Incident of Mayagüez

The incidental of the Mayagüez (12 - May 15th 1975) indicates the illegal boarding of the container ships American civilian S Mayagüez by the American forces Khmer Rouge and military operations which followed having for goal to take again the ship and to release its crew, which led to intense combat in the island of Koh Tang. These engagements are generally regarded as the last battle of the Guerre of Vietnam.

The capture of the Mayagüez by the Khmer Rouge

The crisis started when the May 12th 1975 towards 14:30 (local time) of the high-speed motorboats of patrol khmères of American origin captured the Porte-conteneur S S Mayagüez and its crew of 39 men in international water asserted like territorial water with the Kampuchea. Little before its capture, the radio operator had been able to send a distress message, and the ship was located off the islands Poulo Wai by a Lockheed P-3 Orion in the morning of the May 13rd and was followed to the length of its towing to the island of Koh Tang, an island located at approximately 80 km of the southern part of the Kampuchea.

Preparations of a rescue operation

The US president Gerald Ford, informed business approximately two hours after the capture of the Mayagüez , was given to act by fear that an inaction on behalf of the the United States does not encourage other similar acts.

The the United States not having diplomatic relations with the Khmer Rouge lately with the capacity with the Kampuchea, it could not carry out negotiations. Denouncing the capture of the Mayagüez like an act of piracy, president Ford ordered a military answer to release the crew and to recover the ship.

Fortunately for the Americans, the withdrawal of their forces of Thailand, started two months earlier, was hardly advanced. The US aircraft carrier Coral Sea (CV-43) and the CVW-15 ( Carrier air wing ) which he transported was deployed in the Golfe of Thailand, accompanied by three escort ships. The May 13rd, before the Marines are not put in alarm, USAF sent 125 men of its police force of safety of Nakhon Phanom to the base of U Tapao in Thailand. One of the CH-53C was crushed during the transport of military police officers, killing 18 passengers and 5 team members.

Meanwhile, the 7th Air Force had been charged to supervise the Mayagüez and to prevent its towing in direction of the Kampuchean coast. The ship was located by F-111A Aardvark 347th TFW ( Tactical Fighter Wing ) about midday the May 13rd. In the night of the 13 to the 14, a AC-130E Specter 16th S.O.S ( Special Operations Squadron ) supervising the zone essuya shootings coming from the boats and positions khmères in the island. Early the May 14th, the AC-130E drew from the salvos of warning to prevent the towing of the Mayagüez in direction of the continent. Always in the morning of the May 14th, the F-111A and A-7D Corsair II escorted by F-4D Phantom II attacked Kampuchean high-speed motorboats started from Koh Tang for the Kampuchean littoral and five ran some. The research carried out by two HH-53 in the following hours did not make it possible to find survivors.

Meanwhile, towards 07:15, a fishing vessel inhabitant of Thailand left the island. Fearing that the crew of the Mayagüez is not on board (what was indeed the case), the American apparatuses did not open fire on the ship. During the following hours, A-7D and F-4D drew with the guns and the rockets in front of the ship and used teargas to prevent it from reaching the coast. The military planners, being unaware of the fate of the crew, continued to prepare an attack on Koh Tang.

Deployment of the forces

The May 14th, 230 men of the 3rd Marine Division were transported by C-141 Starlifter of Okinawa with U Tapao, reinforced by others coming from the Filipino base of Subic Bay. The main part of the marine belonged to the BLT 2/9 ( 2nd Battalion of the 9th Marine Regiment ) ordered by the Lieutenant-Colonel Randall W. Austin and which had just taken part in the evacuation of Saigon the previous month. After his arrival with U Tapao, colonel Austin and his staff began in the evening a location of Koh Tang with helicopter, at a certain distance from the island not to inform the Khmers of the intentions of the Americans. They determined that Koh Tang was covered with jungle and that the two only zones of landing usable were the beaches on the west coasts and is septentrional part of the island.

The mission of rescue was organized in several groups. 57 marine of the company delta of the BLT 1/4 were transferred on the frigate from US Knox class Harold E. Holt (FF-1074) and were charged with taking by storm the Mayagüez . 600 marine of the companies Echo and Golf of the BLT 2/9 were charged to take by storm Koh Tang by a héliporté attack ensured by the US Air Force.

The destroyer US missile launcher Henry B. Wilson (DDG-7) was assigned with the support of the operation, and the US frigate Schofield (FFG-3) was to block any force khmère coming from the continent (although there were many contacts radars and intercepted communications, the Schofield did not have to engage of engagements during the combat of Koh Tang).

The units deployed for the operation included/understood:

of the elements of the BLT 1/4, BLT 2/4 and BLT 2/9
388th TFW (A-7D Corsair II)
432nd TFW (F-4E Phantom II)
347th TFW (F-111A Aardvark)
374th TAW ( Tactical Airlift Wing ) (C-130E Hercules)
16th S.O.S (AC-130E Spectrum)
56th ARRS ( Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron ) (HC-130P Fights Shadow)
40th ARRS (HH-53C Super Jolly Green Giant)
21st S.O.S (CH-53C Super Stallion)
the 23rd HEAP ( Tactical Air Support Squadron ) (OV-10A Bronco), called in reinforcement in the afternoon of the May 15th.

The apparatuses of the US Navy based on the Coral Sea did not take part in the combat of Koh Tang but intervened on the Kampuchean continental territory during the engagements. The sixteen CH-53 and HH-53 of 40th ARRS and 21st S.O.S were already present in Thailand before the capture of the Mayagüez . The flight of the helicopters of attack of U Tapao in Koh Tang lasted four hours.

The rescue operation

Early May 15th, six HH-53 (a seventh, inalienable, would intervene later in the course of the day) and seven CH-53 took off of U Tapao. The HH-53 had received the radio call signs Jolly 11,12,12,41,42,43 and 44 and the CH-53 were called Knife 21,22,23,31,32,51, and 52). Knife 51 and 52 were assigned with operations SAR (research and rescue) instead of the usual HH-53 because the latter, having a higher firepower, were used for the attack of the island. The first phase of the operation consisted in making deposit the company D of the BLT 1/4 on the Holt by Jolly 11,12 and 13 towards 06:00.

The Kampuchean radio broadcast

With 06:07 hour of Cambdoge, a Kampuchean radio broadcast announced that the Khmer government was ready to restore the Mayagüez but did not mention any crew. That led thereafter to a controversy on the cogency of the American operation because the unloadings on Koh Tang took place only then and could have been differed or cancelled to let the US government try negotiations. However, the contents of the radio broadcast arrived to Washington only more than one hour later, the May 15th with 07:16 in Kampuchea, whereas the attack was already started. The fact that this hour is equivalent to Washington 20:16 time the May 14th was undoubtedly the reason of the controversy.

First unloadings

The five remaining CH-53 and three HH-53 were in charge of the attack on Koh Tang. The marine had of a numerical superiority of two against one and an important air support. The first apparatuses arrived on the Eastern beach of Koh Tang towards 06:15 and were immediately taken with part by the Khmer Rouges using light weapons, rocket launcher and even mortars. Two of the apparatuses were immediately cut down. Knife 23 was crushed on the beach without damage neither for its 20 marine nor for its 5 team members, but those remained isolated from the other groups during the twelve following hours. The second, Knife 31, were reached by two rockets and were crushed with 50 meters with broad, killing a copilot of USAF, two men of the US Navy and five marine . A marine having survived the crash landing drowned, three others were killed by Khmer while trying to reach the beach and a tenth was to then die of the continuations of the wounds caused by the crash landing. The ten marine and the three surviving men of USAF swam during four hours before being helped by a helicopter of the Wilson .

On the Western beach, the first two CH-53 arivèrent with 06:30. The first, Knife 21, could be posed but one of its engines was destroyed while it discharged its marine . He managed to take again the air but made a ditching one mile with broad, during which the mechanic, the sergeant Elwood E. Rumbaugh, was killed after to have left itself the pilot, the Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Denham, of the apparatus running. Second Sea Stallion, Knife 22, could not deposit its men on the island and, seriously damaged, made half-turn and managed to make a crash landing controlled on the coast inhabitant of Thailand, where its passengers (of which ordering Golf company) were recovered and brought back to U Tapao. Knife 32 managed to unload its marine but was touched on several occasions and one of its team members was seriously wounded.

In a few minutes the five CH-53 engaged in the attack had been cut down or put out of combat. Only fifty four men, separate in two groups, had taken foot on the island. The planes of fire support had not initially been able to ensure their mission but the advanced air-traffic controller of the battalion, having survived the crash landing of Knife 31, managed thereafter to guide the air raids by using a radio of survival of USAF while swimming with broad of Koh Tang. The three remaining HH-53 tried to unload their marine on the western beach where the concentration of shootings was less dense. Jolly 41 did not manage to approach some sufficiently but Jolly 42 and 43 managed to unload the marine that it transported (Lt.Col Austin, its group of command and group of mortar of the battalion) on the beach to approximately a kilometer to the south of the preceding group, but Jolly 42 was then put out of combat. A first attempt to recover the group isolated on the Eastern beach failed, Jolly 13 being in his turn seriously damaged on this occasion.

Establishing an effective communication network, the group of command could coordinate the air supports and of artillery for the various separate groups. The planes were directed by a A-7D used as advanced air-traffic controller, and the mortar of 81 mm deposited with the group of command could also be used with effectiveness. Benefitting from this diversion, Jolly 41 managed to deposit his marine but it was however seriously damaged during the action.

American attacks on the continent

During this time, apparatuses of the CVW-15 tackled objectives on the continent. A bombardment of the airport of Ream take place towards 07:45, destroying the apparatuses which were there, majority being T-28 Trojan of American origin delivered before the victory of the Khmer Rouges. Approximately an hour later, another wave of apparatuses of the Coral Sea made up of A-7E Corsair II, A-6A Intruder and F-4N Phantom II destroyed a fuel depot close to Kompong Som.

Fifteen B-52D Stratofortress of 43rd BW ( Bombardment Wing ) based with Guam were put in alarm for a raid on Kampuchea but this one was never started, the crew of the front Mayagüez having been recovered.

The resumption of the Mayagüez

By contrast with the situation on Koh Tang, the capture of the Mayagüez was easier. The Holt lined up along the Mayagüez towards 08:30, while A-7D of USAF sprinkled the teargas container ships. The company B of the 1/4th Marine , equipped with gas masks, carried out the first boarding of a ship by another ever carried out by the American armed forces since 1826. After one hour of excavation during which it proved that the boat was empty, the marine hoisted the US flag on the Mayagüez which was taken in trailer by the Holt .

Release of the crew

Towards 09:45, the fishing vessel inhabitant of Thailand to which the Khmer Rouges had given the crew of the Mayagüez for his release was located by the US Wilson which it recueilla without incident approximately fifteen minutes later.

Extraction of the unloaded elements

On the eight helicopters used for the attack of Koh Tang, three had been cut down and four put out of combat, plus one of the three apparatuses (Jolly 13) initially used for the transfer of the units on the Holt . Not having more but three helicopters the available ones, the command réassigna two CH-53 in charge of missions SAR to the transport of the troops. The five apparatuses embarked 127 marine of one second wave with U Tapao towards 09:00.

When the command was informed that the crew had been recovered, it decided to point out this second wave, not having more for goal but to evacuate the troops unloaded on Koh Tang. Lt.Col Austin managed to convince that reinforcements were necessary to prevent that the already unloaded units are not destroyed.

Towards 12:15, the second wave deposited 108 combatants on the western beach, thus doubling manpower of the unloaded American forces, and re-embarked 9 wounded. An attempt at Knife 52 to re-embark the men isolated on the beach east failed, the apparatus being put out of combat at this occasion. Approximately half an hour later, Lt.Col Austin and its group isolated more in the south managed to join the unloaded forces.

This group however which cannot join the Eastern beach through the jungle, it was decided to extract the group from marine of the Eastern beach by air. A first attempt carried out by Jolly 11 and 43 towards 14:15 failed in spite of the teargas dropping on the positions khmères by A-7D. Having sudden damage on a conduit of food while carburizing of an engine, Jolly 43 had to be posed urgently on the Coral Sea which was to 110 km of the island.

Starting from 16:00, two OV-10A Bronco of the 23rd HEAP dealt with the control of the air support for a-7D, F-4E and AC-130E. A third attempt to help the force of the Eastern beach commança to 17:30, supported by an important air support and of artillery delivered by the tactical planes, a AC-130E which drew with less than 50 m from the friendly positions, by a C-130E which larga a thermobaric bomb BLU-82 “ Daisy Cutter ” of almost seven tons on the positions of the khmères (it was at the time the largest non-nuclear bomb of the US arsenal) and by artillery shootings of the Wilson . Jolly 11, Jolly 12 and Knife 51 managed to re-embark the 25 men isolated on the beach is, but both Super Jolly Green Giant were seriously damaged in the operation.

For the extraction of the forces of the western page, Knife 51 was joined by Jolly 43 who had been repaired on the Coral Sea towards 17:00 and by Jolly 44, the apparatus which was inalienable in the morning but which had been repaired in the day with Nakhon Phanom. Profiting there still from an important fire support, Knife 51 and Jolly 43 respectively embarked 41 and 53 men towards 18:30 and deposited them on the Coral Sea , while Jolly 44, who could not fly to full load, deposited his 34 men on the small platform of the Wilson , of night, having only its nose gear wheels posed. It turned over quickly to Koh Tang from where it evacuated 40 other people. With each withdrawal of troops, the marine resseraient their defensive perimeter on the beach. When Knife 51 re-embarked 29 men with 20:10 during the last extraction, in the black and under an intense ramming of mortars, three marine serving a machine-gun M60 were inopportunely forgotten on the beach.

Assessment

Losses

The American losses of the combat of Koh Tang amount with 11 marine , two members of the US Navy and two aviators of killed USAF (or disappeared in the crash landing from Knife 31 and considered as killed), three marine disappeared, thirty-five marine and six wounded aviators. While adding the 23 died of USAF killed in the accident of the May 13rd, the US losses are assembled to a total of 38 killed and 41 wounded.

Because of the intense shootings of Khmer, the body of the Lance Corporal Ashton Loney, killed on the western beach (only killed during the engagements apart from the crash landing of Knife 31), could not be recovered.

The Americans estimate that the losses of the Khmer Rouges are assembled to 60 killed out of approximately 300 men present in the island.

The controversy around the missings

He was discovered, but too late, that three marine , the PFC Gary L. Hall, the LCPL Joseph NR. Hargrove and the PVT Danny G. Marshall, had been forgotten on the western beach. The radio operator contact with them was lost after the order to evacuate the beach was given. Majors McNemar and James H. Davis made a rapid checking of the beach before evacuating in the last helicopter but do not repèrerent them.

Hall, Hargrove and Marshall received the Purple Heart. The family of Hargrove received the medal only in 1999, after the journalist of investigation Ralph Wetterhahn published several articles in magazines. The three men received from another medal only the Purple Heart, which automatically is allotted to killed, wounded and captive.

They were regarded as missings, then, following an investigation into the incident, the July 21st 1976, their cases were reclassified like “killed with the combat (body not recovered)”. The investigation had not brought a new element and this reclassification was made on the basis of absence of information in favor of their possible survival. The detail of the investigation was not communicated to their families.

It was sometimes marked that the three marine survived the battle and were captured then summarily carried out by the Khmer Rouges, but there does not exist any concrete element in connection with the fate of these men.

Investigations of the Joint Task Force-Full Accounting between 1995 and 2001 updated fragments of bones which could be those of the missings, but tests DNA could not give results because of the too low sample size.

Consequences in Thailand

The incident of the Mayagüez has much affected the situation in Thailand because the base of U Tapao was used for the operation in spite of the explicit refusal of the government inhabitant of Thailand. This one denounced a violation of the sovereignty of Thailand; as of their return, the marine were transported to the Filipino . Following this incident, several parties inhabitant of Thailand called with the withdrawal of all the US forces stationed in their country.

Consequences for the American armed forces

The combat of Koh Tang are officially regarded as the last battle of the Guerre of Vietnam. The names of the killed Americans and missings are the last present on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial.

The American soldiers were criticized much for the failures of their intelligence services to determine the fate of the crew of the Mayagüez as well as the presence of important forces khmères in the island of Koh Tang. The timing of the operation was the subject of controversies until it is clearly established that the attack had indeed started before the authorities American took note of the radio broadcast khmère, and also before the crew is not recovered by the Wilson .

The US Marine Body was particularly critical on “ad hoc” nature of the operation interarmes and towards the pressure of the Ford administration so that an operation is carried out quickly, although the operation of evacuation of the troops of Vietnam was at the origin of good number of decisions taken during the crisis. Problems of co-operation between different the American armed forces will reproduce during the Opération Eagle Claw, which will involve important changes in special operations and interarmes.

This incident was probably one of the reasons which pushed to form SEAL with the counter-terrorism martime, and to create a military unit of counter-terrorism abroad, the “ Delta Forces ”, in the following years.

See too

Hostage S

Random links: