Paradox of the absolute power

The paradox of the absolute power consists of a family of Paradoxes bearing on the definition of what a being the Almighty is able to make; the crucial question being knowing if a being the Almighty can act in order to reduce his own capacity to achieve any Action. If this being can act of the kind, then it can limit its capacity to achieve any action, therefore it cannot achieve any action any more. If it cannot limit the field of its actions, then it cannot achieve any action. This paradox is often formulated about the God of the abrahamic Religions, but it is not a general rule. One of the versions of the paradox of the absolute power, known as " paradox of the pierre" , expresses it in the following way: " Could a being the Almighty create a stone so heavy that it cannot itself carry it? ". If it can it, it would cease being the Almighty; if it cannot it, it is that he is not the Almighty.

For certain philosophers, like Cowan, this paradox makes it possible to absolutely reject the possibility of the existence of a being the Almighty. Others, like Thomas d' Aquin, see it as resulting from an incomprehension of what is really. The paradox of the absolute power can indeed be analyzed like a logical impossibility, insofar as a defect of power (for example the fact of being able to raise the stone) there is seen like an attribute of the absolute power, and not like an absence or a negation of the absolute power.

Descartes, in its Meditations metaphysics, supports that the problem is only apparent and that God is, in spite of that, absolutely the Almighty. Lastly, some Philosophes estimate that to seek to know if a being is the or not Almighty is only one forgery Problème, since it is not considered that there can be degrees in the absolute power. In its contemporary approaches, the paradox of the absolute power was in particular studied in the field of semantics; the capacity of the language - and on the basis of philosophy - to express in an authentic way the concept even of absolute power could be discussed.

A rigorous study of the paradox of the absolute power in any case implies a precise definition of the absolute power. The current definition of the absolute power like " capacity of all faire" appears insufficient to be used for the variety of the problems raised by this paradox. Moreover, the Philosophie is not the only one to consider the question: contemporary physics was also interested there, several versions of the paradox have indeed at the origin of profitable interrogations, in particular with regard to the value of the laws which govern the physical world.

Resolutions of the problem

The problem which installation is similar to another paradox, that of “the irresistible force”, thus formulated “ That does occur when an irresistible force meets an immutable object? ” an answer to this paradox is that if the force is irresistible, by definition there does not exist immutable object, contrary, if it were to exist an immutable object, then no force could be defined like really irresistible. But such a conclusion is impossible in the case of the absolute power, because the objective is to wonder about the possibility that the absolute power makes the any power impossible.

Cowan tries to solve the problem in The Paradox off Omnipotence Revisited (“paradox of absolute power re-examined and corrected”). He proposes the following answer: the absolute power implies that God is able to raise any weight, consequently, it is illogical to affirm that God can create a stone which it could not raise. It is however logical to deduce that if God can raise any weight, then it is not able to create a stone which it would not be able to raise. And because it is unable to create a stone which it could not raise, its absolute power is finally denied.

In order to analyze the paradox in a rigorous way, a definition of the absolute power must be established. Peter Geach describes four types of any power and distinguishes them all from the concept to be the Almighty C.S Lewis, in her work “the problem of the Souffrance” (1944), supports that the nature of the problem is inherent in its assertion: “ It does not have there limit with Its capacity. If you known as that God can give the free will to a creature but can to also withdraw him, that does not say anything about God. A combination of words without significance does not acquire more direction because one introduces it by “God is able of” (p18) (…) at the end of the day, not because Its Puissance meets a Obstacle but because the foolish assertions remain foolish, even when one speaks about God ”.

One can note that the problem rests on its astute construction Linguistique. That which affirms the absolute power of God could simply say “It there does not have too heavy stone for God” and “There is no limitation with the size of a stone that God could create”. It is the question itself which mixes a question of capacity with one of incapacity. Could a paradox of absolute power thus appear with the question “it exists something that God could not make? ” One could then answer that if there is something that God cannot make, God is not very powerful. But the definition even of “absolute power” is precisely that God “cannot not be able”. As such, the problem of the absolute power could be denounced like a linguistic handling of the definition of the any power.

Various types of absolute power

Peter Geach described and rejects four levels of absolute power. He also defines and defends a less notion of the absolute power of God.

1 - Y is absolutely the Almighty means that Y can make any thing absolutely, all that can be expressed in an assembly of words even if that can be contradictory, Y not being dependant in its action, as we are it by the thought and the laws of logic. It is a point of view advanced by Descartes and having the theological advantage to detach God of the laws of the Logique, but with also the disadvantage Théologique to make suspect the first steps of God. On these bases, the paradox of absolute power is an authentic paradox, but the authentic paradoxes could nevertheless be suspect.

2 - Y is the Almighty means that Y can make X is true if and only if X is a purely logical description. It is a point of view formulated by Thomas d' Aquin in his Summa Theologica. This definition of the absolute power solves some of the associated paradoxes but some of the contemporary formulations of the paradox invalidate this definition. If X = “to create something that its creator cannot raise”. Mavrodes underlines the fact that there is nothing contradictory in that, a man could build a Bateau which it could not raise. It would be strange so human beings could achieve such an exploit and which a being the Almighty it cannot. Moreover, this definition poses a problem when X is morally or physically unrealizable for a being like God.

3 - Y is the Almighty means that “Y can achieve X” is true if and only so “Y achieves X” is purely logical. Here, the idea is to exclude any action which would not be acceptable in the field of formal logic concerning Y, even if that can the being for others. Here, Mavrode is occupied owing to the fact that X = “to manufacture something that its creator cannot raise” is not any more one problem because “God makes X” is not purely logical. But this possibility does not solve certain morals questions like X “says a lie” or temporal as X = “supports only forever built Rome”.

4 - Y is the Almighty because each time “there will achieve X” is a logical possibility, then “Y can achieve X” is true. This formula prohibits the paradox and contrary to definition 3, any temporal problem concerning the possibility cancels that a being the Almighty cancels the past. However, Geach criticizes even this version as a bad comprehension of the promises of God.
5 - Y is the Almighty does not mean that Y is more powerful than any creature, but that no creature can enter in competition with him. In this formulation, there is no paradox, but perhaps because God is then not regarded as the Almighty.

The concept of absolute power can be applied to an entity in various manners. A being which is the Almighty by nature is a all-powerful entity. On the contrary, a being which would be it by accident can be very powerful only for one limited period. The paradox can then be applied differently.

Philosophical answers

To require of God to create a stone which it could not raise does not imply only one to be able but also a weakness. For example, if you ask somebody to create a boat which it could not raise, that implies initially which there exists a boat that it cannot raise (weakness) but also that he can create it (capacity). To require of God to create a stone which it could not raise, does not only require of him to achieve something of which It is able (to create a stone) but to do something of which it is not able (not to be able to raise it). In fact, to require of God to act thus does not have a practical objective. Nothing is accomplished if God cannot raise the stone. God could create a stone and not try to raise it. It is the same thing as to require of a perfect striker in front of a cage of goals not to mark of goal. The argument is whereas God cannot be the Almighty because it does not have a weakness, which is absurd. The question in itself is formulated in such a way that she is disguised in question about the capacity whereas it is about a combination of capacity and weakness.

If God can do everything, then it can be also deprived of its absolute power. If God can deprive himself of his clean any power, then It can create an enormous stone, then to cancel its capacity and not to be able to raise it. This makes it possible to preserve the belief that God is very powerful because that means that God can create a stone so enormous that it cannot even raise it. There is however a problem with this theory: if God were to deprive himself of his absolute power, it should not be able to restore it since he is not then the any more Almighty. Consequently, in this theory, he would not be the Almighty after not having been able to raise the stone.

One can try to solve the paradox by establishing a type of absolute power which would not require to be able to make any thing constantly. According to this reasoning, the being can create a stone which it cannot raise at the time of its creation being the Almighty, however, the being can always modify the stone then in order to be able to raise it. Thus, the being must be able to be considered very powerful.

It is more or less the approach adopted by Matthew Harrison Brady, a character of Inherit the wind based on the book of William Jennings Bryan. In the climax of the version of 1960, Brady declares “the natural law was born in the spirit from the creator. It can change it, cancel it and use it as good seems to him! ”. But this solution does nothing but bring back the problem a stage behind; one can wonder whether a very powerful being would have the capacity to create a stone so immutable that it cannot be modified thereafter even by its care.

J.L Mackie, in an article published in 1955 in the philosophical newspaper Mind , tried to solve the paradox by distinguishing an absolute power from first order (unlimited in its action) and one of second order (power unlimited in the capacity to be determined or to delimit the capacities in connection with certain types of action)

A being the Almighty having at the same time an absolute power of first and second order, at one time given, can restrict its own capacity of action and, consequently, cease to be very powerful on the two levels. Since Mackie, many philosophical quarrels appeared about the best manner of formulating the paradox of absolute power in formal logic.

Another answer frequently brought to the paradox is that which defines the absolute power as being weaker than the absolute absolute power such as one conceives it initially, and according to definitions 3 and 4 above. The paradox can be solved by stipulating simply that the absolute power does not require to be it which has it to have logically impossible capacities, but to only be able to achieve things in conformity with the laws of logic. An good example of a modern defender of this reasoning is Georges Mavrodes. The latter declares that it is not a limit with the absolute power only to say that it is not able to make a round square. Because such a task is foolish. But it is not foolish to create a stone which one cannot raise.

If a being is accidentally the Almighty, it solves the paradox by creating a stone which it cannot raise and, consequently, becomes unable. Contrary to a being which would be absolutely the Almighty, it is possible for a being which becomes accidentally the Almighty to lose his absolute power. This raises another interrogation as for knowing however if the being in question forever really be the Almighty or just able to exert an important power. On another side, the capacity to voluntarily give up a capacity is a concept generally considered as power station with the Christian Incarnation.

A very powerful being is in an absolute way and consequently it is impossible for him to lose its absolute power. Moreover, one to be the Almighty cannot achieve what is not logically conceivable. The creation of a stone which the very powerful being could not raise represents such an impossibility, and the very powerful being does not have to achieve such a thing. The very powerful being cannot create such a stone, but nevertheless preserves its any power. This solution also goes with definition 2, as a long time as we know that this being is absolutely very powerful rather than accidentally. Such was the position adopted by Augustin d' Hippone in the city of the gods: Deliver 5 chapter 10: One is right thus to invite it the Almighty, though it can neither die, nor to be misled; because its absolute power consists in doing what he wants and not to suffer what he does not want; double condition without which he would not be any more the Almighty. From where it is seen finally that with the result that God cannot certain things, it is its absolute power even. Augustin d' Hippone thus affirms that god could not do something or create a situation which would have as a consequence that God would not be any more God.

Certain philosophers maintain that the paradox can be solved if the definition of the absolute power includes the position of Descartes which says that a being the Almighty to the capacity to achieve what is logically impossible. In such a scenario, the being the Almighty could create a stone which it cannot carry but could despite everything raise this stone that it cannot raise. In the same way, such a being could make that the sum of 2+2 is equal to 5 or create a square triangle. This attempt to solve the paradox is problematic in the sense that its definition excludes formal logic. The paradox is undoubtedly solved, but at the price of the creation of an illogical logic. What is not a problem if one subscribes to Dialethéisme or other forms of logical transcendence. Others supported that by evoking the absolute power, the fact of saying “a stone so heavy that god could not raise it” does not have more direction than to say “a square circle”. Thus, to ask “does for God have the capacity to create a stone so heavy that even him cannot raise it? ” is as foolish as to ask whether God would be able to draw a square circle. Consequently the question (and the paradox that it creates) do not have of direction.

Language and any power

The philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein is a reference for the evaluation of the language and his capacity to describe the any power. In its Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it remains in the field of logical positivism, until assertions 6.4 but, from 6.41, and of following, it affirms that ethics and other questions are transcendantaux subjects which cannot be approached by the language. Wittgenstein also mentions the will, the life after death and God, supporting that “when the answer cannot be formulated with words, the question either” Wittgenstein, Ludwig. proposal 6.5 The work of Wittgenstein made of the paradox of any power a problem of Sémantique, the study of the significance of the symbols (the fact of rétorquer “it is not that semantics” is a manner of saying that the question relates to only the definition of the words and not something having an importance in the physical world). According to Tractacus, even the fact of seeking to formulate the paradox of any power is without value, since the language cannot refer to the entities which the paradox evokes. The final proposal for this work is an injunction for such considerations “what we cannot formulate, we must conceal it” Wittgenstein, Ludwig. proposal 7 This approach of Wittgenstein had a certain influence on religious thinkers of the 20th century like D.Z.Phillips. Thereafter, however, Wittgenstein wrote works which are generally perceived like contradicting its own positions in Tractacus. Thus, more recent Wittgenstein resembles a critic of old Wittgenstein.

Other versions of the paradox

At the 6th century, Dyonisius claims that there exists a version of the paradox of any power in the argument between St Paul and Elmyas the magician mentioned in Acts of the Apostles 13: 8 pennies the form of a debate on the possibility that God can disavow itself Timothée 2 - 2: 13. At the 11th century, St Anselme defends the point of view which there exists much of things that god cannot make, but that it considers it nevertheless very powerful. Thomas d' Aquin has provides its own version of the paradox of any power by requiring in Summa countered Gentiles if God could create a triangle whose sum of the angles would not make 180°. In a certain way, the traditional image used to define the paradox: a stone so heavy that its very powerful creator could not raise it, is founded in science aristotelician. After all, if one considers the position of the stone compared to the sun around whose the planets turn, one can say that the stone is constantly raised. Modern physics indicates that the choice of the words on the act to raise stones should be made in connection with acceleration, which does not make less valid the paradox in its fundamental Concept. But one could modify it as follows: “A very powerful being creates a universe according to the laws aristotelician of physics. In can this universe, the very powerful being create a stone so heavy which it cannot raise it? ”

The paradox seen by Simpson

In an episode of the Simpson entitled “Weekend at Burnsie”, Homer raises in Flanders a question which is a variation of this paradox: “Could Jesus pass a burrito to the microwave during so a long time that it could not any more eat it? ”

See too

List of paradoxes

Paradoxes and double constraint

Vicious circle

Sophism

impossible Object

References

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