Battle of Koursk

Situation

The war in the East has just entered its third year. The two preceding ones were marked by the same diagram: an offensive of the forces of the Axis during the beautiful season, during which the Germans can exploit the tactical superiority their forces, able to implement coordination necessary between the various weapons, to carry out the operations known under the name of Blitzkrieg. The Soviets, less mobile, find themselves then obliged to yield ground to save time and to constitute reserves, while waiting for that the German offensive marks time with the arrival of the winter. Rigorous climatic conditions and the state of the roads reduce the tactical advantage of the Germans in term of mobility. The Red Army can then block or slow down the progression of the German invasion and pass in its turn to the offensive while benefitting from fighting qualities of its infantry. The year 1941 catastrophic for the Red Army, badly organized, badly ordered, and taken with was deprived by the beachcomber of the German attack. For these reasons, it undergoes during the summer 1941 colossal losses at the time of the Opération Barbarossa. But, contrary to the forecasts of the leaders of Reich Nazi, it did not crumble and, not reinforced by troops of the Far East it managed to stop the German attack at the time of the Bataille of Moscow, passing to the counter-offensive. However, badly directed and too ambitious, this one enlisa rather quickly and caused heavy losses, giving to the German army the possibility of attacking again in spring 1942.

The Germans chose to carry out an offensive more localized than the previous year, by concentrating their forces in the south of the face, to seek the decision there, and while remaining on the defensive on the remainder of the face avoiding the head office of Moscow where wait largest of the Soviet forces. The projection in Russian territory was considerable in 1941 because of initial surprise of the invasion of June. But, compared to 1941, the Soviet losses were less. Stavka could reposition its forces before destroying a whole army corps of Wehrmacht at the time of the battle of Stalingrad (September 1942 - February 2nd, 1943), greater German military defeat since the Bataille of Iéna in 1806. All the German profits of the summer were reconquered and the German Life armed with the marshal Paulus had to capitulate. But this spectacular Soviet victory was followed of a generalized counter-offensive which, there still, fished by excess of optimism. Indeed, the Stavka desired be further, by locking up the forces in the course of fold of the the Caucasus and attacking the Groupe of armies centers. The Soviet troops were ahead thorough, without consideration of the exhaustion of the units and the logistic difficulties. Skilfully, Erich von Manstein benefitted from the occasion and after having saved forces by shortening its face, the Red Army counter-attacked in the area of Kharkov, inflicting a severe defeat in February and March 1943 to him. With the arrival of the season of muds, the Raspoutitsa, the face was stabilized then on a line on the basis of Leningrad in north until Rostov in the south. In the center deep was covering of 200 kilometers width and 150 kilometers depth between the German advanced position of Orel in north and the recent catch of Manstein Kharkov, in the south. The two staffs then were very divided on the action to be taken: to attack or not and if so, where?

German plans and preparations

German side, one is conscious, after the failure of the battle of Moscow and the disaster of Stalingrad, that a total military victory over the Soviet Union is from now on impossible taking into account the extent of the losses of Third Reich on the Russian face since June 1941, manpower of the Wehrmacht which cannot from now on be enough there. In addition, the effect of surprised invasion of June 1941 disappeared and carried by the total mobilization of the Grande Guerre patriotique the Soviet industry of war does not cease going up in power. It is now advisable to save troops and to save time, while hoping to force one or the other of combined with a separate peace. In the east, one decides to take as a starting point the construction of the Ligne Hindenburg on the face of the West of 1918 and one begins the construction of a series of defense works known as a Ligne Panther-Wotan, where the Wehrmacht will be cut off from here the end of the year 1943. However, taking into account the Soviet military potential which does not cease developing of 1941 to 1945, the face lends itself badly to a long-term defensive strategy, and it is necessary to rectify it, as soon as the weather allows the mobile operations again.

Erich von Manstein is in favor of a fast attack in direction of Koursk, as soon as time allows it. He wants to surprise and destroy the many Soviet forces present in the projecting one of the same name, because in fact the troops suffered the most at the time of the last months, before those do not have time to consolidate their positions. This Soviet projection on the enemy face, with the junction of the group of army centers and of the group of southern army, could be crossed by a movement of grip at its base. Many Soviet forces, almost a fifth of human resources of the Red Army ends up being stationed there, could be destroyed and the shortened face in an important way. Moreover, one would seize again, of the strategic rail junction located on the principal North-South line going from Rostov to Moscow. One would thus complicate the movements of the Soviet reserves towards the south. In March the plans were decided. The 9th army of Walther Model would attack in north since Orel while the 4th army panzer of Hoth and the detachment of Kempf under the total command of Manstein would tackle south from Kharkov. They were to meet close to Koursk, but if the offensive proceeded well, they were authorized to continue while following their own initiative, with for general objective creating a new line on the river of the Don, far towards the east. This offensive, the Operation Zitadelle , was to be started as soon as the state of the ground would allow it. The attack was prepared with a very great care by the German generals who gave an special attention to the ground and the defensive system of the Soviets. According to the German general Mellenthin, who underlines qu' “no offensive had never been prepared with more care than that one” , each square meter had been photographed by it of plane.

It quickly appeared, within sight of the air recognitions, that the Soviet staff had anticipated this attack and considerably reinforced defenses. The attack would be transformed into an attack in rule of fortified positions. The actual position of the forces of invasion did not allow the success of such an operation and one decided to delay release of it to reinforce the units having to attack. Initially envisaged for on May 4th, it was delayed until June 12th, then finally at July 4th in order to have new weapons from Germany, in particular the new tanks Panther. Contrary to the recent companies, Hitler gave to the general headquarter a considerable control on the planning of the battle. During the few following weeks, it continued to increase the forces attached to the face, withdrawing on the whole of the German lines all that could be useful for nearest confrontation. Contrary to the preceding offensives, the effect of surprise, even at the tactical level, is not required any more what contradicts the bases of the Blitzkrieg, Stavka knowing the place of the attack and preparing there. The Operation Zitadel envisaged by the OKW was the antithesis of this concept. The point of the attack was largely foreseeable for any person having a chart and reflected a thought resulting from the First World War more than that of Blitzkrieg. Several German commanders raised the question, in particular Heinz Guderian which required of Hitler “ Is necessary to attack Koursk, and by principle in the East this year? Think only that somebody knows where is Koursk? ”. Surprisingly, Hitler answered “ I know. This thought turns over me the stomach ”.

Von Manstein, attache with the idea of surprise, now compromised by the carryforwards of the operation, proposes another approach of the situation. It is based on same the principles which led to the disaster of the Red Army in Kharkov. It is a question of causing the attack of the Soviet defenders, then to act in against, when this one is too advanced. The selected area is that of the industrial center of Donetsk, whose richness constitutes a soft food of choice. Von Manstein, account to attract a maximum of Soviet forces there, then to cut them their backs, by making movement starting from Kharkov on the edge is Donetz river towards Rostov, in the south, trapping the totality of the southern wing of the Red Army against the Mer of Azov. The advantage, thus acquired, would then be used to set up a justifiable face. This plan however has the disadvantage of leaving the initiative to the Red Army during the summer 1943, a precedent very prejudicial with moral and the propaganda of the forces of Third Reich, which will cause the rejection of this plan. Fearing a counter-attack on the side of the attacking units by the face of the steppe, reserves Soviet, which had been spread at the base of the projecting one, it proposed an alternative of the operation then where one would tackle initially this last, by carrying out surrounding, behind of Koursk. But fearing that its means are too weak for an operation in the depth, the OKH preferred to stick to the initial plan.

The troops of Reich Nazi put on line two hundred specimens of their new Char Panther, 90 Elefant (Hunter of tanks), all their Henschel Hs 129 (Avion of attack on the ground), the Tigre I and the recent model Panzer IV. On the whole, they had gathered 2 700 tanks and guns of attack, 1 800 planes and 900 000 men. It was the greatest concentration of German military power ever carried out.

Soviet plans

Soviet side, one was also divided on the action to be taken. Stalin and part of the officers of the Stavka wanted to strike the first because they thought that the previous years had proven that one could not be opposed to a German estival offensive, once this one started. They thus preferred to take the initiative, while attacking frontally with Orel and Kharkov, to exploit the situation in direction of the marshes of Pripiat. Many of other Soviet officers were much more trustful in the capacity of the Red Army to resist thanks to unquestionable progress in the defensive tactics. They preferred to initially wait that the Germans become exhausted in their attack, to profit then from a clear superiority when they would pass to the general offensive, operation until deficiencies still present in planning and logistics, were likely to transform into expensive disaster. The place of attack was not a mystery for the Soviets, Joukov, as of April, predicted an attack on the projecting one. Thereafter, the reports/ratios of information of the Lucie network, operative in Swiss and other sources, like the decodings carried out by the British and American of the codes Enigma, consolidated this intuition and not leaving any doubt about the intentions of the enemy. This careful position ends up carrying the discussion and Soviet then took a care very particular to the preparation of a defense spread out in the depth and to mass many forces in the projecting one.

During the four months of respite granted by the delay of the Germans, the Red Army laid out of more than 400 000 mine S and dug approximately 5 000 kilometers of trenches, with sometimes moved back positions of 175 kilometers. One put the accent on the fight anti-tank device, with creation at all the levels of command of units specialized in this task, gathering at the same time many anti-tank guns, but also of the Sapper S and units mobile. Despite everything, the Soviet command was anxious, by remembering the disconcerting ease, with which the Germans had formerly bored their lines. It thus deployed many reinforcements, to counter-attack if necessary, which enabled them to profit overall from a numerical superiority, as well as a man as in material. 1 300 000 men, 3 600 tanks, 20 000 parts of Artillery and 2 400 planes awaited the German troops in and behind the projecting one. Most of the reinforcements was gathered within the face of the Steppe which closed the base of the projecting one. These forces were to possibly take part in defense, if the enemy attack became threatening, but waited especially that one estimates the Wehrmacht beaten, to be launched in a generalized counter-offensive.

Tactiquement, defense rested on body of infantry, each one extremely of three divisions of Fusiliers. These units were distributed on the first two lines of defense, located in the first twenty kilometers in the depth of the device. Two divisions, in the principal line of defense, constituted the first level, the third occupying the positions of the second line and formed the second level. The basic unit constituting these lines, was the zone of defense of battalion, a square of two side kilometers, which included/understood a complex whole of fulcrums, about a company or of a section, being covered mutually. Two or three Tranchée S connected these fulcrums, the first was furnished with machine-guns and weapons anti-tank device and was protected by a network from barbed wires and a minefield. The others sheltered the weapons of support like mortars or guns of infantry. The second was placed two hundred meters behind and the third, if it existed, one kilometer further. Alternative positions of shooting were envisaged on the sides in the event of opening in the sector of the close units, and of the bowels connected to several places the trenches of combat to allow the routing of reinforcements, the supply and a possible fold on the positions with the back. Fifteen kilometers, behind the tactical zone, a third line of defense was built, occupied partially by troops of the second level. It constituted the last defensive line on the level of the army, the troops defending the tactical zone, if they had survived, would be withdrawn there and, joined by reinforcements, would still continue defense there. Behind the zone of defense of the army, there existed still three lines of defense known as of face, where the reinforcements were based. To enclose this formidable device, the Front of the steppe had established its line of defense at the base of the projecting one, which moreover was doubled by a line known as of state, built on bank is Don. On the whole the depth of the Soviet device was of two hundred and fifty kilometers.

In addition to the minefields posed before the battle, one generalized the mobile detachments of obstacle, consisted a company or a battalion of sappers. Tested before with horse-drawn vans with Koursk, the latter had many trucks finally, in particular those provided by the agreements of lease-lend. Their mission was to mine the ground on the face envisaged of an imminent offensive. Although this tactic was risky for the sappers, and that the mines then were seldom buried, these operations appeared very profitable. The Tislin general will affirm that two thirds of the tanks destroyed by the mines were it by mines posed by these detachments. This tactic thus became characteristic of the Soviet genius which will insist then, following the lessons of Koursk, on the importance of the minefields. In addition to their role in the defensive action, they could be used for at the time of offensive phases to protect the sides.

The operation Citadel

After four months of preparation, on July 4th 1943, the enemy starts the first engagements on the southern sides of projecting, by attacking the Soviet outposts to prepare the general attack of the following day. Those being located on small hills, having sights on the zones of gathering of the German units, any possibility of surprise was excluded. IIIe Panzerkorps of the Hoth general tackled the positions around Zavidovka. Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier-Division, supported by 3 Panzer-Division, attacked Butovo under a torrential rain whereas the 11th Panzer-Division made movement on the heights around the city. In the west of Butovo, Grossdeutschland and 3rd Panzer met a keen resistance of the Soviets and did not make safe their objectives before midnight. IIe SS-Panzerkorps attacked the advanced observation posts and met to him also a solid defense which required to reduce the bunkers to the Lance-flame. On the northern side, in the course of afternoon, the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka bombarded during ten minutes a portion of the face of three kilometers. Their action was then followed by a massive shooting of preparation of artillery.

With 22:30, the Red Army started a massive artillery shooting to try to disorganize the German attack. On the northern side, this operation aiming at opposing artillery will be particularly effective since about half of German artillery will be touched by the shooting of against-battery but will have an influence the quite less following day. In the south, Joukov will recognize thereafter that the shooting was started too early, mainly missing the German units of infantry and armoured tanks aimed because not left their zones of regrouping yet to the back. The German losses will be thus weak but the Soviet counter-preparation will cause nevertheless a delay of a few hours in the deployment of the German troops and thus of the attack.

The true battle began the following day. VVS tackled massively the bases of the Luftwaffe in the zone, to counter it in its usual tactic of obtaining the air superiority. The few following hours can be probably regarded as the largest aerial combat of the History. Luftwaffe was defended successfully and lost very little of its offensive capacity. But as from this moment, its control of the sky was disputed hard and it could not sweep its rival in the sky with the top of the battle field.

Fast stagnation in north

The 9th army of Walter Model, in north was almost unable to advance as of the first day, not reaching any the objectives envisaged. Its attack, aiming at the city and the station of Ponyri, on a broad face of forty-five kilometers, having been correctly anticipated by the staff of the central face of the marshal Rokossovski, it was found in the middle of gigantic defensive minefields, protected by shootings from infantry and artillery. The units of sappers who worked to release from the routes then underwent heavy losses and this in spite of the use of remote-controlled vehicles Goliath. These mines caused many losses of vehicles, for example, the 653e Schwere PanzerJaegerAbteilung lost 37 of its 49 Ferdinands in the day of the 5. The majority of these losses were not final because the simply immobilized vehicles could be repaired. But it resulted a constant weakening of the forces from it taking part in the attack. This last was blown very quickly. The advance was only of 5 kilometers on a face of 40 the first day, 4 the second. Starting from July 7th, the face of attack was strongly reduced, with only 15 kilometers, and passed to 2 kilometers the two following days. But the attack trampled of more beautiful and never again an advance higher than 2 kilometers was recorded. July 10th, the attack marked time, having advanced only of twelve kilometers in the Soviet device and that not having hardly started the second defensive belt of this one.

This failure has several causes. Is ironic: although the 9th army was weakest of the two parts of the German clipper, the Soviets had it by anticipated error as the principal attack and had deployed their forces consequently. Another reason of this failure, the 13th Soviet army which supported large this attack had made the choice, contrary to the units of the southern side, to defend in a priority way the tactical zone, that is to say the first 20 kilometers in the depth. This choice, although leaving few units to cover the following lines of defense, seems to be revealed much paying, defense being often in excess on the decisive points. German having lost 300 PzKW III and PzKW IV, a half-dozen of Tigers and about fifty tank destroyers, finds itself completely bloodless and incompetents to continue their advance. July 12th, the Red Army starts its counter-offensive, against 2nd and 9th army in the projecting one of Orel. Exceeded in manpower and power, the Wehrmacht must evacuate this one quickly and thus to give up the northern face of covering of Koursk, pressed closely by the Soviet units of attack. The total ratio of losses of these operations is always in favor of the Germans but it is only of three per five, much lower than the preceding operations and very insufficient compensating for the growing superiority of the Red Army. Added to the territorial retreat and the loss of Orel, it is thus a resounding failure which the Wehrmacht for the northern part of the operation undergoes.

The passage to the offensive of the defenders of the Red Army, in north, intervenes very early in the battle, without almost any transition, as of on July 12th. This day, the two faces more in north of the device, the Face of Briansk and that of the West, start a concentric offensive, the Opération Kutuzov, in direction of Orel. July 15th, after being themselves reorganized, the face of the Center, joint with the attack, and the Germans attacked on three sides, must beat a retreat precipitately on the Hagen line, prepared partially well at the base of covering and must send reinforcements starting from the south. The engagements will last until August 18th. The combat, although more expensive for the Soviets, enable them to release Orel and constitute the first successes of this army in summer period. They will allow the release of Smolensk during the month of September 1943.

The southern side

Preliminary operations

In the south of projecting, the circumstances are much more favorable for the Germans. The face of Voronej which faces them is less powerful than the central face because of error of appreciation of Stavka and is attacked by the best units of Wehrmacht. The Soviets, moreover, could not identify the exact sector of the German attack and thus had to distribute their forces in a way more regular and spread out on the depth. The German progression is thus more important and the threat of a decisive opening is profiled quickly. The attack is conducted by two German armies out of two axes. The principal push is carried out by 4th Panzerarmee of the Hoth general strong of eleven divisions including six mechanized. It aims at the small town of Oboyan which is the most direct way to reach Koursk. On its line, the detachment of army of the Kempf general, party of the area of Belgorod, attacks him on other bank of the river Donets, in direction of north. Von Manstein decides, contrary to Model, to push its units armor-plated as of the first day to break as fast as possible. The surprise, already compromised by the capture of prisoners, is still attenuated on the southern face by the preliminary operation carried out during the day of July 4th against the outposts of the 6th army of the guard, facing the 48e Panzerkorps. These outposts, placed on small low hills with sight on the German zones of regrouping, made any surprise impossible. The Knobelsdorf general, ordering the body, thus decided to seize the day before it the general offensive because they had also the disadvantage of dissimulating the first Soviet line to him.

After the opening of corridors in the minefields in the night from July 3rd to 4th, a bombardment per hundred Ju87D with 14:45 and a short preparation of artillery, the regiments of infantry of the 3 {{E}} and 11 {{E}} Panzerdivision as those of division Grossdeutchland tackle these positions, with the assistance of units of the 52e Armeekorps on its left and 2nd Panzerkorps S on its line. The 199e regiment of fusiliers of the guard which defends the outposts, resists some time, but evacuates with fallen the day towards the principal line of defense. The 48e Panzerkorps gained favorable positions of attack but any chance of tactical surprise flew away. Vatutin thus concludes, with reason, that it has to face an attack in direction of Oboyant with a secondary attack starting from Belgorod. Like Rokossovsky, it as starts him against thirty minutes preparation using its artillery but, because of its different situation, chooses to target firstly the concentrations of troops rather as opposing artillery. The units Nazis, for the majority with the shelter in defensive positions, will undergo few losses however. On the other hand the effects on the organization and moral German will be important and it will be necessary for the German staff to delay three hours the attack to reorganize its units. The enemy genius makes nevertheless the night profitable to release from the corridors in the minefields which protect the first Soviet line.

The attack

At four o'clock in the morning, on July 5th, the bombers of 4th Luftflotte are presented to the top of the positions of the 6th army of the Guard which they bombard intensely. The air attack is followed of a very intense artillery shooting fifty minute old but on all the face of attack of the group of southern army. At five o'clock in the morning, the tanks and the infantry of 4th Panzerarmee start to advance. The dry ground until July 4th was softened in the afternoon of this day, making the movement of the vehicles with wheels very difficult. Another omnipresent problem, the Soviet mines, which in spite of the work of the German pioneers, cause many losses. The Soviets will affirm thereafter that on the southern face of projecting, at the time of the first day, the losses of Wehrmacht were of 67 tanks and the equivalent of two battalions of infantry. Moreover, many officers will be killed this day by the Soviet traps. The commander of the 332e Infanteriedivision, for example, will find the death in this way at the time of the initial attack. The results are rather unequal, according to the units. The 3rd panzer division, in spite of the difficulties, succeeds in as of the first day pushing back the elements of the Red Army defending Butovo of almost five kilometers, thus boring the first line of defense. Division Grossdeutschland, it, is found blocked by an anti-tank ditch filled with water, until the following day. Panzerregiment 39 with its two hundred tanks Panther bright burning coal new, wedged in a minefield, sudden of heavy losses and is then unable to support the division which, it also, sudden of large losses of infantry and is pushed back. The attack must be then cancelled and replaced by a news more in the east. 11th Panzerdivision, it, makes a success of its attack against the 67e division of the guard but manages to push back this one only of six kilometers, following the intervention of the forty tanks of the 96e armor-plated brigade. At the evening of July 5th, the 48e Panzerkorps thus succeeded in boring the first Soviet line of defense but its advance is lower than the forecasts with six kilometers to the maximum. It is only halfway of the second line and incompetent to prepare an attack at the dawn of the 6.

More in the east, 2nd Panzerkorps S, had more chance to him because its three divisions Nazis had like opposition only two regiments, one of the 375e division and one of the 52e division of the Guard, the Soviets apparently not having anticipated an attack in this sector. In spite of the mines and the weather, the attack proceeds well and progresses quickly, the 375e division continued by division Totenkopf Nazi must be folded up behind the Donets river, and exploiting the breach creates divisions Leibstardte Adolf Hitler and Das Reich, can position, at the evening, with less than five hundred meters of the second defensive belt. Compared to the other German units, the result is good but the losses are heavy and the units of the Red Army were folded up in good order, giving up only little material. More in the south, the detachment of Kempf army attacks the 5th army of the guard, starting from the head of bridge which the Germans took on bank is of Donets with Belgorod. This started attack the 5 with 2:25, is more difficult because of need for crossing the river. The Soviet artillery will destroy many bridges in the course of the day, slowing down the enemy progression. The 168 infanteriedivision, however supported by the tanks of 6th Panzerdivision, pushes back the 238e regiment of the Guard only of three kilometers. 19th Panzerdivision, it also confronted with the units of the 81e division of the Guard, more with north, progresses little. Only 7th Panzerdivision succeeds in boring the first line of defense held by the 78e division of the Guard, after having crossed the river and pushes back this one between the defensive belts halfway. The Breith general, ordering 3rd Panzerkorps, then decides to reinforce this success by withdrawing the 6th panzerdivision of the northern head of bridge and to send it to support 7th in the south. This initiative, though correct tactiquement on its scale, will cause a difficulty for the whole of the German, kind device during several days, Totenkopf division to face the east to protect the line from the 4th army of panzer. The 19th panzerdivision will be it also obliged to engage towards north to cover the left of Kempf. The Soviets will push many reinforcements in this small projecting to try to maintain separate the two German attacks. They will succeed in being maintained there until July 15th, fixing many German forces who could not thus take part fully in the principal offensive. More with the south, 11th and 42e body know little success, only the 106e Infanteriedivision will succeed in taking foot on bank is but only a bridge of eight tons will be established, unable to support armoured tanks to support the continuation of the attack. It seizes the small town of Toblinka where its advance is stopped by a counter-attack of the 72e division of the Guard supported by armoured tanks and elements of the 213e division. The 320e infanteriedivision reaches the railway with Maslova Pristani. Other divisions, if they made a success of all crossing, are blocked even more quickly. The two bodies of infantry in the south of Kempf did thus not succeed in boring the first line and are found in a delicate situation, back with the river.

Its first line of defense being bored at two places, Vatutin benefits from the night from July 5th to 6th to deploy reinforcements behind its second defensive belt, to reinforce the units in place and those which were folded up vis-a-vis the German attack. The 1st army of tanks is spread behind the 6th army of the guard to prohibit the direction of Oboyan. Initially, it must counter-attack the 6 in the morning but Vatutin and the Katutov general who orders it, finally decides to place it in a defensive posture by burying his tanks to prohibit very bored direct towards Koursk. Stavka placed also at its disposal two armor-plated bodies, 10th, coming from the 5th army of the Guard, reinforces the 1 {armed with tanks, and the 2 {{E}} body armor-plated of the Guard, resulting from the reserves from the south-western face, him is put in position at the south of Prokarvha to act on the side is of the 2 {{E}} S Panzerkorps. Vatutin takes also units within the armies out of the sectors of attack, to redeploy them vis-a-vis the German threat. Thus the 309 {{E}} division of fusiliers of the 40 {{E}} armed is put in reserve in the axis of Oboyan. Two armor-plated brigades, the 180 {{E}} and 192 {{E}}, will carry out counter-attacks on the western side of the 48 {{E}} Panzerkorps.

Von Manstein gives the order to bore the second line in the morning of the 6. The 48 Panzerkorps advances by pushing back three divisions of the Guard which face him in the positions of second line but delayed by the mines and Soviet resistance, it must note its impotence as of the end of the day. On the whole, it increased only by ten kilometers in 48 hours. Already present on the outposts of the second line, at the evening of the 5, the 2nd S panzerkorps is thus the only unit which tackles these positions. Largely supported by Luftwaffe, the attack of division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, in Iakolevo, is very successful and the 155e regiment of the Guard sees its submerged positions, of many prisoners being captured. The enemy exploits this success then by attacking side the 151e close regiment. But the Soviets plug the breach by deploying the 31e armor-plated body, to the north of the city, blocking any immediate exploitation and launch two counter-attacks of armoured tanks. More in the east, division Nazi Das Reich attacks in Luchki. She progresses well but the counter-attack carried out by the 2nd armor-plated body of the Guard, supported by the armed 69e, prevents it from boring the lines of defense. The third division of the body Totenkopf, it, does not attack and spends all its day to push back the offensives carried out by the 375e division, supported by the armoured tanks of the 96e armor-plated brigade and the 496e of tank destroyers. At the evening of the 6, the 2nd body S thus started the second line of defense. They assert the capture of 1609 prisoners and the destruction of 90 tanks and 83 anti-tank guns. However, the German losses are heavy: division Adolf Hitler deplores 84 dead and 384 wounded, only this day. In 48 hours, it adds up 181 killed and 906 wounded what represents ten percent of its manpower. And Koursk is still with 110 kilometers.

In the sector of Kempf, 3rd Panzerkorps successful definitively to bore the first line of defense and to reach to it second, 6th and 7th panzerdivision reaching Yastrebovo. The 11th body can then benefit from the retirement of the Soviet units and advance him too. On the other hand the 52e body, in spite of its attack, remains to him on western bank of Donets.

The attack on a narrower face, approximately thirty kilometers, progresses better, but as in north, the face of attack and the progression tend to be reduced as the days pass. As of on July 7th, the attack does not occur any more that on twenty kilometers of face, then will fall to fifteen on July 9th. The progression carried out in-depth fall it also very quickly, the advance is of nine kilometers, on July 5th, but it falls to five on July 9th and will not exceed two or three kilometers the following days. A soldier of Grossdeutschland division remembers of Koursk: “… of the machines however firmly riveted, opened like the belly of a cow split into two, with flames and moanings, trees reduced to the state of matches…. ; cries of the officers and the warrant officers trying to gather their groups and their companies in this cataclysm” .

If the advance is higher and the first bored Soviet line, the absence of important capture of prisoners and artillery destruction show that the Soviet troops move back in good order. Defense is not overflowed and continuous to be opposed constantly to the offensive. The night, of the Russian small groups of sappers mines pose in front of the supposed face of the German offensives of the following day, 90.000 mines will be thus posed. The units of infantry and the artillery delay by their action the advance of the German troops, giving time to the reinforcements to be installed on the threatened axes.

The losses of Reich are considerable and not compensables in the short run, a great number of units of attack having been practically completely destroyed. Thus, the 195e regiment of the 78e division of infantry loses in two days all its commanders of company. July 11th, less than one week after the release of the operation “Zitadelle”, the elements combatants of 18th Panzerdivision counted 5.266 men and 157 more officers; 12 days later, there remained only 890 men and less than 30 officers. One week later, one of the regiments of Panzergrenadier of division was tiny room to 127 soldiers only and there remained to him only one ordering officer of company. This hecatomb forced the commander of division to order with all the units of supply to go up to the face (O. Bartov). After five days of combat, division Gross Deutschland returns account on July 10th that it does not have in a position to fight but 3 Tigers any more, 6 Panthers and 11 Panzers III and IV out of the 118 tanks which it had at the beginning of the offensive. Its commanders and its senior officers of the two regiments of infantry and three other battalions almost all are killed or wounded. The XLVIII Panzer Body, has nothing any more but 38 to him Panthers out of the 200 initial ones.

The battle of Prokhorovka

At the east, the 7th army of the Guard puts in difficulty divisions of Kempf after their crossing of Donets, discovering the right side of the 4th armor-plated army. Then points some, the whole German offensive seemed enliser. Despite everything, the threat of an opening remained alarming for Stavka and this one decided to deploy troops initially planned to be used only in the counter-offensive and this in order to reinforce the 6th army of the Guard and to give a final crushing argument to the enemy projection. The 5th armor-plated army of the Guard, reinforced by two independent armor-plated bodies, was thus spread, on July 12th, in the east of Prokhorovka and prepared to counter-attack on the side of IIe S Panzer Korps. The battle which in result is known under the name of battle of Prokhorovka. On July 12th and 13rd, in the plain located close to the rail junction of Prokhorovka, with the confrontation of 1.500 tanks of which a hundred tanks Mark VI Tiger (tank of 56 T equipped with a frightening gun of 88 mm and with a frontal shielding of 10 cm) proceeds on a territory of twenty square kilometers the greatest battle of tanks of the history. The shock is titanic. On board sound Stuka, Hans Rudel discovers it in all her width. “On the dry land, as far as the eye can see, is held gigantic combat of tanks. In vast discovered spaces, compact masses of armoured tanks face, as on a parade ground. Many more frightening than the tanks Russians are their anti-tank guns, very powerful and remarkably precis. The Soviet army must have enormous quantities of these guns, because one finds them at all the neuralgic points of the immense battle field” . The Rotmistrov general, by pointing out the history of this battle, points out that it is the avant-garde of Ve armed armor-plated with the Guard, his army, which inserted at any speed the side of IIe S Panzer Korps which had just bored the third line of defense. The combat quickly becomes a confrontation between the best mechanized formations of Wehrmacht and a Soviet infantry good cut off. The committed Soviet armor-plated forces with Prokhorovka had more than 50% of losses. A hero survivor of this confrontation, the Muscovite Alexandre Volochtchenko, note that " close to Prokhorovka the ground had been transformed into mud sanguinolente covered with an iron fondu" glacis; . These two days, Wehrmacht loses 10.000 killed and more than 400 armoured tanks. In 2005, according to Piotr Borissov, which took part in the excavations on the field of Prokhorovka where the battle of armoured tanks took place: " the researchers discovered bones encrusted in metal” .

The German fold

Soviet counter-offensives

In the south, the Red Army will need more than time to attack because its troops suffered much more. Nevertheless, on August 3rd, the face of the Steppe starts the operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev in direction of Belgorod then of Kharkov. Supported by attacks of diversion more in the south, through the Mius, it advances rather quickly, Belgorod and Oryol falling on August 5th and reaching the suburb of Karkhov, on August 11th. The battle for the city is mad and hard twelve days. Wrapped by the Face of Voronej and that of the Face of the steppe, the city ends up falling on August 23rd at midday, most of the defenders being put out of combat. This Soviet victory, although expensive, obliges the Germans to fold up their defense behind the Dniepr as of on August 20th. This fold will allow during the autumn the crossing of the river and the release of Kiev, on November 5th, by Soviet. The catches of Belgorod and Orel were the occasion to inaugurate a new tradition in Soviet Union, that to greet the catches of important cities, by drawn artillery salvos with Moscow. The catch of Kharkov, a city that Hitler said that it would defend at all costs, is also a major victory because the industrial basin which surrounds it cruelly lack in the USSR, since 1941.

Assessment and consequences of the confrontation

The German failure of Koursk had practically overlooked by the propaganda of the mode of Berlin. Soviet side, the gigantic engagement of Koursk was a long time the object of a producing propaganda of legends which for much turn around the Bataille of Prokhorovka. With the opening of the files of the ex- Soviet Union, a more moderate reality is done day. The combat was often more a confrontation between the best mechanized formations of the Wehrmacht and an organized Soviet infantry good. Certain authors saw in the unloading in Sicily the primary reason of the stop of the offensive. But it seems that the tactical effects on the face of the east of this operation amphibian are unperceivable. In practice, only division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) will be sent towards the West, after having left its material on the spot. The failure of Zitadelle is thus well the consequence of the losses undergone by Wehrmacht which even if they are lower than that of the Red Army, are neither bearable nor compensables quickly. The Soviets them will show that they can recover their offensive capacity more quickly, in spite of their preceding heavy losses. The armies of Third Reich will never arrive in fact to reconstitute the potential to influence the events. They will have henceforth to undergo the action on the whole of the face.

On strategic planning and operational, the result is an undeniable Soviet victory. The enormous industrial and human effort authorized by the Third Reich Nazi to concentrate forces maximum and to carry the decision with Koursk is tiny room to nothing. The laid down objectives were not even approached, and, worse, for the first time the Soviets have advanced during the summer months. This simple fact largely reinforces moral Red Army which goes, consequently, to take again confidence in it. German side, it finishes convincing the last optimists whom the war in the east is definitively lost. Admittedly the Red Army underwent higher losses but the ratio is by far lower than that which it underwent before. In addition, the opening of a new face in Italy predicts for the German staff of future difficult choices and a dispersion of the troops. The result is thus without call. Never again Wehrmacht will be able to take again the initiative on the principal face of the second world war. It will have to be satisfied to undergo the Soviet initiatives.

On a tactical scale, the German superiority is still sensitive but the Red Army made great progress in many fields. Most important of them is the increase in the resistance of its infantry in defense. The units holding the face, vis-a-vis the German attacks, resisted during nearly one week, in open country in summer season, with the pressure of the best German units without being made neither overflow nor to destroy. The previous years they would have been due to more the two days. The new tactics developped at the point during the Bataille of Stalingrad become ripe. The positions are less loose than before, being able to cover itself mutually with their fire, they are connected in a systematic way by trenches of connection, allowing the arrival of the reinforcements or the return to positions backwards. The adversary is channeled, by the use of minefields and of the ground towards true pockets of destruction where it undergoes cross shootings and an artillery bombardment. Contrary to the previous years, the units isolated by armor-plated points are not let lock up. They are exfiltrent the night come to take again their place in defense the following day. The executives, even at low the levels, start to show of initiative and experiment. The offensive operations are still lagging behind but progress will be fast thereafter.

In the air field, progress is also sensitive, the VVS held head with the Luftwaffe. It was dominated overall but it was not swept sky in the first days like before. The arrival of new hunters even more competitive and a still increased aggressiveness on behalf of the pilots will enable him to impose itself finally, by the number, and soon the Jadgwaffe will be unable to prevent it from weighing massively on the engagements on the ground. In the field of the armoured tanks, on the other hand, the results were more catastrophic. The T-34/76 and KV-1 showed their limits. Almost invulnerable in 1941, they are not to it any more two years later. Their firepower and their design became defective with time, such as for example the two-seater turrets. The arrival and the development of new models will still take time and it will be clearly the weakness of the Red Army until spring 1944. The massive deployment of T-34/85 and JS-2 will give then the Soviets, the offensive element which they still missed.

Concerning the losses, it is advisable to be careful as for the provided figures by the belligerents. The surest option being to take into account only the allowed losses by each of the two adversaries and to be unaware of those which they think of having inflicted. The Krivosheev general gives the following figures on the Red Army, but only for the defensive part of the battle: 70.330 killed and 107.517 wounded and sick. During the same phase, the Germans had them 24.758 killed, 23.356 wounded and 987 lacks. The offensive towards Orel, the north of projecting, it, cost 112.529 killed and 317.361 wounded and sick Soviet. On the whole, this shock of Titans balances on July 14th, 1943 by the failure of the German armor-plated army and for the infantry hitlérienne, it is a blood bath: 90.000 killed. On the 70 divisions engaged in the zone of Koursk, 30 are destroyed including seven of panzers. The regiments of Sturmovik (plane tank destroyer), flying in attack often with less than 20 meters of the ground, assert the quasi-destruction of 3rd, 9th and the 12th armor-plated divisions of Reich. In fifty days of engagements, the Wehrmacht loses 500.000 men (killed, seriously wounded or disappeared), meadows of 1.200 tanks, more than 3.700 planes. The Red Army account more than 200.000 killed and its losses out of armoured tanks are higher than those of the enemy, but it overcame. Without interruption, dice on July 12th, the Red Army connects in the tread of its victory the starting of the bloody battle of Dniepr.

It is extremely possible that the alternative offensive preached by Manstein was also dedicated to being a failure because the Soviets received British (Kim Philby) all the battle plans of the Germans thanks to their success in the decoding of the code Enigma, in spite of the opposition of Churchill which feared " griller" this formidable source of information strategic. Thus the effect of surprise so necessary for the Blitzkrieg could not play any more. In Koursk, the grounds on which armor-plated divisions were to advance had been undermined, much of places before deserted during the drafting of the plan were strengthened, with barbed wire blocking the projection of the infantry, and the trenches supported by heavy artillery.

After Stalingrad, Koursk puts an end, definitively, with any hegemonic claim of Wehrmacht in Russia. “After the destruction of the 6th army of Paulus in the blazing inferno of Stalingrad, the Soviet counter-offensive of the winter and the autumn 1943, and the failure of the German offensive “Zitadelle”, the losses reach a level without precedent. Between November 1942 and October 1943, Wehrmacht loses definitely more than 1.500.000 men of of which meadows of 700.000 in a final way” . O. Bartov.

If the battle of Moscow represents the true strategic turning of the Second World war, Stalingrad the psychological turning, Kourks means the final swing of the Wehrmacht in a passive role of which it will not be able any more to be extracted until the conquest of Berlin by the Red Army in May 1945.

See too

External bonds

Battle of Koursk, defensive phase
Battle of Koursk, the counter-offensive
chart
Battle off Kursk one the Web (English)
Images of Koursk and others
http://www.geocities.com/armysappersforward/kursk.htm?200611?200612

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