Battle of Manzikert

The August 26th 1071, the Byzantine Armée with the emperor Romain IV Diogène is put in rout by the army of the sultan Seldjoukide Alp Arslan close to the town of Manzikert (or Mantzikert, Mentzi Kert), actuellellement Malazgirt in Turkey), in the north of the Lac of Van.

Context

January 1st, 1068, the empress Eudoxie, widow of Constantin X, wife Romain IV Diogène. The Empire is threatened on all its borders: Norman in Italy, Turks Petchenègues and Oghouzes in Balkans, Turks Seldjoukides in The East. The emperor must face there.

Since 1048, the Turks seldjoukides multiply the incursions and plunderings in the Byzantine grounds of Arménie and the center of Anatolia. In 1064, Ani, capital of the kingdom of Arménie, pass under the control of the sultan Alp Arslan. A broad breach from now on is opened at the Eastern border of the Byzantine Empire, allowing to the wandering clans Turkish to multiply their raids in these areas become grounds of raid. They operate sometimes on the initiative of the sovereign seldjoukide, but generally for their own account. They do it without idea of conquest. After each raid, the band sets out again to put its spoils in safety.

But for the Byzantines, the difference between Moslems not Turkish, Turks seldjoukides and wandering Turkish operating for their own account did not appear clearly. Between 1068 and 1070, Romain IV Diogène lance a series of campaigns intended to put an end to their ceaseless incursions, without real success, even if they lead to a truce concluded with the sultan. Its incapacity to counter this threat weakens its capacity, which the family Doukas disputes to him openly.

For Romain IV Diogène, it is thus a question of releasing the Empire of the Turkish threat, to restore a sure Eastern border by including the territories populated again there mainly Armenians which constituted it traditionally. On the internal plan, a military victory must constitute the decisive demonstration of the cogency of its action which it needs to impose silence on its political adversaries.

On the other hand, Alp Arslan does not have a project of conquest against the Byzantine Empire. Its main aim is the destruction of the caliphate fatimide of Cairo. It thus prolongs the policy of its predecessor, Toghrul-Beg, aiming at ensuring the defense of the Abbasid caliphate, whose sultan holds the dedication of his capacity, and of orthodoxy sunnite. In 1070, it is against Fatimides of Egypt that it carries out its army and initially in Syria against the emir d' Alep, vassal of the latter.

The countryside of Manzikert

Romain prepares his forwarding during the winter 1070-1071. In spring, it joins together its army and progresses through Asia Mineure by Sebasteia (current Sivas) until Theodosioupolis (current Erzurum) where it arrives at the end of June. There, it completes the concentration of its forces.

At the beginning of 1071, by leading its army against Fatimides in Syria, Alp Arslan seizes the Byzantine fortress of Manzikert and besieges that of Édesse without success whereas in February, an ambassador of Romain joined it to engage of new talks. A truce is again concluded. Alp Arslan raises the head office of Édesse and leads its army to the south to besiege the city fatimide of Alep.

But two months later, in May, the sultan receives a second embassy of Romain who, this time, requires the restitution of the fortresses taken in Arménie, of which Manzikert, in exchange of the fortress of Hiérapolis (current Manbij in Syria), under the threat of a war in the event of failure of the negotiations. At the same time, the sultan learns the arrival from the Byzantine army in Arménie. Regarding this advance as a threat of imminent invasion, it raises the head office of Alep and moves in all haste towards the East with such a precipitation that its army disperses, leaving him only to its made up personal guard military slaves, the Ghulams.

For Paul Markham, this diplomatic activity was a voluntary operation of Romain Diogène intended to enable him to reach Arménie and to recover the lost fortresses before the seldjoukides have time to react. Once its restored border and its ensured backs, it could have intercepted the enemy army in strong position or have struck in the middle of the sultanate seldjoukide the model of the victorious countryside of Héraclius against the Sassanides at the 7th century. This kind of trick was completely recommended by the various Byzantine tactical handbooks as making it possible to gain the victory without having to fight battle.

The Byzantine ambassador describes in Romain the rapid departure of Alp Arslan d' Alep like a true rout. Part of its generals advise to him to strengthen its positions in Arménie while waiting for the arrival of the Turks whereas others think to carry the war at Seldjoukides. The emperor decides to take the fortresses of Manzikert and Khliat (modern Akhlat). But, whereas Romain believes Alp Arslan still far, it is in fact very close, informed of the actions of the Byzantine army thanks to effective work of its scouts.

Because this last, considering the situation very serious is not turned over in the middle of its empire to gather its troops. It rather makes them invite to join it in Azerbaïdjan, in Khvoy, where it moved in all haste while passing by Mosul. Its joined together army, it moves towards Khliat where it sends in avant-garde one of its officers which had been distinguished in Asia Mineure and Syria, Turkish Soundaq.

On his side, of Theodousiopolis, the emperor also sends to him in direction of Khliat an avant-garde under the orders of Roussel de Bailleul made up of the body of “Francs” (Normands) that it orders thus that a body of allied Petchenègues whereas itself moves towards Manzikert with the remainder of the army and takes the fortress.

He decides to divide his army into two and to send the most tested part (: 20000 with: 30000 men according to the sources), its troops of mercenaries, under the orders of the magistros Joseph Tarchaniôtès to reinforce the quota of Roussel de Bailleul in front of Khliat. Perhaps this quota included/understood Varègues, since a Moslem source speaks about “Russian”.

It is then, for reasons which the sources do not enable us to elucidate clearly (treason? defeat vis-a-vis the avant-garde seldjoukide?), that the troops of Joseph Tarchaniôtès and Roussel de Bailleul turn back, fork in the west in direction of Mélitène (modern Malataya) and withdraw themselves in Byzantine territory without Romain IV Diogène being informed by it.

It advances on Manzikert which capitulates without combat.

The first engagements

The shortly after the catch of the fortress, probably on Wednesday, August 24, a detachment of soldiers left to forage in direction of Khliat are killed or made captive by the avant-garde of Soundaq. Sent against the Turks, Nicéphore Bryenne is put in difficulty and wounded. It receives with a little delay the help of Nicéphore Basilikès, soft of Theodousiopolis, chief of the Armenian quotas of Syria and Arménie. This last met the Turks in escape but its troop loses its cohesion in the continuation. A Turkish counter-attack the met in rout and Basilikès is captured.

During this time, Romain arranged his army in battle order while waiting for a confrontation which does not come. At the evening, it regains its camp the night is disturbed by an attack of Turkish against allies oghouzes left the camp to trade with local merchants. The precipitated retirement of Oghouzes in the camp sows confusion insofar as it were difficult to differentiate them from the Turks seldjoukides.

At dawn, the sultan establishes his camp not far from that of the basileus. A detachment seldjoukide tries a new attack which is pushed back. But in the night, a Turk oghouzes quota makes defection and passes to the enemy, causing a great distress within the army which fears the treason of the others allied Turkish still present, installing a harmful climate of mistrust to the cohesion necessary of this whole of disparate troops.

In same time, an embassy sent by the Caliph is received by the basileus. Perhaps she had been asked by the sultan who could believe that she would be accommodated better than if she came from her share. At all events, Romain Diogène pushed back the offer of peace.

Shortly after the departure of the embassy, the basileus made leave its army in battle order in the morning the Friday, August 26.

Involved forces

For this countryside, it was far from to have gathered the whole of the forces of its empire since a big number of troops remained in garrison. Moreover, it had separated from the “Nemitzoi”, an undisciplined body Germanic mercenaries, close to Sebasteia as of the best part of its army little before the battle. Jean-Claude Cheynet evaluates his manpower with: 60000 men on: 100000 it would have had with the beginning the countryside.

In the morning of August 26th, it thus preserves an indisputable numerical superiority but its army is more heterogeneous. It has a high number of troops of allies resulting from various ethnicities (Turks Oghouzes and Petchenègues, Bulgares, Valaques, etc) installed in the empire. Its army also includes/understands quotas of Armenians. The Byzantines are represented there in the Tagmata of Occident and the troops raised to Asia Mineure. Lastly, it can count on the troops of elites of Hétairie and Archontes and perhaps of others Tagmata of elite.

Alp Arslan perhaps joined together: 30000 riders. It includes/understands its personal guard made up of 4000 Ghulams. It also recruited: 10000 Kurdish riders in Azerbaïdjan. Lastly, of the Turkish chiefs had to answer his call and to provide him quotas of wandering warriors.

Tactics implemented

Turkish seldjoukides practiced the traditional combat of the people of the steppe, fact of harassings, escapes simulated in order to break the cohesion of the enemy to involve it in ambushes. It is this tactic which the sultan seldjoukide will impose on his adversary with Manzikert like describes it in particular Nicéphore Bryenne (homonymous grandson of Nicéphore Bryenne of the battle and husband of Anne Comnène).

Vis-a-vis it, the Byzantine army had developed since centuries a tactic suitable to counter this shape of war. It rested above all on the maintenance of the cohesion of the troops divided into bodies which are supported mutually and which form a true mobile fortress against which light riders are impotent as long as it remains plain. Romain IV Diogène, in general tested was not to be unaware of it. But in the morning of August 26th, the cohesion of its army already was largely shaken.

And the art of the war being very of execution, it is this rupture of the cohesion of the Byzantine army worsened by the treason of Andronic Doukas, ordering the rear-guard, which will lead to its rout.

On Friday, August 26, 1071

In the morning of August 26th, 1071, Romain IV Diogène, decided to fight a decisive battle, makes leave his army and arranges it in battle order. The emperor divides his army into four bodies:

left wing: Nicéphore Bryenne with the Tagmata of Occident (including/understanding the Bulgarian ones)

that it had ordered in Asia Mineure for several years;

right wing: Theodore Alyatès with the troops raised to Minor Asia and in particular in Cappadoce;
center: Romain IV Diogène with his guard in particular;
rear-guard: Andronic Doukas with the troops of Hétairie and Archontes.

The allies Turkish Oghouzes and Petchenègues are laid out on the two wings in order to constitute a defensive screen of light cavalry.

But whereas its army advances, the Turks do not seem to really engage in a battle arranged during all the first part of the day. It is probable that Seldjoukides let their enemies advance all while badgering them in order to attract them in ambushes and to break their cohesion. Certain sources refer to these ambushes prepared in advance. There exist two versions of the events to describe the abrupt defeat inflicted to the Byzantines in this end-of-day.

According to Michel Attaliatès, witness of battle and favorable to Romain Diogène, the basileus orders the return of his army to the camp before fallen the night, fearing the ambushes. At this point in time Andronic Doukas betrays it and leaves the battle field while making run the noise of dead of the emperor, creating a movement of panic whose sultan seldjoukide profits to launch his troops to the attack of the Byzantine formations which broke their cohesion.

According to Nicéphore Bryenne, favorable to writing Doukas tradivement, the army of Diogène fell into the ambush set-up by the Turks. Encircled, the Byzantine bodies are attacked of any share, putting in escape the right wing of Theodore Alyatès, then the rear-guard of Andronic Doukas and finally the left wing ordered by his/her homonymous grandfather Nicéphore Bryenne. A quite posterior Moslem source retains this last version, giving all the merit of the victory to the impetuosity of the attack of the sultan rather than to a treason within the enemy camp.

Claude Cahen retained this version of the events. On the other hand, Jean-Claude Cheynet leant in favor of treason, asserting experiment of the basileus broken with the tactics of ambushes of the Turks. John Haldon has as for him makes a synthesis of both.

According to him, in end-of-day, the various Byzantine army corps preserved their cohesion but the communication between them is very difficult because of the harassing of the riders Turkish. When the emperor orders with the body which it orders in the center to withdraw in good order towards the camp, it movement badly is interpreted by the right wing which panics and is made retirement in disorder. At this point in time the treason of Andronic Doukas occurs. Instead of covering the retirement of the line of battle as it owes it, it orders to him also the retirement of its body, leaving the central body ordered by the exposed emperor and the isolated wings.

Benefitting from the manifest disorder which settles in the enemy army, the sultan orders a general attack which puts the already disorganized right wing in rout, then manages to break the left wing. Whereas most of the center manages to be withdrawn in order, the emperor and some troops are encircled. Romain Diogène is finally captured.

Losses

According to Jean-Claude Cheynet, the losses for the Byzantine army were much less heavy than than it was often advanced. The rear-guard of Michel Doukas was withdrawn without fighting. The left wing of Nicéphore Bryenne should not have undergone irreversible losses since the following year, these troops of Occident could fight the Slavic ones victoriously and Petchenègues. Most of the center could escape surrounding. As for the right wing, the troops of the East, Romain Diogène was able to mobilize them of number shortly after the battle to reconquer its throne when it was released by the sultan. And its first adversary, Constantin Doukas, also mobilized against him troops resulting from Asia Mineure. The continuation of the Byzantine army by the Turks started at the fallen night, which supported the runaways and thus reduced the losses. The army thus was put in escape but was not destroyed. The total of the losses would be around the quarter of the committed troops (either 5 to 10% of manpower of the Byzantine army). John Haldon also leans in favor of rather light losses with 20% from committed manpower captive and 10% of killed.

Consequences of the battle

Traditionally, the historians considered this battle as a disaster for the Byzantine Empire which would have had like direct consequence the loss of most of Anatolia, and longer-term, its inevitable collapse. But since the last quarter of the 20th century, the contemporary historians gave more moderated vision of this event, considering that the Byzantine army was not destroyed at the time of this battle and that the loss of Anatolia results rather from the policy of the predecessors and the successors of Romain IV Diogène.

This defeat was not a military disaster but rather a political disaster with the capture of the emperor, his deposition by Doukas and the civil war which resulted from this. It is this civil war which wasted the financial and military resources empire, leaving Asia Mineure without defense against the continual incursions of the nomads Turkish.

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