Electoral Cutting

Within the framework of a Vote, the regrouping of the voters represents an element which can be decisive, and always very sensitive. That is well-known since Roman Antiquity with the vote of the Comices tributes. When the base of the regrouping is geographical (Circonscription S electoral), this regrouping is the electoral cutting .

Introduction

In a democratic system, ideal cutting electoral gives to all the voters an equivalent weight, which means two things:

initially and obviously, that the number of elected officials of a district must be proportional to the population of this district,
but also that, all things being equal, the party which obtains the most voice also obtains the most stations.

The first element is relatively easy to control, but it is always much more difficult to correct: the population evolves/moves gradually, and the political system resists the adjustments made necessary. Thus, England of the XIXe century spent it several decades to regulate the scandal of the “rotted Bourgs” (following the Industrial revolution, of the rural regions completely depopulated by the Rural migration designated several deputies whereas the new great industrial centers like Liverpool or Manchester had only one of them). In France, in 2005, the constitutional council has claimed for several years a recutting, because the last one goes back to 1986; all the governments push back the expiry.

The second element is also controllable overall, and the come to power of a party which would have obtained appreciably less voice than its adversary would cause a major crisis. On the other hand, it is more difficult to control in the details, and it is always possible to justify small variations. However, in reality, the distribution of the voters by group preferably is not homogeneous: the majority of the zones are known to vote way rather.

Electoral cutting is thus a delicate exercise, but which, carried out astutely, can allow the politicians with the capacity to improve their chances of success: one then speaks about gerrymandering or about saucissonnage electoral .

The voters can be very sensitive to this aspect, at the point to simply sanction the government because of cutting. But they are the elected officials who are most concerned: the current elected officials are very attentive with the evolution of their district of origin. The governments are thus always very careful, which explains the sometimes scandalous time of taking into account of the demographic trends. The solution is often to increase the number of elected officials, in order to never seemingly not reduce the weight of an area and not to dissatisfy the current elected officials.

That results from a deliberate choice of the person in charge of cutting, or simply from a not corrected natural evolution, the most important concept is that of electoral stronghold : concentration of voters of a party in a zone, which ensures (almost) in all circumstances that this party will obtain an elected official there. The effect of a stronghold is complex, it is composed of three nonconcordant effects:

the insurance for the party to obtain at least an elected official,
but, conversely, a certain reduction of the chances for the party to obtain elected officials in the remainder of the zone.
a political weight of the holder of the stronghold: ensured to be always elected, it is essential more easily against the competitors of the same party but which are not likely to hold a stronghold. That counts in the progression within the party, that also counts when it is the adversary which is with the capacity, and that counts much in next cutting: the elected official is in position to howl with the butchery and the chicanery if one touches with his district in a way which is not appropriate to him.

Thus,

in the zones where the adversary is in any event majority, it is interesting to have electoral strongholds, which balance the results and cancel the unfavourable advantage.
on the contrary, in the zones where one is majority, it is interesting to homogenize the results and thus not to constitute strongholds. However, it is necessary to take into account the influence of the elected officials of the party, which, them, will may find it beneficial to ensure their future election while having a stronghold.
moreover, it is necessary to take account of instabilities of the electorate: if, on average, a zone is favorable to a party, there exist always small evolutions around this average with each election. The strongholds are always much less sensitive to these evolution than the little marked zones.

All in all, the governments thus tend to constitute strongholds: it is their interest for the unfavourable zones, and it is a result of the influence of the elected officials who support them.

For example in a zone which must elect two deputies and who counts 94 “round” voters and 106 “square” voters

the “square” party has interest with the existence of two similar districts, cash 47 voters “round” and 53 “square” voters, which ensures two elected officials to him. It will be noted that the square party does not gain anything with a small evolution in its favor (it has already the maximum), whereas the round party preserves the possibility of reversing the situation.
the “round” party has interest with the existence of two dissimilar districts, two strongholds, for example the first cash 54 “round” voters and 46 “square” voters, which ensures an elected official to him, and the second cash 40 “round” voters and 60 “square” voters, which leaves a lost district inevitably acquired with the square party. In this case, one needs a movement of very great width to make rock one of the two strongholds.

Handling of the electoral map

The gerrymandering is possible in all the electoral systems based on an election in districts, that it is majority or proportional (when there are few seats to provide by district). However, its effectiveness is reinforced, as we will see it in our example, in the elections with the majority poll, uninominal majority poll with two turns French but especially first past the post Anglo-Saxon. One can say that a poll proportional with more than 5 seats being provided eliminates all the risks from gerrymandering.

There are two techniques (by supposing that one does not benefit from the variations of populations between districts, either because of legal impossibilities, or because of the political risks):

in the favorable zones, one homogenizes by the technique of the “Camembert cheese”, which makes resemble all the districts a small-scale model of the zone (for example a piece of downtown area, a piece of suburbs, a piece of countryside). Thus, one maximizes the chances of a “full paperboard”: to obtain all the deputies of the zone,
on the contrary, in the unfavourable zones, one sets up a very typified cutting (for example a district full with HLM and working cities, and a rural district with the easy suburbs).

The gerrymandering is often indicated by the American word gerrymandering , word bag formed of the name of Elbridge Gerry, governor of the Massachusetts who used this technique in 1812 in the objective to support the left democrat-republican, and of the English word salamander (salamander), the cutting carried out by the aforementioned governor resembling a salamander on a chart.

The most equitable cutting

These two systems make it possible to represent the majorities most equitably possible:

the system where all the districts are in the same way made up (homogeneous cutting of the districts). Thus a party which would obtain 51% would have 51% of the voices in 100% of the districts (and would gain all the seats) and the election would resemble a majority list system national.
the system where one represents all the tendencies by gathering a certain category in a certain number of districts which correspond to its manpower (cutting of homogeneous districts). Thus a party which would obtain 51% would have 100% of the voices in 51% of the districts (and would have thus a small majority) and the election would resemble a list system proportional national.

These two systems are both utopian, and often cutting is a mixture of those. Indeed most of the time the gaining party has much more seats than of voice, but it has however seldom more than 75% of the seats.

In all the cases, one can note that handling consists in mixing these two systems by applying for its own party system 1 (thus one as much as possible increases the number of districts likely to be gained of accuracy) and for the opposing party system 2 (by ensuring one to him crushing majority in few districts)

Fictitious examples

These examples detail all the problems of the poll by districts, and the paradoxes which result from it. In all the examples, cutting respects the population.

Majority of the seats opposed in the majority of the voices

These examples show that with a particular cutting, the majority party in voice can obtain less districts, and that a definitely minority party can despite everything have a majority of it.

Example 1: majority Poll

We imagine the territory of Gerryland:

|} The country prepares with an election during which it must elect 5 deputies. It counts 500.000 voters, of which 60% prefer the opposition (in blue) and 40% the capacity (in red). There are thus 3 partisans of the opposition for 2 of the majority. Moreover, the constitution obliges the legislator to respect a perfect equity between the districts, which have all 100.000 voters. The capacity thus draws 2 districts stronghold for the opposition, where it gathers most of its partisans, and draws with the remainder of the territory 3 districts which are acquired to him.

Example 2: Poll proportional

|} The constitution of the country lays out that the country is divided into five districts, which send each one 3 deputies, the districts having to be of equal size. The partisans of the capacity (red) are 45%. They are thus outdistanced of 10 points by the opposition, which controls 55% of the votes. Once again, the cutting of the districts reveals another majority, with 8 deputies from the red party and 7 of the blue party.

Example 3: majority Poll combined with the abstention

The majority poll is nevertheless much more dangerous, as this simulation shows it:

A fictitious country of 1.000.000 habitans is divided into 100 districts of 10.000 inhabitants each one. It is directed by a government which privileges a minority of 127.551 inhabitants, and disadvantages crushing it majority. The government, very unpopular, carries out cutting most advantageous possible.
Lors of the elections, 499.900 inhabitants (~50%) lost any confidence in the policy and abstain from (the abstention is equal in each district). Being given that the majority of the population (500 100 hab.) voted, the election is not invalidated. Therefore, with the election, 372.549 (74,5%) inhabitants (vote for the coalition of the opposition, and 127.551 (25,5%) for the party of gouvernement.
Mais, thanks to the cutting of the circonsciriptions, the governing party obtains 2501 votes (out of 5001, therefore majority) in 51 districts (2501 X 51 = 127.551), and any in the 49 others. The coalition of the opposition, it, obtains all the voices in 49 districts, and 2500 votes (beaten accuracy) in the 51 others (5001 X 49 + 2500 X 51 = 372.549).

Thus, a party which is not majority but has more than 12,5% of the registered voters or 25% of the votes cast can, thanks to a skilful cutting, to obtain more than 50% of the seats and thus to keep the majority. Without need to recourrir with the electoral fraud or a system of " borough pourri". The injustice is even more obvious if the opposition is divided as it is very often the case (with a system of first past the post the party can have only one relative majority and beat the opposition, strong but divided).
Cela shows that the majority system is dangerous because it can support 1/4 of the voters to the detriment of crushing the majority (3/4). It is necessary thus that a party obtains more than 75% of the voices (what is almost impossible) to be sure to have the majority. This case is obviously extrème and has very few chances to be carried out, but the possible hazard exists.

This example is drawn from concrete cases: with the the United States, with 1876,1988 and 2000 the presidential elections, the democrats, although majority in voice, were beaten with the Great Electors because of the state division.

The favorisation of the regional parties

The Vote by districts supports, with equality of votes, a party established in a precise area:

A fictitious country of 1.000.000 voters is divided into 100 districts of 10.000 inhabitants each one. This country with a strong regional tradition: in particular the area X (which counts 34 districts) is very attached to its identity. To the legislative elections arise in particular the party has (not-regionalistic) and the regionalistic party X.
Donc, with these elections, the party has and party X obtain both 195.000 votes (either 19,5%). But, whereas the party has its voices réprties in the whole country and has thus much evil to obtain districts, the patrti X had voice only in its area, where it thus has an average of 57,4%.
Ainsi, the party has obtained with much difficulty 2 seats, whereas party X obtained in its area 30 seats out of 34.

The problem of the Abstention

Even with a cutting where each district has the same number of inhabitants, the principle " a man, a voix" can be distorted by the phenomenon of the abstention:

A fictitious country of 1.000.000 inhabitants is divided into 100 districts of 10.000 inhabitants each one. At the time of the legislative elections, 9000 inhabitants of district 1 abstain from whereas in district 2, all the inhabitants votent.
Le result is that in the district 1,1000 votes are worth a deputy whereas in the district 2,10 000 votes are worth a député.
Ainsi, a voice of an inhabitant of district 2 is worth 10 votes of district 1.

This example shows that with a levelling cutting, the areas abstentionnists are favoured.

See too

References

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