The epistemological anarchism presents two aspects. It is initially a epistemological Théorie proposing a description and an explanation of the evolution of the Science S and Connaissance. This theory is founded on the idea that science progresses primarily thanks to phases of disorders, of Anarchie and not on the basis of ordinate and methodical progression. It is also a Philosophie Politique which lies within the scope of the anarchistic thought , and which, while following a principle minimalist: “ anything goes ” (“all is good”), assigns with the Pensée a space of Liberté which wants to be vastest possible.

The epistemological theses of anarchism are to be attached to work of Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994), Austrian epistemologist who publishes in 1975 a work founder: Against the method. Outline of an anarchistic theory of knowledge . Some of the ideas that it defends are however older, since one can make go up their origins with controversies which accompanied the birth by the Greek Philosophie.

Up to one recent period, epistemological anarchism was especially known epistemologists, but the interest always growing carried with epistemology by thinkers resulting from very different disciplines (Physique, Sociologie), tends to popularize it, so that today it occupies a considerable place in the scientific world. Its place in the political arena today still, is on the other hand, regarded as secondary.

Epistemological theory of Paul Feyerabend

Critical of the refutability

The epistemological theory of Paul Feyerabend fits in a methodical opposition and stubborn person with the theory of the Réfutabilité of Karl Popper (also called sometimes falsificationnism). Paul Feyerabend is sufficiently clearly on top, and criticisms which he addresses to Karl Popper (that he in addition attended), or with other scientists, are sometimes enough directes.
But contrary to a spread idea, epistemological anarchism does not reject necessarily the method of the refutability . The criticism of Paul Feyerabend concerns in fact:

• the monopoly which it acquired in the scientific discipline and its claim to be posed as the best method which is. Paul Feyerabend thus criticizes the reducing aspect of the theory of the refutability and defends methodological pluralism. There exists according to him a very large variety of different methods adapted to scientific and social contexts always different.

• It criticizes the place which the theory of the refutability grants to Science, by making some the single source of knowing legitimates, and the base of a universal knowledge which exceeds cultural and Community cleavages.
• It criticizes its lack of relevance to correctly describe the reality of the scientific world and the evolutions of the speeches and practices scientific.

This last criticism relates to various points which one can gather in two great units:

• For Paul Feyerabend, the error of Karl Popper is to have been unaware of or have underestimated the close links which exist between the political arenas and social and the sphere of the scientific knowledge. Consequently, thus leaving a truncated and simplistic image of the scientist and his institutional environment, the popperism leads to a abstract Modèle which corresponds only by far to the reality, and which is unaware of the importance of the diversity of the scientific practices, the role of the communication of the knowledge, and the artistic and emotional sensitivity in the development of the scientific knowledge.
• Paul Feyerabend affirms that the evolutionary theory developed by Karl Popper does not describe and correctly does not explain the changes which occur in the scientific speech, the accumulation of the theories being very far from following the evolutionary diagram poppérien. To show it, Paul Feyerabend develops three big families of arguments.
• science does not evolve/move according to a diagram of linear and coherent progression in which a more powerful theory replaces another the least powerful, but according to long or short phases of disorders, which break with institutional rigidity and which founds a state of anarchy where the traditional bases of one or more disciplines are called into question, and where dominant theories on the institutional level leave room to a proliferation of varied theories, which are juxtaposed, are combined, collaborate or enter in conflict.
• During the phases of disorders or lull, of the false theories can be accepted, of the not also proven, and of the same theories of the nonrefutable theories (for example the Théorie of the cords). Moreover, the changes of theories are far from yielding with a diagram of “binary” refutation. A theory which does not correspond to the facts can be preserved for various reasons, and the refutation of certain proposals within the theory as a whole does not imply necessarily the rejection of the theory. For example, the scientists can cling to out-of-date theories, even if it means to fold the facts to preserve them. On this point, it should be noted that Paul Feyerabend dissociates ideas of Thomas Kuhn according to which there would be incompatibility of the Paradigme S between them. For him, there exist frameworks of natural interpretation , kind of filters which enable us to apprehend our environment, on which build the theories, and which are transmitted by the tradition. The scientific proposals then find their full range explanatory only inside these frameworks. However, of the proposals, of the concepts can migrate of a framework to another what implies that the borders between the various executives of natural interpretation are relatively porous and moving. There is no strict incompatibility, but rather an accumulation more or less controlled of the concepts and proposals on executives of interpretations.
• Of old theories can be given to the last style, of the recent theories can be rejected with the profit of old, and generally, several theories are present simultaneously (scientists continue to accept theories considered to be false by the majority of the researchers). It is thus impossible to establish a final and systematic bond between the chronological progression of the theories and their explanatory range.

Defense of an anarchistic science

The conclusion which car Paul Feyerabend of his criticism of the theory of the refutability, it is that adhesion with the scientific theories depends for a big part on the complex reports/ratios which maintain the scientists between them. And it should be noticed that by re-registering the thought scientific in its social environment and communicative, it inevitably relativizes the superiority and the prestige of Western Science. It is hardly surprising, because the goal which pursues in background Paul Feyerabend, it is to release the Science of presupposed the universalists who could sclerose it.

However, its epistemology is not at any time an abandonment of the scientific Spirit. Quite to the contrary. It seems rather than during denunciation of a very powerful Science, that is to say the apology for a modest and alternative Science; an opened, free and tolerant Science, which does not try to dominate the other forms of thought while being essential by false obviousnesses; a Science based on free adhesion with the ideas and the methods; a little hierarchical Science; or even, a Science as a Art.

At the end of the day, Paul Feyarabend thus defends indeed an anarchistic Science. Indeed, the will which animates the scientists to make known their ideas and to sometimes impose them towards and against all (scientific competition), the means which they give each other or which are given to them in term of scientific “propaganda”, their capacity to be called systematically into question of the theories which seem acquired, and more simply, the perfection of the human nervous system, are enough to ensure a relative coherence and an adaptive dynamics the scientific thought. No need thus, of a single and coercive method which would dominate the scientific institutions to ensure the richness and the perfectibility of Science. The scientific Order can extremely well exist without Pouvoir.
But Paul Feyerabend goes even further. He affirms indeed that without these phases of disorders and anarchy which punctuate the evolution of sciences, without this diversity of the thought, this indetermination of the objectives and the methods suitable for Science, such a dynamics would be probably impossible. All in all, if Science were to yield with the refutability, that would sign its death warrant. Because it would then become unable to progress in directions that it is today impossible for us to anticipate.

Political implications of epistemological anarchism

We concentrate maintaining on the normative aspect of the thought of Paul Feyerabend. At first sight, it in common seems not to have anything with a political philosophy. In fact, it would be an error to believe it, because it has very important political implications; especially if the political problem is considered from a point of view constructivist, as make it for example Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann or Pierre Bourdieu, or from the relativistic point of view . But how epistemological anarchism begin there does to attach the sphere of knowledge to the political arena?

Knowledge like political problem

One can initially notice that the ideological conflicts, and sometimes scientists, are subjacent with any policy option. Reciprocally, behind scientific choices, behind scientific stakes, generally hide political conflicts, or even of the conflicts between social groups (battles between laboratories, stakes around the definition of a discipline, problems ethical S, etc) the political neutrality of science is thus quite relative. In addition, on a strictly political level, epistemological anarchism defends freedom of thought and freedom of expression. It is thus not very distant from certain traditional liberal positions, such as for example that of Montesquieu.

But it does not leave it there, since it rejects also various types of political power:

• the forms of being able which are legitimated by the constitution and the detention of a monopolistic knowledge (capacity of the expert which excludes the opinion from the layman). He generally criticizes the social hierarchy founded on the intellectual hierarchy (the typical example being the Saint-simonisme).
• situations of monopoly: when a Ideology, a method monopolizes an activity (for example: superiority of scientific medicine on traditional medicine, the monopoly of methodology poppérienne). It defends on the contrary ideological pluralism.
• the various forms of ideological authoritarianism or intellectual which are institutionalized (that of the church, that of science, that of the dictatorships, that of the political parties, etc)
• the transmission of the knowledge which is done in a coercive way (imposition from point of view, repression, censures, control of the means of edition, directives of research, obligatory school, etc).
• Enfin it is opposed to a hierarchy definitions of reality. Each social group, each individual, being able it to define in its manner, any not being able to be regarded objectively as “better than another. ” It is thus in contradiction with the theses objectivists. More generally, he is opposed to intellectual hierarchisation (hierarchisation ideas).

It thus defends the individual, and especially the individual freethinking, against the ideological monopolies which accompany the authoritative political regimes (only one line of thought, only one State). Epistemological anarchism consequently constitutes a political philosophy in the full direction of the term. It defends a political design of the knowledge (transmission and the detention of knowledge is policy issues) and it defends an epistemological design of the policy (the policy is always related to problems of division, construction and diffusion of knowledge and ideologies).

Epistemological and anarchistic anarchist political

Force is however to note that epistemological anarchism has only one very restricted popularity within political anarchism, one can see several reasons there:

• One of the first reasons which is obvious is that it is a very recent movement. But of other reasons can be mentioned.
• First of all, it is a movement far from active on the political plan. But can it really become it? It is far from probable insofar as it can claim to occupy a place also central only that of traditional anarchistic philosophies. Indeed, the proposals defended by epistemological anarchism being brought to be possibly disputed, criticized and rejected by these even which are claimed some, it would be illusory to wait so that it draws up a list of sufficiently coherent, stable and robust positions theoretical, to compete with thoughts like those of max Stirner or Pierre Joseph Proudhon - which fits more in certainty until in doubts.
• Fundamentally defender of indiscipline, it allows only with difficulty the union of individuals around political principles, whose militants would apply these guiding principles, while assimilating and by diffusing these basic principles with constancy. An agreement with large scales, and continuous in time, between epistemological anarchists to a political measure to take would be thus highly improbable.
• the epistemological anarchists are opposed to totalitarianisms but also to certain theoretical implications and policies of the traditional anarchistic thought. Indeed, close to the Relativisme and the Dadaïsme, they criticize the scientific rationalization and the marriage of Science with the State or the political arena, which thus moves away them intrinsically from certain currents of traditional anarchism, more inclined with refonder the bases of the company on the Raison.
• Plus generally, if epistemological anarchism does not merge with political anarchism it is that according to Paul Feyerabend, the political anarchist goes against the Liberté. He wants to eliminate a “form of life” to substitute a model of social organization in conformity to him with his desires. Such is not the case for the epistemological anarchist who, not having durable honesty or of durable aversion towards some institution or some ideology that it is, can want to defend them or to remove them. With the difference of the political anarchist, the epistemological anarchist is changeable. He does not have necessarily political certainty, and if he has some, he can change day at the following day it.

If it appears however interesting to confront epistemological anarchism and political anarchism, it is that one sees well how the first can constitute a parapet against certain excesses of the second. He underlines in fact two weaknesses of political anarchism.

• One often reproaches the political anarchists for referring more to abstract doctrines that with concrete facts, and for adhering in block to these doctrines. Individual freedom becomes subjugated then with a collective ideal, dictated by thinkers (often university) who évertuent themselves to imagine a better and more rational company. This configuration creates two problems. On the one hand, it programs the company according to an objective considered to be universal. In addition, and it is seen how the two problems are dependant, it inevitably creates a intellectual hierarchisation, since the ideas of the large thinkers are supposed being best, and a social hierarchy which is founded, amongst other things, on the control and the knowledge of the texts founders.
• In the political anarchistic organizations, as in any political movement, individual freedom can be the prey of the intolerance of the group. The individual is constrained to adhere to a line of direct thought.

Epistemological anarchism is instituted then against this political domination, since he denies in his same bases (i.e. in its ideological bases), the authority of any intellectual or political capacity.

With epistemological anarchism, thus a new form of dispute appears. It is not only any more the individual against the State, but it is the individual against the Dogme. The individual against the dictatorship of the doctrinaire approach and the homogeneous knowledge. The individual who draws up himself against the intellectual capacity. This new dispute, it is thus: the individual against the Ideology.

A design of the Man: the epistemological anarchist

Throughout its career Paul Feyerabend adopted very variable positions. This shows well that he refused the dogmatic standpoint, as well as the tender to certain standards which structure the intellectual mediums - as that for example, which wants that a researcher or a thinker preserves identical positions in connection with the same subject. In a certain manner, it acted in that in conformity with its ideas.

The epistemological anarchist is opportunist

Because indeed, for Paul Feyerabend, an epistemological anarchist can have very well objectives stable or changing, and it is, as a free individual, the only one who is capable to decide it. No institution, no doctrines, no ideology that it is political, nun or scientist, can impose a procedure to follow to him. Moreover, once it chose a goal, an epistemological anarchist will not accept only one forces it to adopt such or such method to reach it. He will be able to try to do it thanks to his reason, or thanks to his emotion. And there are no sufficiently absurd or immoral designs which it should not take into account. Because no method should be obligatory, and none can a priori be universally rejected. In fact, if it may be that it is opposed to the universal standards, the universal laws, the universal ideas which one seeks to impose to him - as the truth, justice, honesty, and the reason - as on the behaviors which they generate, it may be just as easily that it acts as if it believed that such universals existed. And it can then do it violently or peacefully.

It remains that once it stated its doctrines, the epistemological anarchist can want to diffuse it (even if he can just as easily keep it for itself). Its methods of sale then depend on its goodwill, and the bonds which it maintains with the “public”. It will do it by taking support on networks, institutions, or why not, as a recluse. There are thus no universal constraints or methods in this respect.

The epistemological anarchist is thus well opportunist. One can say in a certain manner, which it incarnates a form of exacerbated individualism since it tries to be released from any social obstacle, moral, rational and humanistic. He can be irrational as he can be rational. Reagent with its environment (or not), it adapts (or not) its desires and its intrigues according to its desires and of the nature of its interlocutors. The limits which it sets, are always limits which it can weigh up, revalue and why not, if the need is felt some, reject.

Epistemological anarchist and dadaïste

This radical vision of the knowledge, which can finally only be relative, this libertarian design of the scientist who carries it, and who by his interested or altruistic attitude, rational or irrational, is led to create a science which exceeds it and which it cannot enclose in durable rules, methods or institutions, bring closer, according to Paul Feyerabend, the epistemological anarchist and the dadaïste.

Both have indeed in common not to have any program, and to even fight against any program which one would try to impose to them. They can be the keen defenders of the opposition to progress, or of its adversaries. The epistemological anarchist is at the same time preserving and innovative. Pareillement, whereas a dadaïste is anti-dadaïste, Feyerabend will say as for him, after having defended the relativism in its work Adieu the reason , its distance with respect to the relativism, by affirming that it is before a whole anti-anti-relativist…

A notable difference however between the two designs: because of his deeply opportunist character, the epistemological anarchist does not hesitate to fall under a competing environment. As saw we, it can diffuse its ideas a such business man, or on the contrary, keep them for him with the manner of a cursed artist! He is not opposed more to the competition of the ideas, than with the intellectual co-operation. The hobby-horse ïste on the other hand, at least historically, tends to deny, or to overlook, this relation competing which exists between the artists. Indeed, the dadaïste, and more generally the contemporary artist, occupy an ambiguous position with respect to the artistic institution: they are at the same time critical in its connection, but at the same time tributary of this one. The epistemological anarchist, on the contrary, can use the institutions, but it can also be unaware of them royally, to vilify them, found institutions parallel, to listen to with attention and serious the words of insane…! Moreover, it is not limited to the artistic activity, because its sphere of activity is knowledge, and consequently, it can engage suddenly in an unspecified activity and call into question its bases without anything to know there.

In his extreme version, the epistemological anarchist does not adhere to the ideas, and the ways of producing and of diffusing the ideas that according to his will; he is not dependant any more and submitted to the institution, he uses the institution, he reverses the power struggle with his advantage. And, as Feyerabend suggests it, this individualism included/understood well does not have anything reprehensible. Since, when it is generalized, it does not lead the organization of the knowledge towards a saddle-oyster state. On the contrary, it leads the knowledge towards a spontaneous order, because of a complex play of selections and errors, “genetic diversity” of the knowledge, and adaptability and richness of the human communication. Epistemic freedom thus leads the Company, in spite of appearances, towards a variety and an always increasing perfectibility of its knowledge. Who more is, it leads it, and it is what is even more unexpected, towards a political freedom increasingly wider. Thus, the release of the Company passes first of all by the release of the knowledge, and Science cannot really serve the Company and progress, only if it is organized freely.

Criticisms of epistemological anarchism

Criticisms against epistemological anarchism are very numerous. It is difficult of all to mention them because the majority of them are transverse, they include simultaneously various traditional epistemological problems.

For example, epistemological anarchism clearly poses the problem of the social inscription and policy of the scientific thought. Is the scientific thought made up of statements having a universal validity, independent of the company in which they are produced? Certain authors lean for a standpoint internalist (the statements are true independently of the social determinants) which slices with the standpoint of the epistemological anarchists, of advantage externalist.

Another point, Karl Popper showed epistemological anarchism, if it were applied, to lead in fine science towards a simple power struggle: most extremely rightly, weakest agrees. This criticism seems however to overlook the fact that this power struggle is precisely of setting today in the world of research, even in sectors where methodology poppérienne is a priori dominant. Capacity forwarding by the control of the means of edition and the institutional stations placed well.

Generally, criticisms addressed to epistemological anarchism join very old problems and debates, like those for example, which opposed in the ancient Greece, the school of the sophists with Gorgias and Protagoras, the ancestors of the contemporary relativism, and the school of the philosophers with Plato and Aristote. For the first, the thought is to be registered imperatively in the communicative play and in the context of the life of the city, for the seconds, the thought can reach universals, it can claim to be extracted from social reality and policy.

Such problems lead naturally to very general questions: which is the relationship between the thought and reality (realism or Anti-realism)? Which is the relationship between the various individual points of view (Solipsisme, Intersubjectivité, Universalisme, etc)? Does there exist a universal point of view? This universal point of view, which would be the best, should it guide the human action? Is it necessary that there is Efficience in the action? Everyone can it bring its point of view on complex subjects (today, the GMO, the nuclear power, unemployment…) ?

These problems, already present in Ancient Greece, re-appear today with force. And deserves it of Feyerabend is perhaps showto have shown that no simple answer could be to them brought. What constitutes already in oneself, an epistemological anarchist, an answer would say.

Resources on epistemological anarchism

Quotations

• “My thesis is that anarchism contributes to progress, whatever the direction that one gives him”, Paul Feyerabend.

• “All methodologies have their limits, and only the " règle" who survives, it is " all is bon" ”, Paul Feyerabend.

• “the idea that science can, and must, being organized according to fixed and universal rules is at the same time utopian and pernicious. It is utopian, because it implies a too simple design of the aptitudes of the man and circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious in what the attempt to impose such rules cannot miss increasing our professional qualifications only at the expense of our humanity. Moreover, such an idea is prejudicial with science, because she neglects the physical conditions and complex histories which influence actually the scientific change. She makes our science less easily adaptable and more Dogmatique: each methodological rule being associated with cosmological assumptions, the use of makes us regard the accuracy of the others as self-explanatory. The naive falsificationism (Réfutabilité naive - NdR) holds thus for asset that the natural laws are manifest, and not hidden under variations of a considerable width; empiricism considers that the experiment of the directions is a mirror of the world more faithful than the pure thought; rationalism, finally, ensures that the artifices of the reason are more convincing than free plan of the emotions (...)”, Paul Feyerabend.

• “science is much closer to the myth than a scientific philosophy is not ready to admit it. It is one of the many forms of thought which were developed by the man, but not inevitably the best (...)”, Paul Feyerabend.

See too

Internal bonds

• Anarchism
• Epistemology
• Relativisme

External bonds

• “the death of Feyerabend. A thought moving”, article of Isabelle Stengers appeared in the review Future former .
• Theses on epistemological anarchism
• Forum devoted to Paul Feyerabend

Random links:

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