Dispatch of Ems

The candidature for the throne of Spain of the prince Léopold de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, sought by the Spanish putchists around the marshal Prim who exiled the queen Isabelle in 1868, causes the opposition of France of Napoleon III, which sees a dangerous diplomatic surrounding there (prince Léopold will say itself publicly (cf Gedanken und Frinnerungen von Otto v. Bismarck - Stuttgart 1898 ) that “ in Madrid, it would never have forgotten that it was above all, a Prussian prince ”). The reactions of imperial France and the negotiations with Guillaume Ier of Prussia, chief of the Hohenzollern house, in February 1870, lead rather easily to a withdrawal of the prince. But at the end of June 1870, the chancellor Bismarck reactivates this candidature and public the July 2nd makes it, to push France with the diplomatic fault.

At once in France the opposition ignites, constant by the press. All the press unanimous and is unchained. The publications of the republican opposition which had required and just obtained Olivier government, two weeks earlier, the reduction of 10.000 men of the quota, are not the least virulent. The tone goes up and the duke of Gramont, Minister French for the Foreign affairs, makes a provocative speech on July 6th, 1870 in front of the legislative Body. By his direct diplomacy, Napoleon III obtains the support of the tsar of Russia and several other courses European. The king of the Belgians Léopold II writing with his brother-in-law prince Léopold: “ the refusal of the throne of Spain is the only means of avoiding the war and this act of abnegation would be worth you the recognition of whole Europe . ”

In Berlin, the Secretary of State von Thil, claims all to be unaware of and know where to join Bismarck. The July 9th the Ambassador of France, the count Benedetti goes to Ems, where the king of Prussia takes water and requests it to speak with his/her relative. The July 12th the father of the prince announces itself the official withdrawal. Bismarck had decided, to make obstacle with Benedetti, to join the king and had made him announce its nearest arrival with Ems. Caught on the wrong foot Bismarck cancels its voyage in Ems, and addresses at once a message to Guillaume Ier threatening to resign if the king receives Benedetti once again. All could be calmed. But in Paris, the opponents of all edges push Gramont and Emile Olivier to request from Benedetti a final renouncement of the Spanish throne on behalf of the king of Prussia.

The July 13rd morning, the ambassador requests a new audience. Guillaume Ier accosts it with the walk of the Sources. Benedetti presents the request for final renouncement to him. Guillaume Ier is exceeded but remains polished and adds “ know You more than me. When I know the conditions of the renouncement, I will re-examine you .” What will not prevent it from cordially greeting Benedetti as of the following day, with its departure for Berlin.

Guillaume makes the very same day send July 13rd by his Abeken diplomatic adviser a dispatched telegram of Ems to Bismarck in Berlin. It is a summary of what was said. And freedom is left in Bismarck make an official announcement of it, to perhaps alleviate France. Bismarck seizes occasion to turn over the situation. It condenses the text of the telegram of Abeken in insolents terms. In its Thought and Memories (appeared in Stuttgart in 1898) Bismarck gives the following details:

In Berlin, Bismarck dines with the Moltke generals, chief of the armies and Roon, Minister for the war. The meal proceeds without spirit. The trap was thwarted and, supreme affront, a Parisian newspaper titrates on first " page; Prussia duck! ". Bismarck seriously plans to resign, which attracts to him the reproaches bitter of its two generals who feel abandoned.

It is 6 p.m. when the quantified dispatch of Abeken arrives.

Bismarck reads it with its guests. Then he asks Moltke if the army would be ready to enter to shift and if he believes possible to overcome France. Moltke known as unquestionable of a victory against France and specifies that, if there is a war, it is much more advantageous to begin it as soon as possible. The army is ready; to wait, it is to give to France time to seize again itself.

Then Bismarck writes a version " condensée" (according to its own terms) of the dispatch:

In its Gedanken und Frinnerungen (T II, p.91 & Thoughts and memories, T II p.108 & 109) , Bismarck precise:

" I read with my two hosts the drafting which condensed the dispatch. Moltke made the note: then: “ Voilà which sounds differently now; previously one had believed to intend to be beating wildly, now it is like a brass band in answer to a provocation. (So hat das einen andern Klang, vorher klang be wie Chamade, jetzt wie einen Fanfare in Antwort auf eine Herausforderung) ” I believed duty to add this: “ This text does not bring aucunes modifications, nor aucunes additions with the dispatch. If, carrying out the mandate of His Majesty, I communicate it at once to the newspapers, and if moreover I telegraph it with all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight. Non only by what he says, but also by the way of which he will have been répandu, he will produce over there on the Gallic bull the effect of the red flag (Eindruck rothen Tuches auf den gallischen Stier machen)… Success depends however above all on the impressions which the origin of the war will cause on our premises and at the others. Il is essential that we are the attaqués (be STI wichtig, dass to wir die Angegrissenen seien). "

One could not be clear any more.

It is noticed that the Prussian term “ Adjutant ”, employed by the king and Bismarck, means “ aide-de-camp ” (according to Littré, French “ assistance” comes from Latin “ adjutum ”).

The text of Bismarck, immediately diffused in Berlin by the German agency Wolf, is taken again and retransmis at once by the Berliner office of the French agency Havas - and it is in this form that the news will appear in the French newspapers of the following day: (Text extracted from the War of 70 - Paris 1970 I p. 105 ):

" Berlin, July 13rd - One mande of Ems. After the renunciation of prince Léopold de Hohenzollern had been communicated of the French government by the Spanish government, the ambassador of France again required His Majesty the authorization to make known in Paris that for all the future, Its Majesty the King began not to give its authorization more, if Hohenzollern reconsidered their candidature. On top, Its Majesty the King refused to once again receive the ambassador and made him say by the adjudant of service which Its Majesty did not have anything any more to communicate to him.

According to other information coming from Ems, the King would have made say to Benedetti which it would have highly approved the renunciation of his cousin of the throne of Spain and which it consequently regarded any subject of conflict as isolated. "

This dispatch of Havas is 3rd and last version of the dispatch of Ems.

But more especially, it is the only one which will be made public to France.

However, it should be noted that the writer of the dispatch of Havas, took very (too much) great freedoms with the text of Bismarck. Two terms are inaccurate in the dispatch of Havas: required and adjudant .

- L' ambassador forever nothing " exigé" , but asked an audience by protocol;

- When with adjudant, it is about a coarse fault of translation. It is difficult to believe that a professional could make " accidentellement" such an enormous lapse. In fact it was about prince Radziwill.

Whereas the text of Bismarck, for insolate that it was, did not exceed the limits of the " diplomatically correct" , the expression " to prevent by the adjudant of service " is fundamentally insulting. Its employment surprises more especially as it is about an extreme subject of topicality, which envenime very strongly for a week the relations free-Prussians with a serious risk of conflict. What no one is not unaware of, French journalists in station in Berlin even less than whoever.

Finally the last subparagraph of the dispatch of Havas retransmet curiously information, rigorously exact, but which does not appear in the " condensé" diffused by Bismarck: " the King would have highly approved the renunciation of his/her cousin of the throne of Spain and consequently regarded any subject of conflict as isolated . " How the writer of Havas was informed, and also quickly, of this information which is known only of some initiates (Guillaume and its advisers, Benedetti and probably Bismarck)? To note with the passage which she testifies to as much better to goodwill and Prussian pacifism - and with contrario, of the French warmongering which she is diffused by a French agency…

Certain authors question themselves if they are really mistranslations. Possibly intentional (in the War of 1870, T.I p.105 ). It should be noted that Bismarck, like the totality of its entourage and of the Prussian municipal officials, practiced our language to perfection…

The dispatch of Havas diffused in France by all the press is a snub. It pays, publicly (" … but also by the way in which it will have been spread,… " cf Bismarck), that the king of Prussia insulted our ambassador coarsely, the official representative of our Country, therefore France.

Chancelleries of the other countries, them (future) " Neutres" but also the other German States (future allies), will not receive the dispatch of Havas under the insulting terms. At best, the ambassador of Prussia will communicate the condensed dispatch of Bismarck to them, which certainly plank the insolence, but whose one could not offusquer at the point start a conflict. (" success depends however above all on the impressions which the origin of the war will cause on our premises and at the others. It is essential that we are attacked the " cf Bismarck).

On a French public opinion heated with white for several days, the fallacious formulation of Havas will cause the explosion.

And on July 19th, 1870, plugged, submerged, carried, by unconscious powerful orators supported by bawlers imbeciles of all edges, and where the press carries a very heavy share of responsibility (" If Prussia refuses to fight, still wrote the newspaper Freedom on July 15th, will force we it with blows of stick in the back to pass by again the Rhine and to empty the left bank "), the government of Emile Olivier will state a war which it knew, neither to envisage, nor to prepare.

See too

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