Battle of Jutland

The battles of Jutland , or battles of Skagerrak for the Germans, is largest naval Bataille of the First World War and certainly one of most complex of the history. She opposed the Royal Navy British to the Kaiserliche Marine, imperial Marine German in the North Sea, to 200 km in the North-West of the Danish peninsula of the Jutland in May 1916.

After more than two years of waiting and several missed occasions, the Large British Fleet , ordered by the Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, succeeds in forcing the Hochseeflotte , the Fleet of open sea of the German imperial Navy, with the orders of the admiral Reinhard Scheer, with a great confrontation in the middle of the North Sea. The general battle, implying on the whole 250 ships of all types, started with 18:30, on May 31st 1916 and lasted two hours. Following the bad conditions of visibility and errors of the British, it was not decisive, in spite of the numerical superiority of the latter. However, Jellicoe succeeds in cutting the road of fold of the German ships towards their ports, and was persuaded on the occasion of a decisive battle for the next morning. But Scheer, given to save its fleet at any price, crossed the British device to the favor of the night and regained its bases of Wilhemshaven, with the shelter of the German minefields, depriving the Royal Navy of a victory certainly crushing.

The confrontation cost fourteen buildings to the British and eleven with the Germans, as well as thousands of human victims. The two camps asserted each one the victory. Even if it is true that the losses of the British in human lives and the ships were most important, the German sailors were not easily deceived and were aware to have escaped little with a disaster. The fleet of German high-sea remained consequently in its ports, except some short exits in August 1916 and April 1918. Admittedly, it continued to constitute a threat, obliging the British to maintain many units in the North Sea, but never more it did not try to dispute the control of the seas to its adversary. On the contrary, the German Navy was going to devote its principal efforts to the underwater war.

Two fleets face to face

With the opening of the hostilities in August 1914, the Royal Navy is found with the catches with its new rival, the German fleet, whose growth since the beginning of the century threatens British hegemony on sea. Even if the rate/rhythm of German naval constructions, doped by the policy imperialist of the Kaiser, were high, Royal Navy preserves an important at least numerical advance. As the Armies of Reich are then victorious and that the German navy was scalded by its demolished of Doggerbank, the orders of the latter are rather wait and see.

The British, on their side, were constrained to give up their traditional strategy of tight Blocus of the opposing fleet in its home ports. Henceforth, the existence of Underwater S, Destroyer S and especially of mine S, makes this one too hazardous. In place and place, Jellicoe, which takes the command of the Grand Fleet, chooses to practice a distant blockade, maintaining its fleet in the ports of the the United Kingdom, ready to install in a few hours, if an attempt at exit of Hochseeflotte is announced. Moreover, at the beginning of the war, its numerical superiority is marginal because six of its dreadnoughts are in recasting, Audacious, having run up against a mine, ran, and it had to detach three of its cruisers of battle to regulate the fate of the squadron of Von Spee. It prudently decides to deliver the combat only if Hochseeflotte ventures in the septentrional part of the North Sea. At the beginning of 1916, the admiral von Pohl who ordered Hochseeflotte hitherto, reached of a terminal illness, is replaced by the Vice-amiral Reinhard Scheer. As the terrestrial face was enlisé and that the total underwater Guerre had to be suspended following the protests of the United States, after torpedoings of the Lusitania and Arabic, Scheer will try, consequently, to use its fleet of surface in a more offensive way.

The German plan

According to Scheer, the German naval strategy must initially aim at inflicting the maximum of losses to the British fleet. On the one hand by offensive raids against the naval forces occupied with the monitoring and the blockade of bay of Helgoland and, on the other hand, by the damping of mines along the British coasts and of the underwater attacks as frequent as possible. The sought-after goal is to establish a numerical balance between the German and British fleets and, this balance reached, to seek in the second time the decisive battle, in the most unfavourable possible circumstances for the adversary.

Indeed, in 1916, the Hochseeflotte had only 18 linerships to oppose to the 33 of Large Fleet and, under these conditions, it was not possible to risk direct confrontation. To divide for better reigning, such was the watchword. While launching raids at sea of North, the Germans hoped to attract in traps of small British squadrons which then would be attacked and destroyed, without possibility of being helped. It failed to trap the squadron of cruisers of battle of the vice-admiral David Beatty, as of the March 26th, but refused the risk of a combat by heavy weather. April 21st, a raid of bombardment on Yarmouth, turned him short also, when Seydlitz touched a mine.

At the end of May, German admiralty had planned an immense operation intended to make leave the squadron Beatty of its bases. Initially, a great number of U-boot (ten) was going to be placed in ambush, with broad of the British naval bases, then a raid of bombardment, would be launched along the coast of the Sunderland what would not fail to cause a British reaction. The British ships would undergo initially the attack of the submarines, then the intact ships would be attracted towards the Dreadnought S of Hipper and are destroyed.

The British answer

However, which was unaware of the German naval staff, it is that the British Admiralty was able to decipher its coded messages (see the Combat of the island of Odensholm) and that it was thus informed of its intentions. The British intercepted and deciphered thus on May 28th a German message, ordering with all the ships to be ready to take the sea the 30. Other messages were intercepted and, though they were not deciphered, it seemed clear that an operation of scale was in hand.

Large Fleet, is 34 dreadnoughts and 3 cruisers of battle thus left Scapa Flow on May 30th, under the command of Jellicoe, before even as Hipper does not leave on its side the Estuaire of Jade. The squadron of Beatty (4 dreadnoughts and 6 cruisers of battle) left off the Firth Forth, the same day. Jellicoe and Beatty were to meet to 145 km in the west of the Skagerrak, off the coast of Jutland, to await the Germans there.

Within Royal Navy, the doctrines which prevailed then were that a fleet preparing with the combat was to move in several parallel columns forming a frontline. That made it possible to operate relatively more easily: several small columns could indeed modify their direction all while maintaining their formation, more quickly than long and single column. In addition, the signals by houses and projectors of the ship-admiral, generally placed at the head central column, could be thus seen immediately by the greatest number of ships. On the contrary, in single column, the transmission of the signals, the head to the tail of the column, could take ten minutes, without counting that the smoke released by the chimneys often prevented from identifying the signals emitted by ships other than those immediately nearby. Moreover, each building having to confirm the received orders, the delay put at their execution was some thus increased of as much.

For the combat itself, the various columns were to meet in only one, the buildings of head swivelling of 90 degrees, with port side or starboard according to the cases, each ship imitating in succession the operation of the preceding ship. The major difficulty was to form the line in the right direction, and whereas the enemy was not yet in sight. It belonged to the reconnaissance patrols, made up of cruisers of battle and cruisers to find the adversary and in good time to prevent large forces of the direction of its arrival, while trying to prohibit with the ships enemy scouts to obtain similar information. Each fleet tried, on its side, to carry out the consistent traditional operation with Barrer T and which allows the fleet located on the horizontal bar of T to make use of a possible maximum of guns, whereas that located on the vertical bar can draw only with the guns from prow. Generally, this tactic proved concretely unrealizable and the combat often consisted of intense exchange of artillery between two fleets following parallel roads roughly.

Fleets

The British had a comfortable numerical superiority, with twenty-eight modern linerships against sixteen and six older, nine cruisers of battle against five. This superiority was also found in the light ships, in terms of tonnage, the British opposed 151.000 tons to the 61.000 their adversaries. On the other hand, the Germans profited from a more precise artillery, partly because the British had chosen a control of artillery, stressing the rate of shooting, the capacity perforating their shells was better, and the shielding of the German ships ensured a better protection to them. Moreover, in Royal Navy, the appearance of the propelling loads made up of powder without smoke, like the Cordite, had involved a relaxation of the procedures of storage and handling of the explosive matters, which was going to appear determining.

( For the fire control system , one will be able to refer to the Naval artillery page ).

The shock

The trap German Sous-marin was completely ineffective. Not only it did not run a ship, but moreover, it does not provide any indication useful to Scheer on the position of the enemy fleet. This inefficiency must partly be put at the credit of Jellicoe which made leave its buildings by small groups and not in block. Thus a German submarine in faction (not identified) warns Scheer by TSF which he saw 2 dreadnoughts, 2 cruisers and several destroyers with 60 nautical in the east of Firth off Forth, course in South-east. Another submarine, U66, will announce 8 battleships, of the cruisers and other boats moving to the North-East. But this partial information, like those of the station of listening and deciphering of Neumünster, will not light the German admiral.

Jellicoe went instead of go without being worried. But, armature in error by the intelligence services of admiralty, it thought that the Germans were much more distant than they were it actually.

The engagement of the cruisers of battle

With 14:20, on May 31st, ships of recognition of the squadron of Beatty saw enemy buildings in south-east. Light units which supervised a Danish neutral vapor sailing between the two fleets, located obviously committed German boats in a mission similar to their. Beatty sought to take with reverse the German ships to cut them their bases and, soon, the first exchanges of artillery of the battle started. The HMS Galatea, of the first squadron of light cruisers, engaged two Destroyer S which it took for cruisers. It was touched by the SMS Elbing , of the group of recognition II of the rear-admiral Bodicker, drawing in extreme limit from range.

The race in the South

With 15:30, Beatty saw the cruisers of Hipper moving towards the North-West. Hipper inflects its road to bring Beatty on the ships of Scheer. Beatty continued the enemy, while inviting the admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, ordering the 5th squadron of cruisers of battle, to follow it. However, this one, distant of almost 5 km to Beatty, could not read the signals. And as Beatty neglected to make confirm its instructions by projectors or radio-telegraph, the 5th squadron carried on its road during some time.

With 15:45, the ships of Hipper were with range of shooting and the two fleets on about parallel roads, with 14km of distance. Beatty opened the fire, which the adversary answered. The phase of the battle known under the name of “Race towards the South started thus”.

The orders given by Beatty were to engage the enemy on line, each ship attacking a German ship, while its own building the HMS Lion was caught some with the Lützow , the flagship of the opposing squadron. However, following a British error, the SMS Derfflinger was not taken with part and could draw without being constrained at all, whereas the SMS Moltke underwent him to it fire of 2 cruisers of battle.

The Germans carried the first blows; 3 of the British cruisers of battle were touched and the combat had lasted for more than 10 minutes already, before one of the buildings of Hipper does not box a shooting. A well adjusted salvo of Lützow destroyed the turret Q of the HMS Lion, killing out of the dozen sailors. But a major catastrophe was avoided thanks to the coolness of the commander of the turret, major Francis John William Harvey of the Royal Navy, however mortally wounded, which had the presence of mind to make close the door of the compartment with ammunition and to make it flood, thus preventing the explosion of the inflammable materials and volatile, thus saving the ship. The HMS Indefatigable did not have this chance; touched at three recoveries by shells of 280 mm of the SMS Tan Von DER, it was put out of combat, then completed by a salvo which reached its turret of 380 mm and bored the shielding of an ammunition store. It exploded then ran with all its crew, that is to say 1.019 men, among whom there were only 2 survivors.

Hitherto, the chance was with Hipper, but that was not going to last. The squadron of Evan-Thomas (4 " super-dreadnoughts" class Queen Elizabeth , armed with gun of 381mm) finally arrived, was going to tip the scales on the British side. Hipper was not able to retort with the shootings new arrivals, out of reach guns of its own ships, but it knew the very close squadron of Scheer and that its soft food mission touched soon at its end. The battle of the cruisers still intensified and, with 16:25, the HMS Queen Mary, touched by shootings coming from the SMS Derfflinger and probably from the SMS Seydlitz, disintegrated after the explosion of its powder stores. Only 9 of its 1.275 sailors survived the catastrophe. With the sight of this disaster, Beatty emitted this comment passed to the posterity: " It would be said that something does not go with our cursed vessels today, Chatfield"

The race in North

With 16:30, the HMS Southampton , 2nd squadron of light cruisers of Beatty, directed by the commodore William Goodenough, saw large forces Scheer to arrive, dodging gusts of salvos of heavy gauges to be able to precisely evaluate the number and the type of the enemy ships: 16 dreadnoughts and 6 old linerships. At the same time, a battle of destroyers developed within the cruisers of battle and, in the confused fray which began, the SMS Seydlitz was torpedoed, the Nestor ordered by the Bingham captain, ran two destroyers, the V-27 and the V-29 , before itself as well as NOMAD are not in their turn touched and given up with the arrival of the dreadnoughts of Scheer.

The arrival of the latter led Beatty to break the combat towards 16:45, and to go back to North towards Jellicoe, while hoping to involve with its continuation the German fleet. This part of the battle started thus which one called " the Race in Nord". Once more, Beatty was unable to transmit its orders satisfactorily. Blow, the superones of the 5th Squadron continued their approach towards Hochseeflotte while the cruisers turned the back to him. When finally they started to transfer edge, obeying the instructions of Evan-Thomas, they did it in succession and not all at the same time, offering to the ships of Scheer all the leisure them to correctly aim and, during one moment which seemed an eternity, they underwent the increasingly precise fire of the German ships. The HMS Malaya thus undergoes heavy losses, which heavier if its captain did not have, of its own initiative, would still have been anticipated the operation of retirement. That being, the British artillerists defended themselves rageusement and inflicted serious damages with their adversaries.

Jellicoe was now informed of the imminence of the great battle, but its information on the German positions and their road remained insufficient. Against admiral Horace Hood was charged to go to the front of Beatty with its 3rd squadron of cruisers of battle, to lend to him hand-strong, while the 1st squadron of cruisers of the rear-admiral Arbuthnot was to patrol in avant-garde of large forces of Jellicoe to prevent any possible operation of envelopment by the adversary.

Towards 17:30, cruiser HMS Black Prince of the squadron of Arbuthnot saw the light cruisers of Beatty, thus establishing the first contact between the two bodies of Large Fleet. At the same time, the signals of the cruiser HMS Chester, which slipped by behind the buildings of Hood, were located by the German vessels of avant-garde, ordered by the rear-admiral Bodicker, which opened fire at once. The Chester was terribly abused before the squadron of Hood, informed, does not make half-turn and arrives on the spot of the combat.

The flagship de Hood, the Invincible HMS , put out of combat light cruiser SMS Wiesbaden while the three other ships of Bodicker returned to any vapor towards Scheer and Hipper and, confusing the ships of Hood with those of Large Fleet, affirmed that this one arrived of the North-East. The German destroyers entered in action against the British buildings in order to slow down their speed and to make it possible large forces to put itself in battle order.

The battle of the fleets

A difficult deployment

Meanwhile, Beatty and Evans-Thomas had taken again their combat with the cruisers of battle of Hipper but, this time, under advantageous visual conditions. After several of its ships were damaged, Hipper joined Scheer towards 18:00, at the moment when the Lion of Beatty was located by the HMS Iron Duke of Jellicoe. This one questioned Beatty on the German positions, but Beatty remained dumb during almost 10 minutes.

Jellicoe, which had over-estimated the distance from the enemy forces, was in an uncomfortable situation, waiting to know the position of the Germans to form his line of battle. Indeed, according to their source, alignment should be done either on the column of the east, or on that of the west and, obviously, that was to be made before their effective arrival.

The deployment on the west had the advantage of bringing closer the British to Scheer, which made it possible to save time, whereas the twilight arrived; but the Germans could occur before the operation is not finished. The deployment on the east moved away Large Fleet de Scheer, but offered the chance to be able to bar T and would make it possible to see the ships of Scheer being profiled at the horizon. Only, alignment required 20 invaluable minutes and the two fleets were close one to the other, sailing with their reciprocal meeting at full speed. With 18:00, Jellicoe ordered alignment on the column is.

While Jellicoe hesitated over the tactics to follow, Hipper and Scheer, now joined together, sank full north towards the British. However, Scheer was unaware of that Jellicoe had taken the sea. During this time, the four cruisers of battle of Beatty crossed the convoy of the dreadnoughts to join the battleships of Hood, lack éperonner in the operation the HMS Defense , the ship-admiral d' Arbuthnot. This old obsolete cruiser by no means had its place in the battle which was announced between dreadnoughts modern, but its commander wanted to take part in the combat to complete the SMS Wiesbaden. In company of the HMS Warrior , it was ruait for the quarry when it was pulverized by the powerful ships of Scheer and Hipper, and disappeared with all its crew (903 men) in a spectacular explosion which was seen by the near total of the buildings of the Grand Fleet . The HMS Warrior was also severely touched, but he escaped the disastrous fate from the Defense . Indeed, the German shooting was diverted by the superdreadnought HMS Warspite near which slipped by to nearly 25 nodes to try to go to the same pace as the buildings of the fifth squadron, trying to follow the cruisers of battle of Beatty in their race towards North, and which ends up blocking its rudder. Deriving in broad circles, it offered a prey of choice to the German dreadnoughts, infinitely more trying that the HMS Warrior . Touched thirteen times, the HMS Warspite survived the massacre, and regained its home port on order of Evan-Thomas.

At the time when the HMS Defense ran, Hipper returned in the field of fire of the third squadron of Hood. The Invincible twice touched the SMS Lützow in lower part of the water line; the SMS Lützow and Derfflinger counteracted by a broadside of shell of 305mm. The British exploded and cut himself into two. Hood and all its men, except for 6 survivors, disappeared with the ship.

Jellicoe bars T

Towards 18:30, the quarrel between the two fleets really started, Jellicoe being able to indeed bar T with Scheer. HMS '' Iron Duke '', flagship of Jellicoe, inflicted a series of blows to the goal with the dreadnought of head German, SMS König . During ten minutes, the British were tactiquement in a very favorable position; however, only ten dreadnoughts on the 24 that counted the Grand Fleet opened indeed fire. As for the Germans, the gravity of their situation was amplified by the bad visibility.

Including/understanding finally that it had dark head dropped in a trap, Scheer ordered the retirement, towards 18:33, and the German ships succeeded in being extracted from the fray, benefitting from the coat of fog and smoke which wrapped the battle field. Conscious of the risks caused by the torpedes for its buildings, Jellicoe did not continue directly but put the course at the south, determined to keep the Hochseeflotte on its west.

The act of madness of Scheer

Scheer realized fully that it did not make enough sinks to be able to distort company without damage with the British. Also, with 18:55, he chose a daring measurement and put the full course is, right on the ships of Jellicoe. He underlines in his memories: " The operation was to surprise the enemy and to upset its plans and, if the things were really badly, it would facilitate the escape the night tombée".

For the second time, shortly after 19:00, the 2nd squadron of light cruisers of the commodore Goodenough essuya shootings of the German dreadnoughts to restore the visual contact with the Hocheseeflotte ; Jellicoe again barred T with Scheer, but in a more effective and destroying way that previously, inflicting severe damages with the Germans, particularly with the third squadron of the rear-admiral Behncke, who carried out the Germanic fleet. For the second time in less than one hour, with 19:17, Scheer was folded up towards the west, while launching its destroyers with the load on the adversary in a combat of back keeps, with the support of the four cruisers of battle of the First group of recognition still in a position to fight, in order to prevent the British from launching out to the continuation of large of its fleet. Itself had to give up the SMS Lützow , definitively out of combat. In the desperate fight which followed, the Germans underwent 37 blows with the goal and only two inflicted any. With him only, SMS Derfflinger was touched 14 times! That being, with 20:24, Scheer and its large units benefitted from carnage to disappear in the falling night.

The night escape of Scheer

Taking into account deficiencies of its ships for the night combat, Jellicoe decided, with 21:00, to avoid major engagements with the enemy and to await the paddle to take again the battle. He placed a screen of cruisers and destroyers behind his fleet of battle to patrol in rear-guard, while he shingled towards the south, to cut the road of return of Scheer towards Ems. Actually, this one had decided to cross the wake of Jellicoe and to escape by the Chenal of the Horns Reef. Happily for Scheer, the British scouts once more appeared unable to locate its route. As for Jellicoe, it could not anticipate an operation as daring as that which consisted in passing in its wake. At all events, the operation of Scheer compared to the inaction of Jellicoe confirms the undeniable German control of the night combat.

The course of the events of the night was quite as confused as the remainder of the battle. The HMS Southampton , boat-admiral of Commodore Goodenough, was seriously damaged but succeeds in running light cruiser SMS Frauenlob , with 22:23, (320 missings, no survivor). At 2 o'clock in the morning, the HMS Black Prince , unfortunate 1st British squadron, explodes under the shootings of the SMS Thüringen (857 missings, not of survivor). To 2:10, several flotillas of destroyers launch attacks to the torpedo against the large German buildings. The fray is wild: 5 cast destroyers on the British side, prédreadnought SMS Pommern (844 missings) cast on the German side and the SMS Rostock touched by a torpedo. Moreover, in the confusion of the engagements, the SMS Posen éperonna the SMS Elbing , which was abandoned. Finally the SMS Lützow was scuttled towards 1:45, after being given up by the 1.150 survivors of its crew.

Roof of bad luck for Jellicoe, the intelligence services of the navy in London intercepted a message giving the exact position of the Hochseeflotte , but they were not able to transmit it in good time. When Jellicoe was informed finally of the place where Scheer was, towards 4:15, the battle was definitively finished. But if the hecatomb had ended, it was as clear as Jutland would not be a new Trafalgar for the British Navy.

An incomplete victory

For two years that the sailors of Royal Navy awaited this confrontation with their adversaries of Hocheseeflotte, the conclusion of this battle has left them a back taste of unfinished. Admittedly, the fleet of Scheer has flees twice vis-a-vis the guns of Large Fleet, and does not have at any time, seemed able to dispute British total supremacy. But trapped, the German fleet succeeded in escaping and remaining a threat for Royal Navy. For the British, such a battle should have had like conclusion, logic with the sight of their numerical superiority, the destruction of the fleet of German surface.

Another reason of dissatisfaction, importance of the British losses: Germans asserting of the disproportion of the losses asserting even the victory, though they could not obtain the control of the sea. On the whole, the British lost fourteen ships, against eleven German, put out of combat. Owing to the fact that three of those were cruisers of battle, their human losses are raised also, 6.094 English sailors against 2.551 Germans, but also in tonnage, 111 compared with 62 thousands of tons.

Tactiquement, the British thus gained an expensive and imperfect success. However, from a strategic point of view, the British victory is clearer. Many other buildings having been damaged on both sides. At the conclusion of the battle, the British had still 24 dreadnoughts and cruisers of battle in a position to fight against only ten on the German side. Their damaged vessels will quickly be given in state, contrary to those to the Germans and the latter will hardly any more leave their ports, and will have to be satisfied henceforth, to constitute a potential threat, preventing Royal Navy from redeploying all its forces in other engagements, as the Bataille of the Atlantic.

Deficiencies of Royal Navy

The battle is often quoted in example like illustration of the technological and operational delays of Royal Navy compared to the German imperial Navy.

In his report/ratio, Jellicoe writes this: " The point worrying of the battle of the cruisers of battle, is that 5 buildings, facing six British ships of similar class constant, after the first twenty minutes and certainly at long distance, by the shooting of four linerships of the class Queen Elizabeth , were able to send by the bottom the Queen Mary and the Indefatigable … the circumstances which contributed to the British losses, are due initially to the insufficiency of the shielding of our cruisers of battle, and, in particular, that of the turrets and the bridges and, then, with our dependence of a good visibility…. The German night organization is very good. Their system of indication excel. Ours is null. Their projectors are higher than ours and they control the use fully of it. Lastly, their techniques of night shootings give excellent results. I must admit that we have to learn much from them as regards combat nocturne."

Let us add that until 1914, the schools with fire on the British ships were done at a maximum distance of 8.700 meters. On another side, Jellicoe explained why " the fire of artillery starts to 20 km and becomes effective around 16,4 km… so that the large buildings are with the shelter of the launched torpedes (…) one should not approach with less than 9.000 meters… as this distance is insufficient to make it possible to avoid the attacks of the flotillas, it is good to remain at least with 14 km". This explains why the British could draw, can be more quickly, but less better at these distances than their adversaries.

During the summer 2003, plungers examined the wrecks of the Invincible , of the Queen Mary , the Defense , and the Lützow in order to examine the reasons for which, the British buildings implosaient. The main cause seems to be the imprudent handling of the propelling loads of principal artillery, containing Cordite. The British doctrines privileged the rate of shooting rather than the precision. However in practice, cordite could not be provided rather quickly the artillerists by the hoists and the hatchways. Consequently to go more quickly, of the doors of safety which should have been closed between each shooting remained open to facilitate the fast routing of the product between the compartments and the turret. Moreover, the German cartridges were brass cylinders; the British, them, made use of silk bags! And, to finish, logical consequence of the doctrines recommending a rate of shooting raised, decision was taken, in 1913, to increase by 50% the equipment out of shell and cordite for each ship in order to prevent that it is not with court of ammunition at the time of the combat. The ammunition in advance, powder and shells, are then stored in the turrets or the hoists without particular protections. In other words the British ships had been transformed into floating explosives magazines. The memories of Alexander Grant, gunner on board the Lion prove that some British officers were perfectly conscious of the dangers of a negligent handling of cordite:

" With the replacement of the powder by cordite for the loading of the guns, the rules of prudence essential to the handling of the explosives were inconsiderately slackened, I regret having to say it, on all the levels service. This negligence in the respect of the procedures aboard ships, is explained by two reasons. Initially, cordite is much less dangerous to handle than the powder. Then and especially, the modifications made to the explosives magazines on board ended up giving a feeling of false safety… The replacement of wood by iron or metal, flashlights, open metal doors because there was no slide to pass the ammunition; all that gave the officers and the men an impression of facility and peace of spirit incompatible with the material explosifs" handling;.

After the battle, Admiralty wrote a critical report/ratio on laxism in force concerning the handling of cordite. Let us note how this overpowering ratio for the officers of the fleet was buried when Jellicoe was promoted at the station of " First Sea Lord" and Beatty with that of chief of the Large Fleet .

This battle will also clarify the two other weaknesses of the British fleet:

the perforating capacity of the British shells was insufficient: shieldings of 203 mm resisted direct shootings of shell of 381mm. The shells broke even on the shielding. They did not have either rocket of delay, allowing the explosion only after having penetrated the shielding.

the communications between his ship and commander-in-chief were disastrous. Even when British ships were in contact with the enemy, Jellicoe had the majority of time no idea of the place where this last was.

The battle also showed that the British cruisers of battle were used in a role for which they were not planned. These buildings had been designed according to the principle defined by the admiral John Arbuthnot Fisher, the father of the dreadnoughts, who had affirmed that best shieldings was still speed. They were thus built to be faster than the battleships, to have a better control of shooting, and to be capable of effective artillery shootings while remaining out of reach adversary. But they were not designed to face battleships. A poor design, united with an unhappy use, mainly explain the losses undergone by the British.

The controversy between Jellicoe and Beatty

Following this battle, one will attend extraordinary a controversy, which will put at the catches the partisans of the two admirals. This controversy will have a great repercussion on the other side of the channel, during more than one ten years.

See: Controversy of Jutland

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