frequent, but there exist rare facts and facts by accident (which are added to the gasoline without him is necessary) Fortune is thus not Cause by oneself (it is not necessary), therefore for old it was not a cause. The chance has more extension than fortune: there is fortune in the practical activity. As for the chance, it belongs to the animals and the inanimate beings, when things take place for an end without keeping in mind the result.

The design aristotelician of the chance is compatible with a causal design of the Nature, the chance thus holds a place relatively Anecdotique, which calls in question a common vision of Aristote like philosopher of the Contingence. It is the Final cause which always at his place orders the other causes.

Fortune: cause by accident relating to the choice, unexpected effect

It results from the meeting of independent causal chains, an external purpose intervening in the chain, whereas it is not the purpose (the choice) initial. Fortune cannot be of this fact a Main cause, it is a cause by accident which is not cause of nothing by oneself.

Chance: cause by accident for vain and unexpected purpose

Whereas fortune relates to the rational beings capable of choice, the chance does not require a preliminary choice.

Refutation of Démocrite: the chance is not for Aristote a main cause

As opposed to what the nuclear physicists think about it (Démocrite, Leucippe, Épicure…) For them, the atoms falling vertically, one needs the intervention of the chance (the clinamen) so that they deviate their trajectories and are composed to form bodies. But for Aristote, chance and fortune are causes by accident, they cannot produce the Nature and the intelligence. For others, our sky and all the worlds would have due the chance. This is particularly surprising because for them the terrestrial Nature (animals, plants) is not produced randomly while the divine beings of the sky are it. This is contrary with the reason, more especially as the sky has a great regularity Nothing accidental is former to by oneself, the hazardous causes could be replaced by the intelligence and the Nature, to which they are posterior. The sky cannot thus be by chance because it would be then the same for the intelligence and the Nature which are contained there.

Finalism against Mechanism

The Reduction with the finality

There are in the Nature three orders of research: motionless (the first engine which must be motionless if not it would be driven), driven incorruptible (sky) and the driven corruptible one (the world Sublunaire). The physicist must seek there the four kinds of Cause S, it should not neglect the final Cause, indeed the Nature is for some end. Moreover the formal cause to the final Cause can often be brought back, insofar as the finality is always for a being to reach its genuine gasoline. As for the cause efficient, or driving, as it does not change the Genre things, it is only the movement of going towards this genuine gasoline. Only the material cause appears irreducible with the finality.

The conflict with the Mechanism

There is a regularity in the Nature and very little chance. The Nature behaves as if it were in the sight of an end: in the living beings, the finality is omnipresent. Moreover, art often imitates the Nature. Lastly, nature is doubly matter and form (Hylémorphisme) and this last door always an end, the things which seem not to have a finality (monsters) are only the errors of the finality. By refusing the finality, the Mécaniste S thus remove the Nature itself.

Peremptory necessity and required Hypothetical

The efficient causes are only requirements for an end: it is about hypothetical causality. The only peremptory necessity (by oneself) is to reach its gasoline like finality.

Aristote: a philosopher of the contingency?

It is the final Cause which always at his place orders the others Cause S. The design aristotelician of the chance is compatible with a causal design of the Nature, the chance thus holds a relatively anecdotic place, which calls in question a common vision of Aristote like philosopher of the contingency.

It is indeed very attentive with diversity in the Nature, and does not reduce like Plato reality to the intellectual gasoline. However, as one saw in his design of the chance, the contingency is only Locale. The reduction with the driving first shows it sufficiently, the Infini and the contingency is not explanatory for him.

Random links:

Palearctic Écozone: plants with seeds by scientific name (M) | Saint-Jean-of-Tholome | Kara (author) | Bible of Gutenberg