Battle of France

During the Second world war, the battles of France is the German invasion of the Netherlands, of the Belgium of the Luxembourg and the France in 1940. The offensive begins the May 10th 1940 while putting fine at the Drôle of war , and finishes the June 22nd by the capitulation of the French armed forces and the signature of the Armistice of June 22nd, 1940 by the Pétain government.

The national territory is then divided into several parts: a zone occupied by Germany in North and the West, a zone occupied by the Italy in South-east and a free Zone under the authority of the Vichy government. The Belgium , the Luxembourg and the Netherlands are also occupied following this battle. They recover freedom only as from 1944.

Be a prelude to

The Funny one of war

Genesis of the German plan

In the beginning, the OKW, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (High-Command of the Wehrmacht), considered an attack of the western face by recommending a strategy of envelopment of the armies allied by north; to some extent a resumption of the Plane Schlieffen of 1914 which would have brought powerful a Groupe of armies B, of the general Fedor von Bock, stations in the north of the German face, to overflow the units free-anglo-Belgians on their left wing, by an offensive armor-plated through the Belgium and the Netherlands, and to fold back of them the elements demolished on the Lorraine area. Then, in the second time, it was planned to take out of clipper the remaining allied troops; the group of armies B coming from the west pushing back them on the group of army has of the general von Rundstedt, placed vis-a-vis the Northern area and at the Alsace, and which would have played the role of an anvil on which best allied divisions would have been definitively crushed.

However, following the crushing of the Polish forces in less than one month, and having become aware of the remarkable tactical value that represented the tandem tank-aviation of attack, Hitler, which always hoped to find a payment political with the conflict in progress with the Westerners, did not cease giving the date of the beginning of the operations to the western. This specific respite made it possible to the general von Manstein to subject a new plan to him. This one, baptized by Winston Churchill “of [[Sichelschnitt]]” (blow of forgery), took the opposite course to the preceding theory and recommended an attack in come force, no longer of north, but of the center. It left the assumption that it was necessary to surprise the adversary with the chink in the armor then, the surprise passed, to take it speed in a fast forward movement towards the Manche: the pivot of the offensive could be only through the wooded solid mass of the Ardenne, area defended by French units reservists badly armed and under equipped and precise place where one had stopped the construction of the Ligne Maginot. This new plan, from its boldness even and its logic as well tactical as strategic, Hitler filled with enthusiasm which imposed it on a reticent OKW.

Consequently the Fall Gelb was born; from now on the weight of success rested on the Groupe of armies of the center, the group of army has, which one hastened to reinforce the operational capacities by placing at his disposal the two-thirds armor-plated forces of all the army.

Forces in presence at May 10th

Combined

Wehrmacht

(A) this figure takes into account only the number of really operational planes

State of the German forces armor-plated at September 1st 1939 and the May 10th 1940:

Fall Gelb : terrible days of May 1940

The opening of Sedan

The turning of Dunkirk

Fall Belch : the invasion of France

June 6th, the offensive begins again then towards the south with a crushing numerical superiority and in spite of a heroic resistance of certain French units, the German advance is very fast. The German forces arrive at the edge of Expensive (the " frontière" future line of demarcation).

June 10th, the Italy declares the war in France but its offensive is blocked in the Alps.

The collapse and the request for armistice

June 14th, the armoured tanks reach Paris declared open Ville and on June 22nd, France signed the armistice with Rethondes, in the forest of Compiegne.

After this catastrophe, and in spite of the signature of the armistice, the soldiers of the Maginot line continued the fight, estimating not to be overcome, and for some until mid-July. The army of the Alps does not have on its not failed side, by pushing back rather easily all the attacks of the Italian Armée until the last days with combat.

Most of France is occupied by the German troops, the country is divided into a zone occupied and managed militarily by Germany (northern, western and south-western), and into a free zone (center and south) which is managed by the Vichy government of the marshal Philippe Pétain.

the armistice

As soon as the decision to require the armistice was made by the new government Pétain, the June 17th, each one expected worst. It was enough to remember the drastic conditions, not to say humiliating, which had accompanied the French agreement reached with plenipotentiary German by November 1918, to consider a terrible reaction of the authorities of the III {{E}} Reich.

It went from there differently for the France of June 1940: not only the allied armies had been destroyed or captured, but still, nearly the two-thirds of the national territory was occupied by the Wehrmacht. The armistice leaves side the French fleet, accepts the existence of a " free Zone " having its own independent government and its army reduced to 100 000 men (like the army of the treaty of Versailles) and went even until obliging their Italian ally to withdraw some their requirements, particularly those concerning the fleet and the Tunisia. He true that such an attitude was not to last and that many in the government new the French State, is elected the July 10th 1940, quickly last déchanter within sight of the new German requirements: : 400000000 of francs per day for the maintenance costs of the troops of occupation, foreign exchange rate forced between the Reichsmark and the frankly, which allowed the various economic services military administration and S to undertake a systematic plundering of the France, without speaking about the armistice councils which imposed very strict limits on the theoretical autonomy of the authorities of free Zone and conditions " opposites with the honneur" concerning refugees anti-nazis.

Paradoxically, and before such a state of affair does not worsen, it is Operation Catapult, carried out in July 1940, in order to neutralize definitively risk that represented fleet French, and which leads to the disaster of Seas-el-Kébir, which was to bring the German authorities to more flexibility in their relation with the government Pétain, going until considering at the request of this one a policy of Collaboration. In order to sign the Hitler armistice made withdraw the coach of the armistice of 1918 of the museum where it was exposed and given in the forest of Compiegne (at the same place as on November 11th, 1918). The day of the armistice, Hitler arrived late. On its arrival, the German anthem was played. It went to sit down in the same place as that of the Foch marshal in 1918. The signed armistice, Hitler left the coach and went to see the statue of the Foch Marshal where with his feet, there were a German eagle terrace and an inscription " the German pride broken in this place ". Hitler laughs.

Reasons of the French defeat

In spite of a current idea, the French Army was far from being lower than the German army in quality and quantity, except the fields of the Aviation and the anti-aircraft defense. The sky is however not empty, as it was often known as, even if the French hunters really able to compete with their German counterparts are still too very few within the units, like the Dewoitine D520, with only thirty-six specimens. However, the aviators and the anti-aircraft defense arrive to results: 20% of Messerschmitt-109 aligned in April 1940 were cut down. The French artillery, contrary to the first world war and the war of 1870-1871, does not have anything to envy its counterpart German. In spite of a spread myth, the panzers of Wehrmacht do not have anything invincible in themselves, quite to the contrary. France has SOMUA S35 and the B1/B1 (a) which are among the most powerful tanks of Europe. Their shielding resists all the German anti-tank guns of the time, like with the guns of the Panzer II, III and Panzers IV and their armament exceeds that of the majority of the panzers. If it is true that the majority of the tanks in service are light armoured tanks, it is also the case in the German armor-plated divisions, where the tank most powerful, the Panzer IV, only able to compete with the tanks Somua S-35 and B1 (a) French, accounts for only approximately 10% of the armoured tanks in service.

Alors why France was overcome so quickly in 1940?

At the tactical level, mainly because of the doctrines of use of the weapons , in particular of the armoured tanks. Whereas them: 2592 panzers German are gathered within ten very autonomous and coherent divisions, of approximately 250 armoured tanks supported by motorized infantry, genius and artillery, more of two thirds of the four thousand two French tanks are divided into Groupements of battalions of tanks of a hundred machines to the various armies, without any operational autonomy, nor support. For the staff French of the time, the armoured tank remains mainly, as in 1918, an element of accompaniment and support of the infantry.

The French tanks are thus designed consequently and, in spite of their shielding and their higher armament, suffer from many gaps compared to German. The quasi total absence of communication system radiophonic, in addition, the rare available ones on the heavy tanks fall very often broken down, in comparison all the German tanks have modern and reliable radios. An autonomy always reduced because of their design as a support of infantry, which combines with the weakness of the refuel system. One notes also the prevalence of single-seat turrets where the chief of vehicle is overloaded. In a certain way, worst the côtoie the best. One sees nevertheless, of frank successes, even resounding, as with Stonne, with more than 100 destroyed German tanks, including twelve by only one tank B1 (a), or Hannut and Montcornet. But the French tanks however have few opportunities of showing their superiority, and cannot influence the course of the events, because the war carried out by the Germans goes more quickly than them.

If the combined use of aviation and the armoured tanks explains the French defeat partly, it is insufficient with it only. Worked out and put into practice on the tactical level by the Germans at the time of the countryside in Poland in 1939, its effectiveness against the French Army was still prone has guarantee within the German command before the release of the operations. Even if it receives an unfavorable echo there, because of ideological conservatism staff, it is known also in France and could be applied, by some of his theorists, like the colonel Charles de Gaulle. France then has seven armor-plated divisions: 1st, 2nd and the 3rd mechanical light divisions and 1st, 2nd, 3rd and the 4th armoured divisions. Admittedly, the two last were a little made up with haste after the beginning of the conflict, but the majority are more powerful than their equivalent allemandes, even if they are a little less better organized.

This idea of an irresistible German tactic, the Blitzkrieg , seems to be proposed after the defeat, to minimize the responsibility for the French military chiefs, in the French rout, their errors on strategic planning having been many and serious; dice the Lawsuit of Riom, the Vichyist authorities which have to judge the " fautifs" great rout of spring 40 go until advancing the figures (at the very least whimsical) of: 7500 tanks and of more than: 5000 planes put on line by the Wehrmacht. An arithmetic handling ridiculous good to hide a reality much simpler and much more prosaic. The historians, in particular Anglo-Saxon, such Kenneth Macksey or John Keegan carry today a new glance on this historical episode, and call more and more into question the German superiority. The German historians make in the same way like Karl-Heinz Frieser which, when it gives an account of the transfer a few months before 1940 of the means motorized of very many German divisions to only divisions charged to apply the plan of Hitler, uses of this metaphor: the German army resembled a lance with a tempered steel point, whose handle, out of wood, appeared all the more rotted since it was long Pourtant this point of steel carried a mortal blow to the Allies.

One can wonder about the possibility that had France to continue the fight.

It should be stressed that the German forces underwent losses day laborers higher than those observed in the Opération Barbarossa and that they were in a perilous situation on the plan Logistique at the time of the Armistice.

A report/ratio of Guderian transmitted to OKH at the beginning of October 1940 indicates that the committed German forces in France needed 4 to 6 weeks of stop before taking again the projection towards the south.

State of the fuel: 15% of the needs.
State of the ammunition: 17% of the needs.
State of transport by trucks: 25% to 30% of the necessary number.

Under these conditions, several historians estimate that one could have slowed down the German advance sufficiently a long time so that the French forces can be folded up in North Africa with an intact navy.

Chronology

on May 10th, 1940, the German army launches an offensive on the western face, with 141 divisions, 2 air fleet including/understanding almost: 4020 planes and 1 body of armoured tanks. Holland capitulated at the end of five days, the German troops were in Brussels on May 17th, then in Antwerp the 18. During this time, the division of armoured tanks of the general von Kleist advanced in Luxembourg and crossed the Meuse, close to Sedan.

on May 13rd: the countryside of France was practically played.

on May 20th, the German armoured tanks approached Abbeville.

on May 28th, the Belgian army capitulated, the British troops were concentrated in Dunkirk from where they were evacuated by the sea.

on June 6th, the German armoured tanks continued their victorious walk towards the south. The French Army in full rout was not able to contain the attack: June 14th, the armoured tanks reached Paris.

on June 22nd, France signed the armistice with Rethondes, in the forest of Compiegne. Most of France remained occupied by the German troops. The country was then divided into a militarily occupied zone and a free Zone managed by the Vichy government of the marshal Philippe Pétain.

See too

References

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