Battle of Điện Biên Phủ

Ðiện Biên Phủ is a small plain in the North-West of the Vietnam in the Province of Lay Châu in the top Tonkin, and in which the small town of Ðiện Biên Phủ is. Ðiện indicates an administration, Biên a frontier space and Phủ a district, that is to say, in francized terms, “place chief of frontier prefectoral administration”. In Thai, the city names Muong Tanh .

After its conquest in November 1953 during the Operation Beaver, it was, one year later, the theater of a violent battle between the task force French, composed of troops of the colonial Foreign legion of troops parachutists, artillerists, riders, airborne troops para. Subway, regiment of the genius, health, groups of hunting of the air force. Without forgetting troops of Africa, as our valorous battalion Vietnamese parachutists which composes the Member States of the French Union. Under the command of the colonel de Castries (named General during the battle) and the main part of the troops Việt Minh under the orders of the general Giáp.

This battle saw the victory of the general Giap the May 7th 1954 and was the last of the Guerre of Indo-China, excluded the ambush of the Mobile Group 100 with An Khé a few days before the Agreements of Geneva. The France left the northern part of Vietnam (Tonkin), after the Accords of Geneva signed in July 1954 which founded a partition of the country along the 17th parallel.

__TOC

Battle order of the belligerents of November 1953 has May 1954

The Armed popular Vietnamese

Việt Minh

Infantry

Division 308: Regiment S 36,88 and 102
Division 312: regiments 141,165 and 209
Division 316: regiments 98,174 and 176
Division 304: regiments 9 and 57 only

It is advisable to add 2 Bataillon S of regiment 176 and 3 battalions of regiment 148, engaged in the fight against the Thai maquis of the GCMA (Grouping of Airborne Mixed Commandos on the model of the Chindits of Orde Charles Wingate). Cf on the GCMA

Artillery

heavy Division 351:

regiment 45 (24 parts of 105 HM2)
regiment 675 (18 guns of 75 mm mountain and 20 mortars of 120 mm
regiment 237 (mortars of 81 and 82 mm)
military regiment 151 of Engineering
regiment 367 of DCA (100 machine-guns of 12,7 mm and 80 Soviet guns of 37 mm MOD. 1939)

The unit represents approximately 80.000 men by including/understanding the services and the supply chain. One estimates, very confused, the losses with 23.000 men.

The GONO (Operational Grouping of the North-West)

French Union
Vietnam

Parachutists

2nd Battalion of the 1 {{er}} regiment of hunters parachutists (II/1er CCP) CB Bréchignac
1st Battalion of colonial parachutists (1st BPC) CB Bazin de Bezons
6th Battalion of colonial parachutists (6 {{E}} BPC) CB. Bigeard
8th Battalion of parachutists of shock (8 {{E}} BPC) CB Tourret
1 {{er}} foreign Battalion parachutists (1st BEP) CB Guiraud
2 {{E}} foreign Battalion parachutists (2nd BEP) CB Liesenfelt
1 {{E}} and 3 {{E}} company of the 5 {{E}} Battalion of Vietnamese parachutists (5th BPVN, 5th Bawouan ) CB Botella
Company of command of the 5 {{E}} Battalion of Vietnamese parachutists

Infantry

Foreign legion:

1st Battalion of the 2 {{E}} foreign regiment of infantry (I/2e REI)
3rd Battalion of the 3 {{E}} foreign regiment of infantry (III/3e REI)
1st and 3rd battalions of the 13 {{E}} half-brigade of Foreign legion (I and III/13e DBLE)

Army of Africa:

2nd Battalion of the 1 {{er}} regiment of Algerian riflemen (II/1er RTA)
12th company of the 3rd Battalion of the 3 {{E}} Regiment of Algerian riflemen (III/3e RTA)
5th Battalion of the 7 {{E}} Regiment of Algerian riflemen (V/7e RTA)
1st Battalion of the 4 {{E}} Regiment of Moroccan riflemen (I/4e RTM)
2 {{E}} grouping of tabors Moroccan.

Colonial troops:

2nd and 3rd battalions Thai

Army Vietnamese:

301e Vietnamese battalion

Back-up troops:

Company of white Thais plus remainders of the light companies military back-up troops (CLSM) of the 1st mobile grouping of Thai partisans (GMPT 1). It will be noted that many units were transported by air with at least part of their back-up troops. Moreover, the partisans Méo are present group of airborne mixed commandos (GCMA).

armor-plated Weapon cavalry

3rd squadron of walk of the 1 {{er}} regiment of hunters with horse (3/1er RCC), including a group of RICM. Equipped with 10 tanks M24 Chaffee.

Artillery

2nd group of the 4th colonial artillery regiment (II/4e RAC), with 12 parts of 105 HM2
3rd group of the 10th colonial artillery regiment (III/10e RAC), with 12 parts of 105 HM2
11th battery of the 4th group of the 4th colonial artillery regiment (11/IV/4e RAC), with 4 parts of 155 HM1
2 sections of the 1st anti-aircraft group of colonial artillery of the Far East (1st GAACEO), equipped with quadruple mountings of machine-guns of 12,7 Misters
group of walk of the 35 {{E}} regiment of light artillery parachutist (GM/35e RALP)
1st alien company heavy parachutists of mortar (1st CEPML), with 12 mortars of 120 mm
2nd mixed company of mortars of Foreign legion (2nd CMMLE), with 8 mortars of 120 mm
1st alien company of heavy mortars of the 2nd foreign regiment of infantry (1st CEML), with 8 mortars of 120 mm

Genius

31e battalion of genius (2 companies)
17 {{E}} company of genius parachutist

Aviation

21e and 23e air groups of observation of artillery (21e and 23e GAOA) equipped with Moranes Locust
group of hunting 1/22 Saintonge, equipped with F8F Bearcat
flotilla of recognition Overseas n°80 (EROM 80), equipped with F8F Bearcat

Moreover, the fortified camp profits from the air means from the air force and the Naval Aviation.

Intendance

operational Group of exploitation n.1

Health

mobile surgical Antenna n.9
mobile surgical Antenna n.44
surgical Antenna parachutable n.3
surgical Antenna parachutable n.6
surgical Antenna parachutable n.5

Interarmes

company of command of the operational zone of the North-West
9th company of command and of the services
6th company of command and of the services

The camps profits from various units technique and services such as company of HQ, service of the material and the gasolines, transmissions, antennas surgical, etc

The manpower of the garrison at May 7th, 1954 is assembled to 14.014 men including/understanding the companies of services then of logistics, the French Army counts 2293 dead in its rows. Only 3.290 prisoners, out of 11.721 soldiers return alive to France. 7.801 miss. What did they become? But never this question was not put.

The battle

the operation Beaver

In the morning of the November 20th 1953, within the framework of the Operation Beaver , two battalions of French parachutists, the 6 {{E}} BPC (Battalion of colonial parachutists) of the commander Bigeard and 2/1er CCP (2nd battalion of the 1st Regiment of hunters parachutists) of the commander Bréchignac seize Ðiện Biên Phủ, defended by a not very important detachment of the army Vietnamese soldier-Minh. In the weeks which follow, after restoration of the landing strip built by the Japanese, the French convey by planes men, material, weapons and ammunition with Ðiện Biên Phủ. This air noria functions for four months to create, supply and reinforce the fortified camp. The heavy material (artillery and armoured tanks) is dismounted with Hanoï, is transported in spare parts and is re-installed on arrival.

The preparation Vietnamese soldier-Minh

The Vietnamese soldier-Minh makes convey an important logistics by the sides of the mountains which surround the camp on bicycles.

The attack

The attack is started the March 13rd against the fulcrum “Beatrice” held by the 3/13 DBLE (3rd battalion of the 13th Half-Brigade of Foreign legion) ordered by the commander Pégot.

Fifty thousand men with a Artillerie, mainly made up of mortars, many and effective submerge at the end of 56 days the 14.014 French of the fortified camp. The planes, coming from Hanoï, were in limit of operating range, constrained in addition by a capricious weather (Mousson).

The soldiers Vietnamese soldier-minh who had dug under Éliane 2 a long gallery, explode there more than 900 kg of TNT, a few hours before the French garrison is not definitively submerged, the May 7th 1954. Order writes cease to it fire of the lieutenant colonel Bigeard, related to lieutenant Allaire on May 7th, 1954 at Diên Biên Phu, to Eliane3 position with 17:00. The fortified camp fell to 17:30.

Plans of the French

Driven back with defensive positions, the French staff had as an order to resist while waiting for possible “an Operation Vulture” which consisted in utilizing the American army and its bombers B-29 in order to destroy the positions vietminhs. The staffs of the two countries even planned to use the atomic bomb to arrive at their ends, if the conventional bombardments had suddenly failed. The American political officials gave up this option, with the approach of the conference of peace of Geneva in order not to lead to a situation of no return. But it is not the only reason: indeed, the United States needed the authorization of the Congress to intervene on Diên Biên Phù and, according to the general Bedell Smith (who answered the petitions of the ambassador of France on the other side of the Atlantic) “success depends on the acceptance of London”. Churchill receives M.Massigli (ambassador of France) in the morning of April 27th, (...) and says to him: “ do not count on me. (...) I underwent Singapore, Hong-Kong, Tobrouk. The French will undergo Diên Biên Phù . ”

Analysis of Roger Delpey

In January 1954, the general Clement Blanc, chief of staff of the Army, goes in Indo-China at the request of the French government with for mission of submitting a report/ratio on the situation in Indo-China and particularly on the basis of Ðiện Biên Phủ.

On the spot, the Blanc general realizes “ that there was a capital defect in the French preparation: one had completely been unaware of the artillery ” enemy by thinking that “ the Viet Minh would not have the means of hoisting the pieces of artillery on the peaks of the surrounding mountains ”.

With his right-hand man, colonel Henri Mirambeau, it has “ written the 8 and February 9th 1954 a ratio of 16 pages whose conclusion was: it is urgently necessary to evacuate Ðiện Biên Phủ which is a fortified town promised with the destruction ”, the historian Roger Delpey pays who discussed on several occasions with each of the two soldiers and had under the eyes a specimen of this report/ratio.

The February 10th in the morning, a meeting gathers with Saigon the Minister for Defense Rene Pleven, its Secretary of State to the War Pierre de Chevigné and the chief of staff of the armies, the general Paul Ely. The White general their bed his report/ratio and “ the conclusion makes the effect of a clap of thunder ”, note the historian.

Rene Pleven was carrying a delegation of powers for the control of the Guerre of Indo-China, delegation given by the president of the Council Joseph Laniel. However, it does not modify anything. “ Rene Pleven explains why it is not question of evacuating Ðiện Biên Phủ, because we pledged towards the United States and the Vietnamese government ”.

At the time, the the United States provided weapons and budgets very high to the French government so that it holds its military device in Indo-China “ because it was the time when the United States carried high the banner of the fight anticommunist ” in the Business of the piastres.

However, the withdrawal was technically possible. The general Pierre Fay, chief of staff of the air force, ensured the Blanc general, before the meeting of Saigon, which it could “ to evacuate Well the garrison of Ðiện Phủ into five or six days by air means ”, to carry part of the material and to make jump the remainder. “ the most valorous troops of the Vietnamese soldier-minh were not yet close, they converged ” towards the basin.

Roger Delpey thinks that the report/ratio Blanc “ was choked ”. The general Henri Navarre, commander-in-chief in Indo-China, had decided to use Điện Biên Phủ for “ to protect the Laos by attracting the units Vietnamese soldier-minh and by breaking them at this precise place ”, the historian recalls. However “ it was unaware of the drafting of this report/ratio and the conclusion. He learned it only much later ”. “ One considering a war leader not to be informed forever of a fact being of such an importance ”, he notices.

Source AP, Roger Delpey

Introduction

By enlarging the feature, like symbol and emblem, the battle of Diên Biên Phu east to the decolonization what the storming of the Bastille in 1789 was in revolutionary Europe. To have a complete and major comprehension of this battle, it is necessary to approach the levels policy, strategic and tactic of this armed confrontation which marked the end of a Psychological warfare. The Battle of Diên Biên Phu led to the Agreements of armistice of Geneva of June 1954 which will put an end to the First Guerre of Indo-China, also said independence or, for French, war of Indo-China

The political level is that of the choices between war and peace and the stock management at the broadest level. The strategic level is that of the choice of the battles, soldiers and diplomatic, and of the stock management within a war. The tactical level is that of the choice and the organization of the engagements inside a battle.

The information, (the knowledge of the environment and the internal states) and logistics (provisioning) are found on these three levels.

The policies Frenchwoman and Vietnamese around Diên Biên Phu

With the massive arrival of the American military aid in Vietnam, directly with the CEFEO (French Task force in the Far East) on the one hand and indirectly at the Vietnamese State for its “national army” in formation, the French chiefs felt sufficiently in strong position to engage a decisive battle, to destroy the Vietnamese body of battle and to finish this war. The body of battle vietminh threatened to widen its sphere of activity in mountainous country of Laos what would have given him advantages strategic and tactical, by transforming its material weakness into advantage of lightness within the framework of the combat of light infantry.

Side vietminh, the establishment of the GONO (operational Grouping of the North-West) at Diên Biên Phu was only one minor detail. Even if Diên Biên Phu is a crossroads of pedestrian and equestrian tracks, its importance remains minor for the Armée popular Vietnamese who was configured, upon the departure, to operate in zone difficult of access and to pass where the others did not pass. The policy Vietnamese to extend to the Laos the zone of combat did not suffer from the establishment of a French garrison to the chief place (Phu) of the hamlets of Diên Biên in the district of Lai Chau of the Western North, now divided into two with the grouping of “Diên Biên”.

The policy option to engage the battle at Diên Biên Phu was taken with the advertisement of the possibility of a conference in Geneva on Korea, well after the installation of the French garrison at Diên Biên Phu. the chiefs of the latter, sure of them, refused even the proposals of a supplement of materials. Thus, colonel Piroth, ordering artillery, ensured that no shell could fall on the garrison and that its contrebattery would destroy any enemy artillery immediately. Following the demonstration of its impotence to destroy the enemy batteries, it committed suicide with a grenade as of the first days of the battle.

Following the beginning of the battle of Diên Biên Phu, the Conference of Geneva on Korea was gradually transformed into conference on Indo-China. The General Vo Nguyen Giap explained that the decision (most important of its life) to attack Điện Biên Phủ was made to place Vietnam in strong position and to give an weighty argument to the delegation Vietnamese led by Pham Van Dong to this conference.

Strategies

From the French point of view

From the French point of view, the strategy of Điện Biên Phủ is inspired by the techniques Chindits: an enclave in the jungle, in the middle of the enemy territory, an operational base entirely dependant on air transport for insertion and the supply, allowing the control of a broad zone. This tactic had been employed successfully with Na-San in October - December 1952. Điện Biên Phủ is close to Hanoi by air and very far for the popular Army Vietnamese through tracks of jungle. Logistic calculations of the Operations research gave a report/ratio very favorable for the French side, in terms of daily tonnage.

Old Japanese airfield, the choice of this valley was adapted, although it is surrounded by high hills. For the French strategists, the popular army Vietnamese could not place her artillery. On the slopes hidden for the garrison, the slope is too strong to give him a sufficient range. The other pouring was, as for him, at sight of the garrison and the contrebattery could neutralize any enemy artillery quickly settling there. But the popular army Vietnamese, by her enormous capacity in arm, could dig tunnels across the hills, hoist its howitzers and offer several sites of shooting on the garrison without being seen.

Moreover, one quasi permanent cloudy screen in period of monsoon made its access air difficult at sight (and the radars of flight did not exist more or less). Once the airfield destroyed by the artillery Vietnamese, the fate of the French garrison of Điện Biên Phủ was regulated. Was going to follow only one war of attrition between a supplied vietminh many and a garrison which could not allow the least loss.

In the beginning, Điện Biên Phủ was to be the base of mobile units to radiate in all the district of Lay Chau with its American light tanks M24 “Chaffee” (called “Bisons” by the garrison). For this reason a rider, colonel de Castries, was with the head of the GONO (operational Grouping of the North-West). The camp was protected by a network from fulcrums to the female names. The artillery shells of the Armée popular Vietnamese reduced this mobility to a trench warfare while making the aerodrome unusable and removing the major asset of the garrison: its airlift for its supply and its raison d'être as bases attack and of patrol. This mobility was reduced to counter-attacks in knacks of parachutists on the hills which surround the basin, without never being able to exceed them.

From the point of view of the popular army

For the popular army, the battle of Điện Biên Phủ was an artillery battle to immobilize the adversary and to deprive it of logistics which supplies the troops with the combat. The French believed the adversary unable to use its artillery and did not hide and did not protect their installations destroyed as of the first salvos (cf Jules Roy).

The artillery Vietnamese was mainly made up of guns of 105 mm American manufacture, howitzers of recovery coming from the Chinese spoils of war in Korea or the civil war against the Chinese nationalists. Having learned the lessons from its cuisante demolished Na San, Giap profited from the massive assistance Chinese in the field of artillery, as well ground-to-ground as ground-to-air, which had an major importance in the prohibition of the air support.

The artillery Vietnamese was hoisted with mountainside to back of man. When a cord broke, a soldier made use of his body on the wheels to stop the descent. He became a hero of the battle, sung in the thatched cottages.

With the unforeseen developments, as it arrives in any battle, French aviation was clearly exceeded and had to call upon the services of the CAT (Civil Air transport). the French garrison was supplied by parachuting of troops and equipment with the planes C-117 Flying Boxcar of CAT (Civil Air Transport) of Claire Chennault, American general of aviation honoured in China and in the United States for its “flying tigers” during the Second world war in China.

Logistics Vietnamese was based on tracks of jungle and the Peugeot bicycles adapted to a payload of 500 kg pushed for foot. It preceded future “the Piste Ho Chi Minh” which supplied later the engagements in the South during the Second War of Indo-China or Guerre of Vietnam.

From the point of view of the French Army of Indo-China, the choice of Điện Biên Phủ was judicious on strategic planning, with the crossroads of the pedestrian and equestrian tracks towards Laos, and also on the tactical level of a landing strip which allowed a massive supply by airlift since Hanoi. In addition, this runway is surrounded by high hills which would prevent the adversary from using its artillery with the choice to draw on the rising slope out of sight, but of a strong arrow, and thus of short range which would prevent it from reaching the potential targets or to draw on the downward slope which would reveal it with the shootings of the French contrebattery of Colonel Piroth the artillery. In addition, such an artillery would have only one small quantity of ammunition provided by logistics of transport pedestrian and cyclist of the popular army.

From the point of view of the popular army, on strategic planning, the choice to fight in Điện Biên Phủ was the military argument for the Geneva conference which opened to discuss on Korea, but whose principal subject was Indo-China, as everyone knew it. Indeed, the guerilla is not the “small war of the poor” and it is not either the war of the light troops of the style of the operations of commandos. The guerilla is a strategic envelopment of attack on the higher level of the political order. The political level is that of the choice between the diplomacy or the war and of the choice of the battles to be delivered in the diplomacy or the war. The guerilla is characterized, in his practice, by the effect of surprise psychic and the effect of shock physical, effects reflected and amplified by propaganda. On the tactical level of the popular army, there was, in priority, the destruction of the airfield by artillery to deprive the French garrison of its vital provisioning. For that, it was necessary to dig through the mountain of the galleries and sites of shooting at sight. The exit of the battle was thus sealed. The battle of Điện Biên Phủ was mainly a battle of artillery and logistics, transforming the GONO (operational Grouping of the North-West) to radiate in high area in a fortified camp. Vietnamese side, its goal is at the same time soldier and diplomatic to force the adversary to negotiate in unfavourable position.

The combat of infantry were intended mainly to maintain the pressure and to demoralize the defenders of the garrison who lost the initiative upon the departure of the first artillery shootings.

In the history of humanity, there are only two large philosophers of the war: Sun Tzu at the time bloody of Confucius and Carl von Clausewitz which was the disciple of Napoleon in the “all-out war”.

For Clauzewitz, “the war is the unlimited use of the rough force”.
For Sun Tzu, “the war is the art of the fraud”.

Confrontation between these two ways of thinking on the war is expressed in the war of Indo-China (1945-1954) also named first War of Indo-China for the independence followed then of the war of the Vietnam or second War of Indo-China (1955-1975) for the reunification of Vietnam. The dating varies with the origins with the remote repercussions or starting from the immediate causes with the suspension of the hostilities. Indeed, the end of First divided Vietnam into two military zones of regrouping to reunify by elections chief clerks two years later in 1956, elections which did not take place and of sabotages in sabotages, this reunification was carried out by the right of the force when the force of the right of the agreements of Geneva were not implemented.

These two wars clearly had a political goal of independence and of unit and the military actions were used as argumentation for diplomatic negotiations in order to achieve the political goal. From this point of view, the art of the fraud is in the “bluff”” play of Poker in which each protagonist tries to make accept the others that it with the best “hand” at one convenient period where moment means at the same time “urgent” and “power struggle”. The Vietnamese part practiced the war like the art of the fraud, while the part French, and then American, practiced the war like the unlimited use of the rough force. In both cases of figure, the result was the independence of Vietnam in 1954 and the unit of Vietnam in 1975. The weather remains in Vietnam to be her economic development already in right track, the day before the 21e century. In 1979, there was also short “a Third War of Indo-China” at the borders and Kampuchea and of China, more known in the public by the media under the name of “teaching wars” which resulted from the remote sino-sovetic quarrels and of the antique Contentieux sino-Vietnamese whose Vietnam had to pay the price of their support in the two preceding wars for its independence and its unit.

Tactics

The French tactics were defensive of a garrison besieged and surrounded by hills to the steep slopes. It could count only on vain counter-attacks of parachutists to foot who did not miss courage and of heroism. Important facts of weapons were sung for the young people sent to butchery. These counter-attacks could not exceed the line of the tops and last a long time by the incapacity to supply them and to support them of a fire support.

The tactics Vietnamese, at the beginning, were a frontal attack of infantry to finish some as fast as possible by waves of assault. This tactic proved to be expensive for tiny results. The tactics following Vietnamese were that of the seats, longer and less expensive, with saps and tunnels of approach to launch the final attack to nearest. The whole, of the strategy to the tactic, was planned, organized is implemented according to the date of opening of the Conference of Geneva where the diplomacy directs and delimits the possible military operations.

It belonged to division 308 of the General Vuong Thua Vu to give the blow of thanks to the French garrison, division of infantry which was of all the battles in “high areas”, of the “disasters” of CAD Bang and Lang Its in 1950 until that of Điện Biên Phủ. It was also this division 308 which entered the first Hanoi released in 1955, in way symbolic system, like the armor-plated Division of the Général Leclerc in Paris released in 1944.

Conclusion

At the political level, the battle of Điện Biên Phủ is the example of the military argument to support the diplomatic arguments in the negotiations to finish a war with the Conference of Geneva in June 1954.

At the strategic level, Điện Biên Phủ is the example in a way of thwarting the plans of the adversary, by cancelling its logistic firepower and its advantages.

At the tactical level, Điện Biên Phủ is the example of the method of Vo Nguyen Giap of a business in 2 times and 3 movements, the time of a long preparation meticulous follow-up of that of a fast and complete execution. The 3 movements are that of a concerto which is the fight of an instrument against all the instruments of the orchestra, that is to say “rapid-slow-rapid” or “slow-rapid-slow” according to the fluctuating situation of the battle field. The thrust was given by Division 308 of the general Vuong Thua Vu for the unconditional capitulation of the garrison and walk towards the places of detention of the prisoners of war.

The battle of Điện Biên Phủ is often a subject of study in the Military academies and the military and strategic studies of Politologie. It illustrates the fact that a war is at the same time diplomatic, military and political like said it and writes often Vo Nguyen Giap ().

War crimes and camps of rehabilitation

Attack of the medical convoys of evacuations.
Business Georges Boudarel
3.290 prisoners, out of 11.721 soldiers return alive to France.
has Geneva, one discussed. Mendès France wanted to finish some within a time that it had set itself. One month. This is why undoubtedly it had given up evoking the future fate of these tens of thousands of men who attested, the weapons with the hand in the high valleys of Indo-China, their refusal to be delivered, feet and fists bound, with these Tonkinois, these foreigners whom they had always fought. One should not cause additional difficulties with our negotiators, was to answer the presidency of the council the Ely general who had pled the cause of the mountain minorities.
France closed the eyes, stopped its ears, concealed its voice. Just like it was to remain forever quiet when, the " cease the feu" once signed, it could make the calculation of the prisoners of Diën Biën Phu, you captured 11.721 soldiers of the French, valid or wounded Union. 3.290 were returned to us. 7.801 miss. What did they become? But never this question was not put.

See too

OJ of April 25th, 1954. Decision n.18
on a proposal from the Secretary of State to the War. The Minister for National defense and the Armed forces. City with the order of the army Indo-China (regularization).
the Garrison of Diên Biên Phu .
" For several weeks under the command of the colonel of Castries, the troops of the French Union which constitute it have pushed back day and night the keen attacks of a much higher enemy in nombre".
" The heroic sacrifice of those which fell, the savage tenacity of the combatants add a new glory to the honor of our armes".
" Linked in the will to overcome, officers, warrant officers, corporals and soldiers the admiration of the free world, pride and the gratitude of France deserve. Their courage is a model forever exemplaire".
This quotation comprises the attribution of the Military Cross of the theaters of external operations with palm .
the Secretary of State to the war, signed: P. of Chevigné.
Makes in Paris the signed on April 7th, 1954: R.Pleven
Poem :
courage is a flashover to be it which soaks the armies . It is the first of the virtues, whatever the beauty of the names of which they relative . a soldier without courage is a Christian without faith . courage is what it moreover crowned there in an army ; no one does not have the right to disturb its limpid and fertile sources .

Articles of Wikipédia

War of Indo-China
War of Vietnam
Điện Well Phủ, the film of Pierre Schoendoerffer realized in 1991.
Georges Boudarel

External bonds

www.dienbienphu.org : site devoted to the battle and counsel by the ministry for defense
www.memorial-indochine.org : site dedicated to the victims. One finds there in particular the memorial digitized with the 34.935 names of the victims French are Guerre of Indo-China
http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2004/07/RUSCIO/11315
official site of the ANAPI (National association of the Former prisoners of Indo-China)

Bonds media

Files of the French and American current events

The News Magazine off the Screen (May 1954)

Historical files of defense

To supply Diên Biên Phu: the oral testimony of an aviator.

Retrospectives

Testimony of the General Giap, 50 years after the battle (2004)
Testimony of the General Bigeard, 50 years after the battle (2004)
Testimony of Pierre Schoendoerffer, 50 years after the battle (2004)
Extracts from " Dien Well Phu" , the docudrama of Schoendoerffer (1992)

Bibliographical references

Bernard B. Fall

The Vietminh Mode (1954), Vietminh (1960, French translation, Hake)
The Two Vietnams (1963), both Vietnams (1962, French translation, Payot)
“Indo-China” 1946-1962 (1962, Laffont)
“Vietnam Witness, 1953-66” (1966)
Hell in has Very Small Place: The Sits off Diên Biên Phu (1966), Diên Biên Phu, a corner of hell (1968, posthumous French translation, Laffont)
“Diên Biên Phu a corner of hell”, special Nam n°45, Atlas editions, 1989
Anatomy off has Crisis: The Laotian Crisis off 1960-1961 (posthumous publication 1969).
Jules Roy, the battle of Diên Biên Phu , Julliard, 1963; Albin Michel, 1989.
Pierre Rocolle, Why Diên Biên Phu? , Flammarion, 1968.
Erwan Bergot, 170 days of Diên Biên Phu , Presses of the City, 1992.
Henri de Brancion, Diên Biên Phu: artillerists in the furnace , Presses of the City, 1993.
Roger Bruge, men of Diên Biên Phu , Perrin, 1999.
Martin Windrow, The last valley , Weidenfeld & General Nicolson, 2004.
Vo Nguyen Giap
http://www.bibliomonde.net/pages/fiche-livre.php3?id_ouvrage=2647
http://www.bibliomonde.net/pages/fiche-livre.php3?id_ouvrage=2648
http://www.bibliomonde.net/pages/fiche-livre.php3?id_ouvrage=2649
Thanh H. Vuong, “Theory of the contexts and international relations: departure of the first War of Indo-China”, in International studies , vol. XVII, No 3, p, 571-597, September 1986
Thanh H. Vuong, “Colonizations of Vietnam and Vietnamese colonialism”, in International studies , vol. XVIII, No 3 pp. 546-571, September 1987. Asian
Thanh H. Vuong, “technical-commercial Strategies”, in International studies , vol. XXII, No.3, pp. 551-575, September 1991.
Men of war n°18, special Diên Biên Phu , History & Collections, 1989.
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