Nikolai Vatutin

Nikolai Fyodorovich Vatutin (in Russian: НиколайФедоровичВатутин) (December 16th 1901, province of Voronej (now located in the province of Koursk), imperial Russia - April 14th 1944, Kiev, Soviet Union, maintaining the Ukraine) is a Soviet military commander of the Second world war. Its history is related to the rebirth of the Red Army at the time of the Second world war. It was a general gifted and inspired, but at the time of the invasion of its country by Germany, it was not ready for the combat and made errors. He learned from his errors and crushed the Wehrmacht at the time of several crucial battles.

Pre-war period and beginning of the Second world war

Born in Russia from a country family, Vatutin is called up for the military service in 1920 and is integrated into the Red Army to fight the Ukrainian peasants in favor of Nestor Makhno. He becomes member of the Communist party the following year, being useful with zeal in headquarters junior. Starting from 1926 and during the decade which followed, it alternates between the military service and the studies in a Soviet military academy and the Academy of the staff. The purging of the commanders of the Red Army of 1937-38 opens the way with a fast promotion to him. In 1938, one hoists it with the row of Komdiv and one appoints it chief of staff of the special military district of Kiev. During all these years, Vatutin shares its time between the military service and its activities impassioned for the Party, it was never a careerist intrigant, but rather authentic impassioned.

In 1940, under the orders of Georgi Zhukov, it seizes the Bessarabia pertaining to the Romania. This same year, Stalin, it to reward for this countryside, the fact lieutenant-general of army and at the important post of operational chairman of the board staff names it. Vatutin is obviously not with the height of this station, whereas it is open to the innovations and untiring worker, it lack of experience to the combat and its knowledge of the art of the operations and the strategy is too abstract. In spite of that, its country origin, its relative youth and, more important still, its zeal for the Party, do one of rare of it preferred of Stalin in the Soviet military apparatus. Vatutin, and the graded tops of the Red Army, fail to adequately prepare the army for the German attack (Opération Barbarossa) of the June 22nd 1941.

The June 30th 1941, it is named at the post of head of staff of the face of the North-West and there shows its best qualities. Its lack of tactic is compensated by its leadership. It has much will and is optimistic, it treats well its subordinates and those admire it. Modeste, Vatutin never tries to only assert the success of the engagements for him, it is happy to reward the talent for the others. Its audacity is another of its remarkable qualities. With this stage of the war, the majority of the Soviet generals, destroyed by the defeats, fear to undertake operations of offensive.

Battles of North

The face of the North-West defends the access to Leningrad against the German Groupe of armies Northern carried out by army corps and directed by Erich von Manstein. Vatutin takes the command of the Soviet troops close to Novgorod and gathers them for an offensive, in order to encircle an important group of German troops. It takes Manstein by surprise, the met on the defensive and obliges all the Northern group of armies to gather its troops in order to stop the Soviet offensive. Wehrmacht loses the invaluable season of summer necessary to an effective attack against Leningrad, whereas the Red Army saves time to reinforce the fortifications of the city. Thanks to the actions of Vatutin, the Germans were never able to seize Leningrad, a key strategic defeat of the beginning of the war. The immediate operational results are however much less impressive. Vatutin over-estimates the potential of its troops and its objectives are too ambitious, the coordination of its troops and its control of the unfolding of the engagements is poor. It also does not take into account the difficult ground which favors German defenses and slows down its attack. The losses as a personnel of Vatutin are considerable, reaching in an army almost 60%. The low quality of its commanders subordinate does not improve of anything the lack resources of Vatutin. There is however only one exception: brilliant actions of Ivan Tcherniakovski, young obscure colonel ordering the 28e division of tanks. The two men have much in common and in particular their not very orthodoxe approach of the art of warfare, they become friendly close relations.

In January 1942, during the Soviet offensive of winter, following the victory of the Red Army at the time of the Battle of Moscow, Vatutin takes with the trap two German army corps in Demyansk, thus carrying out the first surrounding of importance of German troops. The German army corps are equivalent in the face to a Soviet Army. During the battle, Vatutin uses actions and innovating tactics and the Germans answer it in a conventional way. Vatutin is unable to destroy the pocket, mainly because of the weakness of Soviet aviation. In April 1942, Vatutin finally manages to bore German defenses, just at the moment when German reinforcements reach the pocket. The German command is pleased some and shooting the bad lessons of this escape of accuracy, they conclude that it is possible to surmount a Soviet surrounding while being supplied by the airs and by organizing an aid operation. These conclusions contributed to the disaster of Wehrmacht with Stalingrad.

Voronej and Stalingrad

Of at the beginning of May in July 1942, Vatutin briefly occupies the station of deputy of the chief of the staff of the Red Army, until the Groupe of Southern armies German engages in its enormous strategy of offensive, the Opération Fall Blau. The German attack concentrates initially on Voronej, they wish to bore the Soviet frontline (Bataille of Voronej) and then to tackle the Soviet southern face and the south-western face by the back in order to encircle them. July 1st, 1942, Stalin dispatches Vatutin, as a representative of the Stavka with the full powerss, on the Front of Briansk, which is renamed a few days later, Front of Voronej and placed under the orders of Vatutin. At the time of the battle, Vatutin once again meets Cherniakhovsky, lately promoted at the post of commander of the 18th body of tanks of the armed 60e. The German attack of great scale is about to bore the Soviet frontline at the time when the body of Cherniakhovsky arrives by train. Cherniakhovsky discharges one from its brigades and, without awaiting the remainder of its troops, directs this brigade against the German troops of higher number and pushes back them. Following this action, Vatutin requires of Stalin to give the command of the 60e armed to Cherniakhovsky. Stalin opposes the request at the beginning, Cherniakhovsky is Jewish, which makes Stalin paranoiac. Stalin has also professional reserves to name a so young general at the headquarters of an Army. This opposition does not discourage Vatutin and it succeeds in convincing Stalin to promote Cherniakhovsky, which was going to become quickly one of the most important generals red. Even if the Germans managed to seize the city, their attempts to bore the frontline of Vatutin failed. After this rout, the Germans give up their initial plan and direct their efforts towards Stalingrad, an error of judgment which will be fatal for them.

The October 22nd 1942, Vatutin is seen entrusting the command of the very new face of the south-west with which it plans the Soviet counter-offensive and the surrounding of the 6th German army at the time of the Bataille of Stalingrad. In December 1942, in order to preserve the enclosure of Stalingrad, Vatutin encircles and destroys the 7th Italian, strong army of: 130000 men, at the time of the operation Litlle Saturn, contributing to the failure of the operation Wintergewitte de Manstein, intended to help the 6th German army.

Kharkov and Koursk

In January 1943, Vatutin unrelentingly pushes back the Germans towards the east of the Ukraine. Its offensive allows the face of Voronej, under the orders of the general Filipp Golikov, to seize Kharkov, but it diversifies too the activities of its exhausted troops. In February 1943, Manstein gathers its troops in an important force and surprises Vatutin, provocant its defeat in Kharkov by encircling the troops of Golikov which move towards the city. Kharkov is then taken again by the Germans. Stavka raises Golikov of its command and badly evaluates the importance of the rout of Vatutin, Stalin rewarded Vatutin for his audacity and the high one with the row for general.

March 28th, 1943, Vatutin takes the command of the face of Voronej in preparation of the Bataille of Koursk. At the time of this battle, Vatutin is better tactician than Manstein, because of its innovating approach to the know-hows and tactical. It rejete the conventional hierarchy of the armies, its innovating deployment allows him, to not only defend themselves skilfully against the Germans having the technical superiority, but also to pass quickly from defense to the offensive. After the Soviet victory with Koursk, Vatutin takes by surprised Manstein, which believed that the Red Army was too weak to continue its offensive, and seizes Belgorod.

Victories in Ukraine

The following target of Vatutin is Kiev. October 20th, 1943, the face of Voronej is renamed 1st Ukrainian face. Vatutin undertakes a secret regrouping with an imaginative and misleading plan. Its troops surprise Manstein, attacking the Germans since unexpected directions and, on November 6th, 1943, Kiev is released. Vatutin exploits without slackening its victory in Kiev to be inserted in-depth in German defenses. Manstein believes capacity to repeat the success of Kharkov of last February, whereas the armies of Vatutin are dispersed. Its strategy misses originality and Vatutin easily holds its attempt at surrounding in failure and inflicts considerable losses in Wehrmacht. Frustrated, Manstein unchains several offensives against the troops of Vatutin, trying to take it by the sides, without success. December 19th, 1943, Manstein believes that it has in hand a bright victory, after having encircled and having destroyed what it believes being four army corps Soviet along the railway way Korosten-Kiev. Its jubilation is of short duration because, actually, it attacked the troops of Vatutin used to mislead it. While Manstein fights the troops being used as soft food, Vatutin gathers a powerful deterrent force on another section of the face and, at the time of Christmas of 1943, it launches a massive attack on the Germans by more pushing back them towards the west.

This offensive created the projection of Korsun occupied by a great number of German troops. In January, Vatutin and the 2nd Ukrainian face of the general Ivan Koniev, carry out the surrounding of the projection of Korsun at the time of the Opération Korsun-Schevchenko. Vatutin exceeds Manstein once again. Even if Vatutin begins the operation two days after striking from Koniev, the 6th army of tanks, lately made up and incomplete, allows him to create an effect of surprised while being implied in the battle. The 6th army penetrates thus deeply in German defenses and, on February 3rd, it joined the armoured tanks of the face of Koniev and takes with the trap 56,000 German soldiers. February 17th, Vatutin and Koniev destroy the Poche of Korsun-Cherkassy.

February 28th, 1944, Vatutin, which carries out a complex regrouping for a new operation, is embusqué by insurrectionists of the Ukrainian insurrectionary Armée far behind the frontlines. He dies of his wounds at the hospital six weeks later. Its influence on strategic, operational planning and technique of the Red Army continues after its death. Vatutin is recognized like one of the most creative generals of the second world war, after the Cold war, by Western military experts. (Note: certain sources indicate that the attack would have proceeded the February 29th and that Vatutin would have died the April 15th).

References

David Galntz, " Vatutin" in Harold Shukman, ED., Stalin' S Generals (NY, 1993, pp. 287-298). *David Glantz, Jonathan Mr. House, When Clashed Titans. How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS, 1995).
David Glantz, Jonathan Mr. House, The Battle off Kursk (Lawrence, KS, 1999).
David Glantz, The Battle for Leningrad, 1941-1944 (Lawrence, KS, 2002).

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