Philosophy of sciences - SpeedyLook encyclopedia

The philosophy of the Science S is the branch of the Philosophie which studies the philosophical bases, the systems and the implications of science, that it acts of Natural science (Physique, Biologie, etc) or of Social sciences (Psychologie, economy, etc). The philosophy of sciences is to be brought closer to the epistemology and the ontology, two fields from which it borrows much and poses new questionings.

Are approached in philosophy of sciences, inter alia problems:

the nature of the scientific thought, its speech and its concepts;
the processes by which science becomes an activity;
the relationship between science and nature;
manners of measuring the validity of the theories in sciences;
scientific method;
the scientific reasoning and their philosophical ranges;
reciprocal implications between scientific method and company…

Nature of the speech and the scientific concepts

Science is at the same time the statement of assumptions concerning the nature of the world, and the checking of these theories like adequate to reality according to an experimental method, which differs according to the fields.

Rationalism

The Rationalisme poses like principle the dependence of scientific rules laid down by the Raison, mainly the rules mathematical, physical, chemical, possibly supported by experimental checks.

One generally considers that the founder of rationalism is Rene Descartes, which in the Discourse on Method (1637) exposed its design of the scientific Méthode, and developed, in the Principles of philosophy (1644), his vision of the philosophy of sciences. The method suggested is very personal and deductive, the classification of sciences refers to the situation of the 17th century. The conditions under which Descartes worked out its system are not exactly any more those of our time.

In a more radical design, Auguste Count founded the Positivisme, thinking that the world could be reduced to explainable Phénomène S by " lois" expressed in mathematical language. This position was discredited by epistemological criticism . She is often criticized for her party taken subjective.

Empiricism

The Empirisme poses like principle the dependence with the obviousnesses. It is one of the pillars of the philosophy of sciences, which especially developed in the Anglo-Saxon world. Empiricism indicates that knowledge derives directly from the human Expérience of the world, so that the scientific statement comes and remains dependant on our experiments and observations. The Théorie S scientists are built and put to the test through the Expérimentation, handling methodical of the experiment, thanks to empirical methods. This information drawn from the experiment, once gathered of sufficient number, can become a consensual base for the scientific community which poses like obviousness its principles, and establishes that these obviousnesses will be used as bases of the scientific explanation. Any science is thus an attachment with the empirical experiment, with the invariant law, which would amount saying according to certain schools of thought which science is basically a Croyance Réflexive a priori .

The Observation implies the Perception, which makes a cognitive act of it, action of thought also dependant on the way in which we can build a rational comprehension of the world. If this comprehension had suddenly changed, then our observations also, at least at the stage of the Apparence.

The scientists try to use the induction, the Déduction, of the quasi-empirical methods, or of the conceptual metaphors to transform this flow of observations into a system with clean coherence.

Scientific realism and instrumentalism

The scientific Realism, or naive Empiricism, consists in taking the scientific speech like reality of the world. The naive term is not pejorative, but indicates that it is a question of sticking to the scientific speech to apprehend reality - what is the point of view of many scientists. Thus, a follower of realism will hold for existing the electrons and the magnetic fields.

Contrary to realism, the Instrumentalisme advances that our perceptions, the scientific ideas and theories do not reflect necessarily the perfect reality of the world, but which they are useful means to explain, envisage and control our experiments. According to the point of view of a instrumentalist, the electrons and the magnetic fields are convenient ideas, whose existence is contingent. Instrumentalism comes partly from the Pragmatisme according to John Dewey.

Constructivism

Social Constructivism

Epistemologies constructivists

Analyzes and reductionnism

The Analyze consists in dividing an observation or a theory into simpler stages or concepts, in order to include/understand it. The analysis is essential with science, just like with any rational company. It would be for example impossible mathematically to describe the movement of a Projectile without separating the force of gravity, the jetting angle and the initial speed of the body put moving. Only analysis distinct from these components, then their regrouping in a system, makes it possible to formulate a theory of the practical movement.

The Réductionnisme in science can have various directions. A scientific type of reductionnism consists of the belief that all the fields of studies can be brought back to final to a purely scientific explanation. Thus, an historical event can certainly be explained in sociological or psychological terms; from the reductionistic point of view, this explanation perhaps described without loss of direction in term of human physiology, itself being able to describe itself like the result of chemical or physical processes, so that the historical event is brought back to an event of physical science. That would thus imply that the historical event was anything else only the fruit of a physical diagram, which denies the existence of independent spontaneous phenomena.

With simplest and shortest the reductionnism, by the suffix " isme" who indicates doctrines, consists in bringing back the " complexe" with simple, like, for example, a two-dimensional photograph of a three-dimensional statue, biological complexity with mechanical simplicity. The reductionnism is not the rule of saving in explanation of the Rasoir of Occam.

" Reductionnism: To give an account of the known data, any scientist must provide the most economic explanation simplest possible, and (generally) most elegant possible. But the reductionnism becomes a defect if one attaches an excessive importance to the principle which the simplest explanation is the only possible one. It happens that one must consider the data in Gestalt more grande". (Gregory Bateson, p. 235, " Nature and Pensée" , Threshold, Paris, 1984).

Daniel Dennett showed that a total reductionnism was possible, while stressing that it would be about a “bad science”, seeking to show too much from too little. The advanced arguments against such a reductionnism rest on the idea that systems autoreferences contain indeed more information being able to be described by individual behaviors, or participating in that of a group, that other systems. Concrete examples are for examples the organizations Fractale S or the car-evolutionary systems discovered in chemistry. But the analysis of such organizations is necessarily destructive information, because the observer must initially select a sample of the studied system, which can be partially representative of the coherent unit. The Information theory can be made profitable to calculate the extent of the loss of information; it is besides one of the techniques applied in the Théorie of chaos.

The justification of the scientific results

The scientific statements most powerful are generally those offering the broadest framework of application; the third law of Newton (on the equal reciprocal attraction of the heavy bodies) is the perfect example.

But it is obviously not possible for the scientists to test each particular case which this theory makes it possible to consider. How consequently to affirm that the third law of Newton is, in a sense, true ? How to be sure that, despite everything the precedents having confirmed the law, the following experiment will not come to contradict it and to hold it this time for false in an unquestionable way?

Razor of Ockham

The Rasoir of Ockham is a stone of key in philosophy of sciences. Guillaume d' Occam stated that it is necessary always to prefer the manner simplest to explain a phenomenon if there are the choice between several valid possibilities. Itself does not say anything on the intrinsic veracity such a statement, but often the manner simplest to explain perfectly a phenomenon proved to be finally more exact than the “complex” proposals more.

The razor of Ockham is generally made profitable like a powerful and rational criterion in the choice between several theories clashing on the same scientific subject. However, it is rare that two theories provide truly similar explanations, IE. as satisfactory in any point one as the other. In fact, the use of the Razor of Ockham remained limited. There exist now mathematical approaches, based on the Information theory, which confront simplicity and theoretical range.

The razor of Ockham often is misused or called upon in cases where it appears in fact unsuited. This principle does not say only it is necessary to prefer the explanation simplest to the detriment of its capacity to explain additional exceptions or phenomena. The principle of falsification requires of the scientist that as from the moment when an exception is noted in experiments, and which it can be repeated to cancel the theory, he must build a new explanation, simplest possible , giving an account of this new phenomenon, and which this new explanation must be preferred with old.

Induction

One of the answers to the problems of the “justification of the scientific results” rests on the concept of induction. An inductive reasoning consists in holding for true an assertion or a theory in certain general cases, under the condition which the assertion or theory was shown like true in all the cases observed adequate, i.e. in conformity with the general situation. In fact, after having carried out successfully a series of experiments on the third law of Newton, it is justified to maintain this law for true - when well even it can be cancelled.

To include/understand why induction is viable most of the time caused a long time interrogation. One cannot use there the Déduction, this process logical which leaves the premises to arrive at the conclusion, because there is not in induction of syllogisms which would allow it. Whatever the number of times that the biologists of the XVIIe century observed white swans, whatever the variety of the places of these observations, there does not exist purely logical way to conclude that all the swans are white. What returns roughly speaking to say that this conclusion can be completely false. Same manner, nothing prohibits to think that tomorrow, it could be observed an action not involving reaction; the same experiment of thought can be made for any scientific law.

To give an answer concerning induction requires to change relational logic, to adopt other rational arguments. The deduction authorizes to formulate a particular truth while being based on a general truth (for example “all the corbels are black; this is a corbel; thus it is black”), while induction makes it possible to state a general truth - or not - with the support of a very strong probability of truth, drawn from a sufficient series of observations (for example “this is a corbel and it is black; this other bird is a corbel and it is black; …; all our examples show that the corbels are black in general”).

The problem of induction generated a considerable debate and remains of an major importance in philosophy of sciences: is induction justified like scientific method, and if so, how and why?

Réfutabilité

Another way of using the Logical to justify the scientific statements, examined by Karl Popper, is the Réfutabilité. This principle states that to be useful (to hear useful scientifically speaking), that it is a scientific statement of a law, a fact, a theory, of a principle, must be refutable , i.e. one must be able to try to prove it false. Without that, it would become difficult, if it is not impossible, to distinguish a scientific statement from the common obviousness: a science indépassable does not prove anything. It is not possible to deduce a general statement from a series of particular statements, but it is completely possible to cancel a general statement so only one particular case is shown false. To find a swan black is a reason sufficient to say that the statement “all the swans are white” does not have a scientific value, therefore which it is false.

The Réfutabilité évince skilfully the problem of induction, because it does not use precisely an inductive reasoning. However, it introduces another difficulty. When an observation comes to contradict a law, it is almost always possible to introduce a theoretical extension which him will return its character of truth scientific. For example, the ornithologists having found a swan black in Australia would have had only to say that this swan was not same kind as the others, even which it was a new alive species.

The intrinsic problem of the critical Réfutabilité as examination of science is that the scientific theories are in fact never refutable. It is always possible to add assumptions ad hoc , to save a law. That means that as from the moment when one wishes to reject a scientific theory, one must utilize a value judgment.

Coherence

Induction and falsification try both to justify the scientific speech by putting in prospect several scientific statements the ones compared to the others. These two methods draw aside the problem of the criterion of justification, each justification having itself to be justified, that involving a movement of unlimited retreat. To escape this problem, one turns to the Fondationnalisme or principle of certainty . The fondationnalism advances that there exist basic statements which do not require justifications. In fact, induction and falsification are forms of fondationnalism in what they rest on statements which derive directly from the observations.

But the way in which these fundamental statements derive from the experiment reveals a problem: the observation is a cognitive act, resting on our reflexive comprehension, our beliefs, our practices. An observation such that the Venus passage in front of the Sun requires a considerable unpacking technical, which implies auxiliary beliefs in great number: certainty in the value of the optics of the telescopes, the mechanics of the telescopes, comprehension of the celestial mechanics… At first sight, the observation does not have anything “basic”.

The criterion of Cohérence is a solution which comes like a principle from comparison from the facts and explanations. According to the principle of coherence, statements can be justified by their membership of a coherent system already set up according to the same process. In the case of science, the system considered is generally consisted of the whole of the beliefs known as scientific of an individual or a group of scientists. W.V. Quine defended this approach of the science, which is that mainly adopted today, in particular in physics where the preoccupation of unit and a general information of the laws is paramount. The observation of a Venus passage in front of the Sun is justified then like scientific statement by its coherent adequacy with our usual beliefs on optics, the telescopes and the celestial mechanics. If this observation had suddenly been in discordance with one of these components necessary to the establishment of a scientific statement relating to it, then an adjustment of the system would be necessary for évincer contradiction.

Social responsibility

Scientific infallibility

A crucial question in sciences is to try up to what point to determine the current luggage of the scientific knowledge can be taken as a veracious explanation of the physical world in which we live. Acceptance without conditions of this knowledge like a true knowledge absolutely , i.e. noncriticizable positively , is called the Scientisme. Science approaches a rational theology then.

The qualifier " scientifique" was regarded a long time by the general public as a pledge of absolute reliability. In this Perception of the science which approaches scientism, of many people were brought to believe that the scientists are daily, in their work, the proof of infallibility. In fact, technical sciences, and especially their applications, are more and more in the middle of the processes of establishment of consensus, by which people of ethics, morals or religions various have suddenly agreed on their Perception of the real-world .

In the laic and impregnated companies of technologies, science in its diversity can seem to bring an arbitration. That led unfortunately to abuses on the scientific language and the objective value of science, to fine policies or commercial. Science cannot bring parapets that only social cohesion can bring according to ethical criteria on the nature of perceived reality.

The shift growing between the work of the scientists and the way in which their work and results are perceived by the company resulted in carrying out targeted communication campaigns, to clarify the concept of scientific skepticism and to explain the scientific method.

In addition, it is necessary to distinguish practical sciences and their applications. As much a scientific theory can seem to bring reliable criteria of truth, as much today the risks are great when the technical applications are complex and touch many people.

Responsibility sociétale

The philosopher Hans Jonas ( the Principle responsibility , 1979) point the responsibility which all the people of the company with respect to the conditions for technical application of sciences carry. From there the Precaution principle rises, whose application if is discussed.

This philosophy generated the principles of Sustainable development, which enter manners gradually.

Criticisms of science

Paul Feyerabend in his work “Against the method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge” wanted to show that there is not only one description of the scientific method which can be sufficiently broad and general to include the whole of the methods and approaches used by the scientists. He criticized the establishment of a normative scientific method, with the title that such a process could only slow down to see repressing scientific progress. For him, the only principle which does not obstruct the scientific activity is the laissez-faire . Indeed no methodology (neither inductivism, nor falsificationnism) agrees with the history of physics. All methodologies having their limits, only one rule survives, it is “ All is good ”. But attention, “All is good” does not want to say to do anything! Methodology according to him “can” provide criteria of evaluation which make it possible to the scientists to make decisions (IE: the Research programs at Imre Lakatos), but they do not contain rules which say to them what it “is necessary to make”.

See too

Sources

Snyder, Paul, Toward One Science: The Convergence off Traditions , St Martin' S Near, 1977, cloth ISBN 0-312-81011-3, paper ISBN 0-312-81012-1.
Van Fraassen, Low C., The Scientific Image , Oxford: Clarendon Near, 1980, ISBN 0-198-24427-4.
Boyd, R.; Paul Gasper; J.D. Trout, ED. (1991) The Philosophy off Science . Cambridge, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers.
Ian Hacking, Between science and reality: The social construction of what? , Paris, the Discovery, 2001
Harre, R. (1972) The Philosophies off Science: Year Introductory Survey . London, Oxford University Near.
Klemke, E. and. Al ED. (1998). Introductory Readings in The Philosophy off Science . Amherst, New York, Prometheus Books.
Losee, J. (1998). has Historical Introduction to The Philosophy off Science . Oxford, Oxford University Near.
PAP, A. (1962). Year Introduction to the Philosophy off Science . New York, The Free Near.
Papineau, D. Ed. (1997). The Philosophy off Science . Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Near.
Rosenberg, A. (2000). Philosophy off Science: In Contemporary Introduction . LOndon, Routledge.
Salmon, Mr. H. and. Al (1999). Introduction to the Philosophy off Science: In Text By Members off the Department off the History and Philosophy off Science off the University off Pittsburgh . Indianapolis, Hacket Publishing Company.
Lecourt D. to dir. (1999). Dictionary of history and philosophy of sciences , 4th réed. PUF/“Quadriga”, 2006.
Lecourt D. (2001) the philosophy of sciences , 3rd réed. Do PUF/Que know I? , Paris, 2005.
Newton-Smith, W.H. ED. (2001). has Companion To The Philosophy off Science . Blackwell Companions To Philosophy. Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell Publishers.
Erwin Chargaff : " The fire of Héraclite: scene of a life in front of the nature" , ED V. Hany, 2006, ISBN 97828581850

Lecourt report/ratio

Dominique Lecourt: Report/ratio with the Minister for State education on the teaching of the philosophy of sciences (2000)

External bonds

PhilSci waiter of prébublications with open Access of Philosophy off Science Association.
The Stanford Encyclopedia off Philosophy - Contains many entries relating to the philosophy of sciences.
" Scientifically incorrect or ideological drifts of the science" of Michel Lefeuvre - Salvator Editions - April 2006 - 154 p.

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