Countryside of the Solomon Islands

The Campagne of the Solomon Islands is the first operation amphibian launched by the Allies during the Guerre in the Pacific during the Second world war and which was launched in between August 1942, eight month after the Attaque on Pearl Harbor.

The general objectives of the countryside, which was installation quickly and with limited means, were the security of the lines of communication threatened between the the United States, the Australia and the New Zealand, lines which were vital for the future operations in the Southern and South-western Pacific.

The countryside was held on a going territory of the the Solomon Islands to the New Guinea between August 1942, when the Marines unloaded on Guadalcanal, and fine 1943, when the Japanese base of Rabaul was isolated from its bases and was cut its lines of supply.

The campaign was conducted by the combined forces of the command of the South-western Pacific and of the Pacific Center, and implied several important unloadings, a dozen naval battles and many air raids.

Context

Operation Watchtower

Advanced Japanese

The countryside of Guadalcanal, the first daring offensive amphibian launched by the United States, began in August 1942, eight month after the Attaque on Pearl Harbor. The objective of this countryside, which was installation quickly with limited means, was the first stage of a strategy aiming at making safe the lines of communication allied between the Australia and the New Zealand, vital to ensure the success of the future operations allied in the south and the south-west of the Pacifique. Advance of the Japanese. Dabs the months which followed the Attaque on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese benefitted from the advantage that this surprised attack had conferred to them to invade the Asia is, the Indies and the Mélanésie during the first six months of 1942. The stages of this expansion were Wake, Guam, Singapore, Bataan, Corregidor and the the Indies Dutchwomen.

The advance of the Japanese towards the south started with the catch of Rabaul on January 23rd, 1942, then Bougainville, in the the Solomon Islands, two months later. Rabaul was an important base which was useful at the same time basic advanced protecting the naval Base from Truk and of starting point for the following offensives towards the south. Bougainville, as well as the other less important positions in Solomon, was a starting point to establish a corner in the lines of communication between Hawaii and the Australia and the New Zealand.

Having established positions on the northern coast of the New Guinea, like Choiseul, Lavella Calved and the islands of the Treasury in Solomon, the Japanese took Tulagi and its port the May 4th 1942, which became thus the southern point of the Japanese projection.

The island had been evacuated by the Australian ones at the beginning of May, but those had for a long time established on the islands of the observation posts which were maintained, and which would be quite useful later.

Initial engagements

The only battle having taken place during the catch of Solomon by the Japanese took place on this occasion: within the framework of the Battle of the Coral sea, Task force 17 of the vice admiral Frank Fletcher, made up around the aircraft carrier '' Yorktown '', surprised the force amphibian Japanese woman concentrated in Tulagi and ran the destroyer Kikutsuki like some smaller ships, damaging the destroyer Yuzuki and the cruiser Okinoshima (which was run one week later by an American submarine).

The Japanese did not develop any airport initially, though the plains of Guadalcanal, to 25 kilometers in the south of Tulagi, offered an excellent ground for this purpose. All the initial efforts of the Japanese tended to develop the port of Tulagi. It is only in June that the Japanese unloaded in Guadalcanal, and of work of development of an aerodrome were started at the end of June.

Though the exact plans of the Japanese are still dubious at present, the presence of the Japanese in the Solomon Islands gave them the capacity to strike Australia, New Guinea and the New Hebrides.

Shortly after the fall of Rabaul, whereas the south-western axis of the development of the Japanese conquests seemed obvious, the Allies started to develop plans in order to slow down or stop this advance.

Development of the Allied strategy

In February 1942, the admiral Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief of the American Fleet, traced the broad outlines of the strategy Alliée during a correspondence with the chief of staff of the American Army, the general Marshall. According to King, the action of Allied was not to be limited to protect the lines from communication, but they were to also establish bases, in particular with Tonga and Espiritu Santo, from which offensives could be gone up against Solomon and New Guinea. It thus considered the occupation of certain islands in the south and in the south-west of the Pacific in a continuation of operation amphibians which would be carried out by the Marines , the army would undertake to maintain garrisons on the conquered islands while the Navy would pass to the following objective.

The occupation of certain strategically important islands began the March 12th, when a mixed force marine-army unloaded without opposition to Noumea, the capital of the New Caledonia in the south of Solomon. While Noumea became a naval base Alliée, an important airport was installed on Tontouta, a close island. March 29th, the Marines unloaded with Port-Villa, capital of Vanuatu, in the north of New Caledonia, and in May, Espiritu Santo was occupied by a combined force of Marines, Seabees of the marine and army ( seabee , which means “bees of sea”, corresponds in fact to the English pronunciation of the letters CB , abbreviation of Construction Batallions ).

Whereas these deployments took place, the fleets American and Japanese were opposed within the framework of the Bataille of the Coral sea, a few days after the unloading of Japanese with Tulagi.

Though this battle was not a great victory, it forced the Japanese to delay the invasion of Port Moresby and the New Guinea.

However, the plans of the admiral King for the southern Pacific started to be set up. In April, the 1e Division of Marines was sent to Wellington for the future operations.

New developments

In June, the Americans realized of the developments to Guadalcanal, namely creation of an aerodrome in the plains of the point of Lunga . This gave a certain urgency to the American plans in Solomon.

In addition, the Battle of Midway, on June 5th, 1942, had subjected the Japanese marine of terrible losses, such as the imbalance of the forces created by the Attaque on Pearl Harbor was some reduced.

This decisive advantage did not escape the general MacArthur, who suggested an immediate attack on Rabaul. This suggestion was however not retained, the Americans felt reluctant to risk their last aircraft carriers in a gamble implying of the operations in an environment confined under the constant threat of Japanese air bases.

However, considering the success of Midway, the combined staff ( Chiefs Joint off Staff ) reconsidered the strategy allied in the Pacific.

Until there, the strategy of the United States and Great Britain had been to concentrate on the Germany and Europe, the Japan coming only as a second and the efforts to be related to the Pacifique theater having to be only those strictly necessary to contain Japan. Within the framework of this strategy, no offensive had been envisaged before the end 1942, any former operation having to have for goal to maintain the lines of communication between the Allies. The catch of Noumea and Espiritu Santo belonged to this defensive strategy.

The success of Midway, of which it seemed normal to profit, and the fact that the pressure of the Japanese seemed to be accentuated, pushed King to be reiterated its preceding councils, namely an offensive in Solomon in order to stop the establishment of what seemed to become, with Rabaul, an impregnable citadel. He recommended the occupation of the islands Santa Cruz, Tulagi and the adjacent zones, with establishment of garrisons of the Australian army. He proposed like goes back to offensive on August 1st, 1942.

Whereas King considered an operation of the Navy, the Marshall general, on his side, estimated that MacArthur was to control the operation. This master key of weapons between Marshall and King highlights the tensions which could exist between the various weapons of the armed forces (situation that very armed, including that of Japan, knew). King insisted on the fact that the troops in charge of the operation would be in fact of the troops of the Navy. Ultimately, King had win and the operation was entrusted to Nimitz.

In fact, the zones of influence of the various weapons in the Pacific were redrawn, since the zone Pacifique South was created, under the orders of Nimitz and entrusted to the vice admiral Robert L. Ghormley.

Planning of the attack of Solomon

June 25th, Ghormley accepted the first instructions relating to the organization of an offensive in its sector. It was to start to establish plans, holding account owing to the fact that the participation of the army could not be completely acquired (and indeed it will be seen that to Guadalcanal, the army entered the operation only three months after the invasion by the Marines ).

Four days later, the Vandegrift general, general of Navy , were also informed to have to make fast preparations for an operation on Solomon.

Ghormley was to direct the operation, while the vice admiral Frank Fletcher would order it. July 4th, the plan of the staff interarmes was sent to Ghormley which thus made confronted with the double problem to have to assemble an operation within one apparently unrealistic month, with means which seemed completely insufficient.

The orders of the staff exposed in general terms the strategy of the moment in the southern and south-western Pacific: the ultimate goal was the conquest of the New Britain, the New Ireland and the New Guinea. This goal was to be reached in three phases: first of all occupation of the islands Santa Cruz, Tulagi and of the adjacent zones, then the catch of the remainder of the the Solomon Islands, finally the catch of Rabaul.

The date of the launching of the first part of the plan (Tulagi) was fixed at August 1st, under the responsibility of CinCPac ( Commander in Chief Pacific , i.e. Nimitz) while the following stages (together of Solomon and Rabaul), MacArthur would be the person in charge.

Means set up

Ghormley having expressed its doubts about the sufficiency of the means placed at its disposal, one assure him that 35 bombers based in Hawaii would be available. However, Ghormley and MacArthur were of hard agreement a point: the success of the naval operation would partly depend on the capacity of the army to protect the force from invasion against Japanese aviation.

Meanwhile, the general Alexander Vandegrift was on the way towards Wellington with the 1st division of Marines , which was not complete besides, having been private of a third of his manpower detached with the Samoa.

From the point of view of the naval power at its disposal, Ghormley could count on a still limited fleet, but of good quality: primarily three aircraft carriers with approximately 250 planes on board, some cruisers, two new battleships (more of the secondary ships such as destroyers).

From the point of view of the air force, one of the points considered to be vital by Ghormley, the situation was far from being also good: in addition to the 250 embarked planes, Ghormley could count on 166 planes from the Navy, 95 of the Army and 30 of the air force of New Zealand. These 291 planes were under the command of against admiral John McCain, under the orders of Ghormley.

In short, Ghormley had a force of invasion well trained of less than one division, a powerful and well trained but limited Fleet and of an air support rather limited.

Ghormley organized its forces in three groups:

Initials

(CV=Porte-avions; Light CVL=Porte-avions; BB=Cuirassé; Heavy CA=Croisor; Light CL=Croisor; DD=Destroyer; SS=Sous-marin )

While the organization was set up, the date of invasion was moved back at August 7th, because of the bad weather.

Information

From the point of view of the information, the invasion of Guadalcanal and Tulagi can be described like an attempt with the blind man: one was unaware of almost all, at the time when the orders were given at the beginning of July, of the forces present on these islands or even of the simple correct cartography of the islands. The Allies made enormous efforts during the 4 weeks which remained to them to collect information, in particular of people having lived on these islands, but at the time of the invasion, it remained enormously of white in their knowledge, and the Marines on the spot would on the occasion to note that their charts were not always exact.

Logistic problems and realization

The preparation of the operation, already extremely reduced in time, encountered various problems. The Marines would carry 60 days of supply, a limited quantity of ammunition, the minimum of personal luggage and only half of the motorized machines normally planned for a division.

July 26th, the various forces envisaged made appointment with broad of the Fiji and the commanders concerned with the operation held a conference during which certain points were raised for the first time.

Vandegrift learned for example that it would not have the naval and air support which it hoped for. In fact, he even learned that he would have in theory only two days to unload the whole of the troops and the material, whereas he estimated that four days were necessary.

It will be seen that the whole of these circumstances determined the way in which Vandegrift had to behave during the first weeks on Guadalcanal.

With 3:10, on August 7th, the American forces were in position in the west of course Espérance. With 6:14, the fleet opened fire on the islands, the invasion could start.

First phase: the conquest of Solomon is

The unloading on Tulagi was almost a formality: the island was conquered in one day.

The Bataille of Guadalcanal lasted 6 months during which the Americans and the Japanese fought at the same time on ground and sea, to bring new troops on the island and to supply them.

The fight on sea was less intense than on ground: the navy Japanese woman and allied was opposed during the Bataille of the island of Savo, the Bataille of Solomon Eastern, the Bataille of the Cape Espérance, the Bataille of the islands Santa Cruz, the naval Bataille of Guadalcanal, the Bataille of Tassafaronga and the Bataille of the island of Rennell.

The countryside of Guadalcanal cost 24 000 men with the Japanese (of which 9 000 died of Malnutrition and Malaria) against only 1 600 with the Americans. If the belligerents underwent losses in the planes and about equivalent warships, the Japanese are unable to replace their losses.

The Americans have nothing any more but one aircraft carrier: the Enterprise, and the following months will be difficult for the Allies. It was however the first breach in the perimeter which Japan had established in the first six months of the war and the proof that from now on the Allies had the initiative. The reconquest could now begin.

Sources

History off U.S. Marine Body, Operations in World War II, Volume I: Exchange Pacific Drive, by Lieutenant Colonel Frank O. Hough, USMCR, Major Verle E. Ludwig, USMC, Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Body, 1966, Share 6 - The turning not, Guadalcanal
History off U.S. Marine Body, Operations in World War II, Volume II: Insulation off Rabaul, by Henry I. Shaw, Jr. and Major Douglas T. Kane, USMC, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Body, 1966, Share 6 - The turning not, Guadalcanal
Solomon Islands Naval Battles

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