Massacre of Deir Yassin

The massacre of Deir Yassin occurred the April 9th 1948 during the war of Palestine. It was perpetrated by 120 combatants of the Irgoun and the Lehi. The historians evaluate today the number of killed in the neighborhoods from 100 to 120 people with a majority of civilians, women and children.

According to the historians and commentators, this massacre had important effects on the continuation of the conflict, in particular by supporting the Palestinian exodus and increasing the pressure on the Arab leaders of the adjoining countries to intervene in the conflict.

There remained a Symbole in the history of the Israeli-Arab Conflit and the drama lived by the Palestinians.

Context

See article: War of Palestine of 1948

The episode occurs at the beginning of the 2nd phase of the Israeli-Arab Guerre of 1948. At this time, the country is always under the control of the British authorities but their departure is planned for the May 15th.

End March, the situation of the Yichouv (Jewish community of Palestine) is precarious. The war of the roads started by Abdel Kader Al-Husseini and the Jihad Al-Muqadas bear her fruits: the town of Jerusalem, where a hundred and thousand live Juifs is a sixth of the Palestinian Jewish community, is besieged and cannot be supplied any more.

Beginning April, the Haganah passes to the offensive. The first operation is the operation Nahshon which begins in the night from the 2 with the April 3rd and the purpose of which is to disenclose and to supply the city by allowing the convoys réemprunter the road Tel Aviv - Jerusalem. The operation is quickly crowned success and will continue until the April 20th. The April 8th, the Palestinian commander Abdel Kader Al-Husseini is killed besides during the engagements.

Deir Yassin is an Arab village located at 5 km in the west of Jerusalem. It counts 610 inhabitants, all Musulmans ([I], p.309). In January, its inhabitants concluded from the agreements with their Jewish neighbors of Givat Saul and signed a pact of good neighborhood with them after having driven out men of Najada out of the village. On several occasions, the inhabitants will prevent men of the Jihad Al-Muqadas or Armée with Arab release to use their village as bases ([I], p.306; [II], p.91, p.97).

The village is not strategic and does not form part of the villages to be taken within the framework of the Nahshon operation. Nevertheless, in spite of the reserves of David Shealtiel, person in charge of the sector of Jerusalem, and finally with its agreement, the Jewish militiamans of the Irgoun and the Lehi gather 120 combatants to attack the village. Combatants of the Haganah and Palmach will also take share later with the operations, after the failure of the first attack ([II], p.237).

According to Gelber, the motivations of Irgoun and Lehi for the attack of this strategically unimportant village are to show that they are them also able to occupy an Arab village (in connection with successes of the Haganah in the Nahshon operation) but also on bottom of revenge following the “crisis on the convoys”, i.e. losses of the Jewish convoys supplying Jerusalem ([I], p.309).

Events

The attack is launched the April 9th in the morning. The operation is badly prepared and of many incidents occur. The Palestinian combatants offer a resistance more important than envisaged. The combatants of Irgoun and Lehi are not involved for an operation which consists in taking a village in full day. They quickly enter 5 dead and 35 wounded of which several “officers”. They then call upon Haganah to evacuate their casualties.

A section of the Palmach intervenes in the neighborhoods of midday and car to the mortar of 2 inches on the house of Moukhtar in the hope to put an end to the Palestinian response. But these shootings are without effect and the combatants continue to fight even after the remainder of the village was taken or that the villagers went. ([III], p.310). However, according to Marius Schatner, the “section '' [[Palmach] ] rédui without problem the principal focus of resistance. Midday Friday, it is withdrawn, leaving the care to the combatants of Irgoun and the Groupe Stern to rake the village”. During this raking, the men of Irgoun and Lehi take the dwellings one by one, often cleaning them with the grenade ([I], p.310). They also make jump several houses to the explosive ([II], p.237).

Although conscious of the situation, no reinforcement is sent of Jerusalem by the National committee. The Palestinians are occupied by the preparations of the burial of Abdel Kader Al-Husseini. The Britanniques are also approximate to intervene but without real insistence. It is only at the end of the afternoon, when first refugees - women and children arrive at Jerusalem that the emergency committee presses the British army to intervene ([III], p.310).

At the time, the press will relay the figure of 254 civilian victims. The historians evaluate today the massacre in the neighborhoods from 100 to 120 people of which a majority of civilians, women and children ([I], pp.311-312; [II], p.238) as of the prisoners who were carried out ([II], p.237).

Testimonys

Colonel pilot Meir Païl of the massacre reports: He was midday when the battle finished. The calm one reigned but the village had not gone. The irregular ones of Irgoun and Stern left their masks and began the operations of cleaning. Making fire of all their weapons, they also balanced explosives in the houses. They thus killed all the people that they found there, including the women and the children. In addition, nearly twenty-five men who had been left on their premises charged in a truck and were exposed, with the Roman, through the districts of Mahahneh Yehuda and Zakron Josef. After which they were taken along in a stone quarry and were cut down sang-froid.

According to the assistant commander of the Irgoun to Jerusalem, Yeouda Lapidot, it is the Lehi which would have proposed “to liquidate the residents of the village after his conquest to break moral Arabs, and to raise that of the Jews, affected by the turning of the events”.

Reactions

This massacre causes the indignation of the international community. Ben Gourion condemns it ([I], p.317) as well as the principal Jewish authorities: the Haganah, Great Rabbinate and the Jewish Agency which sends a letter of judgment, excuses and condolences with the king Abdullah ([II], p.239). “But no concrete action will be undertaken against the dissenting organizations, and the direction Zionist ratifies the same day a cooperation agreement between Haganah and Irgoun before Deir Yassin, for the integration of its forces in the future army of the Jewish State”.

Menahem Begin will deny any massacre, speaking about a “untrue propaganda” but is pleased on the other hand with the result: “they were not what occurred to Deir Yassin, but well what was invented (…) who helped us to open a way to us towards decisive victories (…) The Arabs taken of panic fled with the cries of " Deir Yassin" ”.

Nathan Yalin Mor, political official of the Lehi and member of the “center” (its direction) seems to be shocked by the massacre. He will condemn it later one year.

This charge is sometimes taken again by historians. For example, Ilan Pappus, with certain nuances, considers that the persons in charge of the massacre of Deir Yassin could justify their acts while referring to the Plan Daleth since this last accepted the principle of destruction of all the “enemy bases” considered to be strategic, that all the villages in the neighborhoods were regarded as enemy bases and that the destruction of a village implies well to drive out of them the inhabitants ([IV], pp.131-133).

Gelber estimates on the other hand that “the attempt by Palestinian historians and propagandists to propose Deir Yassin like a proof of a conspiracy planned by the Yichouv to expel the Palestinians (…) is completely unfounded”. According to him, “the massacre of Deir Yassin (…) was an almost inevitable contest of circumstances - the nature of the combatants of the two camps, their organization and position, their level of drive, the deployment and the control of the command and control, the absence of clear military targets, the presence of a big number of civilians (…) and stress inherent in this type of intercommunity combat”.

Beyond this analysis, Gelber estimates that the communication on Deir Yassin was exaggerated compared to the importance of the event. Indeed, other massacres were bloodier, like that of 240 Jews with Kfar Etzion or of 250 Arabs with Lydda.

B. Morris differently analyzes from Gelber the impact of the communication concerning the massacre in the fear of the populations, and thus in the Palestinian exodus. But just like Gelber, it also relativizes the importance of the facts, by qualifying the events of “small operation of Irgoun and Lehi undertaken with the assent (…) reticent of the Haganah” ([I], p.318; [II], p.237).

Reprisals

In reprisals, the April 13rd, a medical convoy moving towards the Hôpital Hadassah of the Mont Scopus with Jerusalem will be attacked by the Arabs. Eighty doctors and nurses will be massacred. Some British soldiers will try to intervene to stop the massacre, but without success.

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