Massacre of Qibya

massacre of Qibya (or Kibiah or Kibié), also known under the name of Operation Shoshana (name given in memory of one of the Jewish victims of the attack which started the operation), refers to an action of reprisals carried out by the Unité 101 of the Israeli armed against the village Transjordanie N with Qibya in the night of the 14 to October 15th, 1953 and which made 70 victims.

At the time, the operation is unanimously rejected in the world and is the subject of a judgment of the Safety advice of the United Nations. It is perceived like the beginning of the discussed policy of systematic reprisals always applied today by Israel.

Context

Following the War of Palestine of 1948, at the time of the Palestinian Exodus, most of the Arab population flees or is driven out territories which form the State of Israel. Moreover, the discussions of armistice between the various protagonists of the conflict do not lead to a solution which allows their return. The Israeli government on its side is harnessed with the consolidation of the nation's economy and the absorption of the new immigrants. From 1949 to 1952, it is close to: 700,000 of them that the government installs mainly in the border zones and the old Arab villages, thus doubling the population of the country. From a geographical point of view, the line of cease-fire between Israel and Jordan, which acts as border, do not follow any natural topographic contour and cross even sometimes from the villages.

In this context, the Palestinians and the Bedouins carry out “infiltrations” in Israeli territory. Their intentions are to reinstall itself in their old residences, to come to harvest the fields left behind them, to fly of harvests or of the animals of farm of the Israeli colonists and finally, in a minority of case, the purpose of the infiltrations are also justified by revenge and are to attack the population or to perpetrate acts of sabotage. Between 1949 and 1954, one thus raises each year between 10.000 and 15.000 civil incidents at the borders and of many Israeli soldiers as well as damage for more: 500000 pounds Israeli, is 0.15% of the total budget of the State. They also put in danger the plans of colonization of the border zones by the insecurity that they produce there.

The Jordanian ones try to be opposed to these infiltrations. Between December 1950 and February 1952, 2575 infiltrated are stopped and condemned to fines or small custodial sentences but without total effect and under the auspices of Moshe Dayan, chief of the southern command of Tsahal, the Israeli answer is soldier. Troops are deployed at the borders with authorization of shooting and carry out “massive and brutal” expulsions. On the whole, of: 2700 with: 5000 infiltrated, generally not armed, find death between 1949 and 1956. The general staff decides however to continue this policy and sets up the Unité 101 whose command is entrusted to the commander Ariel Sharon. The unit, which gathers about fifty combatants aguérris, has the role of carrying out operations of reprisals in enemy territory twelve months old and three years, are killed in an attack with the grenade.

The traces lead to the border with Jordan which authorizes the Israelis to continue the continuation of the murderers on his territory but those are not caught up with. Jordan requires nevertheless of the Israelis not to take measures of reprisals but to let to him continue the investigation.

The October 13rd, at a meeting impromptue between the Minister for Defense in function Pinhas Lavon, the Prime Minister David Ben Gourion, the chief of staff of Tsahal Mordekhaï Maklef and the chief of the operations of the southern face Moshe Dayan, the decision is taken to carry out an operation of reprisals. The Prime Minister in function and Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, is not present and is informed only the following day.

According to the account that in made Ariel Sharon, the investigations of the Israeli police force lead the government to think that the authors of the attack come from the village of Qibya. According to the military historian Zeev Drori, Qibya is selected for its proximity of the Israeli border and because it is about a base camp for the “terrorist” operations carried out on the Israeli territory combatants.

The forces are divided into 3 principal groups. A first group of a score of combatants parachutists has the role of taking military defenses in the east of the village. A second, composed of a score of men of the Unit 101, penetrates in the village by the east. The last group, composed of 40 combatants parachutists and transporting 700 kg of explosives divided into packages from 10 to 15 kilos, has the role of making jump the dwellings. Three sections of 5 men are deployed on the roads leading to the localities close to Nor' flax, Budrus and Shuqba buildings whose mosque, water tank of the village, school, police station and exchange central office and are withdrawn towards 3:20. Some speak still today about an attack conducted by 400 men and at the time the rumors went to 600 men, denouncing an Israeli criminal aggression at this point serious which it could start a war in the area. The October 17th, the Great Britain, the France and the the United States require that the problem of the “tensions growing between Israel and its neighbors” be put at the day order.

The international press, even pro-Israeli, condemn the raid, comparing it with the massacre Lidice made by the Nazis in 1942 or with the Massacre of Deir Yassin. An Israeli member of Parliament visits some in the United States stresses that one forgives of as much less the massacre that contrary to Deir Yassin, it was not made in period of war and by a dissenting organization but by a State.

The British condemn the operation firmly and threaten to activate the treaty of defense with Jordan in the event of new incident. France and the United States also condemn the attack.

The Israeli official reaction takes place only the October 19th, through a radio operator official statement of David Ben Gourion in which he explains why the Israeli army is not to in no case related to the operation but which it acts of a reaction of the tired frontier colonists of the continual infiltrations. He adds that if (…) innocent blood was versed (…), nobody deplores it as much as the Israeli government. The government of the State of Israel formally denies the allegation absurdity and mild nutter according to whom 600 men (…) would have taken part in this operation. It adds that a inquire summer led to this subject and it appeared with certainty that no unit of the army missed with the call the night of the attack on Qibya. .

This reaction is largely commented on in the debates with the Safety advice. To its 633e meeting, the October 30th 1953, the President invites the chief of staff of ONUST to take seat with the table of the Council to come to bear witness. The Israeli version does not convince anybody and the debates which follow lead to the adoption of Resolution 101.

Resolution 101 of the Safety advice of UNO

The November 24th, the Safety advice of the United Nations adopts resolution 101 condemning Israel for its actions of reprisals to Qibya:

The Safety advice (…) note that the action of reprisals undertaken in Qibya by the armed forces of Israel, October 14th and 15th 1953, and all similar actions constitute a violation of the provisions of resolution 54 (1948) of the Safety advice which relate to the suspension of fighting, and are incompatible with the obligations which make with the parts Convention of general armistice concluded between Israel and Jordan and the charter from the United Nations.

Expresses its deeper disapproval of this action, which can only compromise the chances of the Pacific regulation that the two parts must seek in the spirit of the Charter, and requires Israel to take effective measures to prevent all similar actions in the future (…).

Reactions in Jordan

In Jordan, the operation destabilizes the capacity. Demonstrations anti-British and anti-Legion are organized in all the country by opponents with the mode. The Muslim brothers organize a demonstration with Aqbat Jabr and the requests of the left Ba' ath and Palestinians to see the refugees incorporated in the national guards of the Arab Légion become stronger. This would result in to weaken the position of the “royalists” and “palestinialiser” the army. In the camp of Qarameh, the refugees call so that the Islamic conference scheduled for December with Jerusalem declares the Jihad in all the Moslem countries and that and armed the refugees are recruited.

Israeli reactions

The incident causes few reactions in Israel because, according to the historian Benny Morris, the press, subjected to a very strict censure, just as the radio, controlled by the government, maintain the public opinion Israeli in ignorance .

Policy of reprisals

The historian Zeev Drori estimates that the operation of Qibya can be regarded as the starting point of a policy of climbing in answer to the infiltrations. According to remarks made by Moshe Sharett in its newspaper, the Shoshana operation is the first response of this scale ever carried out by the Israelis. He also thinks that the position “activist” testifies to a lack of Empathie and of comprehension with respect to the Arab camp and is purely “judéo-” and “israélo-” centric. The military historian Martin Van Creveld, although very critical as for the methods used by the Israelis in the “antiterrorist” fight, considers that it Unit 101 symbolized the rebirth and the reorganization of Tsahal of which motivation and the effectiveness had crumbled after the War of 1948.

Controversies

Discusses in the transmission of the orders

The historians give a report on a modification of the orders during their transmission between the Large General headquarter and the officer responsible for the operations on the ground, Ariel Sharon But the operational center of the central Command increases the content of the orders, while speaking in particular about:

(…) to kill the inhabitants and the soldiers in the villages.

What the person in charge of the operation on the ground translates into:

The intention: to attack the village of Qibya, to occupy it, and inflict a maximum of damage in human lives and on the goods. .

The historian Benny Morris announces that one questioned oneself at the time on how the order could have been modified kind but according to him the responsibility for Ariel Sharon cannot be called upon in this incident.

Discusses on the causes of dead victims and their number

According to the version of Ariel Sharon, the majority of the victims would have taken refuge in the cellars and the basements of the houses and would have died buried, without the Israeli soldiers not carrying out their presence. He declared indeed that he had believed the emptied houses their inhabitants, his unit having carried out, according to him, the checks necessary before actuating the detonators. This version is supported by the testimony of one of the men having taken part in the operation which reports in particular that a child and that an old man found in the houses were evacuated.

The historian Benny Morris, basing himself on the reports/ratios of the Jordanian medical examiners, indicates that the majority of the victims died by balls or Shrapnel S but not buried under the debris, thus refuting the two preceding theses and Zeev Derori reports that in his report/ratio of the operation, Ariel Sharon will speak about 12 killed national guards. This would increase the number of civil victims to approximately 60. However, Walid Khalidi considers that all the victims were civil by referring to a work John Bagot Glubb in which he writes that the attack made neither victim nor wounded among the Jordanian national guards.

Discusses on the policy of reprisals today

The raid on Qibya and the massacre which followed are often taken as example by the detractors of the Israeli policy of reprisals, with which one associates the image of Ariel Sharon, to denounce what they regard as being terrorism of State in the chief of Israel.

For example, Noam Chomsky declared in 1988 that:

Qibya is the first “well-known” example in the terrorist career of Ariel Sharon. (…)

It is the massacre of Qibya which comes immediately to mind (…) when one tells plots on the purity of the weapons, the conciliation and peace, and on uprightness and the honor to put Begin contrasts about it with its predecessors of the Workers party. (…)

The responsibility for the Israeli army is even more manifest and more projecting in the former case of Qibya than in that of the massacres of Beirut, like its duplicity.

In answer, on the events of Qibya or the Israeli policy of reprisals, the commentators pro-Israelis stress that Qibya fell under the context of continual attacks coming from Jordan and ranges against Israeli civilians. While deploring the victims, they stress that the attack and other operations of reprisals against the stations of the army and “terrorists” Jordanian brought a relative calm on the Jordanian border of Israel.

Israel generally also asserts its right to the self-defense. And even into “period of peace”, the Israeli official line does not change. Thus, pastichant remarks made previously by David Ben Gourion, Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister at the time of the Agreements of Oslo, declared that was needed to fight against terrorism as if there were no negotiations with the Palestinians, and to continue to negotiate with them, as if there were no terrorism

Random links: