Definite description

A definite description is an expression of the form X , in which X is a common noun or a nominal phrase describing a precise individual or object, and only one. For example: the first monkey of space , the 42e president of the United States. Defined description, unlike the proper name, does not name an object, but affirms that there exists one and only one object which satisfies this description.

Russell developed the idea of description defined in the article One denoting , in opposition to the philosophy of the language frégéenne. Frege distinguishes the direction and the denotation from an expression. The denotation is the object which the expression indicates, whereas the direction is the way in which it indicates it. Russell, on the contrary, considers that a definite description does not have any direction (Russell employs " signification"), and has only sometimes a denotation. Definite descriptions have a significance only in one complete proposal. In a general way, it is the distinction itself between direction and denotation which poses problem, according to Russell.

Difficulties raised by definite descriptions

Two types of difficulties of the division of descriptions can be announced:

there are many examples where a definite description does not seem to refer to a reality such as required, like, for example, the man is an animal , or the sentences in the plural.
certain descriptions do not have the form X : for example, my book can be reformulated: the book of me .

The nominal group the current king de France is the traditional example of nonsatisfied defined description (i.e without denotation in the real-world). It comes from an example due to Bertrand Russell and which, as a paradox, raises the questions of the third excluded, of the denotation, and well of others.

(1) the current king de France east bald person .

Since France does not have a king, the problem which installation is to know if such a statement is true, false or stripped of direction. The statement cannot be true, since it does not have a king. But if it is false, that supposes that its negation is true, i.e. current king de France has hair is true.

Russell analyzes the statement thus:

there is X such as this X is king de France;
it there not of there, being different from X there, such as this is the king of France there (in other words, X is the alone king de France);
X is bald person.

This analysis being made, it is easy to see that the conjunction of these atoms is false, since the first term is false. The principle of the excluded third is thus saved, since it is not question of saying that current king de France is neither bald person nor not-bald person, but that current king de France does not exist.

This analysis raised some objections; for example P.F. Strawson estimates that Russell denatured the direction of the statement of origin. For Strawson, indeed, if there does not exist king of France, the sentence (1) is neither true nor distorts, it is unspecified from the point of view of its value of truth. And accordingly, for as much, the problem does not arise in terms of violation of the logical law of third-excluded; it is that above all, the statement of (1) is inappropriate .

With what does serve the theory as descriptions?

Ontological stakes

The fundamental stake is very simple to include/understand: about what does speak one? To which realities does refer one? With what can indeed serve well a proposal which does not indicate anything, whereas it has a direction? the current king de France east bald person can have a direction, just as names without referent (Unicorn, and why not God) can form gifted proposals for a direction. Several solutions are possible:

these referent proposals with non-existent objects (thus, it seems, which have a non-existent reality);
or they referent with concepts;
or many proposals for this kind actually is badly formed and that they thus do not have a direction (i.e they are neither true nor false);
or the solution of Russell, which avoids at the same time the reality of non-existent and to recognize proposals stripped of direction.

Indeed, if we follow the analysis of Russell, an existential proposal for a negative form, such as current king de France does not exist , can be analyzed in two manners:

It is not true that there exists an individual who is the king of France
the king of France does not exist

The second analysis is contradictory because it is necessary that the king of France exists to say that there does not exist. Whereas the first analysis does not need to suppose the existence of an entity. She says only that nothing exists which has the property to be a king de France. The first analysis will thus be retained by Russell, since it makes it possible to save the recourse to referents of which he showed uselessness, and consequently, to avoid difficulties Métaphysique S which are due only to one bad interpretation of the language. No need to distinguish two types of existence (the existence and subsistence, for Meinong) to speak about the non-existent entities.

Stakes epistemological

The distinction between the proper names and definite descriptions is parallel to another distinction, that between knowledge by " acquaintance" and knowledge by description. To give a name to a thing, it is necessary to be in direct contact with this thing. It is thus possible to give a proper name to the people or to the things which one had, or which one currently has experience. In this case, the existence of the named thing is indubitable.

It is in addition possible to know the objects of which we do not have direct experience by description. Socrat, for example, is known for us only like the Master of Plato. Many of other proper names are also defined descriptions, masked behind this name. In this case, the existence of the object described is not certain. We rest only on the testimony of others.

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