Maurice Gamelin

Maurice Gamelin (September 20th 1872 - April 18th 1958) is a French general, which ordered the French Army during the Drôle of war of 1939 - 1940. It succeeded the station of généralissime with Maxime Weygand and was replaced by same Weygand. During the mode of Vichy, Gamelin was stopped and off-set in Germany. It published later a thick volume of memories.

Biography

First World War

Gamelin was used with competence under the orders as Joseph Joffre . It one of was protected from Edouard Daladier.

Inter-war period

Second world war

The généralissime of the French Forces armed during the Second world war was one of the most intellectual generals of its time. It was respected, even in Germany, for its intelligence and its subtlety. In spite of this smoothness and its good states of service during the First World War, its command of the French Armies during the determining days of May 1940 is very criticized.

At the beginning of the Second world war, Gamelin did not want to carry out bombardments on Germany, of fear of the reprisals. To avoid useless bloodsheds was an important concern for him, undoubtedly too, would say some, for a general: the appalling butchery of the war of 1914-1918 had led the French staff to think only in term of defensive.

With the row of his errors and tactical and strategic mistakes, one can quote:

  • the excessive delegation of the command on a crucial face: in Belgium, one did not know too much which ordered the interallied coalition: was this the general Billotte, chief of the 1st group of armies, the Georges general, ordering North-eastern face, or the généralissime itself?
  • its military doctrines ultra-defensive which prohibits to him to carry mortal blows to Germany as of September 1939, the Ligne Siegfried being protected only by forces from reserve while the large one of the Wehrmacht fought in Poland (victim thus of the absence of any military support for the West). Military experts since then estimated that the French Armies would have had great chances of success in an offensive started against the western face (Siegfried line) at the autumn-winter 1939;
  • its obsolete designs of the use of aviation, the tanks, the motorized elements, artillery, the fortifications, largely inspired by the experiment of 14-18 and shared by a very great number of senior officers at that time;
  • its vision of the theater of operations which made him look at the sector of the the Ardennes like impenetrable, to the great displeasure of the general Corap, ordering the IXe Armée in this sector, which did not cease in vain announcing the insufficiency as men and material on this face and its permeability in fact; in the same way the excessive maintenance of forces behind the Line Maginot, excessively greedy as a personnel, but which would have had contrary allowing a great saving in troops;
  • finally, its low values of organizer, born leader, and his lack of charisma (mollesse of its handshake was then enough to characterize the character with the eyes of its opposite).

Gamelin suffered from quaternary Syphilis. It is possible that this disease had an negative impact on its clearness.

External references

  • Description of the defeat of 1940 and the actions of Galemin
  • Web page speaking about quaternary syphilis about Gamelin and its possible influence on its clearness

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