Goldwater-Nichols Act

Le' Goldwater-Nichols Act' (the Goldwater-Nichols Department off Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - PL 99-433) fixes the process of command at the time of the military operations engaged by the Department of Defense. The initial order emanates from the president of the United States via the Secretary of Defense and is addressed directly to the commanders interarmées of combat (Unified Combatant Commanders). The committee of the Staffs interarmes (Chiefs Joint off Staff) does not return in this process: it has simply a role of council.

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 completely reorganized the structure of command of the US armed forces by the organisational change most important since the creation of the US Air Force as an entity independent in 1947 and the National Security Act of the same year.

Goldwater-Nichols Act was voted by 383 votes against 27 by the Congrès and 95 votes against 0 by the Sénat.

The law was signed by the president Reagan on October 1st, 1986. It owes its name to the senator Barry Goldwater and to the deputy Bill Nichols who presented it.

Genesis of Goldwater-Nichols Act

Goldwater-Nichols Act results from the serious problems that the inter-departmental competitions had caused during military operations in the Seventies and Eighties. Those had appeared during the Guerre of Vietnam and the same type of problems had contributed to the catastrophic failure of the mission of rescue of the American hostages in Iran, released on January 19th, 1981. Another obvious example will have been the invasion of the Grenade in 1983.

Until 1947, there were two channels independent of command whose origin was the president, one via the Secretary of Navy for the naval forces and the other via the Secrétaire with the War for the terrestrial forces. There was, during the Second world war, of many examples where the inter-departmental competitions were the cause of dysfunction. In 1947, all the Armed forces (by including the any US news there Air Force) were to return account to the only Secretary of Defense, minister in charge for the Department of Defense, a civilian. However, the US Armed forces were still organized according to lines of command which returned account to their respective department heads (chiefs of the US Army and the US Air Force, chiefs of the naval operations). These persons in charge, in their turn, constituted the Committee of the Staffs interarmes (Joint Chiefs off Staff). The Committee of the Staffs interarmes elected a president to communicate with the civil government. The president of the Committee of the Staffs interarmes returned account to the Secretary of Defense, civil person in charge of the Armed forces. The president of the Committee of the Staffs inter-arm and the Secretary of Defense returned account, both at the same time, with the president of the United States, commander-in-chief of the whole of the US armed forces.

This system generated inter-departmental competitions completely against-productive. The activities in times of peace (such as the provisioning or the creation of concept, etc) were adapted for each service separately. More serious, in time of war, the activities of each service were planned, carried out and evaluated independently from/to each other. These practices had as a result the parcelling out of the efforts, impossibility of making economies of scale and of preventing the development of modern military doctrines.

The concept of AirLand Battle, at the end of the Seventies and at beginning of the year 80 did not put fine at the difficulty in coordinating the various branches of the services. This concept tried to synthesize the whole of the capacities of the combatant services (ground, marine, air and space) so that the action is led in a coherent way vis-a-vis to the enemy.

The structure of the US Armed forces was opposed to it. The invasion of the Grenade by the United States in 1983 was an additional illustration. Even if the forces étasuniennes prevailed easily, its chiefs expressed their fears, at the same time on the incapacity of the various services to coordinate and communicate between them and, on the consequences of a lack of coordination vis-a-vis an enemy more threatening.

Characteristics of Goldwater-Nichols Act

With Goldwater-Nichols Act, the military council is centralized by the president of the Committee of the Staffs interarmes in opposition to the chiefs of the services. He returns account directly to the president of the United States, with the Secretary with the Defense and the National council of Safety (National Security Council). The role of vice-president of the Staff interarmes is him-also specified what simplifies the chain of the command. This increased the capacity of the president of the Committee of the Staffs interarmes to direct a comprehensive strategy while providing a greater authority of command to the commanders of the " fields; unifiés" or spécifiques" : the president of the Committee cannot exert a direct operational authority on the commanders of the Staffs interarmes or any other Armed force (section 152c of Goldwater-Nichols Act)

The law Goldwater-Nichols changed the nature of the interaction between the services. Rather than to return account to a department head, each service does it with a person in charge of command for a specific function (Transport, Espace, Special operations) or with a geographical area of world (Europe, the Middle East, etc), by its commander-in-chief (order-in-chief - CINC - pronunciation " sink"). The commander interarmes can then control all the available resources according to the concept AirLand Battle (or its successors). This retructuration makes it possible to combine the efforts, to have an integrated planning, shared resources and a reduction or an elimination of the inter-departmental competition between the commanders. This also offers a unit of command in adequacy with military science. The services, taken individually, pass from entities of combat to organisational units and formation, persons in charge of their preparation. Thus, the CENTCOM (Central Command) for example, can be seen allocating air, naval or terrestrial resources to achieve its goals whereas, under the same conditions, the action of services taken separately would appear ineffective. Shared resources made it possible the various branches to quickly divide technological advances such as the furtive planes and the clean weapons and to offer auxiliary advantages, such as the interworking of the radios between services, which was unknown before soldiers. A common installation of new technologies allowed an harmonious development of the doctrines of support.

The first successful test of Goldwater-Nichols Act was the war of the Gulf of 1991 (" Storm of Désert") where all functioned as envisaged, making it possible to the general Norman Schwarzkopf to have the complete control of the resources of the various weapons without having to negotiate with each service.

October 29th 2002, the Secretary of State to Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, decided that the functional and regional commanders are not called any more " CINC" but " Commanders opérationnels" in the case of unified regional organizations (for example, CENTCOM and " commandants" when they are units " spécifiques" like STRATCOM. Rumsfeld was convinced that the use of term CINC had an unfavourable connotation for the president of the United States, only Commander-in-chief of the Armed forces from the constitution. The change of title was indeed to clarify the role of the soldiers with respect to the civil government.

External bonds

Goldwater-Nichols Act off 1986

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