Alfred Schütz

Alfred Schütz is a Philosophe Social sciences, of approach phenomenologic and a Sociologue, born with Vienna the April 13rd 1899 and dead the May 20th 1959 with New York.

He is regarded as the founder of the idea of a phenomenologic sociology. He was influenced by the understanding sociology of max Weber, by the theses on the choice and the temporality of Henri Bergson and, especially, by the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. After its immigration with the the United States, the influence of the American pragmatism and logical Positivisme contribute to consolidate its preoccupation with a empiricity, which has at his place the form of an attention in the concrete world, in the lived world (with the Lebenswelt).

Biography

Born in Vienna on April 13rd, 1899 within an Jewish family, Alfred Schütz made of the studies in Right, economy and Sociology at the University of Vienna, following what it obtains in 1921 a doctorate in Philosophie of the right under the direction of Hans Kelsen. He works then as business lawyer and obtains in 1927 (or 1926, according to the sources) a post of executive secretary to the Reitler and Company of Vienna, a private banking firm having international activities. Parallel to this work, it carries out research as independent researcher and it attends in Vienna the Cercle of Settings, an interdisciplinary circle founded by Ludwig von Mises where it ties friendships in particular with Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Machlup and Erich Voegelin. Married to Ilse Heime, which he married in 1926 after a six month old frequentation, this one gives to him a considerable support inter alia in the realization of an important work (of which she seizes six versions), DER sinnhafte Aufbau DER sozialen Welt. Eine Einleitung in DER verstehende Soziologie , published in 1932, in which Schütz puts in prospect sociology for max Weber with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.

Thereafter, in June 1932, it joint with a group of phenomenologists with Freiburg-in-Brisgau, the invitation of Husserl. It meets there in particular Dorion Cairns and Eugen Fink, in addition to having access to the manuscript of Expérience and judgment , of Husserl, which conceals a theory of the types and predicates. Impressed by its collaboration, Husserl then proposes to him to become its assistant. However, in order to provide for the needs for its family, Schütz this proposal is constrained to decline and goes back to Vienna. It will share its time besides, for the major part of its life, between its work in and its research business world in philosophy and social sciences. Husserl, with which it preserves a close contact and maintains a regular epistolary exchange until death this one in 1938, will say of Schütz that he is “a business man of day, a philosopher the night”.

In 1938, when the German troops invade the Austria, Schütz is congédié of Reitler and Company of Vienna and, being in business trip to Paris, it is separate its family lasting three months, until it manages to do them to emigrate in France. Having found a post office in Reitler and Company of Paris, it benefits from its business connections to carry assistance to several people who try to flee Austria. At the end of the month of August 1938, in company of economists and liberal intellectuals, it takes share with the Colloque Walter Lippmann which takes place in Paris. Since it fears the advance of the German troops, on July 14th 1939 it emigrates with his/her children with the the United States - had with the quotas of immigration which had stopped in the calculation of the members of its family, Ilse left for New York one year earlier and dealt with the establishment of their residence.

After this new exile, Schütz works in Reitler and Company of New York, while helping the immigrants. It contributes with Martin Farber to the foundation, in 1940, of the International Phenomenological Society and of the review Philosophy and Phenomenological Research of which he will be member of the leading committee until his death. Starting from 1943, it teaches in Graduate Faculty off Political and Social Science of the New School for Social Research with New York. He died on May 20th, 1959 in New York, at the 60 years age. He also had an interest shown for the Musique, like the Peinture and the Littérature besides (one of its studies puts in parallel an analysis of Don Quichotte, of Miguel de Cervantes, with the theory of the various orders of reality of William James). After its death, its joint, Ilse, largely contributed to the edition of its work and the diffusion of its ideas.

Overflight set of themes of its work

In addition to the publication of an important book in 1932, DER sinnhafte Aufbau DER sozialen Welt , the reflections of Alfred Schütz is mainly developed, in English, in a series of scientific articles. The diversity of its publications can nevertheless be gathered under certain common sets of themes.

The phenomenologic idea of sociology

At the base of the phenomenologic idea of sociology, Alfred Schütz initially was subject to an influence of sociological work of max Weber. According to the theses of this one, “subjective significance” that revêt the action for its author must be the subject of a interpretative act. Against a reduction of the Sociology to a strictly causal model, Weber develops its theorization of social for an interpretation of the subjective reasons for action, in order to ensure a taking into account by the sociology of the subjective dimension of the conduits. It is from there that the expression understanding sociology comes : the explanation should not only be causal, it must also comprise a comprehension, an act of interpretation. To mark what he regards as a double face where côtoient “explanation” and “comprehension”, since he does not oppose them one to the other, Weber speaks about “explanatory comprehension” or “of understanding explanation”.

It is this theoretical contribution of legitimation of understanding dimension inherent in the social actions that Schütz withdraws work of Weber, by stressing the importance of the interpretative aspect for social sciences, considering besides that there is a primacy of the Sciences of the culture on the Natural science insofar as those seem to him to cover (in themselves) a cultural dimension. However, in spite of the contribution which represents understanding sociology, Schütz estimates that the concept of action in work of Weber remains too vague, in particular in what it does not make it possible to suitably distinguish the action as an accomplished act ( the act of a subject ) from the action in its dimensions of achievement ( the action of a subject ). This way, work of Weber on “social control” does not take account of the temporal structures of the experiment and the projects of action, which constitutes a theoretical gap making difficult, according to the criticism of Schütz, the precise treatment of the direction including the social action.

On this level, work of Edmund Husserl proves according to him of first importance for social sciences in what they offer of the supported analyzes of the temporal structures of the Conscience - which is itself constitutive of the social world - like several analyzes of the lived world, of the Lebenswelt. Let us note here as an indication that if Schütz knows well the first work of Husserl, it on the other hand did not have access to the new manuscripts of Husserl which, like in particular showed it Francoise Dastur ( Husserl. Mathematics with the history , PUF, 1995), testify to an evolution of the reflection of this last on the topic of the Intersubjectivité which is based more and more on the concept of “flesh” - a concept then developed by Merleau-Ponty. It is necessary thus to have for the spirit that when Schütz speaks about work of Husserl, and particularly when it speaks about its concept of intersubjectivity, it with work is published of living of Husserl to which he refers.

Considering the potential of work of Husserl, Schütz notices that the eidetic method of reduction is however not directly applicable to social sciences, because it allows little the articulation of the horizons suitable for the experiment, with the praxis , since these horizons consist of a “sedimentation of direction”, such as Husserl itself underlined it in Formale und traszendentale Logik (transl. Formal logic and logical transcendantale ). It is this type of appropriation and application, considered to be too direct, of eidetic phenomenology to the problems of social sciences that Schütz reproaches the first positions max Scheler, like to work of Edith Stein and those of Gerda Walther - work which he judges, from this point of view, of a naive use of phenomenology, as he explains it in Husserl' S Importance for the Social Sciences (transl. importance of Husserl for social sciences ).

It is thus by a side lighting of the reflections husserliennes that Alfred Schütz will develop the phenomenologic idea of sociology, being concretized by analyzes in philosophy of social sciences, treating mainly bases of conceptual equipment having for pivot temporality, the conscience and the social action.

The social action

Structures of the social world

The action enracine within an environment comprising a report/ratio with others which are articulated around a temporal axis and of a space axis. Also, according to Schütz, the social world is structured into four areas (cf Some structure off the Life-World , in Collected Papers III , pp. 116-132):

the horizon of the predecessors, i.e. the individuals who now died (but which worked various historical sediments).
the horizon of the successors, i.e. the individuals who were not born yet, generations to come.
the horizon of the “companions” ( consociates ), i.e. the individuals who share the same environment as us, as much from a temporal point of view that under the terms of a space proximity (to be in the same part, for example).
the horizon of the contemporaries, i.e. the individuals who live at the same time as us, who are contemporary for us, but without to share the same space environment.

To this structure is added, according to Schütz, two types essential of reports/ratios with others: a report/ratio of comprehension/interpretation and a report/ratio of action/influence (direct or indirect) on others. Obviously, only the report/ratio of comprehension/interpretation will be possible towards the predecessors, whereas only the report/ratio of action/influence (indirect) is possible with regard to the successors. Reciprocity of the comprehension-action ratios not being possible that for the contemporaries and the “companions” ( consociates ).

Lived regarded as self-explanatory ( taken for granted ) and the typifications

Schütz notices that the social world consists of asset whose integration is implicit in the practical actions and intentionalities. In his daily newspaper, the individual acclimatized to a culture integrates a whole of knowledge and knowledge-to make which will be of self-explanatory ( taken for granted ), this knowledge and knowledge-to make being taken for asset - until there is otherness. For example, for the individual acclimatized to a culture, taken by its daily newspaper, “that the subway functions tomorrow, as usual, is for him a certainty which is almost of the same order of probability as to raise it sun this same following day. ” ( the Foreigner , in the researcher and the daily newspaper , page 221). The analyzes will have to thus take into account, according to Schütz, that a whole of energies of oneself is inherent in the lived world - these energies of oneself also reflecting itself in the language.

A corollary of the energies of oneself ( taken for granted ) is the typification of the social world; this typification entering concerned the perception of the actions and the social functions. For example, a factor simply crossed on the street is not truly known as anybody, but is initially apprehended as being a typical factor. It is in this respect important to note that Schütz chooses deliberately the term of typification , rather than the term of Ideal-type used by Weber, in order to mark the nonfixed character, according to Schütz, of the typifications which are related to the lived world (with the Lebenswelt).

From these typifications of social environment will rise certain normalized waitings, standardized. I.e. waitings will be usually elaborate under the terms of certain types, making so that the significances granted the typifications acquire a relatively common character which is essential in certain mediums - although the typifications do not have fixed nature. For example, vis-a-vis a “typical” salesman, one usually expects that this one wishes to sell something, one expects that it show a certain courtesy, etc - this being related to a lived world. The social world revêt thus various waitings, which are in bond with typifications of the lived world, which are themselves in interaction with various whole of energies of oneself ( taken for granted ).

Reasons in-sight-of ( in-order-to justifies ) and reasons because ( because justifies )

The ordinary language conceals an ambiguity of the term “reason”, which it is important to clarify in order to be able to deploy a finer analysis of the behaviors. According to Schütz, it is important to distinguish two networks from concepts which the term of reason recovers: reason-in-sight-of ( in-order-to justifies ) and reasons because ( because justifies ) - these two types of reasons being coprésent, according to Schütz.

the reasons in-sight-of ( in-order-to justifies ) refer at an end, under the terms of which an action is made. Intentionalities which are associated for them are prospective intentionalities. According to the example of Schütz, it is of one reason-in-sight-of which it is question when is stipulated that the action of a murderer was justified by a lure of gain. It is on the level of reason-in-sight-of, according to Schütz, that a “voluntary FIAT is located” ( voluntative FIAT ), operating the passage of the state virtual, imaginary, of prospective intentionality to an achievement of the action (the responsibility not being abolished by reason-in-sight-of).

the reasons because ( because justifies ) are not prospective, but refer rather to the integration of a network of last elements - as raised by psychological readings of the events, for example. What is touched by the reasons because, it is not the action as such, but rather the project of action. Always according to the same example of Schütz, these is reasons because of which it is question when is stipulated that the action of a murderer was justified by the environment where it grew, like by such or such type of experiment and such or such biographical data. Reasons because do not constitute a motivation of the action as such, but rather of the project of action: the fact that such or such project is considered in interaction with such or such prospective intentionality (related with one reason-in-sight-of). The reasons because remain reducing within the action (Schütz understands by there the action in its achievement) and can be delimited only have regard to the act (i.e. the once achieved action).

In continuity

Work of Schütz knew various significant prolongations, in particular in the following authors:

To ballast Embree, which in particular carried out developments on the topology of sciences,
Harold Garfinkel, which initiated (with Harvey Sacks) the Ethnométhodologie,
Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger (joint authors of the social construction of reality), which carried out various developments in Sociologie of knowledge,
Maurice Natanson, whose work treats junction between individual dimension and collective dimension within the lived experiment,
other influenced students: Fred Kersten, Dick Zaner, Helmut Wagner, Richard Grathoff, Ilja Srubar, Kurt H. Wolf.

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