Counter-attack of Mortain

The Counter-attack of Mortain , code name Liege operation (in German Lüttich) , is an offensive of the German army during the Bataille of Normandy, on the right side of the Alliées forces. It was held of the 7 to the 13 August 1944 in the area of Mortain.
The name Lüttich (Liege in German), refers to a similar offensive that the general Ludendorff had launched on this Belgian city, during the First World War, exactly thirty years before.

Context

After the Unloading of Normandy of the June 6th 1944, the battle enlise for two months (what one called the “Bataille of the Hedges” in reference to the Norman Bocage where it unrolls, favorable ground with German defense with its many hedges.
The 31 July 1944, after six days of intense combat (Operation Cobra), the 3rd American army of the general Patton obtains an important victory with the bored of Avranches, opening the German face in south-west.
This unexpected success enables him to exploit immediately and strongly the opening of the German left side towards the Brittany on the one hand and, beyond, towards the East in direction of Orleans and Paris, on the other hand.

Marked by the Attack of July 20th, 1944 which saved it by miracle, Hitler, against the opinion of its staffs, only decides to impose a counter-attack.
It does not have any more any confidence in the high command of the Wehrmacht.
Its objective is to cut the entirety of the lines of communication of the army of Patton.

The extreme German left side is thus bored.
The American troops, by whole divisions, are ruent out of Normandy by a narrow corridor of ten kilometers. In only 24 hours, Patton makes cross Avranches to two armor-plated divisions and two divisions of infantry. In six days, these are twelve divisions which escape from Normandy.

Without conscience of the real state of the German units, used by two months of intensive and continual combat, Hitler orders an energetic action with the commander of the group of armies B, the Feldmarschal Von Kluge, the substitute of Rommel. The occasion is too beautiful, thinks one of Berlin.

Involved forces

The German body of battle is worn but still able to play a part in an operational counter-attack. The forces American, as for them, relatively fresh and are prepared to face the shock, are supported by an important artillery and a total aerial cover.

Allied units

The Americans are prevented several days in advance of the German offensive. This time was made profitable to reinforce defenses and to raise the tired units. VIIe (General Lawton Hakes) and XIXe American army corps (General Charles H. Corlett) are implied in this battle.
  • the the 4th division of American infantry is veteran of the Bataille of Normandy (since it unloaded with Utah Beach the June 6th 1944). The general Raymond Barton, old man of the old woman, organized his division for the attack. As the Command was prevented in advance, the unit is conveyed as fast as possible vis-a-vis the corridors planned for the 2nd Panzer and 2nd Panzer S. It is a unit holds some which acts on August 7th effectively, in particular by its artillery support. It for the moment is confined in front of Brecey.

  • the 9th division of American infantry is a powerful unit veteran. Ordered very well by the general Manton S. Eddy, cold and calculator, it faces the 84e division of infantry and 116e division armor-plated, on a favorable ground. The unit is with full power with, in support in the vicinity on its backs, the 12th regiment of the the 4th division of American infantry.

  • the 30e division of American infantry is a unit tested by more than one month of combat. It boxes large shock of the German offensive. It replaces the 1 {{Re}} division of American infantry, tired and on the way worms of other objectives more in the south, which captured Mortain two days earlier. The unit is ordered by the general L. Hobbs, who shows Olympian calm, minimizing, at least in the first hours, the power of the German offensive. The Hobbs general is quickly recalled to the order by Collins, his superior.

  • the 35e division of American infantry is a division little tested, already on the way towards Mayenne when the order of return arrived to the General Paul W. Baade, its commander. August 6th, it makes movement towards Mortain, after having passed by again Pontaubault.

  • the 3rd American armor-plated division is represented by one of its three tactical groupings ( Combat Command B ). It is a very powerful armor-plated division because it usually has two tank regiments instead of one. Its tanks are parked in the corridor of approach of the the 2nd division S Das Reich. It effectively took part in the Opération Cobra, vigorously controlled by the General Maurice Pink.

German units

The German formations implied in the offensive comprise only armor-plated divisions ( Panzerdivision ). They are placed under the command of XLVIIe Panzer Corps of the General Hans von Funck. The Wehrmacht aligns a number of armoured tanks difficult to establish, between 132 tanks and 10 guns of attack, and 180 armoured tanks. Four divisions of panzer and a division of Panzergrenadiers are committed in the counter-offensive of Mortain.
  • the 1 {{Re}} armor-plated division S ( 1. S Panzerdivision ) was withdrawn from the sector of Caen in the night from August 5th to 6th 1944.

Very worn, only two incomplete battalions of tanks, two pomegranate battalions, a group of self-supported artillery batteries, a company of the genius and a battalion of DCA are engaged, that is to say approximately a third of its means of combat. August 5th, division has 103 tanks, but those do not seem all to be engaged, because a good part remained with Caen.
  • the 2 {{E}} armor-plated division S ( 2. S Panzerdivision Das Reich ) is seriously tested by the combat of July 1944. It is the unit which was implied in the Massacre of Oradour-on-Glane and in that of Tulle.

It is reinforced by a rather weak tactical grouping ( Kampfgruppe ) composed of the remainders of the 17 {{E}} division of armor-plated pomegranates S ( 17. S Panzergrenadier Division ).
  • the 2nd German armor-plated division ( 2. Panzerdivision ) of the General Freiher von Lütwitz.

Division was stationed a long time in Pas-de-Calais in preparation for a second unloading. Brought back in the sector of Caen mid-July, it was committed moderately up to now. Its means of combat are thus complete at the beginning of the attack, and she played the central role in the offensive.
  • the 116e armor-plated division ( 116. Panzerdivision ). The unit is ordered by the General Count Schwerin, of which the chief of staff is not other than Heinz Günther Guderian, the son of the famous general Guderian. Division had been far from committed in Normandy, although presents throughout the two months preceding the opening by Avranches. Was there absence of will on behalf of the command of division? In any event, its action is very discussed.

The plan

Hitler in person conceives this limited counter-offensive. It was intended to save time (eight to ten weeks) in order to restore the situation of the Wehrmacht in rout, while being repositioned defensively on the Marne and the Sum. For this purpose, as of on August 2nd, 1944, OKW German request in VIIe armed to withdraw mobile divisions of the face ( Panzerdivision ) in order to be able to prepare the offensive.

The objective of von Kluge is to push three divisions armor-plated of Is in West, on a distance of 30 km, with for effect discounted to cut the communications of the 3rd American army. Then, in the second time, to turn the 1st American Army and to take it with reverse.

  • the 116e armor-plated division aims to follow the northern course of the Sée and to flank the operation by a firm progression towards Brecey, to reach a position in the north of Avranches.

  • In the center, the 2nd armor-plated division German must follow a road to the south of Sée by Mesnil-Adelée and push directly on Avranches.
  • In the south, the 2 {{E}} armor-plated division S has the role via Mortain, to bore by Saint-Hilaire-of-Harcouët the and to reach Ducey and Pontaubault.
  • the 1 {{Re}} armor-plated division S was to act as exploitation in the center after the initial opening.

Hitler promises additional reinforcements in the form of units coming from the south of France (the 9th armor-plated division and 708e division of infantry), but these units do not have time to arrive. They are intercepted in the south of Mortain by the advanced elements of the 3rd American army.
All the messages that the Germans via this system exchanged themselves were known immediately of Alliés.
The information was confirmed by air recognitions.

Also Omar Bradley, new ordering 12th group of armies since August 1st, 1944, can it take precautionary measures more than twenty-four hours before the German offensive. Less than one danger, this German offensive is perceived like an occasion to undoubtedly destroy the German army of Normandy. The Bradley general, discussing with an officer says to him: “It is an occasion which arises to a commander-in-chief only once per century. We are about to destroy a whole German army” . It is it to what the allied command will get busy.

Course of the battle

The initial phase does not take the Americans by surprised and allows them to turn the Germans at the time of the following phase of the battle: the Pocket of Cliff.

Initial phase - August 6th and 7th

The battle begins the August 6th 1944 in the night, without preparation of artillery. The effect of surprise was required. As it is known, they was missed, the Americans having had time to prepare. The operation starts in addition under the sign of confusion, the various states German majors contradicting mutuellement.

The operation is slowed down by multiple events and, ultimately, in the morning of the August 7th, the Germans progressed significantly only in the sector of the 2nd German armor-plated division, which hustles two companies of the 117e regiment of American infantry. The German unit achieves its goal, Mesnil-Adelée, in the course of the day. The 116e armor-plated division is stopped Net by the 39e regiment of the 9th American DI, cut off very well in a favorable ground and largely equipped in parts anti-tank device. To raise and Funck do not include/understand “ the opposition to progress ” of the Schwerin General, and replace it by Colonel Walter Rheinard. But, in spite of the actuation, the panzer do not manage to emerge. The 2nd armor-plated division S, as for it, is fixed a long moment at Mortain, before leading to the trunk road towards Saint-Hilaire-of-Harcouët the, that it does not manage to reach. The 2/120e regiment of American 30e DI (with the company K of the 3/120), approximately 700 men, camouflaged perfectly on dimension 314, remains encircled during five days without yielding an inch of ground. The position occupied by this regiment orders all the approaches of Mortain and has a point of view on all the valley. Since this position, it is possible to direct shootings of harassing of a frightening precision on division Das Reich , which obstructs all its movements. In front of this hitch, von Funck decides to engage 1st Panzer S for at least reaching Juvigny-the-Hillock. In the night, this division is strongly delayed in a procession by the crash landing of an American fighter-bomber on its column heading. Then, while progressing towards its objectives, it strikes the Tactical Grouping B (CCB) of the 3rd American armor-plated division and consequently any more does not manage to advance.

Hitler had promised three hundred planes of IIIe air fleet ( Luftflotte ) in support of the attack. Although many German hunters took off of the Paris region, the US Air Force intervenes very effectively and intercepts all the enemy formations. No air intervention of the Luftwaffe appears in the sky of Mortain.

On the contrary, the Mustang , Typhoon and allied Thunderbolt invade the airspace of the battle field as of the end of morning. Those devastate their rockets the German armor-plated columns, causing the stop of the operation in full day. The Typhoon only carry out 294 exits concentrated on the 2nd German armor-plated division. This formation is literally nailed on the spot.

The assessment of the first day of operation is considered to be weak by the German command. On the other hand, the American command is delighted fully. The pretense had played full.

Evolution of the operation - from August 8th to 13rd

The allied objective is from now on to fix these troops armor-plated sufficiently a long time so that, in a vast turning movement, Patton can cut the German retirement of VIIe armed. Hitler, as for him, is obstinated in the error. In spite of the signs of alarm, he claims the reinforcement of the offensive by IIe body of Panzer S, with three armor-plated divisions. These troops were to be extracted the British face around Caen as of on August 8th.

But the chance passes and the air forces allied, omnipresent, prevent any displacement until late in the evening. The German units pass consequently to the defensive, in a hurry of all shares. As of on August 8th, they do not progress any more. The 2 {{E}} armor-plated division S, it, clings to Mortain and tries to reduce the pockets of resistance of American 30e DI. The American reinforcements (American 35e DI) déboulent in the sector as of the August 8th 1944, and release the encircled troops on August 12th, letting escape any illusion side allemand.

Always on August 8th, the forces of the 3rd American army progress without opposition on the southern side of the counter-attack of Mortain. Mans, great center of communication and base camp of the German supply is under the direct threat of the American points. Against any logic, even the 9th German armor-plated division, which went to the help of Mans, was diverted to reinforce an increasingly illusory offensive. The marshal von Kluge seemed to accept all the orders of Hitler without sourciller, with a supposed zeal to mask the suspicions which weighed on him as for its implication in the attack against the Führer .

Assessment of the counter-attack of Mortain

Lüttich is an attempt at fallen through counter-attack, and thus a failure. Indeed, begun on August 6th in the night, the offensive is stopped as of on August 7th, because of American preparation and especially of aviation. It is an important battle, marking a strategic turning in the Bataille of Normandy, insofar as the Wehrmacht shows its incapacity to react effectively against exposed forces. It precedes also the ultimate German counter-offensive which will be carried out on the face ouest.
The Bataille of the Ardennes, indeed, will be decided same manner by Hitler, against the opinions of its generals, with the same insufficiency of means and against a massive allied air support. The counter-attack of Mortain and its been obstinated continuation, in spite of its initial failure, show the blindness of Adolf Hitler and the loss of influence of the German staff in the strategic decisions of Führer.

This battle is also the confirmation of the hegemonic role of the allied aviation of support on the ground, in this end of war, as well as the confirmation of the loss of any important role of the Luftwaffe, if it of it were need.

It is difficult to take stock of the losses, because the Allies in did not draw up. They are estimated at: 5000 men by including the prisoners. The Germans, as for them, saw their principal files destroyed during the posterior operations, but one can estimate their losses with the double, that is to say: 10000 men.

The failure of Mortain leaves XLVIIe German body armor-plated in a situation very dangerously placed at a peak. As of the August 6th 1944, the open southern side of the German army leaves free of any movement the American forces. As of the stop of the German progression towards Avranches, the 3rd American army goes tent a surrounding of the 7th German army by the south of coordination with the Anglo-Canadian army to north aiming at its destruction in what one called the Poche of Cliff.

See also: Pocket of Cliff

Anecdotes

  • the last German of Mortain was cut down by a gendarme armed with a rifle of the XIXe century, of only one ball, whereas it tried to flee.
  • an American battalion and a company encircled resisted nearly one week. On dimension 314, to the east of Mortain, these units of American 30e DI, were completely cut remainder of division. But the various attacks of the Waffen-SS of the 12th armor-plated division were pushed back effectively. The reserves becoming exhausted, an emissary S presented on August 10th, 1944 to the Rohmiller captain who accommodated his request for rendering by these words: " Allez to the devil and drive the camp of this foutue peak if you do not want that you are killed ". The position was supplied by parachutings (ammunition, plasma and vivres). In spite of a difficult situation, the 2nd battalion did not yield anything. It resisted thus during five days and five nights, until its changing on August 12th by American 35e DI.
  • With the White abbey, in the North-West of Mortain, an American company held a crossroads. The company had a mascot, a puppy named Mobile Réserve .

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