Algerian Civil war

The Algerian Civil war ( black decade or decade of terrorism ) opposed the Algerian government, having of the national popular army and police force, various the group islamist S starting from 1991.

It is estimated that it cost the life more 100 000 people . The conflict ended in the victory of the government, follow-up of the rendering of the Islamic army of the hello and the defeat in 2002 of the Islamic Groupe armed (GIA). However, of the engagements always continue in certain sectors.

The conflict began in December 1991, when the government brutally cancelled the elections after the results of the first turn, anticipating a victory of the Islamic front of the hello (MADE), fearing to lose the capacity and that this last sets up a Islamic Republic. After the prohibition of MADE and the arrest of thousands of its members, various groups of islamist Guérilla emerged quickly and began an armed struggle against the government and its partisans. They were constituted in several armed groups, of which the principal ones are the Islamic Mouvement armed (MIA), based in the mountains, and Islamic Groupe armed (GIA), based in the cities. The integrist ones have at the beginning concerned the army and the police force, but certain groups attacked the civilians quickly. In 1994, while negotiations between the government and the leaders of MADE imprisoned were with their maximum, the GIA declared the war with MADE and with its partisans, whereas MIA and various plus small groups gathered to form the Islamic army of the hello (BOARD), honest with MADE.

In 1995, the talks failed and a news election took place, gained by the candidate of the army, the general Liamine Zéroual. The conflict between the GIA and the BOARD intensified. During following years, the GIA made a series of massacres aiming of the whole villages, with a peak in 1997 around the parliamentary elections, which were gained by a party lately created favorable to the army, the democratic national Rassemblement (RND). The BOARD, subjected to attacks of the two edges, chose in 1997 for a unilateral cease-fire with the government, whereas the GIA tore following its new policy of massacre. In 1999, the election of a new president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was followed of a new law amnestying the majority of the combatants, which justified a return to the normal life. Violence decreased appreciably, with the victory of the government. The remainders of the GIA itself had practically disappeared in 2002.

However, a dissenting group of the GIA, the salafist Group for preaching and the combat (GSPC), based mainly with the periphery of the Kabylie, was made up in 1998, being dissociated from the massacres. Aiming at the army and the police force for the majority, it rejected the amnesty and continued its combat. At present (in 2006), its comparatively sparse activities are the only combat persisting in Algeria. However, a complete end of violences is not yet in sight.

Liberalization, prelude to the war

At the end of 1988, the Face of national release (FLN), sole party in Algeria since the Years 1960 which had remained with the capacity without too many problems, did not seem any more adapted to the situation. The government profited from the high price of the Pétrole, and when, in 1986, the oil price passed from 30 $ to 10 $ the barrel, the planned saving sudden in strong constraints, with the shortages and the rise of unemployment. In October 1988, of the demonstrations against the president Chadli Bendjedid took place in all the Algerian cities, proposing the rise of the Islamisme among the demonstrators. The army, while shooting at the demonstrators, made more than 500 dead and shocked the population by the brutality of the answer.

The answer of the president was to undertake a reform. In 1989, it proposed a new constitution which removed the sole party, and the reference to the Socialisme, while promising “freedom of expression, of association and assembly”. Towards the end of the year, political parties, whose Islamic front of the hello (MADE), were formed and were recognized by the government.

MADE incorporated a broad spectrum of the mobility of the islamist opinion , represented by its two principal leaders. Its president, Abbassi Madani, professor and combatant at the time of independence, represented a religious conservatism relatively moderate and symbolically related to the war of Algerian independence, source of the legitimacy of the FLN to direct the pays ; he expressed a tepid attachment with the democracy, and placed the Charia above. The vice-president, Ali Belhadj, preacher with Algiers, more young person and less educated, had played a part in the demonstrations of October. It was known for its radical and aggressive sermons which gathered disappointed working youth and theislamist ones alarmed by the rejection of the Démocratie and the preserving islamist opinions on the women. MADE quickly became by far the greatest islamist party, with an enormous electorate particularly concentrated in the urban areas. In 1990, it gained the local elections with 54 % of the voices. The war of the Gulf reinforced the party, because it exceeded the opposition of the government to the operation Tempête of the desert.

In May 1991, DID it called with a strike to protest against the new electoral cutting of the government, denouncing a gerrymandering. The strike itself was a failure, but the enormous demonstrations organized by MADE in Algiers were effective; MADE agreed to stop the strike in June in exchange of equitable elections. A little later the more and more alarmed government stopped Madani and Belhadj, as well as a certain number of less important members. The party remained however, legal, and Abdelkader Hachani took control of it.

The progression of the party continued. It agreed to take part in the following elections, after the eviction of people such as Saïd Mekhloufi, which had recommended the direct action against the government. At the end of November, of islamist armed close to the extremist Takfir wal Hijra attacked a frontier station with Guemmar, announcing the conflict to come; elsewhere, calm tended reigned. The December 26th, SAVED it easily the first turn of the elections at the Algerian National Assembly; with 48 % of the votes, they gained 188 of the 232 seats and a government of MADE seemed inevitable.

Coup d'etat

The army regarded these results as unacceptable. MADE had openly threatened the members of the capacity in place, them condemning like antipatriotic, pro-French and corrupted. Moreover, the leaders of MADE were as well as possible divided on the advantages of the democracy.

The January 11th 1992, the army cancelled the elections, forcing the president Chadli Bendjedid to resign and recalling of its exile the combatant of independence Mohammed Boudiaf like new president. Many members of MADE were stopped: 5000 according to the reports/ratios of the army, 30 000 according to MADE, including Abdelkader Hachani. The prisons being insufficient to imprison everyone, of the camps were created with the the Sahara, and the men who wore a beard feared to leave in the street fear of being stopped as sympathizers of MADE. The state of emergency was declared, and much suspended constitutional laws. All the protests were choked. Defense organizations of the Human rights, like international Amnesty, announced the frequent use of the Torture by the government and the detention of suspects without loads nor lawsuit. The government officially dissolved DID it the March 4th.

The few activists of MADE remained in freedom took these events like a declaration of war. In the major part of the country, the remaining activists of MADE, as certain islamist more radical than DID it, took the maquis with weapons of fortune. Their first attacks against the security forces began hardly a week after the coup d'etat, and the soldiers and the police officers were quickly taken for targets. As in the preceding wars, the combatants were almost exclusively based in the mountains of the north of Algeria, where the forest and the maquis were well adapted to the guerilla, but also in certain urban sectors; the Sahara, rich in oil and gas, but very little populated remained peaceful during almost all the conflict. The independent source of currency of the government was thus mainly saved.

The tended situation was worsened by the collapse of the economy, this year, so much so that food aids were suspended. The hopes placed by the population in the apparently intact person of Mohammed Boudiaf were disappointed soon when it was victim in June of an attack of one of its own bodyguards. A little later Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj was condemned to 12 years in prison.

The August 26th, it became obvious that the guerilla aimed the civilians as much as the representatives of the State: the bombardment of the Aéroport of Algiers made 9 dead and 128 wounded. MADE condemned the bombardment as principal the other parties did it, but the influence of MADE on the guerillas appeared limited.

MIA was a resurgence of a movement of the same name, that of Mustafa Bouyali, eliminated by the army in 1987. However MIA, started again clandestinely in 1991, would have been infiltrated by agents of the secret services of the Algerian army (the DRS, Département of the Information and Safety, new name since September 1990 of the famous Military security, in the middle being able it since independence of 1962) . Anxious to control the islamist cores armed in gestation, the chiefs of the DRS had indeed decided to infiltrate them, policy which will lead with the development of the civil war to handling of great extent of perpetrated violence " in the name of the islam".

Since 1991, MIA was equipped by the DRS with " vehicles of services; the DRS wrote, printed and distributed itself certain leaflets; it would have also constituted of the " lists noires" to cut down in the Ghermoul Center, seat of the Management of against-espionage (DCE).

The first engagements seem to be carried out by the small group extremist Takfir wal Hijra and of the war veterans of Afghanistan. However, the first armed movement important to emerge, was the Islamic Mouvement armed (MIA), just after the coup d'etat. It was directed by the ex-soldier Abdelkader Chebouti, islamist of long time which had kept its distances with MADE during the electoral process. In February 1992, ex-soldier, ex-combatant in Afghanistan, and former head of safety with MADE, Said Mekhloufi founded the Mouvement for an Islamic State (MEI), which him, was not infiltrated yet by the DRS. The various groups organized several meetings to try to link their forces, accepting the principle of a gathering around Chebouti. September 1st, he denounced the lack of discipline and airport of Algiers attacks, which could move away from the supports. Whereas Takfir wal Hijra and the Afghans of Noureddine Seddiki joined MIA, the security forces gave the attack. The suspicions born of this attack prevented any later meeting.

DID itself organizes a clandestine network, with newspapers and even a radio related to MIA, and towards the end of 1992, it starts to diffuse since the foreigner of the official reports. However, the opinion of the movements of guerilla on MADE at that time is mitigated; a great part supports DID it, a significant minority, carried out by the “Afghans”, regards the political activity of the party as nonIslamic, and thus rejected the relationship with MADE.

In January 1993, Abdelhak Layada declares that its group is independent of that of Chebouti. The new faction becomes the Islamic Groupe armed (GIA). It was particularly active in Algiers, its suburbs and the urban areas. It took a hard position, being opposed to the government and with MADE, informant “Us kids the religion of the democracy. We affirm that political pluralism is equivalent to sedition” and publishing death threats against several chiefs of MADE and MIA. It was definitely less selective than the MIA, which insisted on the ideological formation; consequently, it was regularly infiltrated by the security forces, causing a frequent renewal as the leaders were killed.

In 1993, division between the movements of guerilla became clearer. The MIA and the MEI, concentrated in the " maquis" , tried to develop a military strategy against the State, aiming more particularly the security services and sabotaging or bombarding the establishments of State. Since its creation, the GIA was concentrated in the urban sectors, recommended and applied the massacre, whoever supported the capacity, including the employees of the State like the professors and the civils servant. He assassinated journalists and intellectuals (like Tahar Djaout), saying that “the journalists who fight Islamism by the feather will perish by the blade”. It intensified its attacks by aiming at the civilians who refused to respect his prohibitions, then it started to massacre foreigners, fixing a one month ultimatum before their departure “no matter who will exceed the one month deadline will be responsible for its death”. After some remarkable massacres, practically all the foreigners left the country; the Algerian emigration (often illegal) increased also appreciably, because people sought an exit with the conflict. At the same time, the number of visa S granted to the Algerians by the other countries fell appreciably.

Failure of the negotiations and internal conflicts

Violence continued during the year 1994, although the economy in same time started to be rectified. The negotiations with the the IMF had made it possible to re-spread the refunding of the debt; the government secured also a loan of 40 billion francs of the international community to liberalize its economy. As it became obvious that the disorders would continue during a certain time, the general Liamine Zéroual was named new president of the High council of State; he had the reputation to be more one man of dialog that a member of the éradicateurs of the army. Shortly after its taking of, it undertook negotiations with the leaders of MADE imprisoned, releasing certain prisoners as a sign of good will. The talks divided the political scene; the great political parties, in particular FLN and FFS (Kabyle and Socialist), continued to claim a compromise, while others in particular, the General union of the Algerian workers (UGTA), without forgetting groups of left or feminists such as the ultra layman RCD near to the éradicateurs . Some vaguely pro-governmental paramilitary movements, such as the Organization of the young free Algerians (OJAL), emerged and started to attack the civil defenders of Islamism. The March 10th 1994, more than 1000 prisoners (mainly of islamist) escaped from the prison from Tazoult, representing for the guerilla a success; later, the partisans of the theory of the conspiracy suggested that it was about a setting in scene to make it possible the security forces to infiltrate the GIA.

While waiting, under the direction of Sherif Gousmi (his chief since March), the GIA became the group more in sight in 1994. In May, DID it suffered an apparent blow when, several of its chiefs who were not imprisoned, with Said Makhloufi MEI, joined the GIA; since the GIA had published death threats against them in November 1993, this surprised many observers, which interpreted it as the result of the internal conflicts to MADE or like an attempt to reorientate the GIA. The August 26th, the GIA declared even a Califat, or Islamic government, for Algeria, with Gousmi like “Commander of the believers”. While as of the following day, Mekhloufi announced its withdrawal of the GIA, informant whom the GIA had deviated of the Islam and which this caliphate was an attempt of the ex-chief of MADE Mohammed Said to control the GIA. The GIA continued attacks on its usual targets, assassinating artists in particular, like Cheb Hasni, and in August adding a new practice to its activities: threatening the insufficiently islamist schools of Case of arson.

The guerillas faithful to MADE, threatened of marginalisation, tried to link their forces. In July 1994, MIA, as well as the remainder of the MEI and various small groups, was linked under the name of Islamic army of the hello (a term which had been sometimes employed by the guerilla favorable to MADE), declaring their allegiance with MADE and reinforcing with this fact DID it in the negotiations. Towards the end of 1994, they controlled more half of the guerilla in the east and the west, but hardly 20 % in the center, close to the capital, which was the principal establishment of the GIA. They published official statements condemning the blind attacks of the GIA against the women, the journalists and other civilians “not implied in repression”, and attacked the countryside of case of arson of the schools by the GIA.

At the end of October, the government announced the failure of its negotiations with MADE. Zéroual proposed in replacement a new plan: it programmed a presidential election for 1995, while supporting “éradicateurs” of the army like Lamari and organizing “militia of self-defense” in the villages to fight the guerilla. The end 1994 was marked by a notable growth in violence. During 1994, the insulation of Algeria was reinforced; the foreign majority of the news agencies left the country there this year, whereas the Moroccan border was closed and the foreign air lines were stopped. The lack of cover of the events by the press was still worsened in June by the government which prohibits with the Algerian media to not mention all news in connection with terrorism - glazes in official press releases.

Some chiefs of MADE, in particular Rabah Kebir, exiled themselves abroad. On the invitation of the the Community of Sant' Egidio based at Rome, in November 1994, they started negotiations in Rome with all the other opposition parties, Islamic or not (LADDH, FLN, FFS, MADE, MDA, Pt, JMC). They concluded a mutual agreement the January 14th 1995: the Platform of Sant' Egidio. It gathers a whole of principles:

respect of the human rights, the democracy, and the multi-party system,
rejection of the role of the army on the political scene and the dictatorship,
recognition of the Islam, the ethnic identities Arab and Berber as essential aspects of the national identity of Algeria,
request for handing-over in freedom of the chiefs of MADE, and the stop of the massacres and extra-judicial tortures in all the camps.

With surprised of much, even Ali Belhadj approved the agreement, which meant that DID it turned over in legality, by mutual agreement with the other opposition parties. However, a crucial signatory was absent: the government itself. Consequently, the platform had few immediate effects. The following months were marked by the massacre of approximately 100 islamist prisoners in the Révolte of prison of Serkadji, and an important success for the security forces at the time of the battle with Ain Defla, causing the death of hundreds the islamist ones.

In the final analysis, however, according to Andrea Riccardi which carried out the negotiations for the Community Sant' Egidio, “the platform encouraged the Algerian soldiers to give up single military confrontation and forced them to react by a political act”: the presidential election of 1995.

Cherif Gousmi was replaced with the head of the GIA by Djamel Zitouni. Zitouni extended the attacks of the GIA to the civilians on the French soil, at the end of December 1994 to begin with the diversion of the flight Air France 8969 then several bomb attacks during the year 1995. In Algeria even, it continued the plastic bomb attacks of car and the assassinations of musicians, sportsmen, and the nonbuckled women, as well as the usual targets. One could then wonder about the apparently against-productive nature of several of his attacks and put forth the assumption (encouraged by members of MADE abroad) that the group had been infiltrated by the Algerian secret services. The area in the south of Algiers, in particular, was dominated by the GIA, which called it “the released zone”, before being called like the “Triangle of dead the”.

The official statements of war between the BOARD and the GIA proliferated, and the GIA reiterated its death threats against chiefs of MADE and of the BOARD, assassinating a cofounder of MADE, Abdelbaki Sahraoui, with Paris. Foreign sources estimated whereas there was approximately 27 000 guerillas.

Continuation of the political expression, emergence of the militia

Following the stop of the negotiations with MADE, the government decided to organize a presidential election. The November 16th 1995, Liamine Zéroual was elected president with 60 % of the voices. The election was disputed per many candidates, including islamist the Mahfoud Nahnah (25 %) and Noureddine Boukrouh (less 4 %) and holding it of secularity Saïd Sadi (10 %), but except for MADE, all noted a strong rate of participation (officially 75 %, rate confirmed by the majority of the observers) in spite of the call to the abstention from MADE, the FFS and the FLN and the death threats of the GIA for all the voters (with the slogan “a voice, a ball”). An elevated level of safety was maintained for the election time until the day of the election, by a massive mobilization. The foreign observers of the the Arab League, UNO and the Organization of African Unity did not express any fundamental reservation. The elections were generally perceived by foreigners like completely free, and the results reasonably plausible, being given the choice limited candidates.

The results reflected the various opinions of the population, energy of the support for secularity and the opposition to Islamism to a desire of stop of violences, independently of the policy. The hope was born that the Algerian policy calms down finally. Zéroual benefitted from it to present a new constitution in 1996, which clearly reinforced the capacity of the president and by creating a second assembly, partly elected and partly named by the president. In November 1996, the text was subjected to a national referendum; while the official rate of participation was 80 %, this election was not controlled, and strong rate of participation was regarded as not very probable.

The policy of the government was combined with a substantial increase in the pro-governmental militia. These “militia of self-defense”, often called the “patriots” to make short, being composed local citizens pulled by the army and armed by the government, were organized in the cities “sure” and close to the zones of activity of the groups of islamist guerilla. The program was more or less well accommodated according to the areas of the country; it was appreciably reinforced with the passing of years, in particular after the massacres of 1997.

The elections were a reverse for the armed groups, which recorded a significant growth of the desertions right after the elections. Rabah Kebir of MADE answered the modifications in the popular opinion by adopting a tonality more reconciling with respect to the government, but this evolution was condemned by part of the Face and the BOARD. The GIA was shaken by internal dissensions; little time after the election, its direction killed the chiefs of MADE who had joined the GIA, showing them to try a recovery. This purging accelerated the disintegration of the GIA: the factions of Mustapha Kartali, Ali Benhadjar and Hassan Hattab refused to recognize the authority of Zitouni towards the end 1995, although they made secession formally only well later. In December, the GIA killed the chief of the BOARD for central Algeria, Azzedine Baa, and in January began to fight the BOARD like an enemy; in particular in the west, the war between the two movements was total.

Massacres and reconciliation

In July 1996, the chief of GIA Djamel Zitouni was assassinated by a ex-faction of the GIA and Antar Zouabri succeeded to him, appearing even bloodier.

The legislative elections were held the June 5th 1997. They were dominated by the democratic national Rassemblement (RND), a new party created at the beginning of 1997 by the defenders of Zéroual, which obtained 156 seats out of 380, followed by MSP (after the name change of Hamas) and the FLN with more than 60 seats each one. The analyzes this election were shared; the majority of the principal parties of opposition complained, and the success of the very new RND surprised everyone. The RND, the FLN and the MSP formed a coalition government, with Ahmed Ouyahia of the RND like Prime Minister. There were measurements of easing towards FIS : Abdelkader Hachani was released, and Abbassi Madani assigned with residence.

It is at that time that a new problem appeared. During April, Algeria undergoes massacres of a brutality and a width without precedent (see the Massacre of Thalit); other massacres had been made during the conflict, but always on a definitely less scale. Aiming particularly the villages or the suburbs without reference of age and sex of the victims, the partisans of the GIA killed out of tens, and sometimes even hundreds, civilians at the same time. These massacres continued until the end 1998, modifying the political situation notably. The south and is of Algiers, which had voted for MADE in 1991, were particularly struck; the massacres of Ray and Bentalha shocked in particular the international observers. Expectant mothers were broken and cut out in sections, of the children were cut of pieces or jetés against walls, the members of the men were cut, in their retirement the attackers removed young women to make sexual slaves of them. Although this quotation allotted to Nesroullah Yous, a survivor of Bentalha, is perhaps an exaggeration, it expresses the apparent mood of the attackers:

“we have all the night to rape your wives and the children, to drink your blood. Even if you escape to us today, we return tomorrow to finish you! We are here to return you to your God! ” The responsibility for the GIA in these massacres is undeniable. He asserted the massacres of Ray and Bentalha, describing them “as offerings with God” and the victims of “impious” defenders of the tyrants in a press release. This policy of massacres of civilians was one of the main reasons of the scission of the Groupe salafist for preaching and the combat (GSPC). At this stage, it had apparently adopted the ideology Takfir ist, according to which all the Algerians combatant not actively the government were corrupted at the point to be Kafir S , and could be killed “legally” in all impunity; an official statement not confirmed of Zouabri declared that “except those which are with us, all the others are apostates and deserve death”. Some think, that the reason for the destruction of a village came from the adhesion of this one to the governmental program, that he lives like a proof of disloyalty; for others, the competition with other groups (for example, the Faction detached from Mustapha Kartali) played a part.

However, for Ray and Bentalha, Amnesty International and the survivors raise that the army had hutments to a few hundred meters, but had not intervened; this and other details led some to see connections between the army and the GIA, and in particular to give in light the theory according to which the GIA was infiltrated by the secret police, not only among theorists of the conspiracy, but also among some Western researchers. In a certain case (the Massacre Guelb to el-Kebir and the Massacre Sidi Hamed) the Algerian newspapers suspected the BOARD, in spite of a flat denial of its participation; the credibility of these reports/ratios is not very clear.

It is at that time that the BOARD engaged an all-out war as well with the GIA, as with the government, being in an intolerable position. The GIA seemed a more immediate enemy, and the members of the BOARD feared that the massacres, that they had regularly condemned, are charged to them. The September 21st 1997, the leader of the BOARD, Madani Mezrag, ordered the unilateral cease-fire and without condition beginning on October 1st, “revealing the enemy who hides behind these abominable massacres. ” the BOARD was put mainly out of the political scene, bringing back the combat to a fight between the government, the GIA, and the various groups which left orbit of the GIA gradually. The Islamic League for Da' wa and Jihad of Ali Benhadjar (LIDD), formed in February 1997, was combined with the BOARD and observed the same cease-fire. During three years following, the BOARD negotiated a gradual amnesty for its members.

The GIA destroyed, GSPC continuous

After many international pressures appeared, the European Union sent two delegations, one of them carried out by Mário Soares, to visit Algeria and to inquire into the massacres in first half of the year of 1998; their reports/ratios condemned the armed islamist groups.

The cities became surer, although the massacres continued in rural sectors. The policy of massacres of the civilians of the GIA had already dug a ditch among its leaders, some rejecting this policy; the September 14th 1998, this dissension was formalized with the formation of the Groupe salafist for preaching and the combat (GSPC), was based in the mountains in the west of Kabylie and close carried out Hassan Hattab.

The September 11th, Zéroual surprised the observers by announcing its resignation. A new election was organized, and the April 15th 1999, the ex-combatant for independence Abdelaziz Bouteflika supported by the army was elected president with, according to the authorities, 74 % of the voices. All other candidates being withdrawn of the not very front election, mentioning the fear of frauds. Bouteflika continued the negotiations with the BOARD, and the June 5th the BOARD accepted the principle of its dissolution. Bouteflika accompanied this success by an amnesty of the government of a certain number of islamist prisoners condemned for minor acts and by submitting the law of civil harmony to the Parliament, a law allowing nonguilty islamist combatants of murder or rape to escape any continuation if they went. This law was finally approved by referendum the September 16th 1999, and a certain number of combatants, including Mustapha Kartali, benefitted from it to take again a normal life causing anger those which had been victims of the islamist ones. The direction of MADE expressed its dissatisfaction with respect to the results, estimating that the BOARD stopped the combat without having solved any problem; but their principal spokesperson out of prison, Abdelkader Hachani, was assassinated the November 22nd. Violence decreased, without any time to disappear completely, and the calm one returned to Algeria.

The BOARD was entirely dissolved on January 1st 2000, having negotiated a special amnesty with the government. The GIA, torn by the dissensions and the abandonments and denounced on all the sides and even by the islamist movement, was slowly destroyed by military operations during the following years; with died of Antar Zouabri at the beginning of 2002, it was unable to continue its action. The efforts of the government were more constant the shortly after the attacks of the September 11th, 2001; the the United States expressed their support of with respect to the Algerian government, by freezing the assets of the GIA and the GSPC and by providing infra-red glasses to the army.

With the decline of the GIA, the GSPC remained as a group rebels most active, with approximately 300 combatants in 2003 (BBC). It continued an assassination campaign of police officers and soldiers in his sector, managing even to progress to the the Sahara, where its division, carried out by Amari Saifi (called “Abderrezak el-Para”), removed German tourists in 2003, before being forced to flee in depopulated sectors of the Mali, and later to the Niger and the Chad, where it was captured. At the end of 2003, the founder of the group was supplanted by the even more radical Nabil Sahraoui, which announced his support for Al-Qaeda, reinforcing bonds governments of the United States and Algeria. He would have been killed little out of time afterwards.

The release of the chiefs of MADE Madani and Belhadj in 2003 did not have any visible effect on the situation, illustrating a found governmental confidence which was confirmed by the presidential election of 2004, in which Bouteflika was re-elected with 85 % of the voices and the support of the two principal parties. The election was analyzed like the confirmation of the popular support extremely for the policy of Bouteflika towards the terrorists and the success of the stop of violences with large scales.

In September 2005 a referendum proposing the amnesty was subjected by the government of Bouteflika, like the law of 1999, to put a term at the continuations for the people who did not have any more military activities and to offer compensations to the families of the people killed by the governmental forces. The proposal was accepted by 97 % of the voters.

See too

Riots of October 1988 in Islamic Algeria
Group armed
Islamic front with the hello
Assassination of the monks of Tibhirine

External bonds

report/ratio of Ahmad Zaoui, George Joffé
Islamism, violence and reform in Algeria: Turning the page, ICG Middle East Carryforward No 29
Chronology of a hidden tragedy, has timeline
the Algerian islamist movement, Salima Mellah
War Nerd Column
Vidéo Algeria civil war (France2)

Sources

Cet article is the translation of the english language version 2005.

Luis Martinez (translated by Jonathan Derrick), The Algerian Civil War 1990-1998 , Hurst & Co., London, 1998, ISBN 1850655170.
Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: In Political History , NYU Near., New York, 1996, ISBN 0814793282
William B. Quandt, Between Bundles and Bullets: Algeria' S Transition from Authoritarianism , Brookings Institution Near., Washington DC, 1998, ISBN 0815773013.
Andrea Riccardi, Sant' Egidio, Rome and the world, discussion with J. - D. Durand and R. Ladous , Beauchesne Editor, Paris, 1996, ISBN 2701013348.
Marco Impagliazzo, Mario Giro, Algeria in ostaggio , Guerini E Associati, 1997, Milano.
Lounis Aggoun, Jean Rivoire Baptist, Françalgérie crimes and lies of States, secret History of the war of independence to the " third guerre" , Paris, the Discovery, 2004.
Mohamed Samraoui, Chronicle of the years of blood, Paris, Denoël, 2003
Nesroulah Yous, Salimah Mellah, Which killed in Bentalha? Algeria: chronicle of an announced massacre, Paris, the Discovery, 2000 (free Books)
Habib Souaïdia, the dirty war, the témoignagne of a former officer of the special forces of the Algerian army, 1992-2000, Paris, the Discovery, 2001 (Free Books)

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