Electoral Fraud

The electoral fraud includes all the processes having the aim of influencing the result of election S, in order to guarantee or support (to increase the Probabilité) a desired result. All the companies using the system of the votes are confronted with the problem, and seek to be secured some (at least officially). Success on the matter is a condition to prevail itself of the democratic label .

The electoral fraud can find a Point application to each element of the Poll:

  • the Electoral campaign of which the Propaganda which it is necessary to distinguish from the Information, including the Affichage and the professions of faith of the candidates,
  • the organization of the polling stations and the poll, of which ballot papers
  • the electoral rolls
  • the calculation of the voices or Scrutinage, to see stuffing of ballot box below,
  • publication of the results.
For each one of these elements, one will give the techniques of fraud and the parades

Fraud carrying on the composition of the Electorate

It aims to the undue elimination of the voters a priori unfavourable, and with the undue inscription of the voters a priori favorable to a camp These two techniques, often used jointly, employ similar means. Complicities in the administrative services are necessary:
  1. Within the framework of a vote by district: the displacement of voters (but without including the electoral Cutting, even sometimes the Gerrymandering, indeed this handling take place before the poll, do not aim by the votes and thus do not constitute an electoral fraud stricto sensus ). In the displacement of voters, people recorded in two districts, move to vote in the district where they have a second home, rather than in that which they live most of the time.

  2. Within the framework of a vote on several places: the multiple vote (by inscription on the various lists)
  3. the secrecy on the composition of the electorate (case of the Cupola, executive body of the Calabrian Maffia ). This type of provision prevents from knowing the Pourcentage Suffrage S expressed on the number of potential voters.
  4. the fixing of short times for the inscription on the electoral rolls with a place of inscription centralized or distant, or a complicated procedure. This type of provision naturally limits the number of voter S registered to the number of Citoyen S informed, that one can select.
  5. modification of the rules of citizenship (example: ivoirisation) which consists of an elimination of a body of presumedly adverse voters
  6. the vote of absent the : It is a question of making vote people who do not vote, which thus will not check the error. That includes obviously “elderly”, even, if one believes certain rumors of them, of deaths. For that, it is enough to present Procuration similar S or other artifices. Moreover, contrary to the stuffing of ballot box which one can consider that it is about an alternative, this fraud is not likely to multiply beyond reasonable the number of bulletins since the vote is associated with a real voter. Like will French example, one quote suspicion on the electorate Paris IEN following some businesses, which led to a revision supplements in 2001 (?), which will appear to a certain extent a remedy worse than the evil (exclusion of Parisiens truths but whose new address was not known); and of course rumors relating to Corsica, source of notorious jokes.

To cure it

Fraud relating to the organization of the polling station

The stuffing of ballot box S

Principe

The stuffing of the ballot box consists in introducing ballot papers additional into the ballot box. These additional ballot papers are favorable to a list or a candidature.

Les pratiques

Première méthode:

A member faker of the polling station benefits from the absence of the members misled - who, in general, are unfavourable political camp - to slip one or more additional ballot papers into the ballot box.

Seconde méthode:

A voter accessory to the member faker slips two envelopes instead of one at the time of the vote.

Troisième méthode:

At the time of the opening of the ballot box after the poll closure, the members of the polling station gathers ballot papers per hundreds. Each one being concerned of his counting, nobody pays attention to what occurs around.

A member faker, who generally does not say anything or pretexts a lack of place on the table, takes a small package of envelopes to put it side but without moving away not to wake up suspicions. Benefitting from the general carelessness, the member faker adds in any discretion one or more ballot papers, prepared in advance.

La régularisation

The stuffing of the ballot box has as a consequence first that the annotatings of the voters are inaccurate. The mission first of the member faker is thus that the number of ballot papers is equal to the number of signatures.

The member faker must be with the fact of two things:

* With the first turn, it will be able to sign only in the place of people whose it knows the unquestionable absence for the two turns. The Electoral code makes it possible a voter to sign by his simple initial,

* With the second turn, it does not matter that he knows the voter or not, it will be able to sign in the place of the voter who voted with the first turn and abstained from with the second turn. For that, it is enough for him simply to imitate the signature of the voter who with voted with the first turn.

Première méthode:

The member faker benefits from the absence - pause toilets, hours of meal, pause cigarettes, etc… - or of the carelessness of the members misled to add signatures on the book of annotatings. This operation is generally done a few hours before the end of the poll and for one period of multitude. The period of multitude makes it possible to be quieter for the member faker.

Indeed, a polling station which closes at 8 p.m. will see little 7 p.m. old world to 8 p.m. for example. The fact of carrying out this operation towards the end of the poll makes it possible to see the abstentionnists and to sign in their place.

The member faker cannot find himself in the situation or he adds a signature and only the voter whom he “made vote” comes then.

Seconde méthode:

This method is employed for the second turn of an election. It consists in affixing signatures in advance on the book of annotating of people whose one knows the absence. The books of annotatings are never checked by the members of the polling station before the poll.

To keep balance Ballot paper = ANNOTATINGS, when a voter presents himself to vote, the member faker locates quickly if this voter presented himself at the time of the first turn. If it is not the case, the member faker makes it sign on the box of the first turn.

No voter lambda checks or it signs.

Troisième méthode:

The member faker undertakes, with the poll closure, to count itself the annotatings and to discreetly add the signature which it misses.

In parallel, the misled members count ballot papers. At the end of counting, the members who count the envelopes ask whether that corresponds to the number of annotatings. The member faker answers that YES and nobody thinks of checking.

If the member faker did not finish adding the signatures which it needs, it answers that does not correspond to the number of envelopes and the members of the office hasten to recount ballot papers. Thus leaving an additional time to the member faker to add signatures.

The member faker can quietly add the missing signatures then.

La prévention

The first of the preventions is that each polling station is made up assessors of several political camps, delegates of candidates or list. The presence of many people of varied horizons is the pledge of a supervised and controlled poll which respects the choice of the voters.

Première prévention:

The members of the polling station must make sure that the book of annotatings does not contain any signature at the time of the first turn and any signature in the box “Second turn” for the second round.

Seconde prévention:

The signatures of the second turn on the book of annotating must be carried out in a color different from those of the first turn. For example, the signatures will be done in BLACK at the time of the first turn and in GREEN at the time of the second turn.

The members of the polling station must make sure that are not reproduced on the table of the assessor who makes sign the book of annotating only one pen which corresponds to the color chosen to make sign the voters.

Troisième prévention:

The book of annotating should be open by the assessor charged to make sign the voters only at the time or the voter presents himself to the table of vote and that its name is stated for checking.

Quatrième prévention:

With the poll closure, the opening of the ballot box should be made only after the members of the polling station carried out the counting of the annotatings collectively.

Cinquième prévention:

Each ballot box has a meter. The members of the polling station must make sure, with the opening of the poll, that this meter posts number 0000.

If you must go away, the member faker will not hesitate to introduce ballot papers into the ballot box without your knowledge. To check that, before leaving the polling station for an absence, mentally recording the number with the meter of the ballot box.

Keep in memory which it is necessary about between 30 seconds and 1 minute 30 with a voter to vote. That is to say on average 1 minute. If you are absent during 5 minutes, your meter can have only to increase approximately 5 votes.

If you made a pause cigarettes for example, ridges in front of the entry of the polling station. During this short pause, mentally count the number of adults which enters the polling station. On your return in the office, look at the meter of the ballot box. It can have to only increase to the maximum of the number of adults which entered the polling station.

Sixième and last prévention:

The blue envelopes must be monitored. First of all, the members of the polling station must check that the number of envelopes corresponds to the number of registered voters on the payroll.

The envelopes, in general, are gathered by 100. When the meter of the ballot box approaches the figure hundred, you ensure that it is indeed a package of 100 which is given to the table of discharge. And thus of following the approach of each hundred.

For example, if the table of discharge requires a hundred whereas the meter of the ballot box is to 280, that wants to say that it misses 20 envelopes compared to the number of voters.

In this case, look in the insulators that blue envelopes is not left and to look at the dustbins of the insulators to check that envelopes were not thrown. If there are no envelopes in the insulators and the dustbins, it is that they really disappeared. Then require table of discharge which each voter takes only one blue envelope.

And, especially, as from the moment when you noted this anomaly, be very careful on the continuation of the poll.

When the voter arrives at the table of vote, look at its ballot paper in order to check that it has in the hands only one envelope.

Explications on the use of the blue envelopes for the faking of the vote:

Perhaps do you wonder how it is possible that envelopes be able to be used to fake the vote?

Quite simply because no polling station has 100% of participation. Except perhaps in the small villages.

Let us take the example of a polling station which includes/understands 800 registered voters. If a participation of 90% is taken - what is rare -, that wants to say that 10% of the registered voters abstained from. I.e. they did not come to vote. 10% of the registered voters that want to say that 80 envelopes are available for the members fakers.

Les exchanges of the envelopes of centaines

Principe

The exchanges of envelopes of hundreds consists in completely modifying the contents of an envelope containing a hundred. This method of faking of the vote requires an good organization and the complicity of members of the polling station.

Les pratiques

Première méthode:

With the poll closure, ballot papers are gathered per hundred and put in envelopes of one hundred. When the whole of ballot papers was put under envelopes of one hundred, the attention goes on the distribution of the tables of tellers.

It is the moment chosen for the members fakers to carry out the exchange of an envelope of one hundred.

Seconde méthode:

With the poll closure, the envelopes of one hundred ballot papers are made up and the remainder of ballot papers is also put in an envelope of one hundred. Rather than to invert an envelope containing hundred bulletins, the envelope of the remainder is inverted. That requires less organization for the members fakers.

The selected moment is identical by the members fakers to carry out the exchange of the envelope.

La régularisation

The exchange of envelopes of hundred or remainder does not have any consequence on the annotatings. It is about a " simple échange".

On the other hand, the number of the remaining blue envelopes will be inaccurate. It is thus necessary that the envelope exchanged is open, carefully removed ballot papers blue envelopes and the hidden or destroyed votes. To set up this faking, as we said in the principle of the EXCHANGES OF the ENVELOPES OF HUNDREDS, that requires an good organization and complicities.

To mitigate the opening of the envelopes of hundreds and ballot papers, the members fakers wait patiently until the tables of examination completed their work. The blue envelopes which " reviennent" tables of examination are taken and put in the remaining envelopes. Quite simply.

But if the misled members of the polling station ignore the bases of the electoral fraud and carry out in an incorrect way their monitoring of electoral operations, that can be done very simply by the members fakers.

La prévention

Première prévention:

The members of the polling station must check that the number of remaining blue envelopes corresponds to the difference between the full number of registered voters on the payroll and the number of voters registered on the meter of the ballot box.

The remaining blue envelopes must be under the monitoring of the members of the polling station.

Seconde prévention:

The counting of the annotatings is done under the monitoring of the members of the polling station. And this counting of the annotatings is carried out before the operation of the opening of the ballot box. Then will be made the opening of the ballot box for the counting of ballot papers.

When the annotatings are counted, and once the emptied ballot box, the book of annotatings must be placed in the ballot box and the ballot box must be locked.

The remaining blue envelopes will have to also be placed in the ballot box and the ballot box will be again locked.

It is necessary thus that the members of the polling station know which are the members of the polling station who hold the keys of the ballot box.

Troisième prévention:

When the envelopes containing the hundreds are made up, they must be placed in the ballot box with the book of annotatings and the remaining blue envelopes. This operation is done under the monitoring of the members of the polling station.

When a table of examination asks for an envelope of hundreds, the members of the polling station must supervise this " transaction" and they must make sure that the ballot box is well locked again.

Quatrième prévention:

When the ballot box contains the blue envelopes, the book of annotatings and the envelopes of hundreds, it is necessary to place the ballot box in the middle of the tables of examination so that it is with considering and known of all.

Autres

  1. That consists in introducing into the ballot box a great quantity of favorable bulletins. That can be carried out before the opening, during the vote (introduction of several bulletins at the same time), or even after the vote.

  2. One can as provide for one of the parties in presence only of the stained or damaged bulletins or easily endommageables, as one will be able to enter like null according to the rules in force.
  3. Alternative of the technologically advanced countries: defective maintenance of the machines of E-voting. The fraud is not easily provable: one calls upon rather the Fatalité, the bad luck, the more so as the problem touches indifferently all the candidatures.

To cure it

  1. It is appropriate to use transparent ballot boxes, to enter the number of voters to make sure that the number of bulletins corresponds, to limit handling which hides the ballot box and its contents (in particular transport: it is thus necessary to strip on the spot of the vote), to make sure that during the examination one does not destroy bulletins (in order to eliminate the votes Dissident S).
  2. to cure the supply of bulletins of bad quality, it is necessary to send bulletins by the post office to the electorate at the same time as the professions of faith and to have the electoral delegates in the polling stations likely to draw up a protest if they note to it not identity of the provided bulletins and the bulletins even distributed to utilize the police force to stop voting operations.
  3. It is appropriate to register in the electoral payments the preliminary checking of the good performance of the machines to be voted, and to submit to the judge the cases of concentration of problems in the districts traditionally favorable to a certain camp
  4. the machines to be voted are, in practice, of the more or less specialized computers. The checking of the program really carried out by one of these computers the day of the election is with the range only of experts highly qualified and equipped. To ensure a level of democratic control comparable with that which the use of the transparent ballot boxes allows, the computers of vote must produce a trace paper, in the form of bulletins checked by the voter at the time of his vote. These bulletins paper can be counted at the time of random check operations, in the event of breakdown of the machine or of suspicion.

The public vote

In a very constraining social context (dictatorial or not), the vote public (i.e one knows the vote of each voter) gives results in conformity so that the opinion believe duty being “the good” vote of the point of sight of the established capacities. In such a context, the vote by show of hands or any other similar technique ensures of the comfortable majorities, often qualified “Soviet” (standard: 100% of favorable voices on 99,9% of participation).

Even in more democratic contexts, without direct pressure on voters, certain members of the community can estimate that it is more reasonable to grant its voice to the party most likely to carry it, if one does not want to risk a collective punishment (the loss of advantages such as special fiscal advantages or subsidies). In oneself, this phenomenon is inevitable and normal (nonfraudulent). But it can be exploited by threats sometimes hardly veiled, which can be regarded as defraud.

Fraud relating to the proclamation of the results

The irregular proclamation

A vote is very often carried out in many places. It is thus enough, provided that information circulates badly, “to voluntarily be mistaken” on totals without touching with the intermediate results to obtain possibly sufficient improvements.

It is thus advisable to be wary of any time between the end of the Scrutin and the proclamation of the results just like of the excessive centralization of results requiring transport on long distance of bulletins stripped and of the documents of scrutinage. Transport is one moment favorable to the disappearance of part of the bulletins (this disappearance takes account of the preceding results for a given area).

Fraud relating to the electoral campaign

Unequal propaganda

When one of the involved parts influences even control the Médias, it he is easy to make sure the control of the speech and to even limit to prevent the electioneering propaganda of the opposite parties. It is the means modern par excellence, because it complies with the rules of the vote formally and, for lack of Indicateur S relevant and recognized (which is not always in place), it is difficult to prove (it is only one question of opinion).

It can take various forms:

  • a part or its sympathizers has the main part of the media of diffusion of mass (general influence big bosses owners of press before the audio-visual era; monopoly of televisions and radios by the state, as at the beginning of Ve French Republic; concentration of the radios and televisions between the hands of a financial group or its ramifications, as in current Italy, or the political hands of sympathizers, as in the audio-visual French public).
  • the budget of the electoral campaigns, if it is not controlled or is not limited, gives an unequal access to the means of propaganda without being able to call upon the fraud.

Fraud relating to the candidatures

The slandering of the candidates or parties unfavourable

So everywhere the electoral campaigns abound in low blows and in particular in slanderings and distorts new, the countries where information circulates badly (for example because of weak a Alphabétisation or an insufficient development of the media) are particularly sensitive to the propagation of Rumeur S and all kinds of false reports aiming at discrediting the opponents or their political options. This handling of information can be regarded as concerning unequal propaganda. Imagination is without limits, the rumors or lawsuits of intention can relate to the sex (So-and-so is inaccurate, so-and-so is impotent), the money (" ils" are financed by the foreigner), the policies (" ils" will transform the country into dictatorship, " ils" let us vons to plunder the country or to deliver it to the foreign enemy - with the modern alternative: to deliver to the international large capital,…) etc

The rejection of the unfavourable candidatures

While prohibiting to present itself to the unfavourable candidates, for example, by refusing an approval of candidature (Iran), by limiting their operating range or by imprisoning them (Russia) under various reasons though whimsical (Corruption, Homosexuality, etc according to the sensitivity of the country).

To cure it

In the case of unequal propaganda, the written law and the publicity of this one, with regard to the electoral rules, protects the rights of the opposition and dissidence. These laws must make public the places of posting reserved to the electioneering propaganda, the access terms with these places, prohibition to post in the inadequate places, the sanctions in the event of pulling up or of covering of the posters in the adequate places.

The laws on the violations of the press laws and the Diffamation contribute to the raising the moral standard of the Politique. Of course, the Civics is the best method of control of the public life by the Citoyen, while a justice effective and recognized like such limit the range of the unfounded charges.

Defraud electronic

See also: ES3B, Diebold

Each technique used, in order to collect votes has its own risks, in this way the electoral frauds are always possible. The fact that the votes are anonymous, in order to protect the voters from the illicit pressure, means that nobody can check if each voice corresponds so that its unknown voter really voted. For this reason, the only means of being certain that the electoral results are right, is to collect the votes, by using a protected and verifiable procedure. The elections on paper held by the monitoring of a correct public can guarantee right elections and in order, because the human ones can check the operations and deal with the votes by polls, which are visible and tangible objects. The Italian electoral procedures are an good example, since nobody forever called in question the legitimacy of the electoral results these 60 last years.

The electronic elections cannot be held under the responsibility of the public, for the reason which the procedures are not verifiable by the human ones, because we are not equipped to check operations which occur on a microscopic scale in a few nanoseconds of time. In fact, for the people who do not know each other there, the computers seem to act one just like limps black and their operations can truly be checked, simply by knowing the entries and by comparing the exits awaited with the noted exits. Since the vote is secret, the entries of the elections and the exits awaited are not known, in order to be compared with the electoral results. Thus, the electoral results cannot be checked by the human ones!

For this reason certain people think that the e-voting is by nature open to a broad series of undetectable frauds.

Defraud via the procurations

Another method consists in knowing voters who will be absent the day of the election and who did not make a procuration to vote. There it is then enough to make false procurations for these people, but it is necessary to be sure that these voters there will not return to vote. It was the case at the time of the election of an municipal election with Chateaurenard, one of the voters presumedly absent returned all the same especially to vote, what a was not its surprise to discover that he had already voted!

Some cases emblematic

France

With each election, the constitutional council cancels several votes for irregularity.

Fraud for the period “French Algeria”

(unfortunately plausible rumors)

The plebiscite of the fastening of Nice and Savoy in France

There were serious cases of fraud at the time of the plebiscites of the fastening of Nice and the Savoy: military and civil occupation of Nice and Savoy by the French authority before the plebiscite; organization of the plebiscite by the authority French, alone main of the inscriptions on the electoral rolls and all grounds for appeal; faking of the electoral rolls; absences of bulletin " non" ; certain communes in Savoy were found with more voters than inhabitants; false official results… Moreover Napoleon III, emperor of French at the time, was known “to turn to its advantage” the elections and referenda. Moreover, the results of the two plebiscites (bordering 100% in favor of fastening in France) throw the doubt about the regluarity of the polls.

Ukraine

In 2004, the electoral fraud involved big demonstrations of street, the Orange revolution. The second turn of the presidential election was reorganized the December 26th 2004.

the United States

the presidential elections in particular of 1960, 2000 and 2004 were the theater of several irregularities, proven in 1960, supposed in 2000 and 2004. In 2000, the proclamation of the results was deferred in the state of Florida.

Ivory Coast

the revision of the code of nationality in 1995 made it possible to draw aside the principal opponent.

Italy

The Electoral system with preferences multiple ordinates was diverted.

Quebec

At the time of the referendum on the sovereignty of Quebec of 1995, several cases of fraud were pled.

See too

External bonds

  • the sincerity of the poll (re-examined French constitutional council)

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