Battle of Kasserine

The battles of Kasserine is an episode of the Second world war in North Africa which fits in the Campagne of Tunisia.

It is acted in fact of a series of Bataille S which was held around the master key of Kasserine, a depression of three kilometers through the solid mass of the Tunisian Dorsale of the chain of the Atlas. The town of Kasserine as for it is located at the west of the Tunisia.

The committed forces of the Axe result primarily from the Afrika Korps under the orders of the marshal Erwin Rommel and of the 5 {{E}} Panzerarmee under the command of Hans-Jürgen von Arnim. The allied forces depend on the II {{E}} Corps of the American armed ordered by the Major General Lloyd Fredendall.

This battle is the first meeting with large scales of the American forces and allemandes during the Second world war. The American troops without experiment of fire are sent to the combat in an awkward way by their command. The consequences are dramatic for them with high losses and a fold of more than 80 kilometers compared to their positions of origin in the west of Faïd. Following these events, the American army carries out a certain number of changes in the organization of the units and changes the command. A few weeks later, at the time of new battles, the American troops appear much more effective.

General situation

The Second world war makes Tunisia an unforeseen battle field after the Anglo-American unloading with the Morocco and in Algérie of November 1942 during the Opération Torch. This unloading take place a few days only after the opening carried out by the 8 {{E}} armed British with the general Bernard Montgomery at the time of the Second battle of El Alamein in Egypt. Including/understanding the danger of a war on two faces, from the German and Italian troops are transferred from Sicily to occupy the Tunisia, one of the rare easily justifiable zones of North Africa located at only one day of navigation of the sicilian bases.

In spite of the combined unloading, the defense of the Axis in the west remains summary. But no particular strain of the air forces and naval allied tries to prevent the transfer of men and material towards Tunis to the beginning of the countryside, which allows an important arrival of German and Italian forces. Moreover, the allied troops progress only slowly to go in contact with the Germans since they negotiate the rallying of the commanders of the French forces faithful to the Régime of Vichy.

The November 15th, the 1 {{British era}} armed enters to Tunisia. The November 27th, its left wing approaches Mateur, on the road of Bizerte, and its right wing reached Djedeida in the Vallée of the Medjerda (with 25 kilometers of Tunis). Central Tunisia is invaded. The American parachutists seize Kasserine and Gafsa. But in spite of several attempts to take Tunis before the important arrival of Italian-German troops, the defensive advantage that gets the ground and bad allied coordination allows the weak German and Italian troops unloaded to resist in front of the allied advance. The German counter-attack and, as of the November 29th, the Alliés are stopped and the blocked offensive. The face is stabilized on a line going of the Cape Serrat in Gafsa. In December and January, the general Von Arnim reinforces his troops in Tunisia whereas Erwin Rommel slowly folds up Tripolitaine towards the Tunisian south, pursued by the general Bernard Montgomery. The 8th British army takes Tripoli the December 23rd 1943 and occupies the principal base of supply of Rommel. But Rommel had prepared the blow and occupies the southern approaches of Tunisia along the Ligne Mareth built by the French to defend the Tunisia vis-a-vis the Italians. Thanks to their lines of defense supported on the Atlas in the west and the Gulf of Syrte in the east, even a low number of Italian and German soldiers could resist vis-a-vis the allied forces.

Catch of Faïd (January 30th - February 3rd 1943) and of Sbeïtla (14 - February 17th 1943)

The German situation is precarious. The American troops crossed already the solid mass of the Atlas and established a head of bridge with Faïd beyond the solid mass of the Tunisian dorsal. They are in excellent position to cross into two the German forces. Rommel and Afrika Korps are likely to find separate remainder of the forces of Wehrmacht and supply bases of the north of Tunisia. It is obvious that they cannot then remain without moving in front of this threat.

Afrika Korps reaches the lines the January 30th. The 21 {{E}} Panzerdivision demolishes the thin French troops defending Faïd, without large effort. The 1 {{era}} armor-plated division American tent several times of enrailler the German progression but its three brigades undergoes traditional the Blitzkrieg. With each time they receive the order to defend a position, this one already fell to the hands from the enemy and they must undergo the fatal fire of the German defenders. After three days of combat, the Americans give up the part and withdraw their troops in the buttresses of the Tunisian dorsal. From now on, Tunisia is almost entirely with the German hands and the approaches of the blocked coastal plains. The Americans still control the interior of the broken solid mass of the Tunisian dorsal, the prolongation of the Atlas, but that is not a subject of concern for the German command which requires of its troops to hold the outlets of the solid mass towards the east. During the two following weeks, Rommel and its commanders débâtent operations to be undertaken and, taking into account their future actions, this carryforward is perhaps expensive.

The “fox of the desert” thinks of being able to improve its supply and to erode a little more the American situation on its side while attacking towards two American supply bases located just at the west of the Western slope of the solid mass of the Tunisian dorsal in Algeria. Although it does not have any tactical interest to hold the plains located in the middle of the solid mass, a fast offensive would enable him to improve its situation from the point of view of the supply and would block any future American action. The February 14th, the 21e Panzerdivision goes back on the way towards the west and attacks Sidi Bouzid, with about fifteen kilometers of Faïd, in the interior plain of the Tunisian dorsal. The battle lasts one day but the too parsimonious use of the armoured tanks by the Americans leads to their defeat. At the end of the day, Afrika Korps is Master of the ground. An American counter-attack is easily demolished the following day and the Germans take again their offensive the February 16th with for objective Sbeïtla.

Not laying out more than one ground giving a defensive advantage, the American forces fold up and establish new lines on the Western part of the mountains on the level of the master key of Kasserine which is easier to defend. At this time there, the Americans already lost 2546 men, 103 tanks, 280 vehicles, 18 guns of countryside, three anti-tank guns and a whole anti-aircraft battery.

Unfolding (19 - February 25th 1943)

The February 19th, Rommel launches several offensive patrols and notes that the master key of Kasserine is the best place to consider an attack. The following day, it personally directs the attack conducted by the any news 10th Panzerdivision detached by 5th Panzerarmee deployed in north. He thus hopes to capture the American deposits of supply whereas the 21e Panzerdivision continues its attack towards north through perforated Sbiba. In a few minutes, the American lines are bored. Their light weapons and light tanks do not make the weight vis-a-vis the heavier equipment of the Germans. Moreover, their lack of experience in the armor-plated war does not improve their situation. The Panzer IV and German Tigre lead their attacks without difficulty vis-a-vis to the American tanks m3 Lee and m3 Stuart having a firepower less important and controlled by crews much less tested. Nothing to arrange, as at the time of the preceding German offensives, the American command is again exceeded by the events. The organization of counter-attacks or artillery stopping takes too much time and the Germans already exceeded the positions of the American units which must start the combat. The scenario of the offensive of at the beginning of February is repeated and the 1 American armor-plated division receives orders null and void.

As of the second day of the offensive, two of its three tactical groupings are hustled and the third is overall out of combat. After having crossed the master key of Kasserine, the German forces are divided into two columns. Erwin Rommel remains with the principal group of 10th Panzerdivision which follows the road towards north in direction of Thala. In same time, a Italian-German force moves towards the North-West while progressing on a road more to the south with for objective Haïdra. In order to be opposed to the southern force of Rommel, made up of Italian and German troops, the remainders of the tactical grouping B of the 1 American armor-plated division is folded up of 30 kilometers with an aim of surprising them the following day (either the February 20th). But the tactical grouping B is hustled once again and does not manage to stop the German advance.

The moral one of the American troops starts with seriously declining and, at the evening of the February 20th, from many troops withdraw themselves by giving up their equipment on the ground. The road from now on large is opened and the deposits of supply of Tébessa are from now on within reach. But the keen resistance of American small groups isolated behind the enemy lines seriously slows down the progression of the forces of the Axis. Thus, at the second day of the offensive, of the operations of reduction of the pockets of resistance mobilize the Infanterie whereas the armor-plated spearhead always progresses along the two axes of attack. In the night of the February 21st, elements of 10th Panzerdivision are posted near Thala, a city having two road links towards Tébessa. If Thala falls and that 10th Panzerdivision takes the road more in the south towards Tébessa, the 9 {{E}} division of American infantry would be found crossed of its supply and the tactical grouping B of the 1 armor-plated division would be encircled between 10th Panzerdivision and the Italian-German troops progressing along the road southernmost. During this night, small French, British and American units manage to join their lines and reinforce the garrison of Thala. All the artillery of the 9th division of infantry, is 48 parts, also comes to reinforce the lines during the night after three days of walk. When the battle takes again the following day, the defenders are much stronger. They primarily made up of British infantry are largely supported by American artillery.

Because of its very stretched lines and lack of supply, Rommel decides to stop its offensive. Fearing that the 8th British army of Montgomery can cross the Mareth line quickly if it is not reinforced, the fox of the desert disengages its troops and is folded up towards the east. The February 23rd, an American air attack of great scale on the master key of Kasserine precipitates the fold of the troops of the Axis and the Allies take again the master key the February 25th.

Assessment

After this battle, the two camps study the results of them. For Rommel, the American troops are of bad quality of the fact at the same time of their equipment and their capacities. It is not a threat for him. It however makes the praise of a few units of which the second battalion of the 13 {{E}} American regiment armor-plated of the 1 {{era}} armor-plated division of the Général Orlando Ward. It describes the defense of Sbeïtla by this unit intelligent and fought well . During a certain time, the Germans use a great number of captured American vehicles. American side, the study of this first disastrous engagement involves an immediate reaction. The commander of the II {{E}} American Body, Lloyd Fredendall, is raised of his command and will not take any more part in a military action until the end of the war. Dwight Eisenhower realizes that the general Omar Bradley and others subordinated of Fredendall did not rely any on its command. This judgment was confirmed by the commander of the British first armed, the Lieutenant Général Kenneth Anderson which qualified it the inefficient one. The March 6th, the general George Patton takes the command of IIe Corps with for mission of improving the effectiveness of it. Bradley is named assisting of the commander of body.

Several officers are promoted or withdrawn. Thus the general Stafford Leroy Irwin, who ordered artillery of the 9th division of infantry during the battle of Kasserine, became talented ordering division. The commanders of unit accepted more latitude to make fast decisions according to the situation without having to refer about it to the hierarchy and they were encouraged to position their headquarters close to the lines. On the contrary, Fredendall had built a headquarters strengthened far from the face and seldom visited the lines. Moreover, Fredendall was accustomed to splitting up its units in groups smaller than the tactical groupings and which were blow easily encircled and submerged.

Efforts were made to improve the coordination of artillery and the air Support with the troops on the ground, coordination which was lacking during this episode. Whereas the use of an artillery support became much more flexible, the problem of coordination between the troops on the ground and the American brought closer air support was not regulated that with the Bataille of Normandy, 16 month later.

On its side, IIe Corps US changed its doctrines of engagement immediately and used its divisions as a great unit and either in several smaller groups with separated missions as Fredendall did it. At the time of the countryside of Sicily, the American forces had largely increased their capacities of combat.

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